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Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) Narrative


Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)

Last Update

March 2015

Aliases

Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari’at Muhammad, Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi[1]

History

Though it has informal origins dating back to the 1970s, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) was officially established in 1994 as a result of insurgencies in the Malakand District against the Pakistani judicial system.[2] The group fights violently for Islamic influence in the Pakistani courts in the hopes of establishing a proper Islamic state.[3] Following the siege of the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in 2007, TNSM is believed to have merged with TTP.[4] Since then, TNSM fighters have actively waged war in Islamabad’s Swat Valley to extend the reach of its extreme variant of Sharia law.[5]

The group has multiple leaders, including one who goes by the alias Mullah Radio and another named Sufi Mohammed.[6] The TNSM numbered approximately 25,000 in May 1994, although its strength has decreased since then.[7] The government of the United Kingdom alleges that the group has provided direct support to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, although the exact nature of this support is unknown.[8] Pakistan typically focuses its counterterrorism efforts primarily on military operations in Bajur and Swat, and the United States is modifying its military strategy into a more aggressive one.[9]

Home Base

Pakistan

Founding Year

1994[10]

Ideology

Religious-Islamist-Deobandi-Wahabi.[11]

Specific Goals

  • The TNSM aims to establish an Islamic state throughout Pakistan, specifically within the judicial system, primarily by waging war against the country.[12]

Political Activity

  • In early 2009, a peace agreement was reached between TNSM and the Swat provincial government, in which the latter sanctioned the imposition of sharia law in Swat. The agreement quickly collapsed, and in May 2009, the Pakistani army regained control over the Swat.[13]

Financing

No information found.

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • Maulana Sufi Mohammed, founder and emir: 1994-2001 (arrested)[14]
  • Fazal Hayat (aka Fazullah, Radio Mullah, Mullah FM), emir 2002-2013 (became leader of the TTP)[15]

Strength

  • 1994: Approximately 25,000[16]
  • 2007: At least 4,500.[17]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Taliban (ally)
    • TNSM mobilized fighters for the Afghan Taliban after it took power in Afghanistan,[18] and again after the 2002 US invasion.[19] TNSM was still allied with the Taliban in late 2007, when it effectively controlled the entire Swat.[20]
  • al-Qa’ida (ally):
    • The UK government claims that TNSM provides direct support to al Qa'ida.[21] Others have described it as a "satellite" of al-Qa'ida.[22]
  • Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (ally)
    • TNSM has reportedly carried out attacks on behalf of TTP. [23]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Pakistan (enemy, target)
    • A central goal of TNSM is to replace the current Pakistani government with an Islamic regime.[24] Accordingly, TNSM has directly targeted the Pakistani government and security forces.[25]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • Domestic and International Military: The national governments of Pakistan and the United States have primarily resorted to military measures against the TNSM, especially in regions such as Bajur and Swat.[26]
  • Domestic Political: In early 2009, TNSM and the Swat provincial government reached a peace agreement, in which the latter sanctioned the imposition of sharia law in Swat. The agreement quickly collapsed.[27]

United States Government Designations

None

Other Governments’ Designations

  • United Kingdom (July 2007): Proscribed Terrorist Organization.[28]
 

[1] Home Office, United Kingdom, “Proscribed Terrorist Organisations” (London, March 27, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf; Navid Iqbal Khan, “Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I-Shariat-I-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of ‘State Inversion,’” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 31, no. 1 (2010): 130–58, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/6.%20Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-%20Muhammadi,%20Navid%20iqbal.pdf.

[2] Navid Iqbal Khan, “Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I-Shariat-I-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of ‘State Inversion,’” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 31, no. 1 (2010): 130–58, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/6.%20Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-%20Muhammadi,%20Navid%20iqbal.pdf.

[3] Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Parvez Khan Toru, and University of Peshawar Pakistan Study Centre, Talibanization of Pakistan: A Case Study of TNSM (Peshawar, PAK: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2005).

[4] “TTP’s Ruthless New Commander Fazlullah,” Dawn, November 7, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/news/1054801.

[5] Jonathan Manthorpe, “Despite Deals, Taliban Stalk Swat Valley,” Vancouver Sun, February 18, 2009, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=f828f7e0-528a-4b78-a4ca-02b7943ce860.

[6] Jonathan Manthorpe, “Despite Deals, Taliban Stalk Swat Valley,” Vancouver Sun, February 18, 2009, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=f828f7e0-528a-4b78-a4ca-02b7943ce860.

[7] Sultan-i-Rome, “Swat: A Critical Analysis,” IPCS Research Papers (New Delhi, IND: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2009), http://ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1542140255RP18-Rome-Swat.pdf.

[8] Home Office, United Kingdom, “Proscribed Terrorist Organisations” (London, March 27, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf.

[9] Isambard Wilkinson, “Taliban Opens New Front in Pakistan,” The Telegraph, September 18, 2008, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/2982887/Taliban-opens-new-front-in-Pakistan.html.

[10] Navid Iqbal Khan, “Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I-Shariat-I-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of ‘State Inversion,’” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 31, no. 1 (2010): 130–58, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/6.%20Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-%20Muhammadi,%20Navid%20iqbal.pdf.

[11] Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence: Between the ‘Arabist Shift’and Indo-Persian Culture,” in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, 2004, 147–70, http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/PDFs/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach7.pdf; Jonathan Manthorpe, “Despite Deals, Taliban Stalk Swat Valley,” Vancouver Sun, February 18, 2009, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=f828f7e0-528a-4b78-a4ca-02b7943ce860.

[12] Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Parvez Khan Toru, and University of Peshawar Pakistan Study Centre, Talibanization of Pakistan: A Case Study of TNSM (Peshawar, PAK: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2005).

[13] Christin C. Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan” (Working Paper, Princeton University, 2009), http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/papers/FMS_2009_The_Roots_of_Militancy.pdf.

[14] Navid Iqbal Khan, “Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I-Shariat-I-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of ‘State Inversion,’” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 31, no. 1 (2010): 130–58, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/6.%20Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-%20Muhammadi,%20Navid%20iqbal.pdf.

[15] Jonathan Manthorpe, “Despite Deals, Taliban Stalk Swat Valley,” Vancouver Sun, February 18, 2009, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=f828f7e0-528a-4b78-a4ca-02b7943ce860; Sana Jamal and M Ahsan, “Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan–Analyzing the Network of Terror,” 2015, http://www.ir-ia.com/reports/IRIA-TTP.pdf; US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2007), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83383.pdf.

[16] Sultan-i-Rome, “Swat: A Critical Analysis,” IPCS Research Papers (New Delhi, IND: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2009), http://ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1542140255RP18-Rome-Swat.pdf.

[17] Christophe Jaffrelot, “Swat Hardened,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 14, 2013. http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/14/swat-hardened

[18] Stephen Tankel, Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan (Peaceworks, 2013), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW89-Domestic%20Barriers%20to%20Dismantling%20the%20Militant%20Infrastructure%20in%20Pakistan.pdf.

[19] Navid Iqbal Khan, “Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I-Shariat-I-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of ‘State Inversion,’” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 31, no. 1 (2010): 130–58, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/6.%20Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-%20Muhammadi,%20Navid%20iqbal.pdf.

[20] Alok Bansal, “Talibanisation of Pakistan,” Scholar Warrior 2, no. 2 (2011): 66–73, http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/397326186_AlokBansal.pdf.

[21] Home Office, United Kingdom, “Proscribed Terrorist Organisations” (London, March 27, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf.

[22] Hassan Abbas, “The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The Rise of TNSM in Pakistan,” The Jamestown Foundation, November 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=986.

[23] Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

[24] Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Parvez Khan Toru, and University of Peshawar Pakistan Study Centre, Talibanization of Pakistan: A Case Study of TNSM (Peshawar, PAK: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2005).

[25] Jonathan Manthorpe, “Despite Deals, Taliban Stalk Swat Valley,” Vancouver Sun, February 18, 2009, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=f828f7e0-528a-4b78-a4ca-02b7943ce860.; Isambard Wilkinson, “Taliban Opens New Front in Pakistan,” The Telegraph, September 18, 2008, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/2982887/Taliban-opens-new-front-in-Pakistan.html.

[26] Isambard Wilkinson, “Taliban Opens New Front in Pakistan,” The Telegraph, September 18, 2008, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/2982887/Taliban-opens-new-front-in-Pakistan.html.

[27] Christin C. Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan” (Working Paper, Princeton University, 2009), http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/papers/FMS_2009_The_Roots_of_Militancy.pdf.

[28] Home Office, United Kingdom, “Proscribed Terrorist Organisations” (London, March 27, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf.