

Experimental research on carrying out and justifying terrorism

- Experiments around the world looking at the impact of Risk, Grievance, Personality Traits (SDO, RWA, AIS, RIS, & RF measured) on the willingness to carry out or justify terrorism (Zogby Analytics)
- 2 (high/low grievance) x 2 (high/low risk) [x 2 (high / low opportunity)*] experimental design.
- DVs = Justification of protests and different attack scenarios
- For Jordan, the US, Turkey*, and Malaysia grievance is key for either justification of protest or attack.
- For Egypt and Morocco RIS and SDO predict justification of attacks but not grievance
 - AIS predicts justification of protest
 - RF positively related to justification of protest, negatively related to attacks against civilians in Egyptian sample
- Next steps: enhanced methodology (AR, content and scenarios), conduct with US samples to explore differences



Recruitment and Radicalization Among U.S. Far-Right Terrorists

Radicalization Pathways







DNDO Integration Task 4: Insider Threat to International Air Cargo (IAC) Supply Chain

RESEARCH OVERVIEW

OVERVIEW & METHODOLOGY

In order to more fully establish the GNDA, **START** seeks to assess the insider terrorism-related threat to the IAC supply chain with respect to its conveyance of freight into the United States. An improvised RN device or source being smuggled into US airspace presents one of the most terrifying potential scenarios; most studies fail to characterize the insider aspect.

Project Focal Points

- [1] Operational and security environments prior to and including foreign last points of departure.
- [2] Infiltrators, traitors, and/or coerced personnel working as vetted employees of any organization with influence over operations or security within the IAC supply chain.
- [3] Development of analytical abilities which can properly assess the deterrent value of existing safety, security, regulatory, and business systems, as well as probable insider vulnerabilities and insider targeting calculus.

Products

Literature Review

Comprising information from 300 sources: cargo aviation supply chain and operations; aviation security protocols and infrastructure; infiltration, betrayal, coercion, and corporate espionage; workplace psychology and security culture.

Operational Process Model

Mapping IAC supply chain, "nodes," freight pathways, and their functional relationships; developing subversion and exploit tables according to employee classes; developing typology of insiders and varying insider targeting and behavior models.


LPOD Case Study/Interviews/Industry Outreach/SME Consultations

Validating and enhancing literature review and operational process model.

PI: Dr. Gary Ackerman | Researchers: Herbert Tinsley and Gabrielle Matuzsan

TECHNICAL APPROACH

OPERATIONAL PROCESS MODEL [VERSION 2]



QUANTITATIVE BENEFITS


SUBVERSION TABLE [SAMPLE]

	FUNC, SPEC, SUPV, MNGT	POLICY	QC	FLIGHT
Protocol Formulation		misidentify role, alter protocol, not create		
		protocol, crew new protocol		
Electronic Monitoring	misidentify role, actively allow others in, tamper/disable with equipment	misidentify role, alter protocol	misidentify role	misidentify role, tamper/disable equipment
Communications	misidentify role, not utilize system, tamper/disable equipment, send incorrect info, overload	misidentify role, alter protocol	misidentify role	misidentify role, not utilize system, tamper/disable equipment, send incorrect info, overload
Personnel Vetting	misidentify role	misidentify role, alter protocol	misidentify role, QC ONLY falsify vetting info, ignore vetting info	misidentify role
Personnel Training	misidentify role, train improperly, train poorly, not train	misidentify role, alter protocol	misidentify role, QC ONLY train improperly, train poorly, not train	misidentify role
Personnel and Equipment Auditing	misidentify role, SUPV, MNGT ONLY ignore personnel issues or faulty equipment, not audit, falsify audit info	misidentify role, alter protocol	misidentify role, QC ONLY ignore personnel or faulty equipment, no audit, falsify audit info	misidentify role

Contact: Herbert Tinsley (htinsley@start.umd.edu) • www.start.umd.edu



Organizational Determinants of Violence and Performance: LEADIR



- Coded **1406 Attacks** on Criteria:
 - Destruction to people, process, property, & symbols
 - Innovation in methods, weapons, & targets
- Coded Organizational Criteria:
 - Notoriety, Reputation,
 Munificence, Recruiting

- Coded 90 Ideological Organizations 42 Features:
 - Leadership Styles, Structure, Operating Norms
 - Marketing Strategies, Promotional Efforts
 - Size, Age, Mission, Control Variables

Dr. Gina Ligon, gligon@unomaha.edu





Big Allied and Dangerous VNSA DATA

Karl Rethemeyer, kretheme@albany.edu

- Data on violent nonstate actors draw from GTD and UCDP
- Yearly data from 1998-2012 (and updating)
- Preliminary data 1998-2007 & cleaned data for insurgents 1998-2012
- Data on: Size, ideology, network connections, social services, funding....

Research agenda

- Examining factors that impact
 - Terrorist lethality
 - CBRN usage
 - Alliance and rivalry structure
 - Targeting civilians
- Examining impact of
 - Decapitation
 - General counterterrorism policies




Validating Models of Adversary Behavior

Dr. Jun Zhuang (PI), Ms. Jing Zhang, Dept. Industrial and Systems Engineering, University at Buffalo; jzhuang@buffalo.edu Dr. Vicki Bier (Co-PI), Dept. Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison

First conference on Validating Models of Adversary Behavior, Buffalo/Niagara Falls, NY, June 23-26, 2013.





- 50 participants
- 17 oral presentations
- 7 poster presentations
- 9 small groups for half-day model validation exercises

Risk Analysis

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis

- 1 accepted; 2 rejected
- 11 under review/revision
- Exp. Publication: early 2015



CSTAB 2.12 Attitudes within American Subcultures

Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko cmccaule@brynmawr.edu

Goal: Fast-turnaround \$30k internet survey for tracking U.S. minority opinions (Muslim, Right-Wing, ALF/ELF)

Progress: July 2013 and 2014 n=200 surveys of U.S. Muslims. 2013 ~ Pew 2011 1000 Muslims 1\$M

Recent result: 2014 added item about going to fight Bashar in Syria: about half favorable ("wouldn't condemn" 25% "morally justified" 25%)

Currently: New items about ISIS September 2014



Terrorist Behavior and Societal Tolerance of Violence

Risa Brooks risa.brooks@Marquette.edu

Question: What are the effects of societal tolerances on terrorist groups' decisions to use tactics that target civilians.?

Method: Through case studies based on field work, this project analyzes significant episodes in the armed campaigns of three groups:

- The Provisional IRA or PIRA (focusing on key events in the period 1969-1993);
- Palestinian Hamas (from 1988-2005); and,
- Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (from 2003-2006).

Findings:

- PIRA and HAMAS: Both groups compromised strategic and ideological goals
 when faced with negative reactions to their tactics; only when the community
 was sufficiently radicalized to endorse attacks against civilians was a group free to
 pursue those tactics without fear of condemnation.
- AQI: A lack of strong social footing in the Sunni areas meant that strategic and ideological pressures prevailed and overrode societal reactions in dictating tactical choices and the targeting of civilians.



One God For All? Fundamentalism and Group Radicalization

Johanna K. Birnir & Nil S. Satana nsatana@bilkent.edu.tr

Research Design

- Coding religion (family, denomination, sect) for all AMAR groups
- Matching AMAR groups with GTD terrorist incidents
- Testing for the effect of group religious differences on terrorist incidents

Methodology

Theory Development and Large N Study -- Statistical Analysis -- and Case Studies

Research Plan

About 50 countries a year to be completed in 3 project years

Progress

First 50 religion and matching variables completed!

Preliminary findings

- Religious family orientation of minority and majority groups has no independent systematic effect across nations on the likelihood for terrorist incidents.
- Religion interacted with political variables (access) has an effect on terrorist incidents.

Difficulties/hurdles & Solutions

- Finding sources for coding group religion harder than anticipated.
- Matching variable coding decisions trickier than anticipated.

Next Steps

Keep matching!