A Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Narrative


Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Last Update

March 2015

Aliases

IMU

History

In 1991, Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani founded the organization Adolat (which means justice) in Namangan in Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley.[1] Adolat focused on implementing Islamic law within Uzbekistan.[2] However, in 1992, President Islam Karimov outlawed Adolat, forcing Yuldashev and Namangani to flee to neighboring Tajikistan where they continued to launch cross-border terrorist and insurgent attacks against Uzbekistan.[3] In 1998, Yuldashev and Namangani met with Taliban leaders in Kabul, Afghanistan. Together, they officially renamed Adolat to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).[4] Yuldashev declared himself the head, or bosh-amir, and Namangani was selected as the group’s military leader.[5] IMU declared jihad on Uzbekistan and focused on expelling the country’s president, Islam Karimov, in order to establish sharia within Uzbekistan.[6]

By early 2001, IMU had bases in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan from which they could launch and support their guerrilla campaigns.[7] However, IMU’s campaign against the Uzbek government ended in late 2001 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and overthrow of the Taliban.[8] IMU, which had an estimated 2,000 members before the war, diminished to a size of less than 1,000 members.[9] Namangani died in battle during November 2001.[10]

After the overthrow of Taliban in Afghanistan, IMU forces scattered to neighboring countries. Yuldashev remained bosh-amir and in 2002 established a new base in the tribal regions of Pakistan in Southern Waziristan.[11] During this period, other IMU cells formed in northern Afghanistan where there are many ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz.[12] IMU has grown ethnically diverse with Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Arabs, Pakistanis, Uighurs, Chechens, and even Slavs as members of their fighting forces.[13] IMU has also forged new allies with the Haqqani network, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Taliban shadow governments in northern Afghanistan.[14]

Due to growing influences from allies and ethnically diverse militant members, IMU’s goals and actions have been more centered on areas surrounding their base in Pakistan, and little has been achieved against their original target, Uzbekistan. Even after finding various safe havens when fleeing from Afghanistan, IMU cadres face continued counterinsurgent efforts by Pakistani, Afghani, and American forces.[15] In August 2009, Yuldashev was killed by CIA drone attacks in Pakistan.[16] Despite these setbacks, IMU continues to operate and has claimed suicide bombings in Afghanistan, co-attacks with the Haqqani network, violent activities with the TTP, and bombings in Tajikistan.[17]

Home Base

  • 1991-1992: Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan[18]
  • 1992-1997: Tajikstan[19]
  • 1998-2001: Kabul, Afghanistan[20]
  • 2002-Present: South Waziristan, Pakistan[21]

Founding Year

1998[22]

Ideology

  • Religious-Islamist-Salafist-Jihadist.[23]

Specific Goals

  • To  overthrow the Uzbek government and replace it with an Islamic government ruled by Sharia law.[24]
  • To establish Islamic rule throughout the regions they are located and to battle against those who are seen as enemies of Islam.[25]

Political Activity

None.

Financing

  • Extortion: In certain areas of IMU control, the local leaders will force the community members to pay taxes to support their jihad.[26]
  • Smuggling/Trafficking:
    • IMU militants were known to traffic the drugs of the Taliban from their opium and heroin trade in Central Asia in return for Taliban patronage.[27]
    • Namangani developed a trafficking network facilitated by IMU militants during the 1990s.[28]
    • IMU predominantly worked with passing heroin from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, Russia, and Europe.[29]
    • The Al-Rashid Trust has also smuggled weapons, supplies, and money under the guise of humanitarian aid to IMU.[30]
  • Charities/Donations: In 2000, bin Laden gave IMU nearly $26 million in fiscal support to purchase weaponry and helicopters.[31]
  • Kidnap-for-ransom: IMU has also received funding by holding hostages and demanding ransom in return.[32]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • Since IMU is dispersed in varying areas, local commanders lead small brigades compromised of certain ethnicities.[33]
  • In 2002, there were arguments in IMU’s shura over whether the group should focus primarily upon Uzbekistan or further its engagement in a global jihad.[34]
  • During the years of 2006 to 2007, IMU faced a splinter with some members creating and joining the group, Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).[35]
  • Military Leadership Timeline:
    • 1991-2001: Juma Hakim (a.k.a. Juma Numangani) was the original leader of the group’s military wing until he was killed in Afghanistan in November 2001.[36]
    • 2001-present: Ulugbek Holikov (aka Muhammad Ayub) became the new leader for IMU military actions.[37] 
  • Political Leadership Timeline:
    • 1991-2009: Tahir Yuldashev (aka Tahir Yo’ldosh) was the group’s original political leader until he was killed in Pakistan by a U.S. drone in 2009.[38]
    • 2009-2011: During this time a power struggle occurred within the group and the official leader was unclear. [39]
    • 2011-2012: Abu Uthman Adil became the group’s new commander in 2011 but was killed in Pakistan one year later by a U.S. drone strike. [40]
    • 2012-present: Uthman Ghazi is the current leader of IMU.[41]

Strength

  • 2001: 1,500-2,000[42]
  • 2002: 2,000 or more[43]
  • 2007: 2,000 or more[44]
  • 2012: 1,200[45]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Al-Qa’ida (ally):
    • From 1998 to 2002, IMU was strongly tied to al-Qa’ida for logistical and fiscal support.[46]
    • The founding of IMU was assisted through seed money from Osama bin Laden.[47]
    • IMU established strong ties with al-Qa’ida during its time in Afghanistan, since both groups were located in the region in the later 1990s.[48]
    • IMU militants received training from al-Qa’ida forces in Afghanistan.[49]
  • Taliban (ally):
    • From 1998 to 2002, IMU was strongly tied to the Taliban for logistical and fiscal support.[50]
    • When Yuldashev and Namangani fled Tajikistan, Taliban offered refuge for the two leaders in Kabul, Afghanistan, where they then would announce the creation of IMU.[51]
    • Namangani was also Taliban’s de facto defense minister during Taliban’s era of control in Afghanistan.[52]
    • During the US war in Afghanistan in 2001, IMU guerrilla cadres worked with Taliban and al-Qa’ida troops against U.S. armed forces.[53]
    • IMU has continued its strong ties with northern Afghanistan Taliban shadow governments and leaders in the Quetta Shura.[54]
  • Haqqani Network (ally):
    • Since IMU’s move to Pakistan, the group has established a strong alliance with the Haqqani Network in Pakistan.[55]
    • Together, these forces have participated in multiple targeted assassinations against the Jamiat-e-Islami Party.[56]
    • Their partnership is cooperative in nature, as IMU relies upon the Haqqani network for refuge and militant training in its bases in Waziristan.[57] IMU then equips the Haqqani network with foot soldiers for insurgent activities.[58]
  • Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) (ally):
    • TTP leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud have forged a relationship with IMU.[59]
    • TTP and IMU have participated in joint attacks against Pakistani security.
    • While in Pakistan, IMU has received support from the local tribe, Mehsud, in South Waziristan and from the tribal leader, Maulvi Manzoor Dawar, in North Waziristan.[60]
  • Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (suspected ally)
    • In 2000, a Russian newspaper reported on a meeting the previous year in Afghanistan which included the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and ETIM, where Osama bin Laden agreed to fund each group. In 2001, a Kyrgyz newspaper named ETIM as a militant Uighur organization with links to IMU.[61] Additionally the United Nation’s Al-Qa’ida sanctions list describes ETIM and IMU as having close ties since ETIM was founded.[62]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Uzbekistan (target):
    • In August 1999, IMU religious leader Zubayr ibn Abdul Raheem declared jihad against the Uzbekistan government, criticizing Uzbekistan's president (Islam Karimov) for closing mosques and Islamic schools. The fatwa also promised attacks on foreign tourists to Uzbekistan. [63]
    • IMU's primary goal is to replace Uzbekistan's secular government with an Islamic regime.[64]
  • Kyrgyzstan (target):
    • In August 1999, IMU religious leader Zubayr ibn Abdul Raheem declared jihad against the Kyrgyzstan government.[65]
    • Later that month, IMU militants kidnapped the commander of Kyrgyzstan's Interior Forces, as well as seven other hostages, including four Japanese citizens. After negotiations, they were released in October, for a reputed two to six million dollars (some of the money was believed to have disappeared along the way).[66]
  • Pakistan (target)
    • From 2001 through 2007, the IMU established multiple training camps in South Waziristan, under the protection of the Pakistani Taliban.[67]
    • Pakistani security forces have targeted IMU militants in Waziristan since 2006, especially after IMU allied with the Pakistani Taliban and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.[68]
    • In June 2014, Pakistan launched operation Zarb-e-Azb ("Sharp and cutting strike") against militants in North Waziristan, including IMU. Airstrikes were said to have killed 50 militants, mostly Uzbeks.[69]
  • Afghanistan (target)
    • IMU bases in Afghanistan were used to stage attacks along the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border in 2001.[70]
    • IMU militants in Afghanistan have protected narcotics smuggling into Central Asia.[71]
    • IMU coordinated with Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban to attack US troops during the US war in Afghanistan.[72]
    • IMU militants are generally seen as better trained than Afghanistan's native insurgencies, and are known to offer training and advice to these groups.[73]
  • United States (enemy)
    • The United States has targeted the leadership of the IMU with drone strikes.[74]
    • The IMU fought against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. [75]
  • Jamiat-e-Islami (enemy):
    • IMU has worked with the Haqqani network in multiple targeted assassinations of Jamiat-e-Islami Party members.[76]
  • Northern Alliance (UIFSA) (enemy)
    • From 1998 to 2002 the IMU joined with the Taliban to fight against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.[77]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • International Military:
    • The United States channeled money and forces to Uzbekistan, thus making it extremely difficult for IMU forces to infiltrate the Uzbek borders.[78]
    • In April 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright sent $3 million in military aid to Uzbekistan and almost $10 million to assist other Central Asian countries battling insurgent activities.[79]
    • The United States has also flown military supplies and counterinsurgency equipment to Kyrgyzstan, another country with scattered IMU guerrilla forces.[80]
    • Every past IMU leader has been killed by U.S. counterinsurgent actions.
      • Namangani died in Mazar-e-Sharif while leading Taliban and al-Qa’ida troops against U.S. forces.[81]
      • Yuldashev was killed in August 2009 by a CIA drone strike in Pakistan and his successor, Uthman Adil, was killed by a drone attack a year later.[82]
    • In 2012, IMU was a prime focus for Afghani operation forces, which conducted 26 raids in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Logar, Helmand, Kunduz, Takhar, and Wardak against the IMU.[83]
  • Domestic Military
    • In Pakistan, IMU has also faced local resistance from tribes who have been known to tell the locations of IMU bases to American and Pakistani officials for reward money.[84]
    • In May 2009, IMU also battled a Pakistani military campaign in South Waziristan against IMU’s base and militants.[85]
    • Pakistan's 2014 operation Zarb-e-Azb ("Sharp and cutting strike") in North Waziristan is said to have killed 50 militants, mostly Uzbeks.[86]

United States Government Designations

  • Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), September 25, 2000.[87]
  • Specially Designated Global Terrorists: Yassin Chouka, Monir Chouka and Mevlut Kar (January 26, 2012)[88]
  • Individuals providing financial, material or technological support: Abdur Rehman ( Sep 29, 2011),[89] Qari Ayyub Bashir (October 17, 2012)[90]

Other Governments’ Designations

  • Canada (June 2003): Listed Terrorist Organization[91]
  • Kazakhstan: Listed Terrorist Organization[92]
  • United Kingdom (November 2002): Proscribed Terrorist Organization[93]
  • Australia (April 2003): Listed Terrorist Organization[94]
  • United Nations (October 2001): Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Other Entities Associated with Al-Qaida[95]
 

[1] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[2]Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[3]Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[4] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[5] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[6] Katzman, Kenneth. 2002. Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002. CRS Report for Congress RL31119. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf.

[7] Dressler, Jeffrey. 2012. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat. 9. Afghanistan Report. Washington, DC: Institue for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf.

[8] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

[9] Fitz, Duncan, Thomas M Sanderson, and Sung In Marshall. 2014. Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf.

[10] US Department of State. 2003. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20177.pdf.

[11] Fitz, Duncan, Thomas M Sanderson, and Sung In Marshall. 2014. Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf.

[12] Dressler, Jeffrey. 2012. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat. 9. Afghanistan Report. Washington, DC: Institue for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf.

[13] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[14] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[15] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[16] Nichol, Jim. 2013. Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and US Interests. CRS Report for Congress RS21238. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf.

[17] Fitz, Duncan, Thomas M Sanderson, and Sung In Marshall. 2014. Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf;  Dressler, Jeffrey. 2012. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat. 9. Afghanistan Report. Washington, DC: Institue for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf.

[18] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[19] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[20] CFR. 2002. “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.” Transcript. Council on Foreign Relations. March 12. http://www.cfr.org/radicalization-and-extremism/jihad-rise-militant-islam-central-asia/p4473.

[21] Fitz, Duncan, Thomas M Sanderson, and Sung In Marshall. 2014. Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf.

[22] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[23] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[24] Katzman, Kenneth. 2002. Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002. CRS Report for Congress RL31119. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf; Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf;  US Department of State. 2000. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999. US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/patterns.pdf.

[25] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

[26] Fitz, Duncan, Thomas M Sanderson, and Sung In Marshall. 2014. Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf.

[27] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[28] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[29] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[30] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[31] Weiner, Tim. 2001. “A Nation Challenged: Central Asia: Uzbeks Face Rebels Allied To the Taliban.” The New York Times, October 7, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/world/a-nation-challenged-central-asia-uzbeks-face-rebels-allied-to-the-taliban.html.

[32] US Department of State. 2000. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999. US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/patterns.pdf.

[33] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[34] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[35] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[36] Katzman, Kenneth. 2002. Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002. CRS Report for Congress RL31119. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf.

[37] Feldholm, Michael. 2010. “From the Ferghana Valley to Waziristan and Beyond: The Role of Uzbek Islamic Extremists in the Civil Wars of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), August 25. https://csis.org/files/publication/100825_Hahn_IIPER_22.pdf.

[38] Dressler, Jeffrey. 2012. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat. 9. Afghanistan Report. Washington, DC: Institue for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf.

[39] Dressler, Jeffrey. 2012. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat. 9. Afghanistan Report. Washington, DC: Institue for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf.

[40] Walsh, Declan, and Ismail Khan. 2012. “US Drone Strike Kills Uzbek Militant Leader.” The New York Times, August 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/world/asia/us-drone-strike-kills-uzbek-militant-leader.html.

[41] Walsh, Declan, and Ismail Khan. 2012. “US Drone Strike Kills Uzbek Militant Leader.” The New York Times, August 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/world/asia/us-drone-strike-kills-uzbek-militant-leader.html.

[42] Chivers, C. J. 2002. “Threats and Responses: Central Asia: Uzbek Militants’ Decline Provides Clues to US.” The New York Times, October 8, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/08/world/threats-and-responses-central-asia-uzbek-militants-decline-provides-clues-to-us.html;  Weiner, Tim. 2001. “A Nation Challenged: Central Asia: Uzbeks Face Rebels Allied To the Taliban.” The New York Times, October 7, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/world/a-nation-challenged-central-asia-uzbeks-face-rebels-allied-to-the-taliban.html.

[43] “Selected Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 102 (2002): 224-231, doi: 10.1093/milbal/102.1.224

[44] “Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 107 (2007): 421-438, doi: 10.1080/04597220601167872

[45] “Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 112 (2012): 477-484, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2012.663221

[46] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[47] Takeyh, Ray. 2002. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. Summer. http://www.cfr.org/world/do-terrorist-networks-need-home/p7348;  Weiner, Tim. 2001. “A Nation Challenged: Central Asia: Uzbeks Face Rebels Allied To the Taliban.” The New York Times, October 7, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/world/a-nation-challenged-central-asia-uzbeks-face-rebels-allied-to-the-taliban.html.

[48] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

[49] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

[50] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[51] Katzman, Kenneth. 2002. Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002. CRS Report for Congress RL31119. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf.

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[53] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Auden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. CRS Report for Congress RL32223. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf.

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