Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options

Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security

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About This Report

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About START

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START uses state-of-the-art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at infostart@start.umd.edu or visit www.start.umd.edu.

Citations

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Executive Summary

The Islamist group Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad, commonly referred to as Boko Haram, has emerged as a violent challenger to the authority of the Nigerian state. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) was tasked with examining Boko Haram in support of the U.S. Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa project, funded and coordinated by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA) of the Department of Defense. Specifically, START explored the following research questions:

1. What are Boko Haram’s strengths and potential vulnerabilities?
2. What policies can be employed to counter Boko Haram’s strengths and exploit its weaknesses?
3. What are USAFRICOM options for engaging U.S. government and foreign partners to deploy policies to counter Boko Haram?

Data informing this case study came from multiple sources. Open-source materials, including media reports, academic analyses, government documents, and intergovernmental reports, were obtained from multiple web-based databases. The author also traveled to Nigeria to conduct field interviews from August 11 through August 28, 2014. During that period, the author and local consultants conducted 46 interviews in Abuja, Kano, and Jos with government officials, diplomatic sources, and civil society actors working in mission spaces related to the crisis engendered in northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram activities. The author also procured additional published materials while in the field that were not available in the United States.

Several dynamics shape the Nigerian polity in ways that facilitate that rise of groups such as Boko Haram, including:

- The persistent divide between the North and South, with the North economically and increasingly politically marginalized;
- Pervasive corruption, with political power a primary means of economic empowerment; and
- Recurrent ethnic and sectarian conflict.

Taken together, these dynamics erode social trust, result in widespread disillusionment with the government, and contribute to a pool of potential recruits for extremism.

Founded by Muhammed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno State, Boko Haram was initially focused on da'wa and the creation of a micro-society exemplifying “pure” Islam. Salafist in orientation, the group’s goal was the Islamization of Nigeria. However, it was largely nonviolent until 2009. Members were recruited via the charismatic nature of Yusuf and financial incentives.

After Yusuf’s arrest and extrajudicial execution by Nigerian police in July 2009, Abubakar Shekau emerged as the new leader of the group. Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram has shifted its focus to jihad, with a dramatic increase in the frequency and lethality of its attacks. In the past year, the group has relied more heavily on conscription for recruitment while also seizing and trying to hold territory, a shift...
from previous hit-and-run tactics. Despite declaring a caliphate, Boko Haram has made little attempt at governing the territory it has captured.

The analysis has identified the following as key strengths of Boko Haram:
- Ability to use ungoverned spaces for strategic retreat and regrouping
- Maintenance of resource flows (both material and financial) through use of high-level criminal activity, including robberies, extortion, kidnapping, and looting;
- Infiltration of various security services and capacity for intelligence gathering; and
- Superior and adaptive fighting techniques, as compared to Nigerian forces.

The analysis also identified the following vulnerabilities:
- Growing reliance on conscription;
- Dependence on local resources, which may be increasingly depleted; and
- Need to maintain control of territory, as well as expand.

The Nigerian government has relied overwhelmingly on military responses to Boko Haram, which have failed. Over-reliance on military responses has empowered rather than defeated the organization. Therefore, going forward, a more balanced and coordinated approach to countering the group is called for.

Possible policy options to counter contextual conditions that advance Boko Haram include:
- Support anti-corruption reformers;
- Support efforts to build national narratives and identities; and
- Increase development efforts in northeast.

Policy option to counter Boko Haram's strengths include:
- Partner with neighboring countries to restrict access to safe havens for Boko Haram;
- Work to counter military corruption; and
- Support better intelligence and information-sharing.

Policy options to exploit Boko Haram's vulnerabilities include:
- Increase counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts, including providing exit options for non-committed fighters; and
- Use negotiations to incentivize defections.
Introduction

The Islamist group Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad, commonly referred to as Boko Haram, has emerged as a violent challenger to the authority of the Nigerian state. Despite a significant influx of military personnel to the areas of its strongholds, Boko Haram remains capable of launching significant attacks. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) was tasked with examining Boko Haram in support of the U.S. Engagement Options in Sub-Saharan Africa project, funded and coordinated by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA) of the Department of Defense. Specifically, START explored the following research questions:

4. What are Boko Haram’s strengths and potential vulnerabilities?
5. What policies can be employed to counter Boko Haram’s strengths and exploit its weaknesses?
6. What are USAFRICOM options for engaging U.S. government and foreign partners to deploy policies to counter Boko Haram?

This report is structured as follows. First, the methodology for the study is outlined. Background information on Nigeria, including a focus on the development of Islamist movements in the country, is then provided. The report then turns to a deep descriptive analysis of Boko Haram. Following an analysis of current policies deployed by Nigerian and international actors to counter Boko Haram, the report provides an assessment of options for policy engagement by AFRICOM and other U.S. actors.

Data and Methodology

Since the imposition of a state of emergency in May 2013 in the three Northeastern states in which Boko Haram activities center – Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa – information and reports on Boko Haram activities has become limited. Field interviews, especially with individuals who normally live in the Northeast or regularly travel there, can help provide information on visible, but otherwise unreported Boko Haram activities. At the same time, however, in the midst of government restrictions on information and the inevitable limits of individual first-hand knowledge, rumors and unconfirmed allegations have proliferated. Additionally, with national elections scheduled for February 2015, there is the possibility of manipulation of information for political gain. Therefore, to the extent possible, triangulation through

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1 “Boko Haram” is frequently reported as being Hausa for “Western education is forbidden.” While that is how the term is usually interpreted, “boko” is better translated as “inauthentic,” “fraudulent,” or “involving deception.” By extension, in common understanding, colonially-imposed Western forms of education (as well as other vehicles for Western, and specifically Western Christian, culture) are culturally inauthentic and fraudulent. For a fuller analysis of the etymology of “boko,” see Newman, Paul. 2013. “The Etymology of Hausa boko.” Mega-Chad Research Network. http://www.megatchad.net/publications/Newman-2013-Etymology-of-Hausa-boko.pdf.

2 Leaders of Boko Haram as well as some scholars who follow the group and policymakers seeking to counter the group have rejected the name “Boko Haram,” arguing that the group should be called by its self-given appellation or the abbreviations JAS or JASLAW. These concerns are here noted, but the term “Boko Haram” will be used throughout this report, due to its ubiquity in Western, and specifically American, accounts. The most prevalent name for the group among the audiences for this report is Boko Haram.
multiple sources unrelated to one another is desirable to, where possible, validate information and place
the views of field interview subjects into the appropriate context.

Data informing this case study came from multiple sources. Open-source materials, including media
reports, academic analyses, government documents, and intergovernmental reports, were obtained from
multiple web-based databases. The author also traveled to Nigeria to conduct field interviews from
August 11 through August 28, 2014.3 During that period, the author and local consultants conducted 46
interviews in Abuja, Kano, and Jos with government officials, diplomatic sources, and civil society actors
working in mission spaces related to the crisis engendered in northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram
activities.4 The author also procured additional published materials while in the field that were not
available in the United States.

Contextualizing Boko Haram

Boko Haram did not emerge nor does it exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is a product of and responsive to
Nigerian demographics, history, politics, and economics. Thus, in order to understand the growth of Boko
Haram and to evaluate policy options to counter the group, it is necessary to contextualize Boko Haram
within Nigeria. This section reviews key factors regarding Nigerian geography and demographics, its
political history and current dynamics, the Nigerian economy, and Islamism in Nigeria.

Geography and Demographics

Nigeria is located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea and is bordered by Benin, Niger, Chad, and
Cameroon. The country’s 36 states are divided into six geopolitical zones, adopted in 1995:

- North-Eastern: Taraba, Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, and Yobe;
- North-Western: Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Jigawa, and Katsina;
- South-Eastern: Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Abia, and Anambra;
- South-Southern: Akwa- Ibom, Bayelsa, Edo, Cross River, Rivers, and Delta; and
- South-Western: Ekiti, Oyo, Ogun, Lagos, Ondo, and Osun.5

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3 The author’s travel to the field was funded by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the U.S. Department of
4 In Abuja, interviews were held with 10 government actors and 22 civil society actors. In Jos, interviews were held with six
government actors and four civil society actors. In Kano, interviews were held with one government actor and five civil society
actors. While the locations of interviews were Abuja, Kano, and Jos, several of the informants were normally based or regularly
traveled to the Northeast, in particular Maiduguri, Borno State, for their activities. To protect confidentiality, especially of
those informants who live or work in the Northeast, no individual names or organizational affiliations will be cited in this
report. Instead, cited informants will be described in terms of their governmental versus civil society status and in terms of the
mission spaces (e.g., security, humanitarian assistance) in which they work.
zones-divide-north-south/.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated 2012 population of 166.6 million.\(^6\)

Nigeria continues to have a high fertility rate, and a significant “youth bulge” with nearly 71 percent of the population under the age of 30\(^7\) and over 40 percent under the age of 14.\(^8\)

Nigeria’s population is diverse, with more than 250 distinct ethnic groups with more than 500 languages and dialects spoken.\(^9\) The three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, who comprise approximately 29 percent of the population, the Yoruba, at an estimated 21 percent, and the Ibo (or Igbo), with 18 percent of the population.\(^10\) Despite significant internal migration, ethnic groups remain fairly concentrated in distinct regions of the country, with Yoruba mainly in the South-West zone, Hausa-Fulani in the three northern zones, and Ibo in the South-Eastern zone.\(^11\) Other significant ethnic groups, each with a population of more than one million, include the Kanuri (concentrated in the North-East, where Boko Haram activity is most prevalent with populations also in neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon), Tiv, and Ibibio.\(^12\)

Religion in Nigeria is, in general, affiliative rather than ascriptive. That is, individuals largely choose the practice of a particular religious faith. However, ethnic divisions tend to coincide somewhat with religious divisions.\(^13\) Muslims, who make up an estimated 50 percent of the population, are concentrated in northern zones, while Christians, with an estimated 40 percent of the population, are concentrated in the south. The approximate 10 percent of the population that practices traditional, animistic religions, is also concentrated in the south.\(^14\)

**Politics**

**British Colonialism**

Nigeria fell under British colonial rule in the late 19\(^{th}\) century, with formal establishment of a British colony on Nigerian territory in 1900, under Sir Frederick Lugard as the first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria.\(^15\) While Southern and Northern Nigeria were initially governed as separate entities due

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\(^13\) The reinforcing nature of ethnic and religious cleavages results in many communal conflicts being labeled alternately as ethnic or religious in nature, at times to suit the desires or preconception of the analyst or the dominant discourse at a given time rather than reflecting the nature of the conflict. For example, conflicts in Plateau State that were formerly labeled as ethnic in nature have in recent years been described as religious, although the primary actors have not changed.


to cultural differences, the British unified their governance in 1914 for economic reasons. However, “even after unification, north and south remained separate as the colonial system of indirect rule – governing the protectorates through indigenous rulers – merely institutionalized existing divisions.” Colonial administrators, ruling through traditional rulers who acquiesced to their directives, did set clear limits on the activities of traditional rulers.

British colonialism had several distinct effects on Northern Nigeria. First, colonialism resulted in the introduction of Western forms of education into an arena that had been a focal point of Islamic education for centuries, with its own traditions and elites. Thus, Western education was “seen as both a threat and a symbol of the increasing impact of an alien, colonial, Christian, materialist and corrupt process of Westernization.” Second, the economic policies of colonization, including the development of infrastructure in the north, resulted in the migration of southern laborers, particularly ethnic Ibo and Yoruba, into Northern Nigeria. These groups formed homogenous pockets within largely Hausa-Fulani cities, initiating “a sharp indigene/settler dichotomy that became a powerful tool through which politicians mobilized supporters for narrow political motives.” The potential for this dynamic to contribute to social violence can be seen in the Kano riots of 1953, which is noted as when “the first collective outburst between the Southerners and the Northerners or more correctly, between the major political parties, was recorded.” The indigene/settler dichotomy continues to contribute to social conflict to the present.

Post-Independence
Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960 and established a republic under the presidency of Nnamdi Azikiwe. The first post-independence elections were held in 1964. However, a military coup in 1966, led by Yakubu Gowon, ended the brief experiment with democratic rule. In February 1966, the largely ethnic Ijaw Niger Delta Volunteer Force declared an independent republic and fought with federal forces for 12 days before being defeated. Shortly thereafter, in response to increases in ethnic violence, an ethnic Ibo separatist movement declared the Republic of Biafra in May 1967 within the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Civil war broke out, resulting in up to three million deaths and mass
displacement of Ibos. Additionally, with the Biafran state located in the oil-producing regions of Nigeria, the economy was shattered. The federal government were able to reassert control, with the Biafran resistance surrendering in January 1970.24

Leadership transition by coup and counter-coup have been dominant in Nigeria's post-independence history. Murtala Mohammed ousted Gowon in 1975 in a coup, while Mohammed himself was killed in a failed coup attempt in 1976 and was succeeded by Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo, over a period of three years, led constitutional reform leading to a restoration of civilian government in 1979. However, once again, democratic rule, under President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, proved to be short-lived. Nigeria's Second Republic came to an end on December 31, 1983, when the military under Muhammadu Buhari once again seized power in a coup. Buhari also fell to a coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985. Babangida, in 1993, led the restoration of civilian rule under an Interim National Government; however, less than six months later, in November, General Sani Abacha overthrew the interim government and installed himself as dictator, a position he maintained until his death in 1998.25

The Fourth Republic
After Abacha’s death, his chief of defense Abdulsalami Abubakar led the transition to civilian rule, overseeing first local, then state, and finally national elections between December 1998 and February 1999. Former military leader Obasanjo won the presidency with his party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) also winning a legislative majority. While Nigeria has maintained civilian and elected rule since 1999, it has not experienced any change in party leadership. The PDP has won every presidential election since 1999, with Umaru Yar’Adua winning presidential elections in April 2007.26 Current president Goodluck Jonathan succeeded Yar’Adua after the latter’s death in 2010 and won re-election in 2011.27 The next federal elections are scheduled for February 2015.

The dominant political party is the People’s Democratic Party, which (prior to Jonathan) had an informal internal policy to alternate leadership between Muslim Northerners and Christian Southerners. With Jonathan, this internal dynamic has broken down, which has also exposed the party to defections.28 The primary opposition party is the All Progressives Congress (APC), which was established in 2013 when four opposition parties – the Action Congress of Nigeria, the Congress for Progressive Change, the All Nigeria Peoples Party, and part of the All Progressives Grand Alliance – merged in order to challenge the dominance of the PDP.29


**The Nigerian Economy**

Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa, having recently surpassed South Africa. Despite recent improvements in the non-oil sector, driven by agriculture and trade and services, the economy continues to be dominated by the petroleum industry, which provided 96 percent of export earnings in 2013 as well as 60 percent of fiscal revenue.\footnote{Barungi, Barbara. 2014. “Nigeria.” African Economic Outlook. Africa Development Bank. 3. \url{http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf}.} Nigeria is the fifth-largest OPEC producer and a major exporter of oil to Western states, including the United States.\footnote{Aghedo, Iro and Oarhe Osumah. 2012. “The Boko Haram Uprising: how should Nigeria Respond?” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 5: 861.} It has also experienced higher-than-average economic growth (compared to both West Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole) in recent years, with estimated growth of 7.4 percent in 2013 and 6.5 percent in 2012.\footnote{Barungi, Barbara. 2014. “Nigeria.” African Economic Outlook. Africa Development Bank. 2. \url{http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf}.}

Islam in Nigeria

Islam first appeared in the territory that is now northeast Nigeria sometime during the seventh and eighth centuries of the common era, although it was slow to spread in terms of numbers of converts. Mai Idris Alooma, leader of the Kanem-Bornu empire (which covered much of what is now northeast Nigeria as well as neighboring areas of Cameroon and Niger and most of Chad), attempted to establish Islamic law in the 16th century. Islam in northern Nigeria was largely propagated by the Qadiriya and Tijaniya Sufi brotherhoods, which continue as the dominant Islamic orders in contemporary Nigeria.

In the early 19th century, Sheik Usman dan Fodio launched an Islamic reform movement, aimed at removing Hausa leaders he saw as corrupt and as “indulging” un-Islamic practices. With his followers, he declared a jihad between 1802 and 1812, by which time he established a federation of Islamic states known as the Sokoto Caliphate under the leadership of the Sultan of Sokoto. The Sultan ruled through a network of emirs. At its height in the mid-1800s, the caliphate covered northern Nigeria, parts of southern Niger, and northern Benin and remained intact until 1903, when overthrown by British colonization. However, even under colonization, the implementation of indirect rule by the British allowed for more continuity than disruption in the caliphate’s internal legal authority structures. Following independence, the formal political power of the Sultan of Sokoto was removed; however, the position maintains a status as the leader of Nigeria’s Muslims. While “the sultan has no formal political powers, his influence is considerable.”

Contemporary Islamist movements in Nigeria frequently claim the legacy of Usman dan Fodio’s jihad, with the (re-)establishment of a caliphate with formal political power as well as religious authority as the ultimate goal. Nigeria has seen the rise of several influential Islamist movements from which Boko Haram’s leadership has drawn, to some degree, inspiration. As one scholar notes, “In moments of crisis and rapid social change, theological arguments acquire paramount importance for the self-definition of a new religious movement.” Among the most prominent of these movements have been Maitatsine, Yan Izala, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. Central to each of these movements was critique and desire to reform Nigerian political institutions, as well as critique of traditional religious elites.

The Maitatsine movement, called “Nigeria's first violent extremist group,” was established by the Cameroonian Muhammed Marwa, who settled in Kano and established a large community of supporters there. Marwa, who was called Maitatsine, was imprisoned and then deported in 1962 for his radical preaching, but later returned. Maitatsine preached the radical rejection of all non-Quranic innovation, which included practices from relying on hadith to the use of wristwatches. Many of his teachings were heterodox, including rejection of the Prophet Mohammed and declaring himself a prophet. Maitatsine recruited from the urban poor, in particular the almajiris, who came to Kano as a center of Islamic learning.

Maitatsine's supporters were involved in violent clashes in Kano as early as 1972, with increasing violence in 1979 and 1980. In 1980, an estimated 6,000 people were killed by the Nigerian army when Marwa and his followers tried to storm a major mosque, including Marwa himself. However, Marwa’s death did not lead to the end of his movement, and clashes erupted in 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1993 in multiple locales in northern Nigeria, including Yola, Gombe, outside Kaduna, and near Maiduguri.

While Boko Haram draws supporters from similar social strata as did Maitatsine, it is more closely related doctrinally to Jama'at Izalat al-Bidaa wa-Iqamat as Sunna, commonly known as Yan Izala. Yan Izala is the largest reform movement in Nigeria and an outspoken opponent of the established Sufi

54 Almajiris are young boys who attend Koranic schools under the tutelage of Islamic scholars. However, they may receive little education, are used for begging, and are subject to abuse. The Nigerian government has attempted to modernize the system of Islamic education, integrating Koranic schools with Western-style education. However, numerous unregulated schools and scholars persist.
orders. Founded in 1978 by Ismaila Idris in Jos under the spiritual leadership of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, Yan Izala is a Salafist organization that embraces a legalist and scripture-centric understanding of Islam, with a goal of purging the practice of Islam of foreign ideas and practices. To accomplish this, Izala proponents encourage “the faithful to live by its quite literal interpretation of the Qur’an, sunnah, and hadith; to emulate the salafs.” Yan Izala has been at the forefront of the movement for the implementation of shar’ia in northern states, and in some cities (such as Kano) its members make up the core of the Islamic police (the hisba). Furthermore, as discussed below, Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf was influenced by the teachings of Yan Izala, and Boko Haram's earliest recruits reportedly came largely from Yan Izala.

Yan Izala appealed to youth, especially unemployed graduates, with its emphasis on “individual, unmediated examination of the Sunna.” Additionally, with its focus on “purifying” Nigerian Islam from un-Islamic practices, Yan Izala rejected many social customs that youth, in particular, found constraining, including marriage payments. Thus, while joining Yan Izala may mean breaking with parents and traditional practices, it also allowed for greater individual freedom and agency for some. Yan Izala, despite its Salafist stance, also attracted significant female participation. Unlike some of its ideological colleagues, Yan Izala has promoted Islamic education for women and the participation of women in the public sphere (although under limitations of “separate but equal” activities). Yan Izala therefore represents a more individual autonomy-centered Islamist option in some senses than traditional Islamic practices in Northern Nigeria.

Shi’a Islam was practically nonexistent in Nigeria until the 1980s, with fewer than five percent of Nigeria’s Muslim population that is Shi’a. Despite the demographic weakness of the Shi’a, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), founded by Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, is a significant player in the Nigerian landscape. Inspired by the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Zakzaky began to promote the cause

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61 Hill 2010, 18
69 Hill 2010, 20
of Islamic revolution in Nigeria, beginning in the 1980s to the present. The IMN, which includes some Sunnis as well as Shi’as, has petitioned for the full implementation of shari’a laws, arguing that “secular authorities were not fit to hold power, and that the traditional religious rulers, either through cowardice or self-serving interest, facilitated their abuses by refusing to stand up to them.” The group allegedly receives funding from Iran, using it to provide social services and education to the poor.

The IMN reportedly “recruited among the most radical elements of the Islamist community, calling for campaigns against the West, Christians, the ‘Yan Izala, and the military governments.” Some sources allege that Mohammed Yusuf initially approached the IMN as a possible organizational vehicle for his vision, although his involvement in the IMN cannot be confirmed. The IMN also has a trained militia unit, the Horas. Based on the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, they are tasked with providing security at group meetings and events. In the past, they have clashed with rival groups.

**Key Dynamics in Nigeria**

Several dynamics shape the Nigerian polity in ways that facilitate that rise of the Islamist groups discussed above, as well as more violent manifestations such as Boko Haram. First is the persistent divide between north and south. The north, largely Muslim, remains economically underdeveloped and, increasingly, politically marginalized. Access to political power is a primary means for both individual and collective enrichment, which encourages some to use extreme measures, including a sometimes reckless exploitation of ethnic and religious identities, in order to obtain political power. As one analyst notes, “Nigerian politics were and remain characterized by a keen competition for socioeconomic resources with the state seen as the main dispenser of these benefits.... [I]n the competition for allocation of political power and resources, ethno‐religious sentiments are exploited.” Another notes, “Politics in Nigeria is the gateway to sudden wealth, an ostentatious lifestyle and self‐aggrandizement. It is a zero sum game, which produces absolute winners and losers. This character of politics encourages the resort to any means, including violence and mobilization of ethnic and religious sentiments, as well as the radicalization of organizations such as Boko Haram.” As will be seen below, Boko Haram in its early years was empowered and provided resources as a manifestation of these dynamics.

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70 Hill 2010, 23
71 Hill 2010, 23
72 Hill 2010, 24-25
75 Hill 2010, 23
The previous factors are exacerbated by pervasive corruption in the Nigerian state. Spoils accrue to the few elites, with limited distribution via patronage systems. Thus, despite a wealth of natural resources and considerable economic growth in recent years, many Nigerians (especially those in the north) remain shut out from economic opportunities.

Finally, since democratization in 1999, Nigeria has been shaken by recurrent ethnic and sectarian violence, driven largely by competition for political and economic resources. More than 30,000 Nigerians have died in these conflicts, eroding social trust and further intensifying the zero-sum nature of political and economic competition. The state’s response to such conflicts has also been largely coercive and repressive, as well as at times indiscriminate, weakening trust in the Nigerian government.

**Boko Haram**

**Founding and Evolution under Mohammed Yusuf**

Mohammed Yusuf founded the movement that would evolve into Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. Yusuf was a student of Sheik Abubakar Gumi, spiritual leader of the Izala movement, in the early 1990s and was also mentored by Sheik Jafaar Adam. Reportedly, many of Yusuf’s earliest followers were from the Izala movement. He moved into a leadership position at the Ndimi and Daggash mosques in Maiduguri, Borno State, although he was expelled from both by 2002 due to his increasing extremism.

After his expulsion from Ndimi and Daggash, Yusuf established his own mosque and Islamic school “to serve as a magnet for primary and secondary school pupils who, in response to his teachings, would abandon Westernized schools in the belief that Western education [Boko] is a sin [Haram].” Preaching radical sermons against the Muslim establishment as well as the state, Yusuf attracted a wide following.

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originally called the Yusufiyya, in northern Nigeria and bordering areas of Chad and Niger. Influenced by Saudi Arabian scholar Abubakar bin ‘Abdullah Abu Zayad’, Yusuf rejected the modern Islamic schools embraced by the Izala movement as well as secular education. He also turned against the Nigerian state and rejected the sultan of Sokoto as the nominal head of all Nigerian Muslims.

Initially non-violent, Yusuf attracted disillusioned youth who viewed him as a “moral crusader.” Yusuf gave grants and financial assistance to his recruits, including loans to start up small businesses; in turn, recruits contributed funds (gained either licitly or illicitly) back to the common purse. In 2004, Yusuf and several thousand of his followers established a settlement, called “Afghanistan,” near Kannamma, Yobe state, reportedly in emulation of the Prophet Mohammed’s migration (or hijra) from Mecca to Medina.

Multiple informants noted that former Borno Governor Ali Modu Sheriff empowered Yusuf’s group in its early years by arming and otherwise financing them and employing them for electioneering activities in a personal militia known as Ecomog; building personal militias during election season is a relatively common practice by politicians.

Small skirmishes between Yusuf’s followers and Nigerian authorities first erupted in late 2003 and early 2004. The Nigerian media then labeled the group “the Nigerian Taliban,” one of several nicknames the group would gain over its evolution. In September 2004, following more attacks, the Nigerian army went on the offensive against the group, dismantling the “Afghanistan” settlement and killing 27 followers.

Violence subsided until June 2009, although the group did not disband. The next confrontation was prompted by new laws regarding motorbikes, including a ban on driving at night and requirement to wear a helmet. Police checkpoints were used to enforce the new rules. Following the refusal by the sect’s members to follow the new law, a clash erupted with police in Bauchi state in which 17 members were

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shot,\textsuperscript{96} setting off a series of attacks and counter-attacks.\textsuperscript{97} The violence spread from Bauchi to four additional northern Nigerian states, with at least 900 killed in Maiduguri alone.\textsuperscript{98} Yusuf was taken into police custody and extrajudicially executed.\textsuperscript{99} The moment of Yusuf’s killing by Nigerian security agents is widely seen as the critical turning point in the evolution of Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{100}

**Boko Haram after Yusuf**

Following Yusuf’s death and the subsequent crackdown on suspected supporters, Boko Haram went underground. Nigerian authorities announced victory over the group. However, a year later, in September 2010, the sect re-emerged under the leadership of Yusuf’s second-in-command Abubakar Shekau with an attack on a Nigerian prison, resulting in the escape of 700 prisoners, including 150 Boko Haram members.\textsuperscript{101} Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram has evolved from a fringe religious movement into one of the most lethal terrorist organizations in the world.\textsuperscript{102}

**Ideology and Goals**

The ideology of Boko Haram is borrowed from Salafist thought and writings,\textsuperscript{103} “which treats anything western as completely un-Islamic.”\textsuperscript{104} Yusuf was reportedly strongly influenced by the writings of the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya,\textsuperscript{105} who called for jihad against rulers (including Muslim rulers) who did


not follow and apply shari’a law.\textsuperscript{106} While at the Ndimi mosque, he also specialized in the hadith collection entitled Riyadh al-Salihin, by Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi. This collection, which focuses on ethics, manners and conduct for a pious Muslim, also emphasizes the virtue and superiority of militant jihad and those that pursue it.\textsuperscript{107} However, in Boko Haram’s early days, the focus of the organization was primarily on da’wa (proselytizing and conversion).\textsuperscript{108} It was after the extrajudicial execution of Yusuf that the focus turned to jihad.\textsuperscript{109}

Yusuf, and Boko Haram, also embraced a redistributionist economic ideology. Umar Mamodu, a Boko Haram historian and scholar, states, “Yusuf believed in the creation of a new order in which the wretched should inherit the earth.”\textsuperscript{110} This rejection of the current socio-political hierarchy has proven appealing to the poor, the unemployed, and the uneducated.\textsuperscript{111} While the group has espoused redistribution, it also rejects the valuation of groups or individuals on the basis of their material wealth. Instead, members are told to value spiritual and metaphysical achievements.\textsuperscript{112}

Boko Haram is best known for its rejection of Western education.\textsuperscript{113} Western education (as well as other forms of Western influence, in terms of lifestyles, entertainment, and governance) are viewed as inauthentic to northern Nigeria and as infiltrating the north’s traditional way of life.\textsuperscript{114} There is a perception within northern Nigeria that Western education, which was introduced initially by Christian missionaries, is a vehicle to convert northern Muslims to Christianity.\textsuperscript{115} So, not only does Boko Haram reject Western education because of some of the content of the curriculum, but also because “evangelism deceptively camouflaged as Western education is Islamically unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{116} It should be noted that Boko Haram does not reject the content of Western education in its entirety – it has embraced technical and engineering solutions, for example. Rather, as Yusuf explicated during his interrogation by Nigerian police, “People should not seek the knowledge that contravenes the teaching of Islam. All knowledge that contradicts Islam is prohibited by the Almighty ... sihirri [sorcery or magic] is knowledge, but Allah has


\textsuperscript{109} Civil society representative engaged in democracy and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria.


\textsuperscript{111} Mohammed, Abdulkareem. 2010. \textit{The Paradox of Boko Haram}. Kano: Moving Image Limited. 43.


\textsuperscript{113} Academic. Interviewed by Chris Kwaaja. August 19, 2014. Jos, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{114} Civil society representative from Borno. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 21, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria.

\textsuperscript{115} Mohammed, Abdulkareem. 2010. \textit{The Paradox of Boko Haram}. Kano: Moving Image Limited. 44.

\textsuperscript{116} Mohammed, Abdulkareem. 2010. \textit{The Paradox of Boko Haram}. Kano: Moving Image Limited. 44.
forbidden it, shirk [polytheism or sharing or associating partners to Allah] is knowledge but Allah has
forbidden it....”117 Specific Western teachings or scientific theories that Boko Haram rejects include the
writings of various philosophers who question the existence of god, the Big Bang theory, Darwinism, the
law of conservation of matter and energy, and the rain cycle.118

Boko Haram’s goals center on the Islamization of Nigerian society in all its facets – political, economic,
and social.119 Initially, Yusuf and Boko Haram expressed this goal through withdrawal from what they
viewed as a corrupt society and the creation of a micro-society where “pure” Islam could be expressed.
Eventually, though, the ambition shifted to the displacement of the secular Nigerian regime for a Salafist
government.120 This includes, according to its spokesman, the application of shari’a throughout Nigeria
(including majority Christian areas).121 Yusuf also resolutely rejected democracy as an appropriate form
of governance for a Muslim society.122 What is less clear – both in Yusuf’s statements and writings as well
as in Boko Haram’s current configuration – is the geographic scope of Boko Haram’s ambitions. The
establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria is clearly a goal; however, it remains an open question if Boko
Haram also seeks the territorial expansion of such as state into neighboring countries or West Africa as a
whole.123

Leadership and Decision-making Structures
Shekau is the emir of Boko Haram, sitting at the top of the leadership structure. He is supported by a
Shura Council,124 although he does makes decisions at times without referring to the council.125 Members
of the Shura Council have responsibility for specific cells of the group, which have either functional or

120 Civil society representative engaged in human rights and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeria/
Singaporean Journal of Business Economics, and Management Studies, Ilishan Remo, Nigeria. 1:5-6
123 Civil society representative engaged in democracy and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin,
124 Different sources provide different estimates of the Shura Council’s membership, ranging from 11 up to 30. The Nigerian
government released a list of 18 members (not including Shekau) in 2012. See Nwankwo, Sunny. 2012. “Nigeria: JTF Declares
http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko-haram/SR308.pdf
geographic foci. According to open sources, the Shura rarely meets in person, relying instead on mobile phones for most communication. Members at lower levels may not know members of other cells.

Shekau is reportedly authoritarian in his leadership style; he has ordered the “death penalty” for anyone who did not follow his orders and has killed defectors. Beheadings have been used in the past to target more moderate members and members who had been arrested and were therefore no longer trusted. Shekau’s leadership style and his expansion of targeting to soft targets led to tensions within Boko Haram and its eventual split, with Mamman Nur (who reportedly introduced Shekau to Yusuf) forming Ansaru in 2012 with a more limited targeting repertoire (primarily, the kidnapping of foreigners). While Shekau maintains overall leadership, individual cell commanders also have some ability to act unilaterally in an opportunistic manner, without direct orders from Shekau.

Recruitment and Membership
Boko Haram uses both voluntary and coercive strategies for recruitment. Fighters joining voluntarily may be motivated for ideological and religious reasons, but may also join due to past victimization by the Nigerian military, which has been accused of human rights violations in the fight against the sect. Boko Haram also reportedly uses monetary incentives to attract recruits. For example, gang members in Diffa, Niger (across the border from Borno State) reported that Boko Haram were regularly recruiting

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131 Over the years, Shekau’s death has been reported multiple times, including at least twice in September 2014. However, most indications are that he is still alive and in control of the group. However, as one informant noted, “I’m not sure if it matters if he’s alive or dead – the idea of him exists.” Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria.


youth using financial incentives. 136 Uneducated, unskilled youth are a popular demographic from which the group pulls. Young people are among the most affected by the worsening poverty rate, and unemployment, along with other socioeconomic woes, contributes to an individual more susceptible to radicalization and indoctrination.137 Surveys conducted in Borno and Kaduna states found the high unemployment and poverty in those areas as the second most important reason why youth engage in religious-based violence.138 Almajiris139 are another population vulnerable to recruitment for material and psychological as well as religious reasons.140

Boko Haram, in its raids against towns and villages, also has routinely kidnapped individuals who are later forced to fight or otherwise provide support to the group.141 Informants also reported other uses of coercion and intimidation to recruit fighters,142 with coercive strategies becoming increasingly important since spring 2013.143

Several informants reported the presence of foreign fighters in Boko Haram’s ranks. One informant reported being involved in the arrest of foreign fighters in Kano in previous years, although he could not divulge the nationality of those arrested.144 According to other informants, attack victims have identified attackers as non-Nigerians and non-Kanuri,145 specifically Tuaregs.146 The Cameroonian government also indicated that it had identified two Tuareg fighters among Boko Haram militants killed in a clash in September 2014.147

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139 Almajiris are young boys who attend Koranic schools under the tutelage of Islamic scholars. However, they may receive little education, are used for begging, and are subject to abuse. The Nigerian government has attempted to modernize the system of Islamic education, integrating Koranic schools with Western-style education. However, numerous unregulated schools and scholars persist.
143 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
145 Civil society representative engaged in democracy and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Patterns of Violence

Following Shekau’s assumption of leadership, Boko Haram greatly increased its violence in terms of frequency of attacks, average lethality, and scope of targets. As of the end of 2013, according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Boko Haram has carried out more than 800 attacks since 2009 which have resulted in nearly 4,000 fatalities, making Boko Haram one of the most active terrorist groups in the world, in terms of attack frequency and overall lethality.148 Figure 1 breaks down the targets of those attacks.149

Boko Haram has also shown, to a far greater degree than other terrorist groups, a propensity for coordinated attacks, defined as attacks against multiple targets (either in the same general location or dispersed geographically) in the same day. More than 40 percent of its attacks between 2009 and 2011 were part of coordinated events, compared to 10 percent of all attacks globally during the same time period.150

Within Nigeria, Boko Haram violence is concentrated in the northeast, especially in Borno State, its birthplace. Boko Haram has also launched occasional attacks across the border into Cameroon and Niger. However, despite a concentration of attacks in northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram has demonstrated an ability to strike further south, including high-profile attacks in Abuja, the capital. Figure 2 maps the geographic and temporal distribution of attacks from 2010 through 2013 in terms of frequency, while Figure 3 maps the geographic and temporal distribution of attacks between 2010 and 2013 in terms of lethality.151

These figures reveal several patterns. First, although Boko Haram has launched attacks across the north and Middle Belt regions of Nigeria, the majority of attacks are in the northeast, with Borno State the primary area of concentration. Second, this dynamic seems to have intensified since the imposition of the state of emergency in May 2013, with a noticeable geographic contraction of Boko Haram activity in 2013 as compared to 2012. Third, while the frequency of Boko Haram attacks decreased from 2012 to 2013,

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lethality increased. That is, the average number of deaths associated with a Boko Haram attack has increased. This is likely due to a shift in the group’s tactical repertoire, as it decreased its use of bombing and assassination and increased its armed assaults (sometimes with 200 to 300 militants involved) on towns and villages. In other words, in 2013, Boko Haram began to rely more on insurgency or guerrilla warfare than classic terrorist tactics – perhaps in response to the declaration of the state of emergency and influx of military personnel into the northeast.

During the summer months of 2014, Boko Haram began seizing control of towns in northeast Nigeria in a shift from its previous hit-and-run tactics. Shekau, mimicking language used by the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL), declared a caliphate. Towns seized include Bama, the second-largest city in Borno after Maiduguri, as well as a string of smaller towns. While the Nigerian military has launched counterattacks and used airpower in an attempt to dislodge the militants, their success has thus far been limited.

Figure 2: Geographic and Temporal Distribution of Boko Haram Attacks
Figure 3: Boko Haram Lethality, 2010-2013
Relationships with Other Actors

Open sources, as well as informants in Nigeria, indicated that Boko Haram has relationships with other terrorist groups in Africa, particularly in the Sahel. The most frequently cited of these is al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),\(^{153}\) which has reportedly provided training\(^{154}\) and some financing to Boko Haram.\(^{155}\) In June 2010, Abdelmalek Droukdel, aka Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, the emir of AQIM, announced communication with Boko Haram and discussed possible assistance for the group.\(^{156}\) In 2011, Abubakar Adam Kambar and al-Barnawi (a member of Boko Haram’s Shura) reportedly met at an AQIM training camp in Algeria. Mamman Nur (who later split from Boko Haram and founded Ansaru) also reportedly trained with AQIM.\(^{157}\) Boko Haram also reportedly sent militants to support AQIM and the Movement for Unity and Jihad and West Africa (MUJAO) in their assault against the Malian state in 2012.\(^{158}\) However, one informant indicated that the relationship with AQIM may have weakened in recent years. Key individuals who brokered the relationship (e.g., Nur within Boko Haram and Mokhtar Belmokhtar within AQIM) have either been killed or moved on to different organizations. AQIM, with the French intervention in Mali, is also now more focused on its own survival.\(^{159}\) There is no indication whether or not the Tuaregs recently killed fighting for Boko Haram in Cameroon were also affiliated with AQIM or another Sahelian group involved in the 2012 Mali uprising.

Sources also mention a possible Boko Haram relationship with al-Shabaab in Somalia, primarily in terms of training.\(^{160}\) Nur reportedly trained in explosives in Somali with the group.\(^{161}\) However, linkages may be purely individual rather than organizational in the case of al-Shabaab.\(^{162}\)

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159 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


162 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Funding
Like many terrorist and insurgent groups, Boko Haram uses criminality to support its other activities. Some of this criminality is transnational and cross-border in nature, while other forms of criminality take place in the Nigerian context. This section details Boko Haram’s criminal behaviors outside its terrorist and insurgent activity. While Boko Haram is frequently presumed to be active in illicit trafficking markets, field research indicates that the group has perhaps not exploited Nigeria’s status as a key trafficking hub. Boko Haram does use non-trafficking related criminality extensively in order to sustain itself financially and materially, including extortion and protection rackets, bank robbery, looting, and kidnapping for ransom.

Illicit Trafficking
Boko Haram is frequently cited as an actor in the international illicit weapons market (for which Nigeria as a whole is a key market and occasional transit point). While some sources refer to Boko Haram as smuggling weapons, informants based in Nigeria downplayed the characterization of Boko Haram as trafficker and emphasized the group as a consumer within the market. The degree to which Boko Haram itself is facilitating the movement of arms into Nigeria, versus buying arms other actors trafficked into the country, was a subject of some debate. No informant indicated that Boko Haram was engaged in any weapons smuggling outside the immediate region (i.e., from neighboring countries into Nigeria or vice-versa). Several informants also referenced indications that Boko Haram may be involved to some extent in drug trafficking, although the group’s exact role was not elaborated. Despite Nigeria’s status as a hub for multiple trafficking markets in the region, Boko Haram at this point in time does not seem to be participating in extensive trafficking behavior, per se.

Multiple modalities are used to move weapons across Nigeria’s northern borders from neighboring states. Pickup trucks and other vehicles have been used, with arms embedded in legal goods or hidden in secret compartments. There are also reports of herds of livestock being used, with leather or


166 Some of the behavior being labeled as “trafficking” or “smuggling” in open sources may be Boko Haram members moving themselves and their arms between Nigeria and Cameroon, Niger, and Chad for purposes of evading state actors in those locations.


thatched bags attached to camels, donkeys or cows to conceal weapons. Boko Haram has also used women to smuggle weapons on their persons because they can frequently pass through checkpoints without being searched.

**Extortion**

Extortion was among the earliest forms of criminality adopted by Boko Haram. The group has coerced merchants into paying protection money. Multiple informants also related stories of northeastern politicians or their families, particularly in Borno State, being threatened with physical harm if they did not “donate” to Boko Haram’s cause. Informants also indicated that politicians in other northern states, such as Katsina and Jigawa, may be paying Boko Haram in order to prevent their locales from being attacked.

**Robbery and Looting**

Boko Haram also engaged in a campaign of bank robberies in the northeast. A 2012 report suggested that Boko Haram had stolen up to 3 million USD, although that figure could not be verified. While bank robbery was of particular importance up until the summer of 2013, it has declined since the declaration of the state of emergency in May 2013.

Boko Haram has also engaged in looting when it attacks towns, villages, and security installations. Informants reported that when Boko Haram attacks, its members frequently carry off everything of value that they can find, including cash, foodstuffs, toiletries, medical supplies, and weapons.

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174 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
177 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Kidnapping
The single largest source of funding for the group may be kidnap ransoms. While Boko Haram's kidnapping (sometimes in collaboration with Ansaru) of Westerners has gained significant media attention and garnered for them large ransoms, informants also indicated that Boko Haram routinely kidnaps local elders and business people for smaller ransoms which cumulate to significant sums. As one informant stated, “When you're talking millions of dollars, it is automatically the major source of funding.”

Responses to Boko Haram
Nigerian and international actors have launched a variety of intervention efforts to counter Boko Haram. This section will detail these efforts, focused on interventions since 2009.

Legal Framework
Early Nigerian laws regarding terrorism were based on section 11 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution, which stipulates that the National Assembly is responsible for public safety and order and can make laws to ensure their maintenance and security. In 2011, the National Assembly promulgated the Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA), which more specifically defined acts of terrorism while also providing a framework for the investigation, prosecution, and interdiction of suspects in terrorism cases. The TPA was amended several times in 2013, largely to address concerns expressed by international and domestic actors regarding human rights abused by Nigerian security forces, as well as to continue to pressure Boko Haram through legal action. Significant aspects of these amendments include the following:

- Delineating the boundary between terrorism and conspiracy;

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181 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


• Specifying functions and responsibilities of agencies with responsibilities in counter-terrorism arena;
• Expanding the role of the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) as the main coordinator for all counter-terrorism enforcement activity; and
• Charging the Attorney General to provide oversight ensuring that all counter-terrorism activities conform to international law.\textsuperscript{185}

Additionally, the death penalty was added as a legal punishment for terrorism convictions, and security forces were provided the right to confiscate vehicles, as well as to enter and bar people from their homes without a warrant.\textsuperscript{186} Despite changes, human rights watchdogs continue to express concerns regarding the TPA, especially section 9, 12, 26, and 28.\textsuperscript{187}

**Federal Responses**

The Federal Government of Nigeria has been the primary intervener against Boko Haram to date. Federal agencies that have played a role in countering Boko Haram and responding to the crises engendered by the group’s activities include the various branches of the armed forces, the Presidency, the Nigerian National Assembly, the Department of State Services (DSS), the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). However, the military has been the dominant actor engaged against Boko Haram. To this end, the Nigerian government has increased its defense budget to combat Boko Haram from $625 million in 2010, to $6 billion in 2011 and $1 trillion in 2012, 2013 and 2014.\textsuperscript{188}

**Security Responses**

**Overview**

In June 2009, under orders to eliminate Boko Haram, the Nigerian military destroyed multiple Boko Haram positions in and around Maiduguri with infantry and artillery, captured Mohammad Yusuf, and after a brief interrogation released him to the Nigerian police. The police subsequently executed him, his father-in-law, and Buji Foi, then State Commissioner of Religious Affairs who was funding Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{189} A video tape of these executions were reportedly released to YouTube.\textsuperscript{190} During the following months, a chaotic crackdown ensued in which more extrajudicial killings occurred, including the targeting of

\textsuperscript{185}“Nigerian senate passes new anti-terrorism act with death penalty for offenders.” Nigerian Watch, February 21, 2013.
\textsuperscript{186}“Nigerian senate passes new anti-terrorism act with death penalty for offenders.” Nigerian Watch, February 21, 2013.
bearded individuals.\textsuperscript{191} Directly after these arrests, clashes continued between government and Boko Haram forces that led to the death of around 700 people.\textsuperscript{192} During this time, security personnel cooperated with local imams and other traditional rulers to pinpoint members of Boko Haram. The property of alleged members was confiscated and distributed to the community leaders that helped identify them.\textsuperscript{193}

After the summer of 2009, the Nigerian military, mobile police (riot police), and DSS continued to act in combination as part of the Joint Task Force in Borno and Yobe states to combat Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{194} However, these forces concentrated on the capitals of these states and the areas around their own bases, which allowed Boko Haram to remain largely unmolested in forested and other uninhabited or lightly populated areas within the large states.\textsuperscript{195}

In 2011, the Nigerian military sent some 3,600 troops along with some Chadian and Nigerian troops to patrol north-east towns and prevent Boko Haram smuggling, but this failed as there were too few troops to adequately guard the large border region.\textsuperscript{196} In 2013, an additional 2,000 troops and air support were moved to the north to support the offensive. In 2014, another 3,000 troops were deployed as part of a joint task force of international military cooperation between Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.\textsuperscript{197}

In August 2013, the JTF combined police and military forces heading the offensive against Boko Haram was disbanded and replaced by a specialized military unit,\textsuperscript{198} named the 7th Infantry Division and placed under the command of Major-General Obida Etnan.\textsuperscript{199} Based in Maiduguri, the unit was initially composed of at least 8,000 troops, including 7,000 from army headquarters in Yola and an additional 1,000 troops returning from Mali.\textsuperscript{200} The three army brigades stationed in the northeast under the 3rd Armored Division are also now under the control of this division.\textsuperscript{201} As recently as June 2014, reports continue to surface that this new division suffers from serious problems, most notably a rift between


\textsuperscript{194} Higazi, Adam. 2013. “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in North East Nigeria.” CERI, July. 2.

\textsuperscript{195} Higazi, Adam. 2013. “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in North East Nigeria.” CERI, July. 2.


\textsuperscript{200} "Jonathan Creates New Army Division, Sends 8,000 Troops After Boko Haram." Vanguard (Lagos). August 18, 2013. LexisNexis Academic.

Officers and enlisted. Officers have accused non-commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers of cowardice, indiscipline, and mutiny, while NCOs and enlisted have accused officers of corruption and of aiding the enemy by selling equipment and intelligence to Boko Haram. Additionally, since its creation, the division has had four commanding officers.

Evaluation

Military build-up in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa since May 2013 has had uncertain results, dislodging Boko Haram from some positions but failing to address their strength in inhospitable and large regions that include porous borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Reportedly, Nigerian security forces have been infiltrated by Boko Haram, particularly in the north, and accusations of corruption and collusion between it and state forces are rampant among local citizens. Intelligence practices suffer from inter-agency competition and mistrust, as well as under reporting, poor information sharing, and bad recruitment policies. In early 2014, Jonathan fired all of his military chiefs of staffs to replace them with new leadership. Although it was never clearly stated, this move was likely due to the poor handling of combatting Boko Haram in the past, particularly the inability of the military branches to cooperate and work together effectively (or simply a political move to shore up support for the 2015 elections). Despite changes in leadership and changes in the configuration of military forces deployed, Boko Haram continued to launch successful attacks, including gaining control of towns and villages in 2014.

There have also been recurrent allegations of human rights abuses by the Nigerian military, as well as the Civilian Joint Task Forces (discussed further below). In August 2014, video evidence was leaked of Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force members engaging in extrajudicial killings (systematically cutting prisoners’ throats at mass graves) against what appear to be unarmed civilians. An Amnesty International report highlighted the incident and noted that the Nigerian military and CJTF engage in such activity “regularly.”

Most informants in Nigeria critiqued the government’s over-reliance on military and security responses. In particular, many informants identified the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf as a key trigger to Boko Haram’s embrace of violence.211 Other common critiques included:

- Prevalence of human rights abuses;
- High levels of corruption within the military; and
- Lack of equipment and counter-insurgency training for the rank-and-file.

Informants identified human rights abuses as a significant barrier to success in the fight against Boko Haram. First, military brutality undermines the government’s efforts to engage in counter-radicalization and de-radicalization.212 Second, human rights abuses by security forces undermines community trust, making it more difficult to obtain actionable intelligence that would aid efforts to counter Boko Haram.213 Informants who commented on the reasons for abuses attributed them to frustration on the part of the military, lack of training, and lack of local knowledge.214 Comments regarding the military’s approach to communities and human rights included:

- “The army’s understanding and perception of locals makes them attack communities indiscriminately.”215
- “The high-handedness of the counter-insurgency campaign has fueled grievances against the state. The state is the enemy of communities in the northeast.”216

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213 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 13, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


215 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 13, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

• “The military is killing out of frustration, in response to killing of soldiers. This has never worked; it just fuels the insurgency.”  

• “I think we need to continue with the military effort, but that is not the ultimate solution. We need to ensure that military and police are not violating rights. The more some violate rights, the more we create space for young people to become militant.”  

• “You do not use bullets or deaths to intimidate terrorists because they have already embraced death. So the repressive strategy is wrong.”

Informants also noted that corruption within the military is also a critical issue. Corruption was seen as taking two forms. First, several informants alleged that money allocated for arming and training forces fighting Boko Haram has instead been misappropriated by military and political leaders for their personal gain. Second, informants expressed concern that Boko Haram has infiltrated military forces and co-opted some military commanders. Comments regarding military corruption included:

• “Military leaders pocket $9 out of $10 of budget for the military campaign. … The military is becoming a criminal network.”

• “They [the military] should also put their house in order as there are elements within the groups that compromise them through giving out of intelligence to the insurgents.”

• “They [Boko Haram] have supporters among the people that are supposed to fight them, that is, the military and other security forces. And that is the biggest problem.”

Some informants linked corruption and misappropriation of defense funds directly to a lack of equipment and training for rank-and-file soldiers deployed to the northeast to fight Boko Haram. Others also
discussed a lack of proper equipment and training without linking it to the problem of corruption.\textsuperscript{226} The lack of support for the rank-and-file is seen as resulting in low morale, which has manifested in the form of protests and even mutiny.\textsuperscript{227} Furthermore, the lack of training is seen as contributing to the problem of human rights abuses. Representative comments regarding the lack of equipment included:

- “The firepower of Boko Haram seems to be overwhelming the federal government.”\textsuperscript{228}
- “There is so much money, but such a poor state in terms of equipment and the welfare of the rank-and-file, which explains the lack of motivation on part of the rank-and-file. Boko Haram understands this and exploits it.”\textsuperscript{229}
- “It has been a long time since the government has been budgeting for the upgrading of ammunitions for the Nigerian Army, so how can there be complaints that the army does not have weapons to engage the insurgents?”\textsuperscript{230}
- “[W]hen the average soldier in the battle front is saying he doesn’t even have ammunition to fight, that means there is a problem and we have been having billions of naira been given for security. What is happening to this money?”\textsuperscript{231}

**Negotiations**

**Overview**

The federal government has also engaged in limited attempts at negotiation with Boko Haram since 2009. In 2011, former president Obasanjo held talks with some Boko Haram members in Maiduguri, passing along their demands to President Jonathan. However, no formal talks or concrete actions emerged from this effort.\textsuperscript{232} In 2012, after Colonel Sambo Dasuki was named the National Security Advisor, he began traveling to the north to persuade community leaders to engage with Boko Haram elements and seek a peaceful resolution.\textsuperscript{233} Dasuki made it clear that he was open to negotiation, but Boko Haram dismissed


\textsuperscript{228} Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{229} Civil society representative engaged in development and humanitarian assistance. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Kop’ep Dabugat, and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 15, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{230} Government actor engaged in conflict management. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 18, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{231} Civil society actor engaged in development. Interviewed by Chris Kwaja. August 20, 2014. Jos, Nigeria


his efforts. In late 2012, the Nigerian government began negotiation with Boko Haram members through “back channels” of communication to disarm and de-radicalize terrorists, which reportedly continued into 2013. The Nigerian government has also attempted to negotiate with Boko Haram to exchange more than 200 school girls kidnapped from Chibok for 12 imprisoned Boko Haram commanders. In mid-October 2014, a government spokesperson announced that a ceasefire agreement had been reached with the group, which would include the release of the girls, although Boko Haram launched additional attacks (including abductions of up to 60 additional women and girls) in the following week. Negotiations did reportedly lead to the release of Chinese workers and Cameroonian hostages (including the wife of Cameroon’s deputy prime minister) seized by the group in northern Cameroon. As of the end of October 2014, a presidential spokesperson continued to claim talks were ongoing with the group, which denied the existence of a ceasefire and its participation in negotiations.

Evaluation
Informants had mixed views regarding efforts at negotiation with Boko Haram. Some felt that the government should have opted for negotiation initially, instead of relying on military options. However, many informants found it difficult to ascertain how to negotiate with a group using the level of violence of Boko Haram. Informants were also somewhat skeptical of the ability to identify and negotiate with Boko Haram representatives that could actually enforce agreements among the membership, especially given the elusive nature of Boko Haram’s leadership. Representative comments include:

- “Dialogue is a very important thing but then you negotiate with someone when you know what they want. Nobody knows what Boko Haram wants. How can you negotiate? It’s a very violent group.”
- “Who are the people we are going to talk to? Are we going to negotiate with ghosts?”

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235 “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency.” International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 216, April 3, 2014. 33. However, Jonathan later denied that talks were in process, saying all contact was “indirect.”


Counter-radicalization and De-radicalization

Overview

Under the leadership of Dasuki, the ONSA has taken the lead in developing counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programming in Nigeria. The 2014 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program headquartered in Abuja has a national coordinator, state coordinators, and local coordinators. It seeks to counter Boko Haram by implementing multiple government-sponsored initiatives that address terrorist motivations, grievances, and behaviors on the local, state and federal levels. The ONSA's CVE program also has developed and is implementing a de-radicalization program for prisoners.

The ONSA's counter-radicalization effort includes religious, cultural, communication, and governance components, with many focused specifically focused on at-risk youth, working in partnerships with a variety of other actors. Religiously and culturally focused programs include:

- Creating interfaith dialogues within regions susceptible to Boko Haram's influence;
- Implementing an imam training program to underscore the state's interpretation of Islam in the face of Boko Haram's;
- Gathering information on schools and religious places to understand how these groups operate;
- Creating a database of Islamic figures and institutions to help authorities understand which threats are more pertinent;
- Empowering research to discover and address how Muslim youths are being radicalized through simplistic Islamic education and manipulative terrorist leaders in the area;
- Building diversionary programs for youth that focus on extracurricular activities such as sports or art, as well as implementing mentorship programs.

The ONSA has also developed a strategic communications initiative, focused on harmonizing the government's counter-terrorism communications and to counter extremist narratives. The program involves media organizations, civil society organizations (including those focused on women’s and youth issues), the Nigeria Inter-religious Council, the Council of Ulamas, and the Army Civil Military Relations

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Unit, as well as key communicators in governmental ministries, departments, and agencies. One key point of focus for ONSA’s communications efforts is the development and deployment of counter-narratives, including:

- Creating a database of religious material that can act as a counter-narrative to Boko Haram’s radical religious beliefs;
- Building a “rapid response media team” will be created to quickly and effectively counter extremist messages in print, electronic and online media;
- Persuading local leaders to speak out against violent extremism;
- Deploying TV and radio messages that promote a counter-narrative to Boko Haram by delegitimizing their ideologies/causes and allowing terrorist victims to voice their outrage;
- Generating and distributing TV documentaries, radio songs, and Islamic audio tapes with religious teachings that act as counter-narratives to Boko Haram;
- Designing text message programs to disseminate SMS messages from the Quran and Hadith that denounce Boko Haram and advocate peace and tolerance;
- Supporting press conferences, mothers and student religious groups to speak out against violence and radical jihad;
- Offering counter-narratives online and in person that counter the ideologies taught to Nigerian youths as part of Boko Haram’s recruitment;
- Developing children-oriented media programming that seeks to delegitimize Boko Haram’s propaganda through rational exercises through simplistic media such as cartoons, books, and games.

Additionally, the ONSA works with the media through “workshops, seminars and periodic meetings” to reiterate the threats of Boko Haram and ensure the media is reporting appropriately on security issues. The office is also implementing an 18-month media campaign that seeks to address issues of “national identity, tolerance, interfaith and community resilience.”

Finally, some aspects of the CVE program focus on improving governance in affected areas. One program seeks to work with law enforcement to create new means of community policing and citizen/law-
enforcement cooperation. Another endeavors to improve engagement with communities and government-local interactions.

In addition to its counter-radicalization programming, the ONSA has taken the lead on developing and implementing prisoner de-radicalization programs for convicted and suspected terrorists already in custody. This includes:

- Establishing screening policies for prison workers to help them assess degree of radicalization within the prison population;
- Creation of units to handle terrorist suspects and prisoners separate from regular criminals;
- Provision of specialized training for units dealing with terrorist suspects and prisoners;
- Training and employment of specialists, including imams, religious scholars, psychologists, and social workers, to provide religious re-education, counseling, and training to prisoners;
- Provision of basic education and vocational training to prisoners, along with development of economic skills;
- Implementation of a sports and arts program; and
- Development of an after-care program for individuals that renounce terrorism, focused on providing psychosocial and economic support for their re-integration into Nigerian society.

The ONSA works closely with the Nigerian Prisons Service on de-radicalization programming. Additionally, the office involves Islamic leaders, the Psychological Society of Nigeria, as well as local and international NGOs.

**Evaluation**

The majority of informants were supportive of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programming, although some believed the government has taken too long to develop and implement...
Informants also had very positive opinions regarding the role of the ONSA, although some feared that the office’s efforts would face resistance by military leaders. Additionally, at least a few informants questioned the traction the ONSA had with the Presidency. However, of all the response efforts discussed by informants, the ONSA’s programming was uniformly seen as the best conceived and with significant potential to effect long-term change if implemented fully.

Some representative comments regarding counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programming include:

- “It took too long to develop a counter-terrorism policy. The current policy is good, with an emphasis on a soft approach. Its key elements of a soft approach, including counter-radicalization and de-radicalization, are very important. De-radicalization – actually changing the ideology – is significant, but counter-radicalization also important.”
- “We need to implement de-radicalization programs, especially of young people arrested and in jail. We need to engage young people in different communities prior to radicalization.”
- “There is a need to use a softer approach as a complimentary strategy at the ration of 30:70 or at most 40:60 with more of de-radicalization. If they [Boko Haram supporters and members] are de-radicalized, the chain is broken and gradually their recruitment drives will wane. The insurgents that are captured should be meaningfully engaged through love and dialogue. People like Sheikh Albani and Sheikh Jaafar were supposed to be engaged in a de-radicalization policy by the government, but they were not [engaged by government] and the insurgents eventually killed them. While that is being done a detailed engagement strategy for de-mobilization should also be initiated. There is a need to use the monies, for example the monies used to train the Niger Delta militants, to establish training centers in Nigeria where the people will be trained and a whole lot of others will benefit from them as well.”
- “The policy is heavily derived from rigorous research on de-radicalization, counter-radicalization, strategic communication, etc. For me, the big question is the buy-in. To what extent does the ONSA have traction in the system? I’ve not seen it influence Nigerian behavior at all.”
- “The NSA policy of der-adicalization is sound. It took two years to develop, but isn’t yet implemented. That is the only one [policy that has been well-conceived].”
- The soft approach is “dealing with root causes/drivers of the entire issue: what turns youth to violence extremism; what causes radicalization; how to deal with recruitment base. It is intelligence and research driven. Lots of research has been commissioned to understand what the

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266 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 13, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

267 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 15, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria


270 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

issues are and properly apply solutions. Some of that work NSRP [Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme] is working on with ONSA. A key aspect deals with de-radicalization – ONSA has commissioned quite a number of studies. Also, there is a unit that deals with strategic communication. For a long time, these guys [Boko Haram] have stolen the narrative. There was no counter-narrative, much less positive messaging. They're [ONSA] working with religious clerics so you can deal with that aspect of Boko Haram, because wrong interpretation of religion has been core of the recruitment base.”

Victim Support

Overview

NEMA is the primary actor within this space, focusing on the provision of humanitarian relief to victims of violence, especially displaced populations. The Presidency, through the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), and the ONSA also have limited programming for victim support.

Violence in the northeast displaced approximately 400,000 people between January and July 2014, according to NEMA. NEMA has set up IDP camps in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Gombe. However, few of the displaced reside in camps, choosing instead to stay with host families (sometimes friends or family members) in urban areas or southern states. Many of the host families and communities in the northeast already experience high levels of poverty, with the presence of IDPs straining resources and resulting in food insecurity. NEMA provides humanitarian relief (including food, sanitation supplies, educational services, and health services), but its access to IDPs is hampered both by their dispersion and by the level of insecurity in the northeast, particularly Borno.

The Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE, discussed in more detail below) incorporates the Victims Support Fund. Launched in 2014, the fund provides economic assistance to families who have

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lost members to Boko Haram attacks.\textsuperscript{280} After an 18-month development process, the ONSA is also starting to implement programming to provide psychosocial support for victims of violence, focusing on the diagnosis and treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The office has established an institute on PTSD, which serves as the umbrella for the three-tier program. The institute is now included in the Nigerian mental health program, meaning providers are required to have training in PTSD. The office is involved in training front-line health workers in every Nigerian state, as well as developing a referral system. A PTSD clinic was set up in Kano in 2014, one of several planned. The ONSA is also establishing centers of excellence in six geopolitical zones.\textsuperscript{281}

**Evaluation**

In discussing victim support, informants focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs of displaced persons and on psychosocial support for victims of violence. There did seem to be less awareness among civil society informants of emergent government efforts for the latter. Regarding humanitarian assistance, informants believed it needed to be extended, especially to ensure that displaced persons residing outside of camps received adequate support. However, informants did not criticize NEMA or its partners in their current and previous efforts to provide humanitarian aid to these populations.

Representative comments regarding victim support included:

- “The humanitarian aspect should be huge. Security may be paramount, but the humanitarian is also very important. There is a refugee problem, a cholera outbreak, lack of access to the basics – food, health, etc. is very poor. How do you get help to the communities? It is very difficult. Refugees are not just in camps. Refugees are also living in private houses/homes. What form of assistance for those? Success depends on how well resources are channelled. ... Humanitarian assistance cannot be constrained just to camps.”\textsuperscript{282}

- “Very little emphasis on victim support or victim protection.”\textsuperscript{283}

- “Now, there is more emphasis on victim support. But, what does victim support mean? What will the program look like? What will be the focus, and what is the role of civil society, of the private sector? How will security forces provide protection for a victim support program?”\textsuperscript{284}

- “Another important policy needed is a deliberate policy aimed at addressing the needs of trauma victims.”\textsuperscript{285}


\textsuperscript{281} Government security official. Interviewed by Amy Pate. August 27, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{282} Civil society representative engaged in democracy and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{283} Civil society representative engaged in development and humanitarian assistance.

\textsuperscript{284} Civil society representative engaged in development and humanitarian assistance. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Kop’ep Dabugat, and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 15, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria

\textsuperscript{285} Civil society actor engaged in development. Interviewed by Chris Kwaja. August 20, 2014. Jos, Nigeria
“One thing is that psychosocial support is almost missing. This support has to be context-specific, the kind of community determines it needs. We can’t wait until the post-conflict period to be providing this.”

Developmental Responses

Overview

The Presidency is the primary driver of federal developmental efforts in response to the insurgency in the northeast. The ONSA’s CVE program also includes some developmental efforts focused on supporting small businesses and job creation.

In 2014, Jonathan announced a plan called the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), which will seek to alleviate the economic motivations behind terrorism, such as poverty and illiteracy. This initiative will serve as an umbrella for some previous efforts as well as introduce new programming. The plan seeks to fast-track economic growth in the region. Specific efforts under the PINE umbrella include a $2.3 billion dollar program to boost domestic sugar and rice production in order to ease reliance on imports. PINE is also providing an estimated $187.5 million dollars for rebuilding schools and other public buildings destroyed by Boko Haram and the fighting in the northeast, with $60 million provided by the federal government while the rest was contributed by the private sector, foreign governments, and anonymous individuals. The federal government is also funding, in part, the Safe Schools Initiative that was initiated in 2014 in the northeast to ensure safety within schools.

Evaluation

Developmental efforts are difficult in the face of Boko Haram violence in the northeast. Informants, however, routinely cited the need for more developmental responses to Boko Haram, as well as attributing the rise of Boko Haram in part to developmental neglect of the northeastern region. Informants focused primarily on the theme of good governance, as well as education and poverty alleviation.

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286 Civil society representative engaged in democracy and development. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 14, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Typical responses regarding developmental neglect of the northeast as fueling the Boko Haram insurgency included:

- “The Nigerian government has reportedly failed at addressing the socio-economic plights, political grievances, and lack of physical security for most locals in Northern Nigeria and areas under the influence of Boko Haram.”

- “The state had no systematic design to deal with unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, social marginalization. You can have now in Borno State, 61% of children not going to school. That is what is creating an army of young people ready to carry arms. Poverty makes them vulnerable, susceptible to manipulation to take up arms. ... I think we need to continue with the military effort, but that is not the ultimate solution.”

Characteristic responses regarding the need to increase efforts to develop and integrate the northeastern states included:

- “Any policy that will not temper with the belief system or change the inner core of the group or address underlying conditions like poverty and the vulnerability of the people that become members, that will not engage the communities and is based on forms of discrimination, is wasting its time. It will not succeed. There is need to talk about resilience, solve poverty and for the communities to be vigilant in their neighborhoods.”

- “Development projects should also be prioritized because if there is development, the Boko Haram ideology will be effectively countered and it will lose its sympathies.”

- “The government needs to employ a stick and carrot approach to the issue, such that has worked in the Niger Delta. There is a need for the government to also make efforts to reduce poverty and also try to give the people a sense of belonging and a stake in peace. ... There is so much stealing in government to such an extent that government has alienated itself from the people and they do not see themselves as stakeholders. So when an insurgent group begins to attack the government and politicians, the people will not be bothered. ... They must also take measure like it was done in the Niger Delta with the aim of empowering people in deep poverty so as to alleviate the problem of youth restiveness.”

- “A food crisis is coming. We need ... to boost the idea that the northeast is part of Nigeria. PINE is underfunded for the size of the problem.”

- “The other angle, getting positive education to the youth and those who may become attracted to Boko Haram’s ideas, to make them understand that is not the way to go. We need to empower...”

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298 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
people economically and with skills to become more productive – this will make them less likely to be attracted to destructive ideas. This is something that could be developed further.”

State and Local Government Authorities

Overview

The federal government controls all security agencies within Nigeria, including the police. Therefore, state and local authorities have played a somewhat limited role in countering the activities of Boko Haram. Furthermore, many local authorities have themselves been displaced by the violence. According to one informant who supports conflict management work in the northeast, local governmental authorities are functional in only a few areas outside Maiduguri. State governments, particularly Borno State, have provided victim support activities. For example, Borno State’s Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development has worked with the UNICEF, the National Human Rights Commission, and NEMA to provide psychosocial support services to populations affected by Boko Haram violence. Kashim Shettima, the governor of Borno State, has also visited affected communities and provided some financial support to victims. Borno State also supports security efforts, especially the formalization of the Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF, discussed in more detail below), by providing monthly stipends.

Evaluation

Most informants viewed the capacity of state and local governments to counter Boko Haram as limited, relegating primary responsibility to the federal government. Local governments, in particular, were viewed as being so disrupted by Boko Haram violence as to render them powerless. Functions that informants did see as being carried out by state and local governments included advocacy on behalf of their constituents with the federal government, awareness and information campaigns, and distribution of humanitarian aid. Reviews of these actors in performing these functions was mixed.

Some illustrative responses regarding the performance of state and local governments included:

- “The state government is quite discriminating in how they distribute the relief materials, religious discrimination in their distribution.”
- “The state governments have enforced their security personnel; it now includes local community policing using vigilante groups comprising of residents of the local community. ... The Local Government Areas have collaborated strongly with their various state governments to pass information about any suspected activities in these areas. In fact, the federal, state and local...”

governments have developed multifaceted and collaborative approaches to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria.”

- “The state government should put pressure on the federal government to pay attention to certain things peculiar to the state because all Nigerian states are not the same. More attention should be paid on trust building among the state populace and state government. Let there be open forum with the state government as many problems are not communicated to the main actors of the government.”

- “The local and state governments are incompetent to address the problem posed by Boko Haram. Key to the issue is the federal government as this is more of a national issue and more needs to be done.”

- “The centralization of politics doesn’t allow states to take responsibility. In the North, the policy on roaming prophets and preachers has been watered down. All states have policies that preachers have to be certified – not only Islam, also Christianity. They are not being enforced.”

Some respondents also remarked on how poor performance in the past by state and local governments make effective response now much more difficult. Some illustrative responses in this vein included:

- “Some states are not alive to their duties, for example, the establishment of SEMAs. If you take a huge sum of money to help the people you govern, but don’t establish an agency fund so as to be in a state of preparedness, how do you coordinate a quick response should an emergency happen? The, if it happens, who do the people look to?”

- “My sense is that the northeast has had the worst governance over the decades – that has played a role in deepening poverty and creating structural basis for these grievances [fueling Boko Haram]. The large number of out-of-school youth is a pool. The problem with this country is that we develop great policies that we never implement. ... What are states/LGAs doing to ensure kids are going to school? These areas – education, health – are their primary responsibility. But, in Niger, just as poor and uneducated, so be careful of conclusions. Also, we have an almajiri system. Significant number of children in Borno are in the almajiri system; it creates a pool. It is the responsibility of communities to deal with the structural conditions that predispose to this type of response.”

**Civilian Groups**

Civilian groups, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups, and others, have been largely overwhelmed by Boko Haram’s onslaught. Nonetheless, respondents identified several roles

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308 Civil society representative engaged in anti-corruption. Interview with Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 18, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
in both non-security and security-related realms that civil society has been playing in northeastern Nigeria, frequently at great personal risk. The role of civilian groups, outside of the #BringBackOurGirls campaign and the civilian vigilante groups, has largely not been explored in open sources. While informants mentioned several non-security realms in which civil society organizations (CSOs) have been active, most focused more on the security role vigilantes have assumed in the face of the military's failure to contain Boko Haram violence.

Non-Security

Civil society actors have emerged in a variety of capacities in countering Boko Haram. These include:

- Promoting interfaith dialogue\(^{311}\) and working to counter Boko Haram's religious narratives;\(^{312}\)
- Conducting research and reporting results;\(^{313}\)
- Serving as advocates for human rights, good governance, and victim support;\(^{314}\) and
- Providing and distributing humanitarian relief.\(^{315}\)

Informants largely did not provide detailed descriptions of the work being carried out by civil society actors in these areas. For the most part, civil society groups (both religious and non-religious) act as partners to governmental actors. This has been due to both the relative weakness of civil society in the northeast, as well as the deteriorating security conditions there. For example, one informant noted, “The civil society is too weak and fragile to be effective. Broad networking among civil society and religious leaders should be strengthened. Such networks can be formed through funding. Funding can ensure that


people are better organized to address the issues. Generally, that is the problem across the north that CSOs have no capacity."316

Several informants noted that the federal government has not engaged civil society on the issue. Illustrative responses reflecting this perception included:

- “CSOs [civil society organizations] are left with no option than to play what I call a marginal role, very marginal role actually. ... CSOs can play very critical role I believe if they are supported to do so, if they are recognized as partners in progress in the fight against terror in this country.”317
- “Many civil society organizations and actors have knowledge to address the issue but they are hardly being consulted. Civil society is creating awareness but what they are doing is limited because of the lack of funds. The only way to boost what the civil society is doing is for the government and the civil society to work together.”318

Security

Overview

The inability of the Nigerian military to counter Boko Haram led to the development of self-protection, vigilante groups in multiple municipalities in northeastern Nigeria. Founded and organized in June 2013,319 these groups are largely made up of young men in units of 50 to 60 lightly armed individuals.320 These groups, termed the “Civilian JTF,” have been especially prevalent in Maiduguri and worked in conjunction with the Nigerian military to identify and apprehend Boko Haram members.321 The organization patrols, set up checkpoints and detains suspected Boko Haram militants.322 As a result, suspected CJTF members are often targeted by Boko Haram attacks in ambushes and assassinations.323

In May 2014, CJTF legal advisor Barrister Jibrin Gunda and spokesperson Bello Dambatta requested that their group receive arms from the Nigerian government to combat Boko Haram and protect civilians.324 By this time, the group had organizational capacity in more than 25 LGAs in northeastern Nigeria.325 In September 2014, the government announced it would begin professionally training the CJTF and

incorporating it into the government with more thorough oversight. Also in September 2014, around 12,000 volunteers showed up in Maiduguri to join the CJTF.

Evaluation

The CJTF has been accused of widespread human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings. For example, in August 2014, video evidence was leaked of Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force members engaging in extrajudicial killings (systematically cutting prisoners’ throats at mass graves) against what appear to be unarmed civilians. An Amnesty International report highlighted the incident and noted that the Nigerian military and CJTF engage in such activity “regularly.” The CJTF has also been accused of recruiting children to assist in attacks and spy. CJTF elements have been known to collude with the enemy and leak secret or misleading information to the media. Chief of Defense Staff Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh created an oversight committee within the government to regulate CJTF activities. The initiative recognizes that the CJTF has had some successes, but that some of its elements have committed human rights abuses, and aims to counter this latter trend with firmer government oversight.

Informants gave mixed evaluations of the CJTF. The majority of Nigerian informants supported the group, while international informants were more likely to express skepticism and concerns regarding its activities.

Positive evaluations of the CJTF included the following:

- “For us, in Borno, we all believe we are living in Borno still because of the CJTF.”
- “The CJTF is a confidence-building measure. Society said ‘enough, we don’t want a BH siege.’ So, bold youths mobilized a neighborhood watch. These youths need to be organized. ... They are now the partners of the security agency. They have rules of engagement. They have suffered casualties in past, which is a testimony that it is trying to join government to restore peace.”
- “The CJTF has been a very useful tool for positively engaging communities. If these young people were not engaged by the CJTF, they would have been engaged by Boko Haram. They help get intelligence and information for the military. From the signs we get, they [Boko Haram] know that...”

334 Civil society representative from Borno. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 21, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
335 Government researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate. August 26, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
CJTF constitutes an important instrument for the government. If government can leverage that resource, inject a few more creative ideas, we should see more good results.”336

- The CJTF “has helped a lot with intelligence, providing information because they are youth within the communities, especially in Maiduguri. It’s a grassroots initiative. ... They are able to identify Boko Haram members. ... [M]ost welcomed their [CJTF] participation. It goes to the importance of community participation, which had been overlooked until the CJTF made their own space.”337

Negative evaluations of the CJTF included:

- “It’s very scary, the CJTF. I went to Maiduguri twice now. By the time I got there, I had been stopped at 20 to 30 CJTF roadblocks. The CJTF are just everywhere. ... For military, it’s easy for them to abuse the CJTF. If you need not to be accountable, send in the CJTF. How do they join? Is there any screening? For me, if we don’t do something within the next six months, we’ll have problems. I prefer the military to these guys. Initially they may have been useful. But now, they are just scary.”338

- “The community groups are not a good idea. If you have an effective army that is strong, supported in all ramifications, use best practices, you don’t need any support from civilians, who are unarmed, untrained.”339

- “I am very suspicious of involving civilians. It could have consequences for the future – engaging young people in violent activities without the requisite training. ... I have heard it is successful, but I don’t have enough information, operationally speaking, to judge. But, I am very suspicious.”340

International Responses

Overview

International responses to the Boko Haram insurgency have included efforts to designate the group by a variety of actors as a terrorist organization, military assistance to and coordination with Nigeria, and development and humanitarian assistance.

Several countries and international organizations have designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. Such designations trigger sanctions against the group and its membership in terms of asset seizure and travel restrictions while also criminalizing the provision of material or financial support to the organization. In June 2012, the United States named Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and

336 Government actor engaged in conflict resolution. Interviewed by Amy Pate. August 26, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
340 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 13, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Abubakar Adam Kambar as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. The United Kingdom’s Home Office added Boko Haram to its list of proscribed terrorist organizations in July 2013. The U.S. designated Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in November 2013. The United Nations and the European Union designated the group as a terrorist organization in May 2014, following the Chibok kidnapping.

In the realm of military responses, many informants noted military cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbors as critical. In May 2013, a joint international task force consisting of units from Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria began a campaign against Boko Haram under the precedent of the Lake Chad Commission. However, Nigerian officials have said that Cameroon and Niger have not committed all of the troops that they originally pledged to combat Boko Haram militants in the border regions. Nigeria also began sharing intelligence with Cameroon and Benin on Boko Haram activity through its joint Gulf of Guinea Commission that was created to protect borders and ensure stability. In May 2014, Cameroon gave Nigerian air force pilots the right to enter their airspace while in hot pursuit of any Boko Haram militants.

Western powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, have also provided advice and training to the Nigerian military, as well as facilitating broader partnerships. International military assistance appears to have increased considerably following the Chibok kidnapping.

Nigeria is a major recipient of international development assistance from a variety of donors, including the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Programs in the states most affected by Boko Haram violence have focused on health initiatives, agricultural development, and education, although these have been somewhat disrupted since the upsurge in violence. There is also increasingly support for displaced persons, whose numbers have increased since 2013.

Evaluation

Informants uniformly recognized the importance of international cooperation and assistance in countering Boko Haram. The cooperation of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon was seen as particularly crucial, given Boko Haram’s propensity to move across those borders to recruit, procure resources, and find safe havens. France’s diplomatic efforts in regards to its former colonies was also seen as very constructive.\(^{349}\) In general, military cooperation and assistance was most frequently mentioned as desirable, primarily in terms of intelligence sharing, training, and provision of state-of-the-art equipment for troops. Some informants also mentioned the need for development assistance to address poverty in the northeast, while others mentioned efforts to fight corruption and increase government accountability and transparency. Characteristic comments regarding these facets of international responses included:

- “When we need you most [is] in terms of training. If the Nigerian military was working hand-in-hand with an international force, it would help build trust with local community.”\(^{350}\)
- “The international community should do two things: first, the international community should appreciate the circumstances that has brought about the current situation and embark on honest and sincere efforts for reducing the scope of some of these problems. The interventions of the international community are mostly in technical sectors that seek to assist in strengthening the state institutions. But there are short- to medium-term interventions that can help to alleviate the problem of crushing poverty. The second thing that the international community can do is for them to come down heavily on the government to demand that they are more inclusive, transparent and accountable and make the government to directly intervene in the poverty prone areas through special poverty alleviation skills acquisition programs.”\(^{351}\)
- “There is role – obtaining and sharing intelligence, helping with advice in general.”\(^{352}\)
- “Boko Haram is not in Pakistan or Iraq or Syria or Afghanistan or Saudi or Yemen. It is a local problem, and Nigeria needs to take care of it. But, the international community has not put enough pressure on Nigerian government to do the right thing.”\(^{353}\)

A minority of informants were critical of the level of support the Nigerian government had received from the international community. Comments representative of this minority opinion included:

- “At the international level, Nigeria has been one of the most consistent and persistent nations that has been part of the United Nations Mission in all crisis all over the world but Nigeria has been suffering from insurgency for many years but no effort. You can quote me anywhere – no effort


from the UN to help in any way; even the headquarters of the UN was bombed in Nigeria, but the UN has not deemed it fit to intervene in the Nigeria case.”354

- “We understand Francophone countries get support with France. France responds. We have not seen that from the US and the UK. What is the interest if you don’t intervene?”355

A larger proportion of respondents, while recognizing the importance of international cooperation and assistance, critiqued the lack of coordination among donors and a tendency of donors to respond in an ad hoc manner to highly visible events (such as the Chibok kidnapping)356 rather than engaging in a more systematic and strategic manner. Illustrative comments in this vein included:

- “All these efforts can work better if they are harmonized and coordinated effectively. There is a no information sharing policy by some of the actors involved with some of these programs.”357
- “Everybody is offering assistance, and we are welcoming all of them. But, who is harmonizing all these things?”358

Finally, a number of respondents recognized the difficulties the international community has faced in working with Nigerian actors. Limited capacity among key Nigerian state actors, reluctance of the Nigerian government to accept assistance, and frustrations with corruption and human rights abuses were all raised as significant obstacles for international actors. Such responses included:

- “But, they [U.S. military] can’t work with troops whose hands ‘are soiled,’ and troops in general have a low capacity to fight.”359
- “There are two things about the response of the international community. Number one, there is exasperation with the character of the current regime. They are at a loss as to what can help with this regime. They don’t think it has capacity. That presents a dilemma – how do you provide support? How do you intervene? Issues have been compartmentalized – not holistic. Then, there is further exasperation. That is a big problems. Issues have been raised and discussed; assistance has been offered, but then it doesn’t go anywhere. There is no transparency, accountability. We have to move beyond occasional intelligence support. Intelligence is only as effective as its utilization. Lots of willingness to support, because it is in these countries’ interests to contain global terror network. But, there is a lack of agency on the part of the recipient of support, due to the underestimation of the threat and pride.”360
- “There’s only so much you can do if the system can’t or won’t let you.”361

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355 Civil society representative from Borno. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 21, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
356 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
359 Civil society representative and researcher. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, and Kop’ep Dabugat. August 13, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
360 Civil society representative engaged in development and humanitarian assistance. Interviewed by Amy Pate, Kop’ep Dabugat, and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 15, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
361 Diplomatic source. Interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin. August 20, 2014. Abuja, Nigeria
Assessing Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options

Boko Haram: Strengths and Vulnerabilities

Boko Haram has demonstrated considerably more resilience than initially anticipated by the Nigerian government or international actors. Its key advantages may be summarized as the following:

- Ability to use ungoverned spaces for strategic retreat and regrouping, including the Sambisa Forest and porous borders between Nigeria and Cameroon, Niger, and Chad;
- Maintenance of resource flows (both material and financial) through use of high-level criminal activity, including robberies, extortion, kidnapping, and looting;
- Infiltration of various security services and capacity for intelligence gathering; and
- Superior and adaptive fighting techniques, as compared to Nigerian forces.

Despite these advantages, there are potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited. These include:

- Growing reliance on conscription;
- Dependence on local resources, which may be increasingly depleted;
- Seeming need to hold onto territory, as well as expand.

Informants noted, without exception, that Boko Haram is maintaining and growing its forces increasingly through conscription and other coercive means. Some informants believe that coercion is now the primary recruitment mechanism for the group. This indicates clear limits to the group’s popularity within the region. Furthermore, Boko Haram (unlike such groups as ISIS) has shown neither the ability nor the inclination to bring in members from outside the region. Conscripts may be less committed (and less skilled) fighters, as well as being more susceptible to co-optation or defection (if they have somewhere to defect to).

A second vulnerability is Boko Haram’s dependence on local resources, including for day-to-day needs. Informants noted that Boko Haram relies on criminality (especially robbery, looting, and extortion) in order to supply itself with weapons, food, medical supplies, and other necessities. Multiple informants (especially those with direct knowledge of the situation on the ground in Borno) noted that areas are becoming de-populated and that normal economic activities (such as farming and markets) have been disrupted. Both of these trends means that Boko Haram may be forced to go further afield in order to supply itself. This presents a potential vulnerability for the organization.

Finally, the increased scope in Boko Haram’s ambitions may present a vulnerability. Previously, Boko Haram depended on hit-and-run tactics. In declaring a caliphate, Boko Haram needs to control villages, towns, and cities, which both stretches its personnel resources as well as making them more vulnerable to counter-attack by military forces.

Partners and Policy Options

Based on the previous analysis, several options present themselves. First, in terms of potential partners for engagement, the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) emerged as the federal actor with the most positive evaluations from informants and also, perhaps, the most need for external partnership to bolster its internal standing. The ONSA is tasked with coordinating counter-terrorism efforts, but many
informants expressed reservations regarding the degree of buy-in from other key actors, including elected leaders and the military. Furthermore, the ONSA was seen as using a balanced approach that was rigorously researched, while it was not seen as tainted by human rights violations. The ONSA may also be the best situated to provide a coordination function which several informants said is sorely needed.

There are also multiple policy options, although all are difficult in the short-term. First, based on interviews and open sources, it seems clear that the Nigerian military will continue to be a key actor. However, the situation in the northeast has been overly securitized while rank-and-file troops are both under-equipped and under-trained. However, the primary reason for military failure has not been a lack of resources allocated to the military. Rather, it is the illicit diversion of those resources to private purposes that seems to be the primary problem. Therefore, further increasing resources allocated to the military will not likely increase substantially military capacity while also constraining resources that can be devoted to other needs, including development priorities, which have long-term effects on the viability of Boko Haram. Thus, military corruption becomes an important area for engagement.

Furthermore, to date, the military has been largely reactive, a stance which has clearly failed. While this reactive stance is in part due to lack of training and equipment, it is seems to be more strongly related to poor intelligence and to high levels of mistrust within the military. Supporting better intelligence and information-sharing processes may help alleviate the first problem. However, the successful utilization of the intelligence depends on the rank-and-file trusting their commanders and vice-versa. Widespread belief (with some empirical justification) that Boko Haram members have infiltrated the military simultaneous with poor conditions of troops make trust a difficult objective to achieve. Policies to improve morale could therefore be pursued.

Finally, in terms of security responses, the role of the CJTF needs to be considered. Given the failure of the government to provide security to civilians in the northeast, it is not surprising that self-organization of security has emerged. However, such experiments in other contexts have proven difficult to control in the longer term and have undermined long-term governance and development, while exacerbating violence and human rights abuses. Therefore, policies to reduce the role of the CJTF while also regularizing it should be considered.

As previously mentioned, the emphasis on military response has resulted in other response options being under-utilized. Counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies, which are currently in the early stages of implementation, need to be supported and expanded. Such policies, while helpful in the short-term, are crucial in preventing the emergence of other extremist groups which could either join or take the place of Boko Haram.

Negotiations also continue to be a policy option. Given recent events, including a failed ceasefire and Shekau's insistence that negotiations are not ongoing, some analysts have advanced that all attempts at negotiation should be abandoned. However, while negotiations with Shekau and his inner circle may not be fruitful, it may be possible to promote defections by some commanders or units using negotiations. Thus, negotiations should not be abandoned in their entirety due to recent failures.

Finally, in the long-term, the northeast needs to be developed and integrated into the Nigerian state. The northeast, even prior to the Boko Haram insurgency, suffered from underdevelopment and a lack of connection to the Nigerian state. Many informants noted that without a more comprehensive development strategy – built and implemented with input from key stakeholders in the northeast –
violence will remain a viable strategy for the disillusioned, even if that violence does not take the form of Boko Haram.

Boko Haram has entrenched itself in Nigeria’s northeast, proving itself resilient in the face of past attempts to dislodge and dismantle it. Over-reliance on military responses has empowered rather than defeated the organization. Therefore, going forward, a more balanced and coordinated approach to countering the group is called for.