A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Narrative


Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

Last Update

July 2015

Aliases

JEM-Jibril[1]

History

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is a largely Islamist Sudanese armed opposition group seeking national reform and regime change within Sudan.[2] Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Muhammed, while completing his master’s degree in public health in the Netherlands in 2001, declared the founding of JEM following the dissolution of the national assembly and the declaration of a state of emergency by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. In the state of emergency, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir purged the followers of rival politician Hassan al-Turabi from government. The majority of the founding members were former members of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) (also known as Islamist Popular Congress) of al-Turabi, a spearhead of Sudan’s Islamic revolution.[3] African Muslims from Darfur who were forced to leave also went on to join the newly formed JEM.[4]

JEM leaders call for the creation of a new country named the United Regions of Sudan. This proposed new nation would entail a rotating presidency, granting all six Sudanese regions a term in power.[5] Khalil Ibrahim remained leader until his death in 2011.[6] Following Khalil Ibrahim’s death, the group was led by his brother Jibril Ibrahim and a new 18-member JEM executive office.[7]

In 2008, JEM gained national recognition after launching an attack on Khartoum.[8] Prior to a mid-2010 government offensive that led to significant casualties, JEM was estimated to have more than 5,000 men. JEM soldiers were armed with mounted anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, several hundred vehicles and at least two tanks.[9]

Home Base

Sudan (Darfur)

Founding Year

2000

Ideology

  • Religious-Islamist[10]
  • Ethnic-Zaghawa[11]
  • Regime change-Federalist[12]

Specific Goals

  • Redress economic and political inequalities between North and South Sudan (prior to South Sudan’s independence)
  • Pursue armed struggle to change the al-Bashir regime
  • Fight for equal representation for southern Africans and western Arabs in the Khartoum government
  • Establish a new country named The United Regions of Sudan, whose presidency is rotating in order to allow all six Sudanese regions a term in office.[13]

Political Activity

  • JEM is rumored to be the armed wing of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) (also known as Islamist Popular Congress) led by Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi. Rumors persist claiming Turabi maintains close links with JEM through his Germany-based deputy Ali Al Haj.[14]
  • In 2012, Justice and Equality Movement – Sudan (JEM-S) split from mainstream JEM and signed a peace deal with Sudan in March 2013.[15] JEM-S is claimed to have contained 40-65 percent of JEM.[16]

Financing

  • State Sponsorship
    • From the beginning of the JEM insurgency, Chad supported JEM financially. In return, JEM fought in the Chadian civil war on the side of Chadian President Idriss Déby.[17]
    • Uganda, in 2010, established a positive relationship with JEM and provided training for the group’s recruits outside Kampala.[18]
    • It is rumored that Libya sent anywhere between $10-100 million to JEM; the money was conditional upon JEM’s role in supporting the Libyan government in clashes during the civil unrest under the Gaddafi regime.[19]
    • Chad, previously JEM’s primary backer, provided the group with a “severance package” following the expulsion of JEM out of Chad in February 2010. [20]
  • Other: Diaspora and Expatriate Funding
    • JEM is also reported to be financed by Zaghawa and Islamist diaspora supporters.
    • JEM is financed by Arab Islamists who were expelled from Sudan and lost the majority of their assets following the Islamist movement split in 1999.[21]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • There is little information, beyond the current presence of an 18-member executive office, available in the open sources on the structure of JEM.
  • JEM merged with a Liberation and a Justice Movement (LJM) splinter group on April 13, 2012.[22]
  • JEM has undergone a series of internal divisions in its history.
  • September 2007: JEM Vice President Bahar Idriss Abu Garda split from the group and formed his own faction named JEM Collective Leadershhip (JEM-CL)[23]
  • 2011: Deputy Chairman of JEM Mohamed Bahr Hamadein was relieved of his post due to suspicions that Hamadein was planning on signing an unfavorable ceasefire agreement with the Sudanese government.[24]
  • 2012: JEM Commander in Chief Bakheit Abdallah Abdel Karim (Dabajo) and Jibril Ibrahim were critical of each other; Jibril removed Dabajo from the group in 2012; many JEM soldiers under the command of Dabajo elected to remain with him.
  • 2000-2011: Khalil Ibrahim was the leader of JEM from its inception until 2011 when he was killed by an airstrike.[25] Abu Garda was head of United Resistance Front (URF) and Mohamed Bahr Hamadein was the Deputy Chairman and head of the Kordofan sector of JEM[26]
  • 2011-current: Jibril Ibrahim became the chairman of the movement and a new 18-member executive office was formed in February 2012.[27]
  • January 2012: Zakaria Musa formed JEM Corrective Leadership (JEM-CL)

Strength

  • 2004: Several thousand[28]
  • 2007: Several thousand[29]
  • 2010: Greater than 5,000[30]
  • 2012: Up to 5,000[31]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Chad (State sponsor)
    • From the beginning of the JEM insurgency, Chad supported JEM financially.
    • In return, JEM fought in the Chadian civil war on the side of Chadian President Idriss Déby.[32]
    • This relationship ended in 2010.[33]
  • Libya (State sponsor)
    • Libya proved to be the group’s main external supporter, providing the group with military provisions including anti-aircraft weapons, vehicles and fuels.[34]
    • Libya provided funds to JEM in exchange for the group’s mobilization of forces within Libya on the side of the Libyan regime at the time of unrest.[35]
    • With the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya’s replacement government was more sympathetic to the Sudanese regime.[36]
  • Sudan Revolutionary Front (ally)
    • JEM joined with the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front in November 2011.[37]
  • Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) (ally)
    • Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) [38]
    • Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW)[39]
    • The Sudanese Bloc to Liberate the Republic (SBLR) claimed it was joining JEM on October 3rd 2011.[40]
  • Liberation and a Justice Movement (LJM) (ally)
    • JEM merged with this splinter group on April 13, 2012.[41]
  • Uganda (State Sponsor)
    • Uganda, in 2010, established a positive relationship with JEM and provided training for the group’s recruits outside Kampala.[42]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Chad (Rival)
    • In 2003, Chad sent troops to Sudan to fight both JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army.[43]
    • Despite their previous alliance, JEM was expelled from Chad in 2010 due to political reciprocations carried out between the rival leaders Sudanese President al-Bashir and Chadian President Idriss Déby during their proxy war.[44]
  • Government of Sudan (Target)
    • JEM and SLA fighters triggered the rebellion in Darfur by attacking the El Fasher air base in April 2003.[45]
    • JEM is known to fight government-supported militias ("Janjawid" fighters),[46] but has also actively recruited from the Janjawid, as well.[47]
    • In 2006 while other armed groups were signing peace agreements with the government, JEM refused to sign citing a disproportion of power. In addition, the group demanded the disarmament of the Janjawid.[48]
  • JEM Collective Leadership (Rival, Splinter)
    • In 2007 JEM Vice President Bahar Idriss Abu Garda split from the group and created his own faction JEM Collective Leadership (JEM-CL), citing Ibrahim’s totalitarian style of leadership as the reason for the split.[49]
  • JEM-Bashar (Rival, Splinter)
    • Dabajo and his followers formed a new movement under the leadership of Mohamed Bashar, naming the group JEM-Bashar.[50]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • International Law Enforcement: In 2006, International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) issued a “Red Notice” for Khalil Ibrahim, per Sudan’s request. Ibrahim was charged with terrorism for targeting oil pipelines.[51]
  • International Military: In 2003, Chadian forces joined the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to fight JEM and SLA fighters.[52]
  • Domestic Military:
    • In 2003, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fight JEM and SLA fighters, backed by Chadian forces.[53]
    • In 2008, the SAF repulsed a major JEM attack on Khartoum.[54]
    • In spring 2013 a series of prolonged battles in South Kordofan between SAF and the SRF (of which JEM is a member) displaced 30,000 civilians.[55]
  • Domestic Political:
    • In February 2010, an agreement to secede hostilities, release prisoners and set a framework for future negotiations was signed between JEM and the government of Sudan. However, shortly after, the agreement collapsed.[56]

United States Government Designations

None

Other Governments’ Designations

None

 

[1] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[2] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[3] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/; “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[4] Martin Plaut, “Sudan: Elections and Beyond: Polling in a Powder Keg,” The World Today, April 2010, http://www.exacteditions.com/read/the-world-today/april-2010-6944/4/2.

[5] “Who Are Sudan’s Jem Rebels?,” Al Jazeera, May 15, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/05/20095721141953829.html.

[6] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[7] Khalid Abdelaziz and Alexander Dziadosz, “Darfur’s Strongest Rebel Group Elects New Chief,” Reuters, January 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/ozatp-sudan-darfurr-idAFJOE80P05T20120126.

[8] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[9] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[10] “Who Are Sudan’s Jem Rebels?,” Al Jazeera, May 15, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/05/20095721141953829.html.

[11] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[12] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[13] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[14] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[15] “Justice and Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM-S) / JEM-Military Council (JEM-MC) / JEM-Bashar,” Sudan Tribune, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot2233.

[16] “Justice and Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM-S) / JEM-Military Council (JEM-MC) / JEM-Bashar,” Sudan Tribune, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot2233.

[17] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[18] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[19] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[20] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[21] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[22] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[23] Lucia DiCicco, “The Case of the Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda at the International Criminal Court,” The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Courts (Washington, DC: United Nations Association of the United States of America, May 29, 2009), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Abu_Garda.pdf.

[24] Lucia DiCicco, “The Case of the Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda at the International Criminal Court,” The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Courts (Washington, DC: United Nations Association of the United States of America, May 29, 2009), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Abu_Garda.pdf.

[25] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[26] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[27] Khalid Abdelaziz and Alexander Dziadosz, “Darfur’s Strongest Rebel Group Elects New Chief,” Reuters, January 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/ozatp-sudan-darfurr-idAFJOE80P05T20120126.

[28] “Selected Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 104 (2004): 362-377, doi: 10.1080/725292356

[29] “Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 107 (2007): 421-438, doi: 10.1080/04597220601167872

[30] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[31] “Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 112 (2012): 477-484, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2012.663221

[32] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[33] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[34] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[35] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[36] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[37] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf; “Darfur Peace Process Chronology,” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, July 24, 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/peace-process-chronology/HSBA-Darfur-Peace-Process-Chronology.pdf.

[38] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[39] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[40] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[41] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[42] “Justice and Equality Movement - Sudan (JEM-S) / JEM-Military Council (JEM-MC) / JEM-Bashar,” Sudan Tribune, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot2233.

[43] “Sudan-Chad Proxy War,” Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, February 6, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war-historical.html.

[44] Martin Plaut, “Sudan: Elections and Beyond: Polling in a Powder Keg,” The World Today, April 2010, http://www.exacteditions.com/read/the-world-today/april-2010-6944/4/2; “Sudan-Chad Proxy War,” Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, February 6, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war-historical.html.

[45] “Conflict Analysis,” Eyes On Darfur, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.eyesondarfur.org/conflict.html.

[46] “Conflict Analysis,” Eyes On Darfur, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.eyesondarfur.org/conflict.html.

[47] “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.

[48] “Conflict Analysis,” Eyes On Darfur, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.eyesondarfur.org/conflict.html.

[49] Lucia DiCicco, “The Case of the Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda at the International Criminal Court,” The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Courts (Washington, DC: United Nations Association of the United States of America, May 29, 2009), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Abu_Garda.pdf.

[50] Lucia DiCicco, “The Case of the Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda at the International Criminal Court,” The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Courts (Washington, DC: United Nations Association of the United States of America, May 29, 2009), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Abu_Garda.pdf.

[51] “Sudan: Rebels Dismiss Governments Demand for Its Leader’s Arrest as ‘Laughable,’” The Citizen (Sudan), May 12, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.

[52] “Sudan-Chad Proxy War,” Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, February 6, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war-historical.html.

[53] “Sudan-Chad Proxy War,” Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, February 6, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/sudan-chad-proxy-war-historical.html.

[54] Anke Fiedler et al., “The Sudanese Press after Separation - Contested Identities of Journalism” (Berlin, DEU: Media in Cooperation and Transition, 2012), http://www.mict-international.org/projects/the-sudanese-press-after-separation/.

[55] Satellite Sentinel Project and The Enough Project, “Civilians Caught in the Crossfire: The Bombing of Abu Kershola and Ad Dandour” (Satellite Sentinel Project, June 10, 2013), http://enoughproject.org/reports/civilians-caught-crossfire-bombing-abu-kershola-and-ad-dandour.

[56] Martin Plaut, “Sudan: Elections and Beyond: Polling in a Powder Keg,” The World Today, April 2010, http://www.exacteditions.com/read/the-world-today/april-2010-6944/4/2; “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril),” Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (Geneva, CHE: Small Arms Survey, August 2013), http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf.