A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Al-Shabaab Narrative


Al-Shabaab

Last Update

May 2015

Aliases

Al-Shabaab Al-Islaam, Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, Al-Shabaab Al-Jihaad, Al-Shabab, Ash-shabaab, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Harakat Shabab Al-Mujahidin, Harakatul Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin, Hizbul Shabaab, Hisb'ul Shabaab, HSM, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Mujaahidiin Youth Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement, Shabaab, MYM, The Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations, The Unity of Islamic Youth, The Youth, Young Mujahideen Movement, Young Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, Youth Wing[1]

History

Al-Shabaab was formed as the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of 11 local sharia courts,[2]  as early as 2004[3] but did not become truly active until 2006.[4]

The roots of al-Shabaab lie with al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI), a militant group of Somali Wahhabis active during the 1980s and 1990s.[5] Like the AIAI, al-Shabaab’s goal is to eliminate Western-backed forces operating in Somalia, overthrow the Western-backed Somali national government, and make Somalia an Islamic state founded in Wahhabi ideals.[6] Due to the lack of a powerful central government, al-Shabaab operated almost without restraint in southern Somalia, recruiting and training new members and even functioning as the local administration in some areas.[7]

From 2006 to 2008, al-Shabaab capitalized on the nationalist zeal harbored by many Somalis, stirred up as a result of the Ethiopian invasion, expanding their numbers from a mere 400 fighters in 2006[8] to a couple thousand fighters in 2008.[9] This growth allowed al-Shabaab to continue to carry out attacks throughout southern and central Somalia including assassinations, bombings, and attacks on Ethiopian and Somalia’s transitional federal government (TFG) forces.

On October 29, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed became the first known suicide bomber with American citizenship.[10] In February 2010, al-Shabaab took steps towards expanding its international focus by announcing the connection of its current jihad in the Horn of Africa to the global jihad waged by al-Qa’ida.[11] Al-Shabaab carried out its first attack outside of Somalia on July 11, 2010, killing 70 people in coordinated bombings at a sports club and restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, where people had gathered to watch the World Cup finals.[12]

In August 2011, AMISOM and Somali forces were able to push al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu, forcing the organization to retreat once again to the rural parts of central and southern Somalia.[13] Following the withdrawal, Ahmed Abdi Godane, the emir of al-Shabaab, announced an official alliance between al-Shabaab and al-Qa’ida. Al-Shabaab experienced another setback in September 2012 when they lost control of Kismayo, a port city in southern Somalia and a major source of revenue for the group.[14]

Despite internal conflicts, al-Shabaab successfully conducted an attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, that lasted from September 21 to September 24, 2013, leaving 68 dead.[15] Since then, al-Shabaab has remained active throughout southern and central Somalia, continuing to carry out smaller scale attacks against AMISOM and Somali forces. Ethiopia officially joined AMISOM on January 22, 2014 increasing the number of troops operating in Somalia to 22,000.[16] March 2014 marked the beginning of an AMISOM-led offensive against al-Shabaab. The push has been successful in limiting al-Shabaab’s territorial control but has been unable to eliminate their capacity to carry out attacks throughout the country and abroad.[17]

Home Base

Somalia

Founding Year

2006[18]

Ideology

  • Religious-Islamist-Sunni-Wahhabist-Jihadist

Specific Goals

  • To remove all foreign forces from Somalia
  • To overthrow the current government and replace it with an Islamic government based on Wahhabi ideals.[19]
  • Following Godane’s takeover in 2008, the focus shifted to joining al-Shabaab’s jihad in the Horn of Africa with the global jihad waged by al-Qa’ida.[20]

Political Activity

  • In 2006, the ICU and al-Shabaab gained control of Mogadishu and declared sharia law. Until that point, the city had been plagued by crime and violence since the government overthrow in 1991.[21]
  • Al-Shabaab governs areas under its rule with a very strict interpretation of sharia law.[22]

Financing

  • Taxation: In the years that they maintained control of Kismayo, al-Shabaab taxed the export of charcoal from the port, earning an estimated $35 million to $50 million a year.[23]
  • Smuggling/Trafficking: Al-Shabaab has also been linked to the smuggling of sugar into Kenya.[24]
  • State Sponsorship: A number of countries have been accused of funding al-Shabaab including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Qatar, Iran, and Eritrea, but they deny any affiliation with the group.[25]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • Al-Shabaab is divided into five different brigades for the various geographic regions in which the organization operates. Each has a military division and an administrative division.[26]
    • The administrative sector governs the areas under al-Shabaab rule using very strict sharia law.[27]
    • The militant branch is called Jaysh al-Usra,[28] and the administrative branch is called Jaysh al-Hesbah.[29]
    • Internal tensions escalated in 2013 when two senior al-Shabaab leaders published letters openly criticizing Godane for his dictatorial leadership style and extremist goals. Ibrahim Haji Jaama’ Al-Afghani, one of the two authors of the letters, was killed a few months later by Godane loyalists in June 2013, along with Abu Zubeyr Al-Muhajir, another critic of Godane’s leadership.[30]
  • 2004-2008: Aden Hashi Ayro,[31] killed by a US missile strike
  • 2008-2014: Ahmed Abdi Godane[32]
  • 2014-present: Ahmed Diriye[33]

Strength

  • 2010: 1,000 to 4,000[35]with as many as 200 to 400 foreign nationals[36]
  • 2014: 7,000 to 9,000.[37]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Islamic Courts Union (Founding Group)
    • Al-Shabaab was subordinate to the Islamic Courts Union until the 2006 Ethiopian invasion, at which point al-Shabaab broke away and established its autonomy.[38]
    • In June 2006, the ICU, along with al-Shabaab, took control of Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.[39]
  • Al-Qa’ida (ally): Al-Shabaab established informal connections with al-Qa’ida in 2008 and solidified the alliance in 2012 with Godane’s announcement of a merger between the two organizations.[40]
  • Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Ally)
    • AQAP has served as intermediary between Al-Shabaab and the Al-Qa'ida core.[41]
    • AQAP provided military training and explosives to Al-Shabaab members in 2010 and 2011.[42]
    • In 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed to have sent fighters to join AQAP in Yemen, and to have received AQAP fighters in Somalia in return.[43]
  • Allied Democratic Forces (ADF (Ally)
    • According to a report released by the UN Group of Experts in 2012, ADF trained individuals in camps and sent them off to Somalia, beginning in November 2011.[44]
    • This report also confirmed that in November 2011, Al-Shabaab agents posted bail for the son of the leader of ADF, Jamil Mukulu.[45]
    • However, the extent of these ties with ADF is unclear.[46]
  • Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) (Ally): According to the U.S. government, Al-Shabaab and AQLIM started to coordinate activities in 2012.[47]
  • Boko Haram (Ally): Cooperation between Al Shabaab and Boko Haram has been widely documented.[48] Evidence in 2011 showed that Boko Haram militants received training in Al Shabaab training camps in Somalia. [49]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Hizbul Islam (rival)
    • Hizbul Islam is a coalition of four smaller Islamic militant groups.
    • Al-Shabaab occasionally fights them for territory but have worked together.[50]
    • In March 2010, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a joined with the TFG to combat al-Shabaab.[51]
    • In March 2012, Godane outlawed all groups and organizations in al-Shabaab controlled areas in a motion to discourage the formation of any splinter groups by members of al-Shabaab that did not agree with his ideals or methods.[52]
  • AMISOM and foreign peacekeepers (target)
    • Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces launched a counterattack in December 2006, regaining control of the capital and forcing al-Shabaab to retreat to southern Somalia.[53]
    • The United Nations authorized the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), made up of forces from mainly Uganda and Burundi[54] who took over operations in Somalia after Ethiopia’s withdrawal in January 2009.[55]
    • Ethiopian forces initially expelled al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2006.[56]
    • The African Union Mission to Somalia has been active in Somalia since 2007, combatting al-Shabaab.[57]
    • Ethiopian forces reengaged in early 2014 after joined AMISOM.[58]
  • Somali Federal/ Transition Government (target)

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • Domestic Military:
    • The TFG collaborated with AMISOM forces to combat Al-Shabaab since 2007.
    • In August 2011, the TFG and AMISOM forces pushed Al-Shabaab militants out of strongholds within Mogadishu.[59]
  • International Military:
    • Ethiopian forces initially expelled al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2006.[60]
    • The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has been active in Somalia since 2007, combatting al-Shabaab.[61]
    • Since 2007, the US has funded African Union forces with over half a billion dollars for training and equipment.[62]
    • In May 2008, a US missile strike killed Aden Hashi Ayro, the leader of al-Shabaab since 2006.[63]
    • In August 2011, AMISOM and Somali forces were able to push al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu, forcing the organization to retreat once again to the rural parts of central and southern Somalia.[64]

United States Government Designations

  • Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), February 2008.[65]

Other Governments’ Designations

  • Australia (2009): Listed Terrorist Organization[66]
  • Canada (March 2010): Listed Terrorist Entity[67]
  • United Arab Emirates (November 2014): Listed Terrorist Organization[68]
  • United Kingdom (March 2010): Proscribed Terrorist Organization[69]
  • United Nations (April 2010): Sanctioned Entity[70]
 

[1] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Al-Shabaab.” Australian National Security. September 18. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-Shabaab.aspx.

[2] Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468; Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

[3] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

[4] NCTC. 2015. “Al-Shabaab.” National Counterterrorism Center. Counterterrorism Guide. Accessed May 13. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html; US Department of State. 2007. Country Reports on Terrorism 2006. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83383.pdf; Cohn, Julie. 2010. “Terrorism Havens: Somalia.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. June 1. http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366; Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf; Roque, Paula Cristina. 2009. Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab. Situation Report. Pretoria, ZAF: Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SABAAB040609.PDF.

[5] Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[6] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf; TerrorismMonitor. 2010. “Somalia’s Ras Kamboni Group Joins Al-Shabaab’s Global Jihad,” February 4. http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_5.pdf; Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf.

[7] Roque, Paula Cristina. 2009. Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab. Situation Report. Pretoria, ZAF: Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SABAAB040609.PDF.

[8] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

[9] Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[10] Johnston, David. 2009. “Militants Drew Recruit in US, FBI Says.” The New York Times, February 24. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/washington/24fbi.html; Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[11] Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf; Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf; Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[12] Macleod, Ian. 2911. “Somali-Canadian Women Recruited by Terror Group, US Politicians Told.” Online Newspaper. Ottawa Citizen. July 26. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Somali+Canadian+women+recruited+terror+group+politicians+told/5169114/story.html; Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf; Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf; Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf; Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[13] Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf; BBC. 2015. “Who Are Somalia’s Al-Shabab?” Online News. BBC News. April 3. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689

[14] BBC. 2015. “Who Are Somalia’s Al-Shabab?” Online News. BBC News. April 3. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689.

[15] Karimi, Faith, Steve Almasy, and Lillian Leposo. 2013. “Kenya Mall Attack: Death Toll Rises to 68.” Online News. CNN. September 23. http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/kenya-mall-attack/index.html.

[16] Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

[17] Barasa, Lucas. 2014. “Somalia, AU Troops Capture Town from Al-Shabaab.” Online News. Daily Nation. March 23. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Somalia-African-Union-Al-Shabaab-Qoryooley/-/1066/2254714/-/14vod70/-/index.html; Aynete, Abebe. 2014. “The Evolution of Al-Shabaab.” Online News. The Reporter - Ethiopia. February 22. http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/index.php/opinion/commentary/item/1644-the-evolution-of-al-shabaab; Miriri, Duncan, and Feisal Omar. 2014. “Al Shabaab Claims Responsibility for Djibouti Suicide Attack.” News service. Reuters. May 27. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/uk-djibouti-attacks-idUSKBN0E72AA20140527.

[18] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

[19] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf; TerrorismMonitor. 2010. “Somalia’s Ras Kamboni Group Joins Al-Shabaab’s Global Jihad,” February 4. http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_5.pdf; Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf.

[20] Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf; Roque, Paula Cristina. 2009. Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab. Situation Report. Pretoria, ZAF: Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SABAAB040609.PDF; Childress, Sarah. 2010. “Somalia’s Al Shabaab to Ally With Al Qaeda.” The Wall Street Journal, February 2. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704107204575038674123215854.

[21] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

[22] Anderson, Jon Lee. 2009. “The Most Failed State.” The New Yorker, December 14. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state.

[23] Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[24] Boniface, Bosire. 2013. “Kenya: Sugar Imports From Somalia Fund Al-Shabaab, Kenyan Officials Say.” allAfrica, April 24. http://allafrica.com/stories/201304250180.html.

[25] Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468; Al Jazeera English. 2012. “Eritrea ‘Reduces Support’ for Al-Shabab.” Online Newspaper. AlJazeera. July 17. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/07/2012716164543714168.html.

[26] Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

[27] Anderson, Jon Lee. 2009. “The Most Failed State.” The New Yorker, December 14. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state.

[28] Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

[29] Roque, Paula Cristina. 2009. Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab. Situation Report. Pretoria, ZAF: Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SABAAB040609.PDF.

[30] Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

[31] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf; Cohn, Julie. 2010. “Terrorism Havens: Somalia.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. June 1. http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366.

[32] US Department of State. 2015. “Terrorist Designations of Ahmed Diriye and Mahad Karate.” Media Note. US Department of State. April 21. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240932.htm.

[33] US Department of State. 2015. “Terrorist Designations of Ahmed Diriye and Mahad Karate.” Media Note. US Department of State. April 21. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240932.htm.

[34] Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2015. “Al-Shabab.” CFR Backgrounders. March 13. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468.

[35] Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf; Watkins, Tom. 2013. “Al-Shabaab Grew amid Somalia’s Lawlessness.” Online News. CNN. October 7. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/05/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-explainer/index.html.

[36] Watkins, Tom. 2013. “Al-Shabaab Grew amid Somalia’s Lawlessness.” Online News. CNN. October 7. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/05/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-explainer/index.html.

[37] BBC. 2015. “Who Are Somalia’s Al-Shabab?” Online News. BBC News. April 3. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689.

[38] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf.

[39] Wise, Rob. 2011. Al Shabaab. Case Study 2. AQAM Futures Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf; Cohn, Julie. 2010. “Terrorism Havens: Somalia.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. June 1. http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366; Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf.

[40] Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf; Bryden, Matt. 2014. The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity. CSIS Africa Program. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf.

[41] Bennett, Brian. 2011. “Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, US Says.” Los Angeles Times, July 18. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-20110718.

[42] FBI. 2013. “Guilty Plea Unsealed in New York Involving Ahmed Warsame, a Senior Terrorist Leader and Liaison Between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for Providing Material Support to Both Terrorist Organizations.” Press Releases. New York Field Office. March 25. http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involving-ahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-for-providing-material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations.

[43] Plaut, Martin. 2010. “Somalia and Yemen ‘Swapping Militants.’” Online News. BBC. January 17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8463946.stm.

[44]Rajab Ramah and Deodatus Balile, “Somalia: Authorities On Alert After Al-Shabaab, Ugandan Militants Join Forces,” Sabahi, January 17, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201301180238.html.

[45] Rajab Ramah and Deodatus Balile, “Somalia: Authorities On Alert After Al-Shabaab, Ugandan Militants Join Forces,” Sabahi, January 17, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201301180238.html.

[46] Kenny Katombe and Chrispin Mvano, “Congo Army Attacks Ugandan Islamist Rebels in Lawless East,” Reuters, January 17, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-congo-democratic-rebels-idUSBREA0G0TF20140117.

[47] Lerman, David. 2012. “African Terrorist Groups Starting to Cooperate.” Bloomberg.com. June 25. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starting-to-cooperate-u-dot-s-dot-says.

[48] David Adams and Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya, “Ethnic and Regional Violence in Nigeria: Implications for National Security,” Journal of Politics and Law 7, no. 3 (2014): 20–34, http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/39770.

[49] Freedom Onuoha, “Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria,” Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, 2014, 158, http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/boko-haram-islamism-politics-security-nigeria.pdf.

[50] Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf.

[51] Floyd, Kathryn H. 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Rajaratnam School of International Studies. http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia%27sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf.

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