Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Benefits of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel

Laura Dugan - UMD
&
Erica Chenoweth - Wesleyan
Raise the costs of violence in order to deter
  - Direct => toward perpetrators
  - Indirect => toward potential perpetrators

Effectiveness of deterrence is mixed
  - Especially when applied to terrorist violence
  - Risk of backlash
  - Northern Ireland (LaFree et al 2009), substitution effects of metal detectors (Enders & Sandler...), etc.
Incorporating the Other Side of the Cost-Benefits Equation

- Lowering the benefits of illegal behavior
  - Raising the benefits of legal alternatives to terrorist violence.

- This could also have direct and indirect effects
  - Direct benefits by keeping terrorists from attacking
  - Indirect benefits by keeping potential terrorists from engaging in terrorist behavior.
## Incorporating Both Sides of the Cost-Benefits Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs Repressive Actions</th>
<th>Benefits Conciliatory Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Discriminate repression directed toward the guilty (direct deterrence)</td>
<td>Discriminate conciliation directed toward the guilty (direct benefits of legal alternatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiscriminate repression directed toward the Palestinian’s in general (indirect deterrence)</td>
<td>Indiscriminate conciliation directed toward the Palestinian’s in general (indirect benefits of legal alternatives)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk of Backlash
The Research Strategy

- GATE data project (Government Actions in a Terrorist Environment)
  - START-funded research

- Contains a full range of government actions toward non-state actors—from fully conciliatory to excessively repressive

- Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, and Algeria
3-Tiered Data Collection Strategy

1. Literature Search

2. Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI)
   - Searches lead sentences of news sources based on complex dictionary that specifies subject, verb, and object (actor-action-target), using CAMEO codes
   - Filters observations into a database
   - Keeps all action by state actors against sub-state actors

3. Human coding of remaining observations
Sample Actions

- beat
- assassinate
- patrol
- stakeout
- internment
- martial law
- raid
- deploy
- harass
- release
- boycott
- investigate abuses
Dimensions of Countering Terrorism

- ACTION: Repressive, Indiscriminate
- TARGET: Discriminate, Conciliatory
- ACTOR TYPE: Justice, Politician, Police, Military, Material, Non-material
Conciliatory-Repessive Scale

1. Accommodation
2. Conciliatory action
3. Conciliatory statement or intention
4. Neutral or ambiguous
5. Verbal conflict
6. Physical conflict
7. Extreme repression (intent to kill)
7-9-1987: West Bank Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini was released today after three months in Israeli jails and vowed to fight on against Israel's occupation of Arab areas held since the 1967 Middle East war.
Indiscriminate immaterial verbal conflict (5) by judiciary

3/30/1988: Israel's Supreme Court rejected a petition of the Foreign Press Association (FPA) on Wednesday to open the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip immediately for news coverage.
Indiscriminate material extreme repression (7) by military

2/17/1988: Israeli troops shot dead a Palestinian and wounded several others on Wednesday during violent anti-Israeli demonstrations in the occupied West Bank, hospital officials said.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions Captured by TABARI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accommodation/Full Concessions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrew from town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed peace accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handed town to Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conciliatory Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Met to discuss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifted curfew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulled out</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigate abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conciliatory Statement or Intentions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressed optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed to hold talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Praised Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressed desire to cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted mistake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral or Ambiguous</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Infighting over</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failed to reach agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host a visit</td>
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<td>Appealed for third party assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbal Conflict</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make pessimistic comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blame for attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten military force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Conflict</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barred</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sealed off</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imposed Curfew</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrested</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Extreme Repression (deaths)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fired missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clashed with</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raided</td>
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<td>Helicopter attack</td>
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Pilot Case: Israel

- Sample
  - 243,448 Reuters news articles from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 2004
  - Over 10,000 preliminary observations
  - Result: 6,070 cleaned actions

- Flexible levels of aggregation
  - Tactics vs. campaigns
  - Daily, weekly, monthly, annual
  - Relative comparisons of conciliatory, repressive, and mixed measures
  - Actors and targets
  - Principals and agents

- Reduced level of noise within the data
Distribution of Israeli Actors

- Politician: 45%
- Military: 46%
- Police: 5%
- Judiciary: 4%
Distribution of Israeli Targets

- Palestinians: 74.5%
- Palestinian Terrorists: 17.8%
- Lebanese Terrorists: 0.4%
- Lebanese: 0.4%
- Israelis: 5.8%
- Other: 0.3%
Discriminate and Indiscriminate Actions

- Discriminate
- Indiscriminate

The graph shows a comparison between conciliatory and repressive actions. The repressive actions are significantly higher than the conciliatory actions.
Material and Nonmaterial Actions

- Conciliatory actions
  - Material: 1500
  - Immaterial: 500

- Repressive actions
  - Material: 4000
  - Immaterial: 2000
Israeli Actions Aggregated by Month

![Graph showing the number of actions by month from June 1987 to December 2004. The graph is color-coded to distinguish between Repressive Actions, Neutral Actions, and Conciliatory Actions.](image-url)
Israeli Actions against Palestinians & Terrorist Attacks Against Israel

Month, Beginning June 1987 and Ending December 2004
Examining the Relationship Between Actions and Terrorism

Lots of Variations of Actions (Last Month)

Attacks Against Israelis (Current Month)

We first examine the relationship non-parametrically (GAM), and then test it parametrically (Neg-Binomial)

Lagged Attacks, going back as far as needed
All Actions on Terrorist Attacks using GAM Smoother

GAM 3 df smooth for all actions

Not significantly different from zero, evidence of slight quadratic
Conciliatory & Repressive Actions on Terrorist Attacks Using GAM Smoother (and testing with NBREG)

Conciliatory

Repressive

GAM 3 df smooth for reprla

GAM 3 df smooth for concla

Significant & positive, linear-ish

Significant & negative, slight quadratic
Lagged Repressive Actions
GAM 3 df smooth for ractla

Lagged Repressive Statements
GAM 3 df smooth for rsayla

Lagged Conciliatory Statements
GAM 1 df smooth for csayla

Lagged Conciliatory actions
GAM 3 df smooth for cactla

Nonmaterial
Conciliatory
Significant & Negative

Insignificant, slight evidence of quadratic

Material
Repressive
Insignificant
Significant & Positive

Nonmaterial
Repressive
Conciliatory
Insignificant

Material
Conciliatory
Repressive
Insignificant
Lagged Repressive Indiscriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for rindla

0.48
-0.246563

Lagged Repressive Discriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for rdisla

0.32
-0.387786

Lagged Conciliatory Indiscriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for cindla

0.26
-1.6182

Lagged Conciliatory Discriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for cdisla

0.8
-1.10168

Discriminate Indiscriminate
Conciliatory Repressive
Insignificant
(marginally positive)

Discriminate Indiscriminate
Conciliatory Repressive
Insignificant

Significant & +/- quadratic

Significant & Negative

Insignificant
Examining Weekly Government Actions on Terrorist Attacks

- Effects of conciliatory actions are null
- The following are significant and +/- quadratic.
All Actions

GAM 3 df smooth for all actions
More Specifically, Repressive Actions
Even More Specifically, Repressive Indiscriminate Actions
Conclusions

- By looking at the full range of government actions, we learn more...

- In general,
  - The benefits of conciliatory acts are cumulative over a longer period of time (and are negatively associated with terrorism)
  - Repressive acts are positively associated with terrorism (backlash)
  - The effects of repressive indiscriminate actions are more immediate, and unless there is a large campaign, they will usually generate more terrorism.
Turkey is coded and cleaned. Analysis is needed.

- Lebanon, Egypt, and Algeria need to be cleaned
  - Complete by the end of the summer

- If the START recompete is successful data will be collected on the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the U.K., India, and Sri Lanka
A Look at Turkey Actions and Terrorism
1,845 Total Actions
(170 conciliatory, 268 neutral, 1,407 repressive)
Questions?

ldugan@umd.edu
echenoweth@wesleyan.edu