The results of previous research indicate that the presentation of deterring situational stimuli in an attacked computing environment shapes system trespassers’ avoiding online behaviors during the progression of a system trespassing event. Nevertheless, none of these studies comprised an investigation of whether the effect of deterring cues influence system trespassers’ activities on the system. Moreover, no prior research has been aimed at exploring whether the effect of deterring cues is consistent across different types of system trespassers. We examine whether the effect of situational deterring cues in an attacked computer system influenced the likelihood of system trespassers engaging in active online behaviors on an attacked system, and whether this effect varies based on different levels of administrative privileges taken by system trespassers. By using data from a randomized experiment, we find that a situational deterring cue reduced the probability of system trespassers with fewer privileges on the attacked computer system (nonadministrative users) to enter activity commands. In contrast, the presence of these cues in the attacked system did not affect the probability of system trespassers with the highest level of privileges (administrative users) to enter these commands.
Testa, Alexander, David Maimon, Bertrand Sobesto, and Michel Cukier. 2017. "Illegal Roaming and File Manipulation on Target Computers: Assessing the Effect of Sanction Threats on System Trespassers’ Online Behaviors." Criminology and Public Policy (August). http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12312/abstract