



START

Public-Private Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism: Field Principles for Action

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About This Report

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About START

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Executive Summary

This report articulates steps toward creating successful public-private partnerships (PPPs) for the purposes of eliciting positive outcomes for countering violent extremism (CVE). It specifically provides guiding principles for government actors to facilitate CVE-focused PPPs, as well as describes key means for government and non-government partners to develop, implement, and sustain successful CVE-focused PPPs. In addition to, and in accordance with this vision of partnership, the report seeks to achieve the following:

- Survey different government sourcing options and partnering strategies to achieve desired programmatic and policy outcomes, with a particular focus on PPPs.
- Discuss the field of CVE policy and practice, including its evolution and why government actors have increasingly called for PPPs to achieve desired outcomes.
- Enunciate 14 field principles of successful PPPs, drawn from lessons in the “Partnered Government” literature and lessons learned from successes and setbacks in multiple contexts, including CVE.

These 14 field principles, listed below, span across two broad categories for CVE-focused PPPs: 1) Principles for Government Actors to Facilitate PPPs and 2) Principles for Developing, Implementing, and Sustaining Successful PPPs.

Principles for Government Actors to Facilitate PPPs

1. Identify the division of labor
2. Reduce barriers to entry for non-governmental partners
3. Foster an organizational culture that makes partnering a top priority
4. Act as an “innovation catalyst”

Principles for Developing, Implementing, and Sustaining Successful PPPs

1. Have clear goals
2. Focus on results and measure progress
3. Involve consumers in developing programs
4. Involve diverse stakeholders from the start
5. Identify and utilize champions for support
6. Establish clear governance structures
7. Adapt to changing conditions
8. Enable all partners to benefit
9. Work to maintain momentum and sustain efforts
10. Balance transparency and confidentiality

Introduction¹

Since 2000 in the United States there have been two major developments relating to the delivery of public safety services at federal, state, and local levels. One major development is the increasing shift from the government as the traditional provider of services to the government as *manager* of services. This movement has been driven by a longstanding American preference toward non-governmental (private and civil society) actors engaging in service provision, wherever possible, as opposed to public actors. It is also based on the rationale that, “when properly implemented—it results in significant benefits, in terms of improved performance *and* lower costs, to both the government and to the public being served.”²

Therefore policymakers increasingly rely on some aspect of Partnered Government³—a broad concept where different public agencies join with each other and non-governmental actors to develop and deliver services—as a means of crafting effective solutions to public policy challenges at home and abroad. A public-private partnership (PPP) is one type of Partnered Government sourcing option, among several that policymakers can choose from, to deliver services. PPPs have been utilized to deliver a variety of goods and services to the public.

The second major development has been international policymakers’ increased attention to combating terrorism and violent extremism, particularly after September 11, 2001. To date, most governments’ policies have largely focused on employing the use of force, such as surveillance, arrests, and in some cases, military strikes. However policymakers and law enforcement practitioners are increasingly recognizing the limitations of such “hard” approaches, thus providing avenues for non-governmental actors such as religious workers, social workers, development professionals, and mental health workers to professionally contribute their insights and skillsets to this issue.

This report seeks to articulate principles of developing effective PPPs for the purposes of countering violent extremism (CVE).

It begins with an overview of the methodology, definition of terms, and limitations of the report. It then provides a brief survey of different government sourcing options and partnering strategies to achieve desired programmatic and policy outcomes, with a particular focus on PPPs. We then discuss CVE, including its evolution and why government actors have increasingly called for PPPs to achieve desired

¹ The authors wish to thank Dr. Amy Pate, Dr. John Sawyer, and Brandon Behlendorf for their reviews and assistance. They also want to thank Dr. Gina Ligon, Dr. Stevan Weine, Liberty Day and Meredith Collier-Murayama for providing access to their research and training publications. Thanks to Jason Albersheim for his proofreading assistance. Finally a special gratitude is owed to William Lucyshyn, Interim Director and Director of Research at the University of Maryland’s Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, whose willingness to share his scholarly and practical insights on government contracting and public-private partnerships were invaluable to the success of this publication.

² Jacques S. Gansler, “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the Provider,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2003, 6, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/MarketBasedGovernment.pdf>.

³ Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, “Partnered Government: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,” *University of Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, January 2010, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/file/871/download?token=cytRerlf>

outcomes. Finally, the report articulates 14 principles of successful PPPs, drawn from lessons in the “Partnered Government” literature and lessons learned from successes and setbacks in multiple contexts, including CVE.

Parameters, Methodology, and Limitations

To establish the research parameters, it is necessary for us to briefly clarify what are and what are *not* the purposes of this report. We provide general guidelines rather than step-by-step instructions on how to create successful public-private partnerships (PPP) for the purposes of combating violent extremism (CVE) and achieving CVE-positive outcomes.

Our report draws from the literature on PPPs, largely from youth development and other contexts, for two reasons. First, despite policymakers’ calls for PPPs as a means to achieve CVE-positive outcomes, we were unable to identify any scholarly publications focused on the formation of PPPs specifically for CVE purposes. Second, research suggests insights from youth development, crime prevention, mental health, and public health contexts can inform efforts to reduce environmental factors that are theorized and empirically found to be associated with individual-level radicalization into violence.⁴ However, we also draw from literature in other contexts—in this case, U.S. defense procurement, policy innovation, health services, and cybersecurity outcomes—following the suggestions of other scholars who sought to access a broader range of theories and data in an effort to generate better insights on PPPs in specific contexts.⁵

It is necessary to note that the principles articulated in this report are likely to evolve in response to new violent actors, regional/social contexts, and lessons learned both within CVE contexts and the broader PPP research field. For now, these principles can assist government and non-governmental actors in facilitating, developing, implementing, and sustaining successful CVE-focused partnerships.

⁴ For example, see: Stevan Weine, “Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul,” University of Maryland START Center, August 2012, accessed April 28, 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf; Kamaldeep S. Bhui, Madelyn H. Hicks, Myrna Lashley, Edgar Jones, “A Public Health Approach to Understanding and Preventing Violent Radicalization,” *BMC Medicine* 10, no. 16 (2012), DOI: 10.1186/1741-7015-10-16; Pete Simi, Bryan F. Bubolz, Hillary McNeel, Karyn Sporer, and Steven Windisch, “Trauma as a Precursor to Violent Extremism,” University of Maryland START Center, April 2015, accessed April 27, 2016 https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_TraumaAsPrecursortoViolentExtremism_April2015.pdf; Arie W. Kruglanski, “Psychology Not Theology: Overcoming ISIS’ Secret Appeal,” *E-International Relations*, October 28, 2014, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/28/psychology-not-theology-overcoming-isis-secret-appeal/>; Lucian G. Conway III, Laura J. Gornick, Shannon Houck, Kirsten J. Towgood, and Katherine R. Conway, “The Hidden Implications of Radical Group Rhetoric: Integrative Complexity and Terrorism,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and Genocide* 4, no. 9 (2011): 155-165; Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British,” *Journal of Strategic Security*, 6, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 44-66; Emily Corner and Paul Gill, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” *Law and Human Behavior*, 39, no. 1 (2015): 23-34.

⁵ For instance, see: Jens K. Roehrich, Michael A. Lewis, and Gerard George, “Are Public-Private Partnerships a Healthy Option? A Systematic Literature Review,” *Social Science & Medicine* 113 (July 2014): 110-119; J.P. Pantouvakis and N. Vandroos, “A Critical Review of Published Research on PFI/PPPs in Construction,” *CIB W92 Conference Proceedings*, Salford, UK, November 2006, 410-419. Available at: <http://www.irbnet.de/daten/iconda/CIB1884.pdf>

Finally the insights articulated in this report are also informed by recent proceedings from a November 2015 conference held in New Delhi, India, co-sponsored by the National Consortium for Responses to Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Facebook India, the U.S. Department of State, and the Vivekananda International Foundation. The proceedings reflect insights from scholars and practitioners for the specific purpose of informing future cross-sector partnerships to elicit CVE-positive outcomes.⁶

Partnered Government and PPPs

As noted earlier, Partnered Government is a broad approach to governance that involves collaboration within and between governmental and non-governmental actors to achieve desired outcomes in the public provisions of goods and services. There are at least four types of engagement with non-governmental actors for the purposes of enhancing service provision:

1. Outsourcing
2. Privatization
3. Competitive Sourcing
4. Public-Private Partnerships⁷

The first type of engagement, **outsourcing**, can be defined as, “the practice of turning over entire business functions to an outside vendor that ostensibly can perform the specialized tasks in question better and less expensively than the organization choosing to outsource.”⁸ Outsourcing is different from privatization (see below) in that only the workload has shifted from public to private actors, but no transfer or sale of assets—including the management, workforce, equipment, and facilities—to a private actor has taken place. Although an outside non-governmental actor now handles the performance of the task, government entities continue to remain responsible for management decisions and ultimate provision of the service.

Second is **privatization**, “the process of transferring an existing public entity or enterprise to private ownership.”⁹ The difference between privatization and outsourcing is that the management, workforce, and often the equipment/facilities are transferred or sold to private owners. Privatization as an outcome

⁶ “Workshop on ‘Public-Private Partnership in Countering Online Radicalization and Recruitment to Violence,’” *Vivekananda International Foundation* November 27, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2015/november/27/workshop-on-public-private-partnership-in-countering-online-radicalization-and-recruitment-to-viol>; “Detailed Report of the Seminar on Countering Online Radicalization and Recruitment,” *Vivekananda International Foundation*, December 30, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2015/december/30/detailed-report-of-the-seminar-on-countering-online-radicalization-and-recruitment>.

⁷ Jacques S. Gansler, “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the Provider,” *IBM Center for the Business of Government*, June 2003, 12-42, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/MarketBasedGovernment.pdf>.

⁸ Jacques S. Gansler, “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the Provider,” *IBM Center for the Business of Government*, June 2003, 12, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/MarketBasedGovernment.pdf>.

⁹ Jacques S. Gansler, “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the Provider,” *IBM Center for the Business of Government*, June 2003, 27, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/MarketBasedGovernment.pdf>.

can range from “full privatization” (a government entity is fully sold to a private owner) to “partial privatization” (the equipment/facilities remain government-owned but workforce is private).

Third is **competitive sourcing**, which is the facilitation of competition for work contracts between government and private entities. Depending on the strength of their bid, either a government or private sector actor could win. Unlike outsourcing and privatization, competitive sourcing makes no immediate assumption that private actors will be able to deliver services at a lower cost and/or higher quality than government actors.¹⁰

The final type of engagement is a **public-private partnership**. For the purposes of this report, with modifications, we use the definition provided by the Finance Project, a non-profit research firm focused on funding strategies for youth, family, and community development initiatives, which is:

*when the public sector—federal, tribal, state, or local officials and agencies—joins with the private sector—families, employers, citizens, philanthropies, the media, civic groups, services providers, and community-based organizations—to pursue a common goal.*¹¹

We adopt this definition, which was applied in youth development context, for three reasons. First, as noted earlier, there are overlapping insights from youth development contexts that are potentially useful for CVE, particularly insofar as efforts to create better social and civic environments as a means of resilience against radicalization to violence are concerned. Second, while applied in a youth development context, the definition is simple and flexible enough that it can be applied to other similar, but distinct contexts, such as CVE. Finally, while private partners in PPPs are traditionally thought of as business firms driven by financial profit maximization, under this definition, private partners encompass a much broader and diverse set of actors, including individuals and civil society actors whose underlying motivations for participation in a partnership may not be driven by profit.

CVE, the Expanded Role of Non-Governmental Actors, and PPPs

When mentioning “countering violent extremism” (CVE), we are referring to *programs, policies, and activities sourced and/or implemented by government and non-governmental actors intended both to prevent individuals and groups from radicalizing to facilitate or commit violence, and to disengage individuals and groups who are planning to commit or facilitate, or who have already engaged in, extremist violence.*¹²

¹⁰ Jacques S. Gansler, “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the Provider,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2003, 27, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/MarketBasedGovernment.pdf>.

¹¹ Nanette Relave and Sharon Deich, “A Guide to Public Private Partnerships for Youth Programs,” The Finance Project, January 2007, 8, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499567.pdf>.

¹² Definition adapted from, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts,” U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, May 2014, 3.

CVE seeks to address underlying drivers and environmental factors that facilitate radicalization into violence, not only the violent symptoms of larger problems. Factors associated with individual-level involvement in violent extremism include, but are not limited to, histories of substance and sexual abuse,¹³ a desire for meaning in one's life being manipulated by recruiters,¹⁴ failure to think about issues beyond black-and-white binaries,¹⁵ issues of personal identity attached to feelings of exclusion and alienation,¹⁶ and mental health issues.¹⁷

The full spectrum of CVE efforts¹⁸ to address these risk factors includes:

- **Engagement.** Building relationships between local communities and government agencies to build trust and local capacity to counter recruitment and radicalization into violence. Activities such as meetings and structured conversations like “roundtable discussions” between community members and local government agencies are one example. The purpose of these engagements is to create people-to-people connections and facilitating access to critical resources.
- **Prevention.** Community-wide implementation of programs, policies, and activities to mitigate the risk of individuals’ movement into violence by creating healthy environments that reduce the appeal of extremism. Examples range from classes on civics and religious education to creating “safe spaces” for conversations where people have healthy outlets on sensitive topics (such as identity, social relations or political grievances) without the fear of stigma or shame. These activities are collectively analogous to “inoculating” individuals and entire communities against the allure of extremism.
- **Intervention.** Similar to “crisis counseling,” this is about helping individuals whom community members and others—peers, friends, family, law enforcement, mental health, education, or social work professionals—identify as at risk for engaging in violence, but who have not yet taken any significant steps to fulfill that intent.
- **Interdiction.** For those who are taking significant steps toward violent action, are already engaged in violence, or facilitating other illicit actions in support of violence, the use of force may be necessary. These are “hard” counter-terrorism measures, including surveillance/intelligence gathering, arrest, and/or military action.

¹³ Pete Simi, Bryan F. Bubolz, Hillary McNeel, Karyn Sporer, and Steven Windisch, “Trauma as a Precursor to Violent Extremism,” University of Maryland START Center, April 2015, accessed April 27, 2016

https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_TraumaAsPrecursortoViolentExtremism_April2015.pdf

¹⁴ Arie W. Kruglanski, “Psychology Not Theology: Overcoming ISIS’ Secrete Appeal,” E-International Relations, October 28, 2014, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/28/psychology-not-theology-overcoming-isis-secret-appeal/>

¹⁵ Lucian G. Conway III, Laura J. Gornick, Shannon Houck, Kirsten J. Towgood, and Katherine R. Conway, “The Hidden Implications of Radical Group Rhetoric: Integrative Complexity and Terrorism,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and Genocide* 4, no. 9 (2011): 155-165. Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British,” *Journal of Strategic Security*, 6, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 44-66

¹⁶ Kamaldeep S. Bhui, Madelyn H. Hicks, Myrna Lashley, Edgar Jones, “A Public Health Approach to Understanding and Preventing Violent Radicalization,” *BMC Medicine* 10, no. 16 (2012), DOI: 10.1186/1741-7015-10-16.

¹⁷ Emily Corner and Paul Gill, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” *Law and Human Behavior*, 39, no. 1 (2015): 23-34.

¹⁸ “Community-Led Action in Response to Violent Extremism,” University of Maryland START Center, unpublished training material.

- **Rehabilitation/reintegration.** These activities are intended for those who are: 1) “walking back” from the edge of unlawful violence or activities in support of unlawful violence because of intervention activities; 2) currently serving time in prison or on parole after an interdiction; or 3) happen to be returning from a combat zone/exiting from a violent extremist organization. These individuals often find it difficult to return to normalcy due to challenges that range from mental trauma to social stigma and community ostracizing. As the name of these activities suggests, they are intended to help specific individuals themselves get back on a healthier path toward being law-abiding, productive members of society.

CVE is therefore, inclusive of, but not limited to use of force options like surveillance/intelligence gathering, arrest, or military strikes. Recognizing the limitations to the use of force, policymakers and law enforcement officials are increasingly saying they, “cannot arrest our way out of any crime issue, terrorism issue. We’ll never arrest our way out of these problems... whether it’s criminal gangs, whether it’s violent extremism...”¹⁹

An expanded mission, however, also requires an expanded set of actors with the requisite subject matter expertise and skillsets to address the broadened problem set. Somewhat analogous to preventing gang violence,²⁰ law enforcement alone cannot be expected to take on additional social work, education, and mental health functions of the CVE efforts spectrum. More realistic (and effective) approaches involve cross-departmental and cross-sectorial partnerships, where each group of actors can contribute to a collective goal without compromising their respective core missions and functions.

In the context of CVE, this partnered approach is especially relevant, where, for strategic (and in some cases, legal) reasons, government actors are ill-suited to perform certain functions. For instance, on issues of counter-messaging and ideological engagement with current and would-be violent extremists, non-governmental actors—such as former extremists and ex-terrorists—are probably the most credible voices to encourage disengagement and exit from hate and violence. In other politico-legal contexts, like the United States, constitutional and other statutory requirements proscribe government actors from engaging in certain aspects of CVE, such as direct counter-ideological discussions that involve religious views.²¹

The Potential Promise of PPPs

We are unaware of any literature that explicitly articulates why PPPs are the most optimal sourcing option, amid others to choose from (such as the ones described earlier), despite government and non-

¹⁹ Matthew Levitt, J. Thomas Manger, Hedieh Mirahmadi, “New Strategies for Countering Homegrown Violent Extremism,” in *From the Boston Marathon to the Islamic State: Countering Violent Extremism*, ed. Matthew Levitt (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2015), 43, 45. Also see: Steve Benen, “‘We cannot kill our way out of this war,’” MSNBC, February 18, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/we-cannot-kill-our-way-out-war>.

²⁰ Stevan Weine, Heidi Ellis, Ronald Haddad, Alisa Miller, Rebecca Lowenhaupt, and Chloe Polutnik, “Reframing CVE as a Multidisciplinary Approach to Promoting Community Safety,” University of Maryland START Center, June 2015, accessed April 28, 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CVEtoPromotingCommunitySafety_ResearchBrief_June2015.pdf.

²¹ For example, see: Samuel J. Rascoff, “Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization,” *Stanford Law Review* 64, no. 1, (February 2012): 125-189.

governmental actors calling for CVE-focused public-private partnerships.²² However, we argue that, compared to other sourcing options mentioned in the previous section, PPPs present themselves as the best framework to overcome these challenges, for several reasons.

First, while privatization and outsourcing, as defined above, would not necessarily involve devolving the full spectrum of CVE efforts to non-governmental actors, there could be a number of hiccups or problematic inefficiencies in implementation. For obvious reasons, it would be impossible to let private actors take over functions such as interdiction.

In some contexts, government agencies may outsource the provision of necessary wrap-around resources (e.g., mental health or social services) to non-government actors,²³ such as faith-based organizations.²⁴ However, at most this illustrates the applicability of outsourcing to one part of one component of CVE (prevention), rather than its applicability as a sourcing strategy across the full spectrum of CVE efforts. Moreover, when governments employ outsourcing, they often do it selectively and with the broader sourcing framework of a PPP “because they want to concentrate on certain key sectors [or service provisions].”²⁵ Citing Harper,²⁶ Nordtveit notes, “[Government actors] use private providers to deliver auxiliary services... areas where they believe that the private sector has a comparative advantage.”²⁷

The drawback to competitive sourcing, as defined above, is that it provides an opportunity for government agencies to compete for and possibly win any contract bids to provide CVE-focused activities and services to communities. However, as noted earlier, due to legal or strategic reasons, CVE-focused PPPs will require a division of labor where certain services may need to be delegated to non-governmental actors. Therefore it may be inappropriate to provide opportunities for government entities to engage in certain types of “inherently non-governmental” CVE-focused services via contract bids.

²² For instance, see: “Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” WhiteHouse.gov, February 18, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>; “Detailed Report of the Seminar on Countering Online Radicalization and Recruitment,” Vivekananda International Foundation, December 30, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2015/december/30/detailed-report-of-the-seminar-on-countering-online-radicalization-and-recruitment>

²³ For a global overview, see: Leon E. Irish, Lester Salamon, and Karla W. Simon, “Outsourcing Social Services to CSOs: Lessons from Abroad,” World Bank, June 2009, accessed June 9, 2016, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEV/DIALOGUE/Resources/OutsourcingtoCSOs.pdf>

²⁴ “Faith-based organization” is defined here as *a non-profit/not-for-profit civil society organization whose provision of services—political advocacy, social work, mental health, poverty alleviation, etc.—is influenced through a religious lens by means of organizational control, expression of religious identity/values, and/or program implementation*. For more information on definitions and typologies of “faith-based organizations,” see: Wolfgang Bielefeld and William Suhs Cleveland, “Defining Faith-Based Organizations and Understanding Them Through Research.” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 42, no 3, (2013): 442-467.

²⁵ Bjorn Nordveit, “Use of Public-Private Partnerships to Deliver Social Services: Advantages and Drawbacks,” University of Massachusetts – Amherst Center for International Education, 2004, 7, accessed June 9, 2016, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=cie_faculty_pubs

²⁶ M. Harper, *Public Services through Private Enterprise: Micro-Privatisation for Improved Delivery*. (London, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications, 2000).

²⁷ Bjorn Nordveit, “Use of Public-Private Partnerships to Deliver Social Services: Advantages and Drawbacks,” University of Massachusetts – Amherst Center for International Education, 2004, 7, accessed June 9, 2016, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=cie_faculty_pubs.

By contrast PPPs assume that there will be some combination of government and non-governmental actors that perform a myriad of different functions and services across the spectrum of CVE efforts. For certain types of activities, governments are the best or only sourcing option and for others non-governmental actors may be the best or only option.

Principles for CVE-Focused PPPs

We formulated field principles to inform the practice of developing, implementing, and sustaining public-private partnerships for the purpose of achieving CVE-positive outcomes. Here we draw from literature on the concept of Partnered Government and PPPs in the context of youth development initiatives and public health efforts.²⁸

We have formulated two broad categories of principles for CVE-focused PPPs: 1) Principles for Government Actors to Facilitate PPPs and 2) Principles for Developing, Implementing, and Sustaining Successful PPPs. These are summarized in the table below.

Table 1. Field Principles for CVE-Focused Public-Private Partnerships

Principles for Government Actors to Facilitate PPPs
1. Identify the division of labor
2. Reduce barriers to entry for non-governmental partners
3. Foster an organizational culture that makes partnering a top priority
4. Act as an “innovation catalyst”
Principles for Developing, Implementing, and Sustaining Successful PPPs
1. Have clear goals
2. Focus on results and measure progress
3. Involve consumers in developing programs
4. Involve diverse stakeholders from the start
5. Identify and utilize champions for support
6. Establish clear governance structures
7. Adapt to changing conditions
8. Enable all partners to benefit
9. Work to maintain momentum and sustain efforts
10. Balance transparency and confidentiality

²⁸ We deliberately focus on public health efforts because a growing number of researchers and practitioners are calling for and adopting public health frameworks and language to inform ongoing practices to counter violent extremism around the world. For examples, see: Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit, “What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 6-24; Stevan Weine and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” University of Maryland START Center, April 5, 2016, accessed April 27, 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/how-public-health-can-improve-initiatives-counter-violent-extremism>; Kamaldeep S. Bhui, Madelyn H. Hicks, Myrna Lashley, Edgar Jones, “A Public Health Approach to Understanding and Preventing Violent Radicalization,” *BMC Medicine* 10, no. 16 (2012), DOI: 10.1186/1741-7015-10-16.

Principles for Government Actors to Facilitate PPPs

As noted earlier, strategic and legal factors inhibit government actors from taking the lead on the full range of CVE activity categories, from engagement to rehabilitation/reintegration. Nevertheless, government policies and practices may create unnecessary obstacles to successful CVE-focused PPPs. Taking insights from research into Partnered Government, we believe the following principles, intended for government actors, can create a permissive environment for CVE-focused PPPs.

Identify the division of labor.²⁹ There are some services within the CVE efforts spectrum that only government agencies should perform and others that private sector, civil society, and non-profit actors should perform. In the Partnered Government literature, there is reference to defining activities that are “inherently governmental,” or those that only government agencies are allowed to perform because of some compelling legal or public policy reason. In this report however, we refer to this principle as “identifying the division of labor” because employing the term “inherently governmental” it observes the issue solely from a government vantage point, instead of both governmental and non-governmental perspectives. *In other words, this principle advocates that partners determine what is “inherently governmental” and what is “inherently non-governmental.”*

Making the best possible identification of the division of labor can often vary depending on the geo-political context, as well as the specific function(s) intended to be performed; however, the main idea is for policymakers to determine what activities should be performed by government agencies and which should be devolved to non-governmental actors. State actors seeking to understand the strategic environment that can inform (but not necessarily determine) the division of labor may want to consider gathering data via focus groups, polling, and convening subject matter experts *before* formulating and implementing policy. They may also want to ensure they undertake a thorough legal review of relevant statutes to mitigate legal liability and potential backlash from skeptics and naysayers.

Reduce barriers to entry for potential non-governmental partners to the greatest extent possible.³⁰ Non-governmental, particularly community-based and faith-based, organizations may face a number of barriers that inhibit their willingness and/or ability to actively participate in a CVE-focused PPP. In the traditional Partnered Government literature, this normally refers to economic incentives for private business firms to enter into government contracting markets for the purposes of providing goods and/or services at a profit. In the context of CVE, however, while funding may present itself as a barrier to entry, many, if not most, non-governmental actors will be not be driven by profit considerations.

²⁹ Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, “Partnered Government: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,” *University of Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, January 2010, 7; 10-11, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/file/871/download?token=cytRerlf>

³⁰ Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, “Partnered Government: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,” *University of Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, January 2010, 15-17, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/file/871/download?token=cytRerlf>

However, there may be contracting opportunities that involve public funding for non-governmental entities to develop CVE-relevant technologies,³¹ such as applications for mobile devices or specialized software to promote counter and alternative narratives.³² In such cases, it is important for government agencies to incentivize entrepreneurs' involvement, when desired, in CVE-focused opportunities using contracting vehicles, such as tailored non-disclosure agreements, proprietary agreements, and mutually-agreed to licensing agreements, which protect proprietary commercial information and intellectual property.³³

Other potential barriers, specific to CVE, to entry may include:

- *Informational and relational.* Some potential actors may be unaware of the scope and nature of the violent extremist threat to their communities. In some contexts, government actors have wrongly assumed that potential community actors understood the threat environment, contributing to a public misperception that community actors are *unwilling* to act against violent extremism, rather than being *unaware* of violent extremists' predatory actions directed at their communities. In other instances, partners were unaware that certain types of resources existed.³⁴ If they were aware, they often lacked training and experience on how to create relationships and avenues of engagement with government and civil society resources.³⁵
- *Political and policy-oriented.* For some potential partners, there may be mistrust of government and other non-governmental actors. In some instances, there may be only so much outside actors can do to transform that mistrust into productive relationships. However, depending on the reasons fueling the mistrust, things such as affirming and pledging to respond to fundamental concerns of community partners may help to alleviate this dilemma. For instance, if fears about anti-Muslim bias are a concern, issuing statements condemning any form of bigotry directed at a minority, including Muslims, might be one solution. In other cases, some of the mistrust may be fueled by

³¹ For instance, see: "Business Incubator Taps into Muslim-Americans' Entrepreneurial Spirit," National Public Radio, May 7, 2015, accessed June 1, 2016, <http://www.npr.org/2015/05/07/404859244/business-incubator-taps-into-muslim-americans-entrepreneurial-spirit>.

³² For instance, see: Dina Temple-Raston, "White House Invites Millennials to Thwart ISIS' Recruitment Efforts," National Public Radio, June 5, 2015, accessed June 9, 2016, <http://www.npr.org/2015/06/05/412177020/white-house-invites-millennials-to-thwart-isis-recruitment-efforts>.

³³ Thanks to William Lucyshyn for this insight.

³⁴ For a contextualization of U.S. and European Muslim civil society see: Alejandro J. Beutel, "Securing the Homeland Against Domestic *Al-Qa'ida*-Inspired Violent Extremism: Partnership-Based Approaches with American Muslim Communities?" (master's capstone, University of Maryland, 2013), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=744958>; Peter Mandaville and Dilwar Hussain, "Contextualizing Islam in Europe and North America: Challenges and Opportunities," Brookings Institution, April 2015, 10, noting, "The relatively underdeveloped state of Muslim institutions and funding structures in Western contexts."; "Workshop on 'Public-Private Partnership in Countering Online Radicalization and Recruitment to Violence,'" *Vivekananda International Foundation* November 27, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2015/november/27/workshop-on-public-private-partnership-in-countering-online-radicalization-and-recruitment-to-viol>, Noting, "Zubair Meenai from Jamia Milia Islamia explained... the absence of Muslim civil society in India..."

³⁵ For instance, the Muslim Public Affairs Council's Safe Spaces Initiative is largely premised on the assumption that many U.S. Muslim communities lack civic experience and the necessary relationships to facilitate their access to protective resources that promote CVE-positive outcomes. See: Alejandro J. Beutel, "Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities Toolkit," Muslim Public Affairs Council, April 2014, 36-37; 46-50, accessed April 27, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Tools%20for%20Developing%20Healthy%20Communities-MPAC%20Toolkit%20Report.pdf>

feared consequences of existing laws or policies. As an example, in the United States many Muslim community actors are hesitant to engage in intervention activities because they are concerned they may open themselves to legal liability for providing services to troubled individuals. As a result some government attorneys are exploring the option of draft public legal memos that state individuals who are engaged in CVE-focused “good Samaritan” work will not be prosecuted under statutes related to offenses like material support for terrorism.³⁶

Foster an organizational culture that makes partnering a top priority.³⁷ As one study notes, getting the anticipated outcomes from partnerships will, “require a major cultural change in public organizations. Public-private relationships often become adversarial...rather than partnerships. Both the public and private sector must adopt a ‘win-win’ approach, and focus on shared, broad outcomes, not narrow organizational ones.”³⁸ While this insight was taken from the context of business firms and government agencies working together for U.S. defense procurement outcomes, the principle still broadly applies to CVE.

For example, in a domestic U.S. context, some observers have noted that certain federal law enforcement organizations lack the incentives to encourage partnerships whose functions would span across the entire CVE spectrum. Instead, as some critics point out, current incentive structures remain mostly focused on interdiction activities, such as surveillance and arrest.³⁹ Some researchers have raised the possibility of creating incentives, such as developing and implementing non-interdiction metrics, including referrals made to non-governmental actors involved in CVE intervention efforts, as part of an individual law enforcement official’s performance evaluation.⁴⁰

Transforming organizational cultures, particularly in government agencies, is often a difficult task. Some entities may be better positioned than others to successfully undertake the organizational transformation necessary to facilitate partnerships across the entire CVE efforts spectrum. If CVE-focused PPPs cut across various government functions and agencies, one option to consider before undertaking organization transformation is to identify which agency should take the lead on a particular activity within the broader CVE spectrum. In other words, returning to the first principle in this section, government actors need to identify the division of labor. In this case, consistent with the broader concept of Partnered Government,

³⁶ “Community-Led Action in Response to Violent Extremism,” University of Maryland START Center, unpublished training material.

³⁷ Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, “Partnered Government: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,” *University of Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, January 2010, 22-23, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/file/871/download?token=cytRerlf>

³⁸ Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, “Partnered Government: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,” *University of Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, January 2010, 22, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/file/871/download?token=cytRerlf>

³⁹ For instance, see: Marcy Wheeler, “How We Can Fight Terrorism Better in 2016,” *Vice*, January 7, 2016, accessed April 29, 2016, <http://www.vice.com/read/how-we-can-better-combat-terrorism-in-2016>, Noting, “Rather than insisting that the FBI or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spend their time trying to divert young people getting sucked into ISIS on Twitter, federal authorities ought to make it legally safer for community members to help convince people not to pursue violence. That’s especially true because career incentives for the FBI remain focused on arrests and convictions, with a current emphasis on Islamic extremism. Until that changes, it will be particularly hard to divert those who consider, but turn away from, Islamic extremism.”

⁴⁰ William Braniff, “Capitol Hill Briefing on Countering Violent Extremism” (briefing remarks, U.S. Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2016).

the division of labor is not just between non-governmental and government actors, but also among government actors themselves. In order to make organizational transformation possible, a PPP will require “champions” (discussed later in this report) to advocate for and facilitate these necessary changes.

Act as an “innovation catalyst.”⁴¹ To act as an innovation catalyst is to assume a context in which a government has existing services and programs that serve to structure how a problem set is defined. The solutions to the problem set are jointly developed and “owned”/implemented by communities and non-governmental actors that are invested in solving them. A government actor’s role in this context is to spur partnership-based problem solving by, “helping to define the problem and sharing with the community the information that would be instrumental for solving it.”⁴²

There are two key facets to the innovation context in which government actors partner with communities and other non-governmental actors to develop solutions. First, rather than creating a new idea from scratch, solutions are instead largely the result of “modifying or complementing an existing product, process, or service....”⁴³ Second, the communities and non-governmental actors share or take the lead in the responsibility for facilitating problem-solving efforts and implementing the agreed upon solution.⁴⁴ As a result, the innovation context directly informs efforts to set the overall goals of a PPP (discussed in the next section).

This relatively well-defined innovation space appears to be consistent with emerging CVE research and practices. Instead of proverbially reinventing the wheel, CVE research and practices draw insights from other disciplines and contexts, such as public health,⁴⁵ preventing school shootings,⁴⁶ and combating gang

⁴¹ Satish Nambisan, “Transforming Government Through Collaborative Innovation,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2008, 25, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/NambisanReport.pdf>.

⁴² Satish Nambisan, “Transforming Government Through Collaborative Innovation,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2008, 25, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/NambisanReport.pdf>.

⁴³ Satish Nambisan, “Transforming Government Through Collaborative Innovation,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2008, 25, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/NambisanReport.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Satish Nambisan, “Transforming Government Through Collaborative Innovation,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2008, 25, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/NambisanReport.pdf>.

⁴⁵ For instance, see: Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit, “What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 6-24; Stevan Weine and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” University of Maryland START Center, April 5, 2016, accessed April 27, 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/how-public-health-can-improve-initiatives-counter-violent-extremism>; Kamaldeep S. Bhui, Madelyn H. Hicks, Myrna Lashley, Edgar Jones, “A Public Health Approach to Understanding and Preventing Violent Radicalization,” *BMC Medicine* 10, no. 16 (2012), DOI: 10.1186/1741-7015-10-16. For an example of using public health messaging frameworks, such as the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral (IMB) Skills model to explain the power of violent terrorist messaging and narratives, see: Jarret Brachman, Antony Lemieux, Jason Levitt, and Jay Wood, “Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 2 (2014): 354-371. Also see: “Workshop on ‘Public-Private Partnership in Countering Online Radicalization and Recruitment to Violence,’” *Vivekananda International Foundation* November 27, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.vifindia.org/event/report/2015/november/27/workshop-on-public-private-partnership-in-countering-online-radicalization-and-recruitment-to-viol>, particularly the presentation by Zubair Meenai.

⁴⁶ Alejandro J. Beutel, “Moving Toward a Society with NO HATE – A Proposal for Advancing U.S. Domestic CVE,” University of Maryland START Center, November 30, 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/moving-toward-society-no>

violence.⁴⁷

For example, the intervention-related portions of the Muslim Public Affairs Council's CVE toolkit, "Safe Spaces Initiative," are largely based on a threat assessment team model used to prevent acts of targeted violence in K-12, university, workplace, houses of worship, and public space settings. However Safe Spaces' intervention methodology was modified to take into account the specific behavioral peculiarities of violent extremism that differentiate it from other forms of targeted violence, namely ideology as a motivating factor for violent action. It was also modified to account for the particular religious and institutional contexts of U.S. Muslim communities and institutions.⁴⁸

Principles for Developing, Implementing, and Sustaining Successful PPPs

In this section, unless noted otherwise, we largely draw on principles taken from the report, "A Guide to Successful Public-Private Partnerships for Youth Programs."⁴⁹ Wherever necessary, we elaborate upon the relevance these principles may have for CVE-focused partnerships. We also synthesize these principles with insights drawn from other contexts, such as cybersecurity-focused partnerships.

Have clear goals, focus on results, and measure progress. Any and all successful partnerships first need to clearly articulate their mission and/or vision, including short and long-term goals. These goals need to be understood and agreed to by all the participating stakeholders. Goals that are commonly shared and understood raise the likelihood that participants will feel ownership in the partnership. This in turn raises the probability of remaining cohesive and committed over the long-term.

One of the most consistent findings across the literature on PPPs, irrespective of issue context, was the importance of developing and using the appropriate success metrics.⁵⁰ This gives partners insights into which efforts are likely to be effective and which are not—serving to inform stakeholders what areas may

[hate-proposal-advancing-us-domestic-cve](#); Diane M. Zierhoffer, "Threat Assessment: Do Lone Terrorists Differ from Other Lone Offenders?" *Journal of Strategic Security*, 7, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 48-62.

⁴⁷ Madeline Morris, Frances Eberhard, Jessica Rivera, and Michael Watsula, "Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Degang and Deprogramming," *Duke University Institute for Homeland Security Solutions*, May 2010, accessed April 27, 2016, http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Morris_Research_Brief_Final.pdf.

⁴⁸ Alejandro J. Beutel, "Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities Toolkit," Muslim Public Affairs Council, April 2014, accessed April 27, 2016,

<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Tools%20for%20Developing%20Healthy%20Communities-MPAC%20Toolkit%20Report.pdf>

⁴⁹ Nanette Relave and Sharon Deich, "A Guide to Public Private Partnerships for Youth Programs," The Finance Project, January 2007, 18-26, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499567.pdf>.

⁵⁰ It should be underscored that metrics are often context-specific and CVE tends to lack good metrics at the current time. See: Caitlin Mastroe and Susan Szmania, *Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland START Center*, March 2016, accessed April 27, 2016,

https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVMetrics_March2016.pdf; Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, "From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs" Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2012 http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf

or may not deserve further attention. Focusing on results is also important as a means of maintaining group cohesion in structures with shared authority and multiple interests.

CVE as a field of practice and research has been hindered by a lack of well-defined goals and appropriate metrics to measure implementation and effectiveness outcomes. Much of this challenge is rooted in a lack of basic definitions, including terms such as “prevention,” “radicalization,” and even “CVE” itself.⁵¹ As a starting point, when undertaking any joint program design, PPPs may want to consider employing SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound).⁵² Goals and metrics will be further determined by the type of activities and desired outcomes.

For instance, if a PPP is interested in developing an intervention-related referral program for individuals identified as at-risk for violent extremism, it can choose to focus on implementation results, such as the number of connections made between actors/institutions and the number of people trained in intervention protocols. If it is more interested in answering questions about effectiveness, it can look at things like public awareness of the program, conduct polling on people’s attitudes toward using the program in a time of crisis, as well as the number of referrals made through the program consistent with its established protocols.

Involve consumers in developing programs. In broader youth and community development PPP contexts, youth and families are often the main consumers of their programs and services. In a CVE context, youth and families are often desired consumers for CVE programs because they are often the target audiences of various violent extremist movements’ narratives and propaganda.⁵³ Families and the peers of youth targets for violent radicalization also tend to be the first ones to notice an individual’s context-specific trouble signs that may suggest he/she is moving down a pathway into violence.⁵⁴ Therefore these factors also make them some of the most credible and empathetic voices to dissuade their family members, friends, and peers from engaging in violence.

However other variables may be important,⁵⁵ including, but not limited to, geographic areas with prior

⁵¹ Caitlin Mastroe and Susan Szmania, *Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs Report* to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland START Center, March 2016, 12, accessed April 27, 2016,

https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_SurveyingCVMetrics_March2016.pdf

⁵² Francis Hartman and Rafi Ashrafi, “Development of the SMART™ Project Planning Framework,” *International Journal of Project Management* 22, no. 6 (August 2004): 499-510.

⁵³ “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States: Preliminary Findings,” University of Maryland START Center, January 2015, accessed April 27, 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/PIRUS%20Research%20Brief_Jan%202015.pdf

⁵⁴ Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans, “The Critical Role Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 45-65.

⁵⁵ See broadly: Shira Fishman, “Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force,” University of Maryland START Center, February 16, 2010, accessed April 27, 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf.

known histories of acts of violent extremism,⁵⁶ and geographic areas with histories suggestive of active hate groups/individuals.⁵⁷ Regardless of how the end consumer is defined, a consumer's involvement in programs can ensure that the content and services are relatable, appealing, and accessible to target populations. This will require giving them the necessary information and tools necessary to be invested partners in such a program.

Involve diverse stakeholders from the start. PPPs that require multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral efforts are most likely to be effective when they have a diverse range of skillsets, resources, and perspectives. Stakeholder membership will largely depend upon the goals and vision of the partnership, but can include actors such as educators, law enforcement, youth services, private businesses, faith-based leaders, and mental health professionals. It is important to note that, "Although it is difficult to know who all the stakeholders will be in advance, taking the time early on to engage as many as possible will save time in the long run."⁵⁸

Any one or all of these different sector leaders can both serve to contribute to the strategic direction and operational management of the partnership and act as voices of credibility on behalf of the project to the communities/constituencies they happen to represent.

As noted earlier, CVE as a concept represents a wide spectrum of policies, programs and activities designed to prevent and counter the diverse and often context-specific factors that may radicalize individuals into violence. Therefore "Whole of Community" and "Whole of Government" approaches, involving individuals from diverse practitioner and subject matter areas, will be needed.

Identify and utilize "champions" for support. By "champions" we are referring to individuals or institutions represented within a PPP "who act as change agents by clearly communicating the goals of the partnership and building a broad base of support."⁵⁹ They can include actors who represent target audiences or their interests, such youth or faith leaders and activists. Champions, particularly those representing end consumers, are effective when they act and speak with a cohesive voice.

⁵⁶ Gary LaFree and Bianca Bersani, "Hot Spots of Terrorism and Other Crimes in the United States, 1970 to 2008," University of Maryland START Center, January 31, 2012, accessed April 27, 2016,

https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/research_briefs/LaFree_Bersani_HotSpotsOfUSTerrorism.pdf

⁵⁷ Brent L. Smith, Paxton Roberts, and Kelly Damphousee, "Update on Geospatial Patterns of Antecedent Behavior among Perpetrators in the American Terrorism Study," University of Maryland START Center, October 2013, accessed April 27, 2016

https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IUSSD_GeospatialPatternsofAntecedentBehaviorAmongPerpetrators_October2013.pdf;

Amy Adamczyk, Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, and William S. Parkin, "Examining the Relationship between the Presence of Hate Groups and the Presence of Violent Far-Right Perpetrators at the County Level," University of Maryland START Center, accessed April 27, 2016,

https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ECDB_ExaminingRelationshipPresenceHateGroupsandViolentFarRightExtremist_March2012.pdf

⁵⁸ Nanette Relave and Sharon Deich, "A Guide to Public Private Partnerships for Youth Programs," The Finance Project, January 2007, 20, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499567.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Nanette Relave and Sharon Deich, "A Guide to Public Private Partnerships for Youth Programs," The Finance Project, January 2007, 21, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499567.pdf>.

What makes champions special is that they bring high-profile, positive visibility to the partnership through a number of information-disseminating means, including media attention via press conferences, public service announcements, and op-eds, as well as sponsoring or participating in public engagements such as hearings, official town hall meetings, and events open to the public at houses of worship, charitable foundations, and other civic organizations.

It is important to bear in mind that in a CVE context, champions may in fact be individuals and groups coming from related sectors, who do not necessarily know that their work is relevant for CVE. Furthermore, those actors who are the most vocal about being the champions of CVE should not necessarily be regarded as such—at least without some vetting and critical examination of their claims. For example, a non-profit group that provides counseling or mental health services that does not explicitly say it does CVE may be more of a viable partner than a for-profit service provider that markets itself as having expertise in CVE.

Keeping Champions and Partners Accountable

A healthy skepticism toward champions also intersects with two other insights from Partnered Government. First, government actors need to maintain a competitive contracting market to have multiple vendors to choose from. Second, they need to have effective oversight to avoid contractor malfeasance. Effective oversight capacities must include contracting and program officers who have subject matter expertise in CVE and intersecting disciplines in order to effectively assess whether or not a contractor is meeting the pre-determined goals and metrics used to measure progress (see Principles, “Have Clear Goals, Focus on Results, and Measure Progress” and “Involve Consumers in Developing Programs”).

Establish clear governance structures. This was another consistent finding across diverse PPP contexts. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the appropriate type of governance structure each partnership decides to employ. However they tend to have a few common characteristics.

First, PPP governance structures typically define the participants’ roles, define the overall division of labor between them, and facilitate the necessary buy-in to ensure all parties understand and accept their roles. Often these structures are articulated through written documents such as contracts or written memoranda of understanding (MOUs). Defining roles and responsibilities tends to occur after participants have developed a common vision and set of goals.

Second, they must define the complexity of the problem. Is the problem simple and well defined? If so, then a partnership may be solved through a horizontal structure using relatively simple mechanisms like short-term contracts. Is the challenge complex? If so, it may necessitate numerous resources and will require a high degree of interaction between the different actors ranging from tangible assets, such as technology,

to intangible assets such as knowledge, expertise, and insight. In short, “problem complexity thus drives the structure of the collaboration,” including governance structures that facilitate resource sharing and integration.⁶⁰

Third, in order to be effective, governance structures must contain mechanisms by which diverse and otherwise competing interests can work through difficult issues, including differences of opinion, while working together toward their shared goals. They can also avoid miscommunication and establish a respected process by which all partners can be respected for their contributions. These mechanisms can include ground rules for “how the partners will share information, conduct meetings, make decisions, define and measure success, and communicate with one another.”⁶¹

Adapt to changing conditions. To meet the needs of their target population(s), PPPs need to be able to adapt to changing circumstances and resources. This can range from new lines of local, state, and federal government funding, to serving a population in a new way based on the concerns of foundations or policymakers (such as leveraging the Internet or text messaging to establish lines of communication with youth).⁶² This principle is especially relevant in a CVE context. As some studies point out, violent extremist organizations evolve and innovate,⁶³ including in how they adapt and employ technologies,⁶⁴ such as Internet-based communications platforms,⁶⁵ to advance their own goals. In response scholars note that policymakers and practitioners should have strategies to counter terrorists’ technological adaptations and evolution.⁶⁶

Start-up tech entrepreneurs can be particularly valuable partners in rapidly responding to technological and contextual changes that can affect patterns of online propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. As noted earlier, incentivizing entrepreneurs’ entry and participation in CVE-focused PPPs will require protection of intellectual property (IP) and proprietary information. However, IP and the costs of utilizing proprietary products may present an economic barrier to their widespread adoption among end users. One option for government and non-governmental supporting entities to consider may be to provide funding for an agreement that would pay for a certain number licenses to provide free access for end-users

⁶⁰ G.S. Ligon, et al., “Critical Infrastructure Partnership and Cultural Study,” Center for Collaboration Science, *University of Nebraska-Omaha*, (June 30, 2015), 10-11.

⁶¹ Nanette Relave and Sharon Deich, “A Guide to Public Private Partnerships for Youth Programs,” The Finance Project, January 2007, 22, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499567.pdf>.

⁶² For instance, see: Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans, “The Critical Role Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 45-65.

⁶³ Assaf Moghadam, “How Al Qaeda Innovates,” *Security Studies* 22, no. 3 (2013): 466-497.

⁶⁴ Brian A. Jackson, “Technologies for Homeland Security: Adaptation and Coevolution of Offense and Defense,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 5, no. 1 (2009): <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/109>.

⁶⁵ For instance, see: Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2004, accessed June 1, 2016, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf>; William Braniff, “Apple, the FBI, Extremists and Strategic Soft Targeting,” *War on the Rocks*, March 30, 2016, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/apple-the-fbi-extremists-and-strategic-soft-targeting/>.

⁶⁶ Brian A. Jackson, “Technologies for Homeland Security: Adaptation and Coevolution of Offense and Defense,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 5, no. 1 (2009): <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/109>.

(such as identified “credible messengers” who complete a counter-narratives/counter-messaging training course) to any proprietary systems or software developed by a tech start-up.

Successful partnerships enable all partners to benefit. Whatever role(s) an actor plays in a partnership, it must stand to gain more from participation than the costs of participation (including opportunity costs) or the costs of non-participation. As long as they perceive they have something to gain from participation and that participation yields greater benefits than costs, they will be willing to remain engaged, even if each actor has something different to gain. While diversity can be a substantial benefit to a partnership, especially if all parties have relevant contributions to make, creating and maintaining cohesion requires a substantial amount of effort. Some internal homogeneity is necessary, such as, “creat[ing] a common language and understanding and to foster a culture in which diverse ideas, talents, and perspectives are valued.”⁶⁷

Work to maintain momentum and sustain efforts. Experience from youth development contexts suggests the most effective PPPs build in a strategy for maintaining momentum and sustainability from the get-go. In some cases, this may mean planning for financial support and garnering resources to hire full-time staff dedicated to maintaining the PPP over time.

Partnerships often maintain momentum by celebrating and publicizing small successes to demonstrate the tangible impact their efforts are making. This can include hosting awards ceremonies and dinners where certificates of recognition are given as the PPP accomplishes interim milestones toward fulfilling longer-term vision and goals.

Balance transparency and confidentiality. Beyond youth development contexts, generally speaking, one of the good governance practices of PPPs is transparency for outsiders. This helps to build trust with prospective partners and neutralize criticism from skeptics. However, there are three notable exceptions to this rule: protecting specific commercial interests, national security, and privacy.⁶⁸ Regarding information that happens to be sensitive, but outside the formal scope of any national security classification, scholars Jacques Gansler and William Lucyshyn point out that any efforts to balance transparency and non-disclosure of information create tensions between competing values in public, private, and academic/scientific domains.⁶⁹

Earlier in this report we mentioned a number of potential contracting mechanisms that can potentially safeguard proprietary information to incentivize entrepreneurs’ involvement in PPPs, while keeping their commercial outputs as accessible and attractive to the end user as possible. However a serious question

⁶⁷ Nanette Relave and Sharon Deich, “A Guide to Public Private Partnerships for Youth Programs,” The Finance Project, January 2007, 24, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499567.pdf>.

⁶⁸ For instance, see: Working Group on Contract Publication, “Publishing Government Contracts. Addressing Concerns and Easing Implementation: A Report of the Center for Global Development Working Group on Contract Publication.” Center for Global Development, (2014): 17-23.

⁶⁹ Jacques S. Gansler and William Luchshyn, “The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy. Crafting an Information Policy for the 21st Century.” *Center Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, (2004), P. 24.

remains about national security considerations, a matter that goes straight to the heart of any PPPs focused on CVE.

We believe there are at least four value tensions to consider when attempting to identify the optimal balance between transparency and confidentiality in a CVE-focused PPP governance structure:

1. *Legal obligations.* Several countries, including the United States, Canada, and European states have “sunshine” laws that obligate government agencies to disclose information, when requested by members of the public. However, there are typically certain national security exceptions to these laws. On the one hand, transparency can uncover serious cases of waste, fraud and abuse, motivating citizens and lawmakers to ensure those engaged in unlawful and unethical breaches of conduct are held accountable. On the other hand, excessive openness on sensitive issues could also identify vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors.
2. *Personal safety of partners.* CVE will often involve some sort of engagement with violent actors, or those who may openly and aggressively advocate on their behalf. Often times, the personal safety of individuals rests on the personal or institutional credibility they may hold with their target audiences. However, potential disclosure of their collaboration with government entities, including any tangential support received, such as seed funding for a project, could harm the reputations (and pose threats to the physical well-being) of implementing partners.
3. *Efficacy.* As noted earlier, in certain socio-political contexts, governments are not only proscribed from engaging in certain CVE activities for legal reasons, but also for strategic reasons. Simply put, they are not considered to be credible actors by their target audiences. Disclosure of any perceived government involvement in a given CVE program may, at best, turn people away from it. On the other hand, one can also argue that transparency in CVE is necessary to dispel skepticism from target audiences, particularly from those who raise concerns about whether CVE activities are simply “a cover” for intelligence gathering functions.
4. *Program Evaluation.* One of the bedrocks to any successful PPP is success metrics that measure implementation and/or effectiveness of a program. Often the party conducting the evaluation is academic researchers. Scientific and programmatic advancements are contingent upon their ability to be scrutinized by peers so that they can be replicated and improved upon. However choosing to keep certain types of information confidential potentially limits that process. In some cases, confidentiality may require protecting the privacy of program participants to encourage their involvement and mitigate discouraging factors, such as stigma, harassment, and potential threats to individuals’ (and their friends’, families’, and peers’) physical safety. Actors that may be not be privileged to this kind of information can include government agencies, communities, and the public at large, including the academic community. The downside is that the potential need for confidentiality may limit the effectiveness of evaluation efforts.

There are no simple solutions to resolving the need, in some circumstances, to balance transparency and confidentiality. Identifying when and how to balance those competing interests may be associated with what aspect(s) of CVE a PPP may focus on. For instance, being fully transparent when undertaking engagement-related activities may be a strength, whereas PPPs for counter-messaging activities that involve outreach to extremist sub-cultures, may require greater emphasis on confidentiality.

In cases where confidentiality is necessary, one broad approach is to leverage insights gained from other areas that require striking a balance on unclassified, but sensitive information. This could include areas such as bio-security and disease pathogens, weapons of mass destruction, and critical infrastructure (e.g., electric power grids).⁷⁰ Another potential option is to develop specific Government-University-Industry partnerships, “where private companies [and other non-governmental entities] can interact with government agencies in a ‘neutral’⁷¹ space.”⁷²

Conclusion

This report agrees with the various calls for CVE-based PPPs as the most optimal sourcing option to address a major security challenge. It has attempted to fill the gap in moving toward implementation of this important goal by outlining principles for government actors to facilitate PPPs, as well as articulating related principles for developing, implementing, and sustaining successful PPPs. This specific notion of partnership, if embraced and put into place thoughtfully, can begin to provide diverse communities the means to counter violent extremism in their midst.

⁷⁰ Jacques S. Gansler and William Luchshyn, “The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy. Crafting an Information Policy for the 21st Century.” *Center Public Policy and Private Enterprise*, (2004).

⁷¹ In this context a ‘neutral’ space, being the University partner, which, given its academic nature can be considered by both Government and Industry partners as a non-biased and trusted third party who can mediate the relationship among all actors involved in the partnership.

⁷² G.S. Ligon, et al., “Critical Infrastructure Partnership and Cultural Study,” Center for Collaboration Science, *University of Nebraska-Omaha*, (June 30, 2015), 23.