A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Narrative


Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Last Update

April 2015

Aliases

Al-Qa'ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; Al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY); Al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad fi Jazirat Al-Arab.[1]

History

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a highly active al-Qa’ida affiliate that mainly operates in Yemen. It was founded in 2009 as a merger between al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) and al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia under the current leadership of Nasser al-Wuhayshi with greater allegiance to al-Qa’ida core.[2] AQAP’s main predecessor, al-Qa’ida in Yemen, formed in the early 1990s, in response to the United States’ presence in Yemen as well as in response to internal sociopolitical issues within Yemen.[3] U.S. military actions influenced the group’s first coordinated attack in which they bombed the USS Cole, a navy vessel that was destroyed in Yemen’s Aden port.[4] The United States and Yemen cooperated on aggressive counterterrorism measures which strained the organization’s leadership and resulted in a period of weakness until 2006.[5] AQY was restored after Nasser al-Wuhayshi led an escape out of Sanaa’s maximum-security prison along with 23 other convicted terrorists in 2006.[6] Under al-Wuhayshi’s new leadership the group worked to reorganize itself, as well as recruit new members.[7] In 2008 the group carried out one of its largest operations, attacking the American Embassy in Sanaa and killing 12 people.[8] In 2009, as a result of al-Wuhayshi’s efforts to expand AQY’s insurgency and al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to escape Saudi Arabia, AQY merged with al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia. After this merger, both AQY and al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia continued their operations as al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[9]

AQAP is a Sunni Islamist group that seeks to break down the secular political structures throughout the Middle East and create theocratic regimes while establishing an Islamic caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula.[10]  The group also aims to spread their jihadist movement to Israel to liberate Muslims in Palestine, implement sharia law, and expel foreign forces and influence from the Arabian Peninsula. AQAP generally targets Shiite Muslims, specifically Houthis in North Yemen, Jews, foreigners, as well as foreign and government security forces.[11] AQAP has its own media branch, Al-Malahem Foundation, which releases videos, audio clips, and publishes the group’s magazine, Inspire.

AQAP’s most well-known attack was an attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound flight on December 25, 2009; however, it was ultimately unsuccessful.[12] Within a month of this incident, the organization was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States.[13] AQAP has expanded with the creation of their insurgent arm, Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), in spring 2011 in an effort to increase support in southern Yemen.[14] In 2013, AQAP engaged in peace talks with the Yemini government; however, no agreement was reached.[15]

Home Base

Yemen

Founding Year

2009

Ideology

Religious-Islamist-Sunni-Salafist[16]

Specific Goals

  • Create a Sunni Islamic caliphate in Arabian Peninsula[17]
  • Break down current secular states and create Islamic states in replacement[18]
  • Liberate Muslims in occupied territories of Palestine[19]
  • Implement sharia law[20]
  • Rid Muslim countries of Western influence[21]

Political Activity

  • AQAP refused to participate politically after failed negotiations in 2009.[22]
  • However, they engaged in further talks (also failed) in 2013.[23]

Financing

  • Robberies[24]
  • Kidnapping for Ransom[25]
  • Charities/Donations:
    • Donations from mosques and Islamic charities[26]
    • Cash donations from wealthy individuals and donors in Saudia Arabia and Yemen, which remains their most significant source of funding.[27]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • AQAP operates in a hierarchical structure with networked cells under the command of an umbrella organization.[28]
  • The group’s militants operate at times in a decentralized manner.[29]
  • 2009-Present: Nasser al-Wuhayshi, also known as Abu Basir.[30]

Strength

  • 2010: Approximately 300-500[31]
  • 2012: Approximately 1,000[32]
  • 2013: Approximately 1,000[33]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Al-Qa’ida (ally)
    • AQAP is believed to plan and implement attacks independent of the Al-Qa'ida core in Pakistan, although it may still consult with the latter.[34]
  • Al-Shabaab (ally)
    • AQAP has served as intermediary between Al-Shabaab and the Al-Qa'ida core.[35]
    • AQAP provided military training and explosives to Al-Shabaab members in 2010 and 2011.[36]
    • In 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed to have sent fighters to join AQAP in Yemen, and to have received AQAP fighters in Somalia in return.[37]
  • Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) (ally)
    • MJN is funded and supported by AQAP.[38]
  • Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) (ally)
    • AQAP leader al-Wuhayshi corresponded with AQLIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, offering advice on how to establish an effective emirate.[39]
  • Southern Mobility Movement (suspected ally)
    • In 2009 and 2010, there were reports of AQAP collaborating with the Southern Mobility Movement fighting for succession from the Yemeni government.[40]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Yemen (target, enemy)
    • In 2011, AQAP seized territory in southern Yemen, declaring it an Islamic State (not affiliated with the Iraqi group of that name).[41]
    • In December 2013, AQAP killed 52 people during an attack on the Yemeni Ministry of Defense.[42]
    • In April 2014, the Yemeni government declared "all out war" on AQAP, initiating a land and air military campaign.[43]
    • In April 2015, AQAP offered a reward of for the death or capture of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh.[44]
  • Saudi Arabia (target, enemy)
    • In 2009, AQAP attempted to assassinate Saudi Arabia's Assistant Interior Minister.[45]
    • AQAP attacked a Saudi border crossing in 2014, killing four Saudis.[46]
  • United States (target, enemy)
    • In December 2009, AQAP claimed responsibility for the failed "underwear" bombing of a passenger flight between Amsterdam to Detroit.[47]
    • In October 2010, AQAP attempted to smuggle bombs onto several U.S.-bound cargo planes.[48]
    • In May 2012, AQAP attempted to bomb a U.S.-bound passenger jet.[49]
    • In September 2014, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security named AQAP as the Al-Qa'ida affiliate most likely to attempt attacks against the United States.[50]
    • In February 2015, the United States closed its embassy in Yemen and evacuated American citizens over security concerns.[51]
  • Houthis (enemy)
    • In September 2014, a Houthi militia (part of a Shiite minority also known as "Ansar Allah") from Yemen's north seized control of Yemen's capital;[52] in February 2015, Houthi supporters dissolved the Yemeni parliament and installed an interim authority.[53]
    • AQAP has been recruiting Sunni tribes to fight the Houthi takeover, allowing AQAP to rapidly expand its control of territory in Yemen's South.[54]
    • In April 2015, AQAP offered a reward for the death or capture of Houthi leader Abdelmalik Bedrudin Al-Houthi.[55]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • Domestic Political: In 2013, AQAP engaged in peace talks with the Yemeni government, however no agreement was reached.[56]
  • Domestic Military: In June 2012, the Yemeni military regained control of Abyan and Shabwah, two southern cities that had been AQAP strongholds since 2011.[57]
  • International Military:
    • U.S. efforts have generally consisted of drone strikes, and have strategically focused on targeting AQAP leadership. While these efforts have been extremely successful and have impacted AQAP, the effects have only been short-term as the organization has been able to successfully regenerate its leadership.[58]
    • In 2010, after AQAP’s attempted Detroit bound plane attack, President Barack Obama vowed to give 63 million dollars to Yemen in development aid in efforts to counter the regional influence of AQAP.[59] In addition to its individual efforts, the United States has also provided training to local militaries to counter AQAP.[60]

United States Government Designations

  • Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), January 19, 2010[61]
  • Specially Designated Nationals (SDN): Ibrahim Hassan Al Asiri, 2009.[62]
  • Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), December 18, 2013:
    • Ajand Misr, Ibrahim al-Rubaysh[63]
    • Shawki Ali Ahmed al-Badani[64]
    • Anders Cameroon Ostensvig Dale[65]
    • Abd al-Rahman bin Umayr al-Nu'aymi
    • Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad `Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani.[66]

Other Governments’ Designations

  • Australia (November 2010/2013): Listed Terrorist Organization.[67]
  • Canada (December 2010): Listed Terrorist Organization.[68]
  • United Nations (January 2010): Listed Terrorist Organization.[69]
 

[1] Office of Foreign Assets Control. 2015. “Executive Order 13224 - Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism.” US Department of the Treasury. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/terror.pdf.

[2] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[3] Lindo, Samuel, Michael Schoder, and Tyler Jones. 2011. Al Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula. Case Study 3. Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program: Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110722_Lindo_AQAP_AQAMCaseStudy3.pdf.

[4] NCTC. 2014. “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015.” National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.; CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[5] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369; Lindo, Samuel, Michael Schoder, and Tyler Jones. 2011. Al Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula. Case Study 3. Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program: Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110722_Lindo_AQAP_AQAMCaseStudy3.pdf.

[6] BBC. 2012. “Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Online News. BBC News. September 11. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11483095; CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[7] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[8] BBC. 2012. “Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Online News. BBC News. September 11. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11483095.

[9] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[10] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.; NCTC. 2014. “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015.” National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[11] HRW. 2013. Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen. Amsterdam, NLD: Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen1013_ForUpload.pdf; CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[12] Sharp, Jeremy M. 2015. Yemen: Background and US Relations. CRS Report for Congress RL34170. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.

[13] US Department of State. 2014. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Other Release. Bureau of Counterterrorism. August 20. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

[14] Zimmerman, Katherine L. 2013. Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the Al Qaeda Network. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_AQAPs_Role_in_the_al_Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf.

[15] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[16] NCTC. 2014. “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015.” National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[17] HRW. 2013. Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen. Amsterdam, NLD: Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen1013_ForUpload.pdf.

[18] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[19] Bakier, Abdul Hameed. 2009. “Al-Qaeda Leaders in the Arabian Peninsula Speak Out.” Terrorism Focus, January 28. http://www.jamestown.org/fileadmin/JamestownContent/tf_006_003.pdf.

[20] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[21] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[22] Novak, Jane. 2009. “Arabian Peninsula Al Qaeda Groups Merge.” The Long War Journal. January 26. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/arabian_peninsula_al.php.

[23] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[24] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[25] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[26] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[27] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[28] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369; Loidolt, Bryce. 2011. “Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2): 102–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538831.

[29] CFR. 2015. “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations. March 19. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

[30] Loidolt, Bryce. 2011. “Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2): 102–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538831.

[31] Harris, Alistair. 2010. Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Carnegie Paper 111. Yemen: On the Brink. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/08/exploiting-grievances-al-qaeda-in-arabian-peninsula.

[32] Benson, Pam. 2012. “New Terrorist Plot to Attack Plane Foiled.” Online News. CNN. May 7. http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/07/world/meast/yemen-qaeda-plot/index.html.

[33] US Department of State. 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism 2012. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf.

[34]Zimmerman, Katherine L. 2013. Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the Al Qaeda Network. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_AQAPs_Role_in_the_al_Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf.

[35] Bennett, Brian. 2011. “Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, US Says.” Los Angeles Times, July 18. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-20110718.

[36] FBI. 2013. “Guilty Plea Unsealed in New York Involving Ahmed Warsame, a Senior Terrorist Leader and Liaison Between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for Providing Material Support to Both Terrorist Organizations.” Press Releases. New York Field Office. March 25. http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involving-ahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-for-providing-material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations.

[37] Plaut, Martin. 2010. “Somalia and Yemen ‘Swapping Militants.’” Online News. BBC. January 17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8463946.stm.

[38] UN Security Council. 2015. “The List Established and Maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with Respect to Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Other Entities Associated with Al-Qaida.” February 19. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/AQList.htm.

[39] Zimmerman, Katherine L. 2013. Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the Al Qaeda Network. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_AQAPs_Role_in_the_al_Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf.

[40] "Arab writer warns Yemen against Al-Qa'idah's support for secession." BBC Monitoring Middle East. May 17, 2009; "Yemen arrests 14 Al-Qaeda suspects in south." Yemen Times. September 6, 2010; Horton, Michael. “Filling the Void: The Southern Mobility Movement in South Yemen.” The Jamestown Foundation. April 25, 2011. Http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37845#.VOYqhvlSanE

[41] The Economist. 2014. “Still There,” August 11. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/08/al-qaeda-yemen.

[42] NCTC. 2014. “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015.” National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[43] The Economist. 2014. “Still There,” August 11. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/08/al-qaeda-yemen.

[44] Razek, Raja, and Jason Hanna. 2015. “AQAP Issues Bounty for Key Yemen Figures.” Online News. CNN. April 8. http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/middleeast/yemen-crisis/index.html.

[45] Sharp, Jeremy M. 2015. Yemen: Background and US Relations. CRS Report for Congress RL34170. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.

[46] Sharp, Jeremy M. 2015. Yemen: Background and US Relations. CRS Report for Congress RL34170. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.

[47] Sharp, Jeremy M. 2015. Yemen: Background and US Relations. CRS Report for Congress RL34170. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.

[48] US Department of State. 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism 2012. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf.

[49] US Department of State. 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism 2012. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf.

[50] Rasmussen, Jicholas J. 2014. Cybersecurity, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to the Homeland. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Digital Library. http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=757594.

[51] Miller, Greg, and Hugh Naylor. 2015. “CIA Scales Back Presence and Operations in Yemen, Home of Potent Al-Qaeda Affiliate.” The Washington Post, February 11. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-scales-back-presence-in-yemen-base-for-potent-al-qaeda-affiliate/2015/02/11/9ad11c52-b219-11e4-827f-93f454140e2b_story.html.

[52] ABC News. 2015. “Explained: The Main Players in the Yemen Conflict.” Text. ABC News. April 14. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-09/conflict-yemen-explained/6366996.

[53] Miller, Greg. 2015. “Al-Qaeda Franchise in Yemen Exploits Chaos to Rebuild, Officials Say.” The Washington Post, April 5. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaeda-franchise-in-yemen-exploits-chaos-to-rebuild-officials-say/2015/04/04/207208da-d88f-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html.

[54] Al-batati Saeed, and Kareem Fahim. 2015. “War in Yemen Is Allowing Qaeda Group to Expand.” The New York Times, April 16. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/middleeast/khaled-bahah-houthi-rebel-yemen-fighting.html.

[55] Razek, Raja, and Jason Hanna. 2015. “AQAP Issues Bounty for Key Yemen Figures.” Online News. CNN. April 8. http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/middleeast/yemen-crisis/index.html.

[56] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[57] NCTC. 2014. “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015.” National Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[58] Zimmerman, Katherine L. 2013. Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the Al Qaeda Network. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_AQAPs_Role_in_the_al_Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf.

[59] Murphy, Caryle. 2010. “Yemen: Why It’s a Bigger Problem for Saudi than US.” Christian Science Monitor, January 21. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0121/Yemen-Why-it-s-a-bigger-problem-for-Saudi-than-US; Fromm, Charles. 2010. “Yemen: US Poised to Increase Aid.” News service. Inter Press Service. January 6. http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/01/yemen-us-poised-to-increase-aid/.

[60] Zimmerman, Katherine L. 2013. Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the Al Qaeda Network. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_AQAPs_Role_in_the_al_Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf.

[61] US Department of State. 2014. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Other Release. Bureau of Counterterrorism. August 20. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

[62] US Department of the Treasury. 2015. “Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN).” Resource Center. April 23. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.

[63] US Department of State. 2014. “Terrorist Designations of Ajand Misr and Ibrahim Al-Rubaysh.” Media Note. December 18. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/235386.htm.

[64] US Department of State. 2014. “Terrorist Designation of Shawki Ali Ahmed Al-Badani.” Media Note. June 17. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/227678.htm.

[65] US Department of State. 2014. “Terrorist Designation of Anders Cameroon Ostensvig Dale.” Media Note. July 15. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229277.htm.

[66] US Department of the Treasury. 2013. “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen.” Press Center. December 18. http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx.

[67] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[68] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheArabianPeninsulaAQAP.aspx.

[69] UN Security Council. 2013. “QDe.129 Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing. Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities. November 7. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQDe129E.shtml.