A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Narrative


Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Last Update

June 2015

Aliases

Taliban Movement of Pakistan; Pakistani Taliban.

History

The TTP was founded in December 2007 by a shura council of 40 Taliban leaders in an effort to unify militant groups active in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP).[1] The name Tehrik-i-Taliban (literally, "Student Movement") had been used as early as 1998 in Pakistan, but was unrelated to TTP.[2] Since the creation of the militant organization, it has become an adaptive and resourceful network of self-interested groups united by similar causes. The TTP is made up of various factions and groups, the three most powerful being the Mehsud Group, the Muqami Taliban and the Punjabi Taliban. Each group is self-financed, but TTP networking is supported by protection money, kidnapping, and donations from sympathizers both in and outside of Pakistan.[3]

In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud (leader of the largest TTP faction) was killed in a drone attack.[4] His cousin, Hakimullah Mehsud, then assumed leadership, and TTP attacks grew in severity, including a January 2010 suicide bombing at a CIA outpost in Afghanistan (retaliation for the death of Baitullah Mehsud) and May 2010 attacks on mosques in Lahore that killed over 80 Ahmadi Muslims.[5] The TTP is also alleged to have organized the bomb plot in Times Square that same year.[6] Following Hakimullah Mehsud’s death (also by drone attack) in 2013, hard-liner Mullah Fazlullah – who ordered the assassination attempt of Malala Yousafzai – was named as his replacement.[7] Failed peace negotiations in early 2014 between the TTP and the Pakistani government were followed by the December 2014 massacre at a school in Peshawar in which almost all of the victims were children.[8]

Home Base

Pakistan

Founding Year

2007

Ideology

Religious-Sunni-Deobandi[9]

Specific Goals

  • Enforce sharia law
  • Establish a unified front to combat coalition forces in Afghanistan and a defensive jihad against the Pakistani government.[10]
  • Secondary goals include a discontinuation of military check points in the FATA.[11]

Political Activity

  • Tehrik-i-Taliban does not participate in formal political processes.
  • In January 2014, TTP entered peace negotiations with the Pakistani government, in hopes of ending US drone strikes and implementing Sharia law.[12] Those talks were temporarily suspended two weeks later, after the TTP beheaded 23 Pakistani soldiers, and permanently dissolved following the June 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi.[14]

Financing

  • Kidnapping: Despite condemning kidnapping for ransom, the TTP supports abductions to "advance an Islamic agenda," with most victims being wealthy businessmen, aid workers, and journalists.[15]
  • Smuggling: The transportation of rare woods and gems has also been a large source of income, with timber from the Swat Valley raising an estimated US$100 million.[16]
  • Extortion: In the FATA, TTP imposes taxes on the local population, charging vehicles passing through the area or imposing a "protection tax" for shipments from the region's marble mines.[17]
  • Donations: Large sums also come from donations, as either monetary contributions or other items, such as jewelry, from both Pakistani sources and benefactors abroad.[18]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • 2007: The Pakistani Taliban had been active since 2003, but over time the network built by its members spread out eventually leading to the creation of an umbrella network of groups in FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. TTP is ruled by a shura (governing council), but is made up of several groups, each with its own chain of command.[19]
  • Although member groups share common goals (e.g., enforcing sharia law, jihad against Pakistani and foreign intervention in FATA), there are internal divisions:
    • Mehsud Group: the core of TTP, waging jihad against the Pakistani government, currently led by Mullah Fazlullah[20]
    • Muqami Taliban: pro-government factions focused on supporting the Afghan jihad, led by Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir[21]
    • Punjabi Taliban: multiple sectarian groups focused on helping the Kashmiri jihad[22]
    • Various smaller groups with objectives separate from TTP's shared goals[23]
  • 2007-2009: Baitullah Mehsud (killed in U.S. missile strike)[24]
  • 2009-2013: Hakimullah Mehsud (killed in U.S. drone strike)[25]
  • 2013-present: Maulana Fazlullah[26]

Strength

  • 2009: Approximately 10,000[27]
  • 2012: 20,000-25,000[28]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Taliban (ally)
    • Militants under the TTP banner all pledge support for the Taliban and Afghan jihad despite opposing interests at times. Most significantly, the Taliban do not condone the TTP’s attacks within Pakistan. However, the two groups cooperate to maintain control over tribal regions near the Afghan-Pakistani border.[29]
  • Al-Qa’ida (ally)
    • Al-Qa’ida and TTP have been closely allied since the founding of the TTP in 2007.  Al-Qa’ida provides logistical guidance while TTP allows Al-Qa’ida members safe haven in areas under their control in Pakistan.[30]
  • Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (ally)
    • The groups reportedly began an alliance and coordinated attacks as early as 2007. When Hakimullah Mesud took power in 2009, he sought to strengthen this relationship.[31]
  • Haqqani Network (ally)
    • Haqqani Network and the TTP began coordinating and offering support to each other in 2007.[32] However, in 2012 there were reports that the two groups had clashed, resulting in the deaths of several militants.[33]
  • Harkatul Jihad-E-Islami (HUJI) (ally)
    • The groups are believed to coordinate through joint membership in the 313 Brigade.[34] In 2012, there were reports of the two groups meeting together to discuss future strategies.[35]
  • Janish-e-Mohammad (JEM) (ally)
    • Several news articles have described the groups as linked however, the full extent of their alliance isn’t clear.[36]
  • Indian Mujahideen (ally)
    • TTP has provided trainings to the Indian Mujahideen.[37]
  • Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (ally)
    • According to the U.S. State Department, the two groups work closely together.[38]
  • Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) (ally)
    • TNSM has reportedly carried out attacks on behalf of TTP. [39]
  • Jundallah (suspected ally) (refers to the Sunni Iranian group, not a group of the same name in based in Pakistan)
    • In 2009 and 2010 journalists speculated that Jundallah and TTP were linked although the extent of the relationship is unclear.[40]
  • Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (suspected ally)
    • The two groups have occasionally collaborated and the LeT has served as a network through which the TTP can train and communicate with other organizations.[41]
  • Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) (suspected ally)
    • BLF and TTP were suspected of carrying out joint attacks in 2010 and 2011.[42]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Coalition Forces in Afghanistan (target)
    • One of TTP's core goals is to unite to oppose Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.[43]
  • Pakistani Government (target)
    • A central TTP goal is to replace the current Pakistani state with an Islamic regime, along its radical Deobandi principles.[44]
    • Between 2007 and 2013, 30 percent of TTP attacks targeted Pakistan's government, military or police personnel.[45]
  • United States (target, enemy)
    • The U.S. designated TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2010, dramatically increasing the targeting of TTP militants and leaders with drone attacks.[46]
    • The TTP has attacked Pakistani military and security targets for collaborating with the US (on drone strikes and targeting).[47]
  • Lashkar-e-Islam (rival)
    • The groups are engaged in a power struggle for Khyber Agency and in 2010 clashed violently resulting in the deaths of approximately 50 militants.[48]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • Domestic Military: The Pakistani military has conducted offensives against TTP, such as Operation Tri-Star in January 2008.[49]
  • Domestic Political: In spring 2014, TTP entered peace talks with the Pakistani government, with the objective of ending the U.S. drone campaign and the implementation of sharia law.[50] However, infighting and subsequent attacks – especially the June 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi – effectively ended those efforts.[51]
  • International Military: The United States has been using drone strikes to degrade militant capabilities and kill militant leaders in Pakistan since 2004.[52] TTP leaders killed in drone strikes include Baitullah Mehsud (August 2009) and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud (late 2013).[53]

United States Government Designations

  • Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), September 9, 2010.[54]

Other Governments’ Designations

  • Canada (August 2011): Listed Terrorist Organization.[55]
 

[1] Zachary Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (November 18, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422; Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan; Qandeel Siddique, Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s Northwest (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2010).

[2] Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

[3] Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban, Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, April 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/collinsali.pdf.

[4] Shah Pir Zubair, Sabrina Tavernese, and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban Leader in Pakistan Is Reportedly Killed,” The New York Times, August 8, 2009, sec. International / Asia Pacific, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/world/asia/08pstan.html.

[5] Stephen Farrell, “Video Links Taliban in Pakistan to CIA Attack,” The New York Times, January 10, 2010, sec. International / Middle East, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/world/middleeast/10balawi.html; Waqar Gillani and Jane Perlez, “Attackers Hit Mosques of Islamic Sect in Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 28, 2010, sec. World / Asia Pacific, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/29/world/asia/29pstan.html.

[6] NCTC, “Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” National Counterterrorism Center, Counterterrorism Guide, (2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ttp.html.

[7] Asad Hashim, “The Iron Fist of Maulana Fazlullah,” Al Jazeera, November 8, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/iron-fist-maulana-fazlullah-20131171538269715.html; Zachary Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (November 18, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422.

[8] BBC, “Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar School Attack Leaves 141 Dead,” BBC News, December 16, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30491435.

[9]  Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan; Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller, and C. Christine Fair, “Ethnicity, Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2452059.

[10] Qandeel Siddique, Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s Northwest (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2010); Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

[11] Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

[12] "Pakistan enters peace talks with Taliban," BBC News, February 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26065385

[14] BBC, “Pakistan Taliban Announce Month Truce,” BBC News, accessed June 29, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26398758; Jon Boone, “Pakistani Taliban Claim Karachi Attack and Leave Peace Talks in Crisis,” The Guardian, June 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/pakistan-taliban-karachi-attack-peace-talks.

[15] Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban, Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, April 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/collinsali.pdf.

[16] Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban, Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, April 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/collinsali.pdf.

[17] Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban, Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, April 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/collinsali.pdf.

[18] Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban, Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, April 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/collinsali.pdf.

[19] Qandeel Siddique, Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s Northwest (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2010); Naveed Ahmad, “Pakistani Taliban: New Leadership, Old Feuds,” Al Jazeera, November 24, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/11/pakistani-taliban-new-leadership-old-feuds-201311188445136336.html.

[20] Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman, “Faces of Pakistan’s Militant Leaders,” Foreign Policy and Security, Center for American Progress, (July 22, 2009), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/07/22/6316/faces-of-pakistans-militant-leaders/.

[21] Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman, “Faces of Pakistan’s Militant Leaders,” Foreign Policy and Security, Center for American Progress, (July 22, 2009), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/07/22/6316/faces-of-pakistans-militant-leaders/.

[22] Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, April 2009, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/defining-the-punjabi-taliban-network.

[23] Qandeel Siddique, Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s Northwest (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2010).

[24] Jayshree Bajoria and Jonathan Masters, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/Pakistan’sNewGenerationOfTerrorists.pdf; NCTC, “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015” (National Counterterrorism Center, August 15, 2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[25] Jayshree Bajoria and Jonathan Masters, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/Pakistan’sNewGenerationOfTerrorists.pdf; NCTC, “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015” (National Counterterrorism Center, August 15, 2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf; BBC, “Hakimullah Mehsud Killed by Drone, Pakistan Taliban Say,” BBC News, November 2, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24776363.

[26] NCTC, “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015” (National Counterterrorism Center, August 15, 2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf; Saira Yamin and Salma Malik, Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), http://scar-dev.xululabs.us/sites/default/files/Mapping_Conflict_Trends_in_Pakistan.pdf.

[27] Qandeel Siddique, Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s Northwest (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2010).

[28] “Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 112 (2012): 477-484, doi: 10.1080/04597222.2012.663221

[29] David Khattak, "The Complicated Relationship Between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 16, 2012. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-complicated-relationship-between-the-afghan-and-pakistani-taliban

[30] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, May 30,

2013, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209989.htm; Dean Nelson and Ghulam Hasnain, "Pakistan angry at NATO raids to catch militants," The Sunday Times (London), March 11, 2007. 

[31] David Witter, “Backgrounder: Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” Insitute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/BackgrounderIMU_28Jan.pdf; Duncan Fitz and Thomas M. Sanderson, Central Asian Militancy A Primary Source Examination, Lanham: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf

[32] Gretchen Peters, "Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry," The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2012. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf

[33] "Not allies: 8 dead as TTP, Haqqani Network clash in North Waziristan," The Express Tribune, April 19, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/367215/not-allies-8-dead-as-ttp-haqqani-network-clash-in-north-waziristan/

[34] “Pakistan:Is Kashmiri still alive?” Right Vision News, June 6, 2011; Bill Roggio, “’313 Brigade’ claims car bombing that targeted Hezbollah in Beirut.” The Long War Journal, July 10, 2013.  http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/07/313_brigade_claims_c.php

[35]Anwer Abbas, "'Dead' kashmiri holds talks with Hakimullah," The Frontier Post, March 7, 2012.

[36] "Police Arrest 7 Men Suspected of Links to Attacks on Minority Sect in Pakistan," Guelph Mercury (Ontario), May 30, 2010; "Indian Agency behind Pakistan Terror Attacks – Official," BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political, October 16, 2009.

[37] "Pakistani Taleban training Indian Mujahidden - sources." BBC Monitoring South Asia. September 17, 2012.

[38] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, Terrorist Organizations, August 18, 2011, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, April 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/

[39] Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

[40] Robert Tait and Mark Tran, "Guardian Weekly: Iran spreads blame for suicide attack," The Guardian Weekly. October 23, 2009; Saeed Kamail, "The wrong approach to Iran," The Guardian, January 7, 2010.

[41] Ashley Tellis, "Policy Outlook: The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf; Neil Padukone, "The Next al-Qaeda? Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Future of Terrorism in South Asia," World Affairs, November/December 2012. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/next-al-qaeda-lashkar-e-taiba-and-future-terrorism-south-asia

[42] “BLF-TTP Nexus in Navy Attacks,” Right Vision News, April 30, 2011.

[43] Sana Jamal and M Ahsan, “Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan–Analyzing the Network of Terror,” 2015, http://www.ir-ia.com/reports/IRIA-TTP.pdf; Abubakar Siddique, “Jundallah: Profile of a Sunni Extremist Group,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 20, 2009,

http://www.rferl.org/content/Jundallah_Profile_Of_A_Sunni_Extremist_Group/1856699.html

[44] Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller, and C. Christine Fair, “Ethnicity, Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2452059.

[45] START, “Global Terrorism Database [Data File],” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

[46] Qandeel Siddique, Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s Northwest (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2010); NCTC, “Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” National Counterterrorism Center, Counterterrorism Guide, (2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ttp.html; Matt Apuzzo, “Obama Strategy Widens Assault on Terrorists,” Marine Corps Times, February 12, 2010, http://archive.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20100212/NEWS/2120306/Obama-strategy-widens-assault-terrorists.

[47] Fayaz Aziz, “Blast in Pakistani City of Peshawar Kills 14,” Reuters, June 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/30/us-pakistan-blast-idUSBRE95T06R20130630.

[48] Ahmad Nabi, "Militant groups clash in Khyber; 50 killed," The Nation, June 6, 2010; Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal, Issue Paper: The Pakistani Taliban, January 2013. http://www.refworld.org/docid/514313f12.html

[49] Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Making Peace with Pakistani Taliban to Isolate Al-Qaeda: Successes and Failures,” Peace and Security Review 1, no. 2 (2008), https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/28335567/peace-and-security-review-vol1-no-2-international-centre-for-/9.

[50] Scott Neuman, “Pakistani Taliban Promise Cease-Fire To Resume Peace Talks,” NPR.org, March 1, 2014, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/01/284362882/pakistani-taliban-promise-cease-fire-to-resume-peace-talks.

[51] Jon Boone, “Pakistani Taliban Claim Karachi Attack and Leave Peace Talks in Crisis,” The Guardian, June 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/pakistan-taliban-karachi-attack-peace-talks.

[52] Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland, “Drones Decimating Taliban in Pakistan,” CNN News, July 3, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/03/opinion/bergen-drones-taliban-pakistan/index.html.

[53] Zachary Laub, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (November 18, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422; CNN, “Sources: Pakistani Taliban Leader Killed in Drone,” CNN.com, November 2, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/01/world/asia/pakistan-violence/index.html.

[54] US Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Other Release, Bureau of Counterterrorism, (August 20, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

[55] Public Safety Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” Listed Terrorist Entities, March 4, 2014, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx.