Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs

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About This Report

The authors of this report are Caitlin Mastroe and Susan Szmania. Mastroe is currently a doctoral candidate at Cornell University, where she is completing her dissertation on the implementation of countering violent extremism initiatives within the United States and United Kingdom. Mastroe is the recipient of a 2015-2016 START Terrorism Research Award (TRA), and her mentor is START Senior Researcher Susan Szmania. This paper is a joint collaboration as part of the TRA award. The authors would like to thank START staff members Amy Pate and Peter Weinberger for reviewing early drafts of this paper. The authors also extend appreciation to the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of University Programs for hosting a workshop on December 14, 2015 on the topic of CVE metrics, where some of the ideas in this paper were generated. Questions about this report should be directed to infostart@start.umd.edu.

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About START

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this working paper is to survey the literature on evaluation metrics used in research studies addressing countering violent extremism (CVE). We reviewed forty-three studies published in peer-reviewed academic journals or published books that included qualitative or quantitative empirical assessments of CVE programs. We augmented this survey with information gleaned from sixty-four additional sources, including book chapters, journal articles, public government reports as well as published papers from think tanks and nongovernmental organizations. As policymakers direct more efforts at CVE program evaluation, we hope this review will advance the CVE evaluation discussion by contextualizing what already exists in the field and by highlighting areas where future efforts might be productively directed.

Key findings from this literature review include:

• Similar to the counter-terrorism literature writ large, most of the current CVE literature does not include program evaluation data. Overall we found forty-three published studies providing empirical assessments of CVE programs. Most reported descriptive results, while only twenty-four studies provided data that could be broadly categorized as correlational findings of program effectiveness. We did not find any CVE evaluations based on experimental design.
• Studies investigating CVE prevention programs suggest promise for supporting community resilience through community outreach initiatives and initiatives that promote dialogue within communities regarding the threat of violent extremism although critics raise important yet sometimes unsubstantiated concerns about stigmatizing communities through these efforts.
• Existing disengagement and de-radicalization program evaluations typically provide data on numbers of participants who have participated in or completed programs as well as limited evaluation through assessment of recidivism rates.
• Areas for continued research prioritization should include: refining terms and definitions used in the field, supporting the development of clear metrics for success across different types of CVE initiatives, and promoting more rigorous CVE research designs to better assess causality in CVE studies.

All of the 107 studies, reports and documents reviewed for this project are included in Appendix II as an annotated bibliography.
Overview of CVE Policies and Programming

In recent years, CVE has emerged as an important global security concern. CVE generally refers to a broad range of policies and programs aimed at deterring individuals from radicalizing to violence. As such, CVE is broadly characterized as a preventative approach to terrorism. Unlike traditional counterterrorism programs focused on targeting or disrupting terrorist plots, CVE aim to address threats before violence occurs. CVE work is done in a variety of ways, such as through prevention work or engagement processes targeting the “root causes” of violent extremism. There are also emerging efforts to include targeted interventions, whether done with law enforcement involvement or through civil society efforts, to provide psychosocial support to individuals who may be assessed as “at-risk” for mobilization to violence. Finally, there are a few examples of rehabilitation programs that help individuals who have been radicalized to disengage from violent action and reintegrate into society.

Although policymakers around the world have increased calls for CVE engagement and research, the CVE field within an academic context is at a very early stage of development. A few government-supported CVE programs, notably the United Kingdom’s efforts titled Prevent, have been in existence for several years and have some measurement and evaluation data to address questions about outcome and impact. However, there are few publically available academic studies providing rigorous evaluative data to build strong conclusions about the Prevent program. Further, many CVE programs are locally operated, loosely defined and lack sustained resources to conduct systematic evaluation measures.

These challenges are partly due to the fact that CVE is a relatively recent policy objective, which can be formally traced in the American context to the 2011 White House CVE strategy and the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (SIP). In the United States¹, systematic evaluation efforts have only just begun to assess the progress and effectiveness of three cities participating in a domestic “CVE pilot program.” In the United States, government-sponsored funding for evaluation of these pilot programs is underway as of fall 2015, but formal results are not expected to be available for at least a year or more. More established programs, such as the aforementioned UK Prevent program or Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program, have not always provided public results or have not published reports adhering to rigorous research standards.²

Despite these difficulties in obtaining an empirical base for CVE evaluation and assessment, there is an emerging body of academically-grounded CVE evaluation work that can be assessed. This working paper provides a systematic review of the existing empirical, theoretical and policy work on CVE evaluations. We note that, while our literature review primarily addresses CVE programs targeting terrorism inspired by al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), we also draw from CVE-relevant programs addressing a range of extremist ideologies, most notably the violent far right as well as one study

addressing disengagement and de-radicalization from the Columbian terrorist organization known as the FARC.

**Evaluation of CVE Programs: Types, Outputs and Outcomes**

Until recently, there have been few attempts at CVE-specific program assessments and evaluations, although Romaniuk’s (2015) review of the state of the CVE field acknowledges that we are “no longer starting from scratch” on evaluation efforts (p. 35). To this end, this literature review provides a summary of current research on the evaluation on three broad CVE programs types that we defined as: (1) **prevention** programs, or programs that “seek to prevent the radicalization process from taking hold in the first place and generally target a segment of society rather than a specific individual” (Vidino and Brandon 2012: 9); (2) **disengagement** programs that attempt to convince an individual to abandon involvement in a terrorist group; and (3) **de-radicalization programs** that attempt to alter the extremist beliefs that an individual holds. Generally, the studies that we categorized in the first category – prevention – were focused on programs aimed at large groups. Efforts aimed at disengagement or de-radicalization, in contrast, typically focused on individually-tailored engagement.

Within the three broad areas of CVE programs outlined above, there are different measures used to assess programs. We referred to Lindekilde’s (2012) discussion of the terms “output” and “outcome” to differentiate the findings from CVE program evaluation. For our purposes, studies that focused on outputs analyzed factors such as the number of interventions a program conducted, the number of participants enrolled in the program or the number of participants who experienced a relapse into violent behaviors. Output metrics generally provided a descriptive assessment of the program itself, but may not reflect the larger effects of the program.3 Studies that focused on outcomes, however, analyzed the short and long-term effects of the programs, such as how well the programs met their stated objectives. These types of evaluations are sometimes referred to as “impact” evaluations and may target direct effects (e.g., Johns et al 2014) or the indirect or unintended effects of the programs (e.g., Kundnani 2009; Lindekilde 2012). In our review, direct effects refer to the effects of the programs on the participants. For instance, in regard to a de-radicalization program, a direct effect refers to the assessment of whether a program de-radicalized an individual. Indirect effects refer to the unintended side-effects of the program or policy, such as potential negative effects a program or policy has on the wider public. This distinction is useful to employ when assessing the scope of the CVE program.

**Literature Identification Method**

To identify relevant literature to include, we conducted systematic searches using online academic search engines as well as reviewing electronic databases indexing academic studies. Search terms of “counter violent extremism;” “evaluation of counter violent extremism;” “CVE”; and “CVE strategy” were used to identify relevant English-language academic studies post-2005. Studies were chosen for inclusion in the

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3 See for example Rooke and Slater’s (2010) analysis of the Prevent Program implemented in Southwark, United Kingdom.
review based on the relevance of the study to the primary subject of interest of this working paper, the evaluation of CVE programs, and the public availability of the study. The relevance of the article was initially assessed by the abstract. Studies that provided empirical investigation rather than a theoretical overview of the various CVE programs were included in our primary review. A total of forty-three studies, including edited volumes, were identified as containing empirical data, which includes both qualitative and quantitative research.

To augment this work, we also included in our annotated bibliography over sixty other reviews, reports and other papers, which address four thematic areas: (1) consequences of radicalization discourse and the root causes of radicalization; (2) studies that overview CVE programs and other counterterrorism initiatives; (3) summaries of various programs and potential methods that can be used for CVE evaluation purposes; and (4) literature reviews on CVE.

**Overview of CVE Prevention Program Metrics**

CVE policymakers and practitioners instinctively recognize the difficulty of evaluating prevention efforts, rightly noting the challenge of trying to prove that a behavior or action has not occurred. Yet prevention is an important way that governments and communities often frame goals of CVE. As stated by President Obama, "We have to commit ourselves to build diverse, tolerant, inclusive societies that reject anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant bigotry that create the divisions, the fear and the resentments upon which extremists can prey."[4]

Prevention programs aim to reduce the threat of violent extremism largely through community orientated programs. The promotion of community resilience efforts forms that basis of prevention programs in North America and in many parts of Europe.[5] These programs aim to establish resilient communities that are resilient against violent extremism (Weine 2013). Prevention programs range from community policing initiatives to events that promote dialogue within communities concerning topics related to extremism.

Evaluation of prevention programs has proven difficult given the variety of the programs categorized as prevention and the difficulty in determining whether programming efforts directly affect behavioral changes in a target population. In our review, we identified only five published studies that gathered prevention program outcome data. In all cases, attitudinal surveys were utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs. Besides research that focuses on the direct outcomes of these programs, researchers and analysts have raised concerns about the potential or actual negative consequences of CVE programs or the unintended consequences of these programs. As we will discuss, these concerns

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5 European Union focused strategy information can be found in Bakker (2015) and Kessels (2011).
highlight assumptions about what CVE prevention efforts entail, and to some extent, determine how prevention programs are ultimately judged as successful or unsuccessful.

**Empirical Assessments of CVE Prevention Programs**

*Direct Output Assessments:*

The first set of studies focuses on policy outputs of the various CVE prevention programs. These studies outline how the programs were implemented and the different components of the programs. The majority of these studies review the efforts of CVE programs in European countries. A group of studies have outlined the UK’s Prevent strategy and programs, identifying key aspects of the different programs associated with this strategy (Lamb 2013, Combes 2013, Briggs 2010, Kundnani 2009, Powers 2015, Rooke and Slater 2010, Vidino and Brandon 2012). Vidino and Brandon (2012) also include an overview of the policy outputs of other prevention programs found in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, while Lindkilde (2012) surveys Denmark’s prevention policies and El-Said (2015) provides information on Turkey’s programs.

Outside of Europe, output measures have been provided for other countries as well. El-Said (2015) provides detail on the prevention and de-radicalization programs found in four countries: Australia, Mauritania, Singapore, and Sudan. In terms of research conducted in the US, scholars have focused on the CVE programs in Minneapolis (Southers and Heinz 2015, Weine 2013) and all of the CVE pilot cities which include: Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Boston (Hughes and Vidino 2015). Finally, a group of studies also focus on the prevention efforts of programs found in Saudi Arabia (Ansary 2008, Combes 2013).

To varying degrees, all of these studies provide useful data regarding information on how many interventions were conducted, participation rates in programs and number of events held. However, given the predominately descriptive nature of these studies and reports, evaluation in terms of the effectiveness of the programs is lacking.

*Direct Outcome Assessments:*

Based on our search criteria, we identified five academic articles providing empirical data on outcomes of CVE-focused prevention programs. The programs evaluated took place in Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Kenya, and Mali. Each evaluation included an attitudinal survey to capture change in a participant’s views once exposed to the program. However, because these assessments were tailored to the specific programs, the questions and metrics used varied considerably by study.

In Australia, Johns et al (2014) conducted an evaluation of a sports program that aimed to reduce barriers of social difference and attempted to facilitate experiences of mutual trust. The researchers collected information regarding the participants of the program and their attitudes towards other
cultures through pre- and post-survey evaluations. Based on the analysis of twenty-one participants, they found that the participants' attitudes towards different cultures improved after the program.

While the program in Australia focused on promoting cultural awareness, a prevention program funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in Mali attempted to promote civic engagement and alter opinions about terrorism. Aldrich (2014) conducted an evaluation to determine whether or not radio programs containing information about peace and tolerance altered the voting behaviors of Malians. Respondents were asked how often they listened to the radio programs and whether or not they participated in local politics, and they were asked about their opinions on terrorism, terrorist activities and U.S. policies. While the study did conclude that listening to the radio correlated with increased participation in local government, the study found that there was no relationship between listening to the radio and attitudes about terrorism. An additional evaluation was conducted on a similar USAID program in Kenya, although not as comprehensive as the Mali study, the authors stated that the program contributed to dissuading certain individuals from radicalizing (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014).

One publically available study that evaluated a CVE prevention program in the United Kingdom\(^6\) was identified. Sheikh et al.'s (2012) evaluation of the Muslim Council of Wales' Prevent program focused on the program's four objectives: to build the capacity of the Muslim community; increase Muslim participation in civic life; develop leadership skills of Muslim youth; and to decrease the risk of violent extremism among Muslim youth. Based on data from interviews and an online survey, the authors found moderate evidence that the projects helped participants better support Muslim communities, although the authors found only limited evidence that taking part in training had resulted in increased partnerships between the Muslim communities and statutory agencies. The authors were unable to evaluate whether or not the program led to increased civic participation due to problems with recruitment of interview participants. Furthermore, they found only limited evidence that participation in the programs decreased the vulnerability of youth to violent extremism.

In the Netherlands, Feddes et al. (2015) conducted an analysis of the Diamant program.\(^7\) The authors presented quantitative data from a total of 46 male and female Muslim adolescents that participated in an intervention training program which aimed to empower individuals who were labeled as vulnerable to radicalization. Pre and post-test evaluations were conducted that consisted of questionnaires that attempted to measure perceptions of: individual relative deprivation, collective relative deprivation, self-esteem, agency, narcissism, empathy, perspective taking, attitude toward ideology-based violence by others, and own violent intentions. The authors found that the training increased participants’ reported self-esteem, agency, and empathy, and that participants were less likely to support violent ideologies and exhibit personal violent intentions.


\(^7\) Additional background information on other programs within the Netherlands can be found in: Eijkman (2011), Jongman in Fenstermacher et al (2010), Vermuelen (2014), and Vidino and Brandon (2012).
In addition to differences in metrics used across these five studies, the strength of the research design varied by study. Although all of these studies provided pre and post-treatment evaluations, only one (Aldrich 2014) included a control group and incorporated a quasi-experimental design. In this study, one city, Timbuktu, had exposure to USAID programming, whereas the other city, Dire, did not. Aldrich was able to compare the treatment group in Timbuktu to the control group in Dire to draw causal inferences of the effect of the USAID programming. While only this study provided such a rigorous research design, together this small set of five studies provides promising indications that the prevention programs achieved some desired objectives.

Unintended Indirect Outcomes and Recommendations:

Despite the promising information revealed by the studies above, CVE prevention programs have received a fair amount of criticism. Beyond recognition that there are very few empirical studies with data to assess prevention program effectiveness (Vidino and Brandon 2012), a number of concerns have emerged regarding the unintended consequences and the shortcomings of these government prevention efforts for Muslim communities. The underlying premise of these critiques underscores an important dimension of CVE program evaluation—namely that programs should provide positive and productive programming and support to communities facing threats from violent extremists. However, as seen most clearly in the example of the United Kingdom, sometimes CVE prevention and engagement programs can undermine these stated government objectives and, further, may reflect what some consider to be the government’s true desire, which is to use CVE prevention programs for counterterrorism surveillance and intelligence gathering (Thomas 2010).

Unintended consequences of prevention programs have been assessed by multiple authors using data from interviews or surveys with Muslim community members in a number of countries. Specifically related to the United Kingdom, scholars have proposed that CVE prevention programs may lead to unintended outcomes such as increased racial tensions (Miah 2012), discrimination (Demant and Graaf 2010, Mythen et al 2009, and Spalek 2013), reduced activism of young Muslims in the University setting (Brown and Saeed 2014), and the readjusting of city security without the input of community members (Coaffee and Rogers 2008).

Other scholars have put forth similar arguments regarding prevention programs in other countries. In reviewing Denmark’s approach to violent extremism, Lindeklide (2012b) found that Danish Muslims expressed considerable skepticism at the effectiveness of Danish prevention programs, with respondents of an interview perceiving the programs as “degrading, discriminatory, and stigmatizing” (p. 120). In Spain and India, Chowdhury and Krebs (2009) found that moderate\textsuperscript{8} Muslims lost credibility within the communities when promoted by the government, as demonstrated using the example of ties between the Congress Party in India and the Sikh nationalist group Akali Dal that were subsequently skeptically

\textsuperscript{8} Utilizing a minimal definition of moderates, the authors define moderates as “those willing publicly to foreswear violence, even when it would further their goals, and to uphold the rule of law.” (p.376).
viewed by fellows Sikhs. Given the possible unintended consequences of these programs, scholars have put forth a number of recommendations for future programs. For instance, Briggs (2010) called for the United Kingdom's Prevent program to take community engagement seriously, suggesting, for example, that governments should invest in people, not projects. Kundnani (2009) further cautioned that engagement should not be based on demographics or perceived religious views, such as assessing whether certain groups are more “moderate” in the practice of their faith. Further, Spalek (2013) emphasized that engagement work requires mutual participation between government and communities. Finally, Vermeulen (2014) has argued that, while there are genuine concerns about creating “suspect communities,” adverse outcomes may be surmounted by working with diverse community groups beyond Muslim communities to overcome potential stigmatization.

**CVE Disengagement and De-radicalization Program Metrics**

How do scholars assess whether or not disengagement or de-radicalization programs are successful? This section covers seventeen studies that have empirically evaluated the direct outcome effects of either a disengagement program or de-radicalization program aiming to address violent extremism. To better compare this set of studies, we created a chart with information on the country, program name, program type, metrics used to assess the program, any evaluation statistics provided, and the study in which the information appears. For some of the programs limited information was provided within the studies especially in terms of the scope of the program. The chart guides our discussion about empirical studies on CVE disengagement and de-radicalization programs. We have included the chart in Appendix I.

Before delving into a summary of the empirical data, however, there are a number of important issues to address within the literature focused on CVE disengagement and de-radicalization. One point concerns definitions of what disengagement and de-radicalization mean within the context of CVE practice. Generally, the term de-radicalization refers to the process by which an individual rejects certain attitudes or beliefs supporting the use of violence whereas disengagement refers to the process by which an individual uncouples from participation in a violent extremist group (Schmid 2013). As such, the process of disengagement does not necessarily mean that an individual will also become de-radicalized.

In our review, we found that even though some studies conflate the two terms, disengagement and de-radicalization are generally treated separately. In practice, sometimes, disengagement programs include a de-radicalization component, and vice versa. Moreover, while both types of programs should be carefully distinguished, especially for evaluation purposes, program content may be similar, consisting of counseling and support services. The programs are also primarily tailored to accommodate individuals, although one program in Colombia was designed for collective disengagement of individuals leaving the terrorist group known as the FARC.

**Empirical Assessments of CVE Disengagement and De-radicalization Programs**
Direct Output Assessments

Based on our survey, we found that the metrics most often provided as program outputs for disengagement and de-radicalization programs are the numbers of participants and, in some cases, program participant completion or non-completion rates. Generally, these program output numbers are very small. For instance, Indonesia’s ad-hoc, prison-based disengagement program reported in 2007, that of the roughly four hundred people who were offered counselling, only twenty accepted the offer (Abuza in Bjørø and Horgan 2009; Horgan and Braddock 2010). In Australia, El-Said (2015) provides a brief overview of Australia’s nascent programs to engage eighteen individuals but laments that it is simply too early to evaluate the success of the programs. However, some programs are larger with some studies that reported several hundred participants, most notably Sweden’s program that works with individuals from far right groups and Germany’s program (Bjørø, van Donselaar and Grunenberg in Bjørø and Horgan 2009). The one outlier in this regard is the program in Saudi Arabia, which reports that some 3,000 participants took part in the program (Boucek 2008).

Besides participation rates, two studies also provide an outline of day-to-day activities and output rates. Through interviews and participant observation, Christensen (2015) provides details about the use of former right-wing extremists as mentors in Sweden’s program. For instance, the author examines the process of dialogue that takes place between the mentor and mentee and notes the opportunities that arise within these dialogues that allow for the development of social skills and the transformation of a participant’s identity. Similarly, Gunaratna and Mohamed Hassan in Gunaratna, Jerard and Rubin’s edited volume (2011) provide statistics regarding the outputs of Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group, which by 2009 had conducted over 1,200 counselling sessions to detainees and 120 sessions for the families of detainees.

Direct Outcome Assessments

When reporting direct outcome assessments of programs, we found that the most common assessment metric was offender recidivism rates for both disengagement and de-radicalization programs. Researchers typically report recidivism rates in two ways: (1) whether an individual returns to active participation in an extremist group, such as Bjørø and Horgan (2009) reported in the EXIT Germany program; or (2) whether an individual has a prison release revoked or has been rearrested (see Horgan and Braddock 2010). Sometimes, it is difficult to decipher what is meant by the term recidivism, as is the case with the recidivism rates provided by the Saudi government (Boucek 2008). Nonetheless, recidivism rates are widely used within the studies overviewed in this literature review. For instance, El Said (2015) uses individual re-offense rates to determine the effectiveness of CVE de-radicalization programs.

We also noted a few examples of programs using attitudinal surveys to assess program outcome or impact. For example, Hirschfield et al (2012) provided data from multiple youth intervention programs in the United Kingdom and discussed several programs that utilized pre- and post-test surveys assess attitudinal changes of those participating in programs. Broadbent (2014) administered online surveys at
the end of the program to determine what participants had learned from their participation in the program.

Looking across the studies, we identified an important but often overlooked variable; that is, the environment in which a program takes place may affect what measures are used to assess the impact of the program. Our literature review revealed that many de-radicalization and disengagement programs take place in correctional settings. Examples include programs in Singapore (El-Said 2015), Saudi Arabia\(^9\) (Boucek 2008; Horgan and Braddock 2010), Mauritania (El-Said 2015), Sudan (El-Said 2015), Malaysia (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; El-Said and Harrigan 2013), Northern Ireland (Horgan and Braddock 2010), United Kingdom (Hirschfield et al 2012), and Yemen (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009) that take place within prisons and include both de-radicalization and disengagement components. These programs primarily offer some type of counselling services or promote dialogue between inmates and religious leaders as is the case with Yemen’s program. Other programs are even more extensive, such as Singapore’s program which receives money from Muslim organizations to provide financial support to detainees and their families (El-Said 2015).

In contrast, programs that take place before an individual is charged with a crime or placed in jail are often referred to as interventions in the pre-criminal space. These programs are most often found in Europe, but we also identified one example of a program in South America. Examples include: Australia (El-Said 2015, Broadbent 2013), Denmark (Vidino and Brandon 2012) Germany\(^10\) (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009), Sweden\(^11\) (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009), the Netherlands\(^12\) (Demant et al 2009), Norway\(^13\) (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009), and Sweden (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009). Additionally, a program in the United Kingdom named the Lamberth Young and Safe Program tailors its work to individuals both within and outside of the criminal system (Krafchik 2011).

An outlier case is the program found in Colombia, known as the Reincorporation Program. While other programs tend to focus on individual disengagement or de-radicalization, Colombia’s program focuses on both individual and collective disengagement initiatives (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan and Braddock 2010), Ex-fighters voluntarily disengage from militancy and afterwards are allowed to reintegrate within society provided that the individuals check in with the government. These individuals are provided health care, vocational support, counselling, and other basic needs. Uniquely, Horgan and Braddock (2010) report a decrease in murder rates as a potential measure of the effectiveness of the programs. Although this measure is not necessarily a direct outcome measure, levels of violence within areas may possibly be used as an indirect measure of program effectiveness.

### Challenges and Implications

\(^9\) Please see Ansary (2008) and Combes (2013) for additional background information.

\(^10\) For additional background information on Germany’s programs please see Fekete (2015).

\(^11\) Additional background information on Sweden’s programs can be found in Fekete (2015), Christensen (2015) and Lodenius (2010).

\(^12\) Please see Demant and Graaf (2010), Vidino and Brandon (2012), for additional information.

\(^13\) Additional background information on the programs in Norway can be found in Vidino and Brandon (2012).
There are a number of challenges to collecting, analyzing and evaluating CVE disengagement and de-radicalization programs. One important issue involves the reliability of data reported. One example can be found in Horgan and Braddock’s (2010) review of the Saudi program, which has reported an extremely high success rate. The researchers questioned the outcome assessment of the program stating, “such claims are based on suspiciously low recidivism rates (with, unsurprisingly, recidivism never clearly defined) touted by those in charge of the programs” (p. 268). In other studies, government reported data comes under scrutiny by outside observers, indicating the need for more studies to be managed by non-governmental researchers. In addition, gathering reliable data takes time. For example, although intending to provide a program assessment of Australia’s de-radicalization program, El-Said (2015) concluded that the program lacked maturity to provide a meaningful evaluation, an issue which has been raised with the internationally-known foreign fighter de-radicalization program in Aarhus, Denmark (Vidino and Brandon 2012). Certainly, as these programs mature, outcome data will help to address some of these outstanding issues.

Demant et al (2009) describe another challenge, which is finding program participants to take part in CVE-specific de-radicalization program. Originally, these researchers intended to carry out a program in two cities in the Netherlands, but they ultimately could not locate a target group for the program to be carried out in the second location. This difficulty suggests that programs developed in one area may not be easily transferrable to other locations.

We also note that there is little discussion about whether disengagement and de-radicalization programs are mandatory and attached to legal proceedings, or if the programs are voluntary programs like the Australian study. We found evidence of disengagement and de-radicalization outcomes in both correctional and non-correctional contexts. Outcome measures for these different contexts need to be taken into account, and assessment of these outcomes should be carefully considered. El-Said and Harrigan (2013) report that a judge involved in a prison-based de-radicalization program in Yemen determined the success rate of participants. This raises another important question for future researchers to consider as they determine how to define and operationalize success since a judge may define success differently than a psychologist, a teacher, or a family member.

Finally, with regard to geographical location of existing program evaluations, we found that de-radicalization programs designed to address Islamic radicalization are most prevalent in Muslim majority regions whereas studies of European and South American de-radicalization programs are more likely to address right-wing extremism or violent political groups such as the IRA in Northern Ireland or the FARC in Colombia. However, the recent surge in foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq has led to the development of de-radicalization programs focusing on Islamic-inspired terrorist groups in countries like Denmark. Somewhat unexpectedly, we did not find any published academic outcome evaluation of a CVE disengagement or de-radicalization program within the United States, underscoring how the CVE field of evaluation has matured differently across regions.
Addressing the Challenges of Evaluating CVE Programs

To date, there is little consensus regarding the effectiveness of CVE prevention programs or disengagement/de-radicalization programs largely due to the lack of empirical studies. Yet, the lack of empirical studies focusing on CVE is not surprising given the overall dearth in empirical studies within the counter-terrorism literature writ large. In 1988, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman concluded that, in the counterterrorism literature, “there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written based on so little research.” (as quoted in Dalgaard Nielsen 2010: 811).

Nearly twenty years later, Lum et al (2006) conducted a literature review on counter-terrorism research to determine the number of scholarly articles that conducted an empirical study to support their arguments. Out of a sample of 20,000 articles, the researchers found that only twenty-one studies connected an outcome with a counter-terrorism strategy through a minimally rigorous scientific test. Of those studies, only seven studies could be categorized using at least a moderately rigorous scientific test. Given that the field of terrorism studies has suffered from a lack of empirical data, we next consider several reasons that the CVE sub-discipline has suffered from a similar shortcoming, and we propose ways for spurring an increase in collecting more rigorous data.

First and foremost, there is a lack of agreement on basic definitions in the field. Not only is there no one accepted definition of “CVE,” there is little consensus on the terms discussed such as “prevention,” “de-radicalization,” and “disengagement.” Furthermore, there is a lack of agreement on the factors that lead individuals to be more or less susceptible to radicalization. In fact, most scholars have reached the conclusion that there is no one pathway to radicalization (e.g. Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, Bjørgo 2011, Neumann 2013), and the term “radicalization” itself is an additional source for confusion (e.g. Sedgwick 2010). This partially explains why Horgan and Braddock’s (2010) call for a reliable risk assessment procedure that includes indicators that capture reduced risk of re-engagement to use in order to gauge the success of a program has gone largely unanswered. Consequently, scholars and CVE practitioners need to be mindful of the differing terms and confusion that can arise with conflating these terms.

Additionally, there is a need for reliable data on the programs themselves and clear metrics for success (Horgan and Altier 2012). Both issues present substantial challenges. CVE practitioners often lament the lack of funding and support for CVE programs. They say there is little time to carry out all the services they provide, let alone gather reliable program data. There are also no clear methods for determining success. In some disengagement or de-radicalization programs, scholars have used the metric of recidivism to assess whether a program is a success. But other measures might be important to consider.

Besides actual metrics, to assist in the evaluation process, scholars have proposed frameworks that can be used more fully. Horgan and Braddock (2010) present two possible frameworks that can be used by

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scholars or CVE practitioners for evaluation purposes. First, the Multi Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT) is an assessment technique for risk reduction programs that identifies and weighs goals and objectives of a program and assesses how well that program meets those goals. This framework utilizes stakeholders associated with the programs to weigh the objectives and goals of the programs. Using quantitative data, the results of this assessment are geared for policy refinement of the programs themselves. Second, the authors propose that process evaluation frameworks can also be used to focus on the immediate outcomes of the intervention or program. These frameworks are valuable for assessing questions such as if resources are being used correctly. The framework relies on qualitative methodology including interviews and surveys to assess the programs. Process evaluation frameworks can also be used to identify areas where the implementation and structure of the program can be improved.

A third framework that can be used for evaluation purposes is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Quality Standards for Development. Endorsed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the framework evaluates programs based on five criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance, and sustainability. Moreover, "evaluations based on DAC Standards look at the relationship among overall aim, context, and implemented activities and how these lead to outcomes that ultimately may have positive impact" (Ellis et al 2011, 2). The DAC Standards and questions associated with the Standards can be applied to any counter-terrorism program and may be helpful for scholars to work-through in order to increase our understanding regarding the effectiveness of CVE initiatives.

A final framework that can be used to evaluate these programs includes one proposed by Williams and Kleinman (2014). The authors explain how to evaluate deradicalization programs which they term “terrorism reduction programs,” using a utilization-focused evaluation perspective. In accordance with this framework, the authors argue that the primary dependent variable of evaluations should be a measure of post-detainment terrorism engagement. However, since there is no consensus on how the outcome variable should be measured, the authors suggest this measure be left up to stakeholders to decide. The authors also describe how stakeholders can go about conducting an evaluation, such as identifying a theory of change referring to a statement about how the program is able to achieve the results that it does.

A further challenge relates to research design and determining the causal role of CVE programs in achieving their various objectives (e.g., Demant et al 2009). There is an urgent need to engage all CVE stakeholders in a deep discussion of causality in CVE intervention programs as well as the outcomes of these programs (Lindekilde 2012; Romaniuk and Fink 2012; Vidino 2008). Recidivism rates alone do not prove that a disengagement program successfully caused an individual to disengage from a violent extremist group. Instead, it may be the case that some other factor, such as the efforts of a family member, explains why the individual disengaged.

For any researcher, especially in evaluating programs, the ideal is to determine causality. Is the program responsible for the change in attitudes of participants or the change in recruitment efforts within a community or is it another factor? This is what makes research design and the inclusion of control groups
critical. Therefore, although we have outlined the measures that have been previously used to evaluate the direct and indirect effects of these programs, these measures should be accompanied by a research design that enables the researcher to draw causal inferences. Generally speaking, a valid causal inference requires comparison between a treatment group, or participants in a program, and a control group, non-participants in a program. An individual participant in a de-radicalization program can then be compared to a similar individual who is not subject to the program, in order to draw inferences in regards to the effectiveness of the de-radicalization program. Scholars and CVE practitioners can choose from an array of research designs that may best fit their needs. These options may range from a basic treatment-control comparison study to an experimental design that incorporates randomization.

**Way Forward**

Given these challenges what can be done to increase our understanding of the effectiveness of CVE programs? The purpose of social science research is to accumulate knowledge on a subject. As echoed in Romaniuk's (2015) assertion that CVE is “field that has risen to prominence in a manner disproportional to its achievements,” the problem with research on CVE is that this knowledge accumulation has been primarily based on assumptions that are not always grounded in rigorous empirical research (p. v). Our goal in preparing this working paper and annotated bibliography is to contribute to the ongoing dialogue among scholars, practitioners and policymakers regarding the development of metrics for the evaluation of CVE initiatives. We recognize that one important aspect of CVE development has been the locally-driven nature of programs attuned to the unique on-the-ground circumstances in local communities. This trend within the CVE field has resulted in a scatter-shot approach to program evaluation and testing. As we have seen through our review, there are a handful of studies across different contexts that provide some initial evidence as to what works in local conditions. But many questions remain.

Additional research can shed light onto key questions regarding what techniques work and under what conditions. For instance, are certain types of individuals more receptive to a specific counselling effort? Perhaps some individuals are more receptive to counselling provided by an ex-extremist during the process of de-radicalization compared to a social worker. As we saw, programs include various different measures to encourage an individual to disengage from an extremist group. It may be the case that programs which are more extensive in their support, as seen with the programs in Singapore which provide financial assistance to participants, are more likely to achieve their objectives.

Questions also remain regarding the long-term impacts of programs. What happens to individuals after they complete a program? Are these individuals able to find jobs and continue to reject violent extremism in years to come? Follow-up studies that track participants long after their completion of the program may help answer these key questions.

As CVE policies and practices mature, data collected on existing CVE programs should ideally be able to provide more generalizable findings. In our assessment, this will be achieved only through increased support and funding for well-designed CVE research initiatives. Without reliable data, assessments of
CVE will not be able to adequately answer policymakers’ questions about whether or not CVE works; and the public, sometimes footing the bill of CVE programs, will have little confidence in CVE programs’ effectiveness. Moreover, research findings should be made public to promote the sharing of information. Given increased international attention to CVE, now is the time for researchers to engage in these collaborative partnerships to address the complex challenges related to countering violent extremism and to provide an evidence-base for sound initiatives that will reduce violence and promote safe and secure communities.
## APPENDIX I

The table provided below outlines the CVE disengagement and de-radicalization programs that we identified within the literature.\(^{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>Evaluation Metric</th>
<th>Evaluation Statistics</th>
<th>Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Youth Service Project in Victoria, Australia</td>
<td>De-radicalization-leadership program, pre-criminal space</td>
<td>Online survey-participants were asked what they learned from the program</td>
<td>18 participants- 62% learned how to be a good leader; 68% learned how to be a good team member; other reported learned skills included: confidence, accountability, communication skills</td>
<td>Broadbent et al 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>City of Medellin program</td>
<td>Disengagement/rehabilitation/reincorporation-post-conflict space</td>
<td>Recidivism rates</td>
<td>The recidivism rates for the city of Medellin stand at 3%, with 43% of former combatants working.</td>
<td>Ribetti in Bjørgo and Horgan 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reincorporation Program</td>
<td>Reincorporation-post-conflict space</td>
<td>Murder Rates</td>
<td>Colombia National Police Commander General Jorge Castro attributes the drop in murder rates since 2002 by 87% to the Reincorporation Program</td>
<td>Horgan and Braddock 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>De-radicalization: Targeted Intervention Program</td>
<td>De-radicalization program in Aarhus, Copenhagen and</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Danish officials have indicated their satisfaction with the program</td>
<td>Vidino and Brandon 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>EXIT Deutschland</td>
<td>De-radicalization/Disengagement</td>
<td>Recidivism rates</td>
<td>From interviews with NGOs such as EXIT-Deutschland, by the time of the interviews in 2006, the NGO was</td>
<td>Bjørgo, van Donselaar and Grunenberg in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{15}\) In this table, we only included studies that presented some type of empirical data. These types of programs do appear in other countries besides the ones listed in the table. For information on Egypt, please see Gunaratna and Ali (2009) and Rubin in Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin (2011); for information on Southeast Asia, please see Ramakrishna (2005). For information on a mixed number of countries please see Zeiger and Aly (2015) and Rankin and Cowen (2012)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program Description</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Aussteigerprogramm fur Rechtsextremisten vom Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV)</td>
<td>De-radicalization/Disengagement</td>
<td>Completion rate</td>
<td>Bjørgo and Horgan 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the time of writing of the study, in the previous five years, out of 230 individuals who contacted BfV, 130 individuals were admitted and 30 individuals did not complete the process.</td>
<td>Bjørgo, van Donselaar and Grunenberg in Bjørgo and Horgan 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>North-Rhine Westphalian Program</td>
<td>De-radicalization/Disengagement</td>
<td>Drop-out rate</td>
<td>At the time of writing the program was guiding 30 individuals; approximately 30 individuals had already dropped out of the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>De-radicalization/Disengagement/rehabilitation-prison based</td>
<td>Recidivism rates</td>
<td>Although the authors note that Malaysia does not officially have de-radicalization statistics, there have been no reports of recidivism by those released so far.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Prison based</td>
<td>Release rates</td>
<td>of the approximately 115 individuals detained, 65% were released which has been partially attributed to the de-radicalization program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Prison based</td>
<td>Release rates</td>
<td>35 to 37 participants were released from prison, although the Mauritanian the government admitted that at least one returned to violent extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Program Description</td>
<td>Change in Behavior</td>
<td>Recidivism rates</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherland(s)</td>
<td>De-radicalization/disengagement</td>
<td>15 out of 22 participants stopped right-wing behavior in Winschoten</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demant et al 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Early Release Scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Horgan and Braddock 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>“Police Talks” with the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BJØRGO, VAN DONSELAAR AND GRUNENBERG IN BJØRGO AND HORGAN 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare program (PRAC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boucek 2008; Horgan and Braddock 2010; Boucek in Gunaratna, Jerard and Rubin 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>El-Said 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Metrics</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Prison based-de-radicalization/deseengagement program</td>
<td>Release rates</td>
<td>The Singaporean government attributes the release of the 44 of 73 individuals detained on terrorism charges to the individual’s positive response to religious counseling. Abuza in Bjørgo and Horgan 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Recidivism rates</td>
<td>Of 79 formerly detained radicals, 6 returned to violent extremism El-Said 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Lamberth’s Young and Safe program</td>
<td>Participation rates and recidivism rates</td>
<td>An evaluation completed by the Swedish Council for Crime and Prevention in 2001, found that 133 individuals were provided assistance with 125 of those individuals left the White Power movement. By spring 2008, 600 people received assistance with only 2 individuals who were known to have returned. Bjørgo, van Donselaar and Grunenberg in Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Christensen 2015; Lodenius 2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both a prison and pre-criminal space program</td>
<td>the supervision of a Restriction Order (RO), with only a few individuals ever being fully released. Krafchik 2011</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Offending Team Projects (YOTs)</td>
<td>Almost exclusively prison-based-interventions</td>
<td>Change in Attitude</td>
<td>In 12 of 48 projects, pre and post-intervention measures were used to detect changes in attitudes of participants. Positive provisional findings were found, with no more additional details.</td>
<td>Hirschfield et al 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen Religious Dialogue Committee</td>
<td>Prison based de-radicalization/desengagement program</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>According to the one of the Judges, the program reformed about 40 percent of jihadists.</td>
<td>Boucek, Beg and Horgan in Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan and Braddock 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Release rates</td>
<td>87% of those prisoners that went through the program were later released and reports of a 90% success rate as determined by a judge involved in the program</td>
<td>El-Said and Harrigan 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation rates, release rates</td>
<td>In the four sessions held, the first phase involved 104 people, the second involved 120 people, the third involved 76 people, and the fourth involved 462 individuals with each phase receiving positive outcomes. In the third phase, all 76 individuals were released.</td>
<td>Al-Hitar in Gunaratna, Jerard and Rubin 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II: Annotated Bibliography

Empirical Evaluation Studies on CVE Initiatives:


In this report, Aldrich summarizes the United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) policies in Africa and conducts an evaluation of the effects of US programming on residents in two towns in Mali. The main question of the study is whether or not US programming altered cognition and behaviors of Malians in terms of four outcomes of interest: whether or not respondents listened to a radio show regarding peace; respondent’s civic engagement activity levels; respondent’s views on Al Qaeda; and respondent’s views on the West's efforts to fight terrorism. Using a quasi-experimental paired-comparison of 200 respondents, the author finds that in Timbuktu, a town that was exposed to US programming, respondents were more likely to listen to the radio show and more likely to participate in local government activities versus respondents in Dire, a city that was not exposed to US programming. US programming was found to have insignificant effects on respondent's views on Al-Qaeda and western efforts to counter terrorism.


This article broadly examines Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism approach. After explaining the history of extremism in Saudi Arabia, Ansary describes the two approaches that the Saudi government has taken: (1) the Security Strategy; and (2) the Advocacy and Advisory Strategy. The latter is implemented through counseling programs and advocacy campaigns that focus on prevention and deradicalization. This includes an extensive counseling and reeducation prison program that is implemented by the Ministry of the Interior. Release is granted for those prisoners who have proven to have responded effectively to the program and recanted their previous actions and radical ideology.


Bjørgo and Horgan’s edited volume is a compilation of comparative case studies with the purpose to understand the processes and conditions under which individuals disengage from terrorism. In addition, the volume provides an overview of different polices in many countries that attempt to facilitate this process. The countries featured in this volume include: Norway, Sweden, Germany, Colombia, Yemen, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. This volume serves as the first comparative analysis of disengagement programs. The information provides varies by each country, but most of the analysis focuses on policy outputs of the various programs. However, a variety of different measures are used to provide a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of these programs including: recidivism rates, crime rates, number of individuals released from the programs, number of individuals who have claimed to disengage from terrorism, and even employment rates of participants.


In this article, Boucek describes Saudi Arabia's Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC) programs. Boucek explains the structure of the programs and the various agencies involved in their implementation. The programs vary in scope ranging from programs that focus on public information and communication to programs that aim to prevent extremism within schools. Of particular interest in this study are the programs focusing on the rehabilitation and aftercare of prisoners convicted of being associated with violent extremism. Through interviews conducted with Saudi officials, Boucek notes that recidivism rates were as low as 1 to 2 percent. Although the results of the evaluations of these programs should be viewed cautiously because the statistics on recidivism rates are provided solely by the Saudi government, the background and overview of the Saudi programs are comprehensive and insightful.


The authors of this article conduct an evaluation of a multicultural leadership program in Victoria, Australia that targeted youth who were considered to be exhibiting signs of fostering hatred and intolerance. The program is designated to work with young people from 12-17 years of age by providing these individuals with individual and group mentoring opportunities. The main goals of this evaluation were to determine what worked, how it worked, and whom it worked for under what contexts. After reviewing the program and the context under which it was conducted, the authors present the results of an online survey that the participants of the programs completed. The students were asked about what they had learned from the program. The responses were then matched with the overall goals of the program in which the responses seemed to correspond to the program's objectives.

Among the profiles of terrorists, one characteristic that is somewhat surprising is the prevalence of high education among terrorists in the UK. This finding has resulted in universities becoming targets of counterterrorism measures due to the perception that radicalization flourishes within the university. The authors of this article analyze these implications for students via analysis of student narratives. The authors find that such security measures constrain student activism and negatively impact the university experience for students. Uniquely, the authors focus on female Muslim students, a distinction that is often overlooked by other articles. Policies that restrict Muslim women from wearing religious garments often restrict their ability to be politically active as students. The authors use interviews of British Muslim women with Pakistani backgrounds to draw their conclusions concerning the consequences of counterterrorism measures at universities.


Should states strategically use moderates to counter more radical Islamic ideology? The authors of this article investigate the strategic use of moderates by states to marginalize extremists. The authors argue that “moderates” are not a preexisting, well-defined, or stable group, rather moderates are identified by their public self-presentation. Utilizing a minimal definition of the term, the authors define moderates as “those willing publicly to foreswear violence, even when it would further their goals, and to uphold the rule of law.” (p.376). Aside from the use of violence to counter terrorism, states use soft power approaches or approaches to win the "hearts and minds" of the populace. Under this strategy, moderates can be used to marginalize radicals on the theological level. The benefit of using moderates to counter radicalization is the credibility that such individuals have within the Islamic community. States often recognize the benefits of using moderates and consequently forge partnerships with these individuals. However, after analyzing India's campaign against the Sikh extremists and Spain's campaign against Basque extremists, the authors point out that once moderates interact with the authorities, the previous credibility that these individuals had is lost. Consequently, the authors suggest that isolating moderates and creating space between moderates and the government may be the best option. Although the article is limited to only two case studies, this article challenges previous policies that advocate for a close partnership between the state and moderates to combat radicalization by illuminating the possible unintentional consequences of such decisions.


What rhetoric should states use to counter terrorism? The authors argue that states should delegitimize extremists’ means and politicize some of their aspirations rather than using militarized rhetoric to counter terrorism. The authors draw this conclusion from insights gained from case studies of the Indian, Spanish, and Turkish counterterrorist campaigns. The authors match the utility of a chosen rhetoric with the tasks of counterterrorism which include: "(1) render insurgency politically unpalatable (in part by casting political violence as terror); (2) undermine the insurgents’ will or capacity to engage in violence; (3) sustain a moderate, yet
legitimate, communal political voice; and (4) concede few substantive demands” (134). From these tasks, the authors conclude that rhetoric that delegitimizes the violence but also politicizes some of the grievances of the community is the best option.

Christensen, T. (2015). A Question of Participation- Disengagement from the Extremist Right-
A Case Study from Sweden. PhD Dissertation, Department of Psychology and Educational Studies Roskilde University

The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: to first understand the process of disengagement, and second, to understand the support that helps people successfully disengage. After a historical overview of programs in Scandinavia, Germany, Singapore, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Christensen analyzes disengagement work in Sweden primarily by conducting 23 interviews with those involved in the program. The dissertation provides a comprehensive overview of Sweden’s EXIT program, founded in 1998, which forms a part of a youth center named Fryshuset that is located in Stockholm. The program uses dialogue, mentoring, and other activities to assist participants in successfully disengagement from right-wing extremist groups. EXIT Sweden conceptualizes the disengagement process as a five step process: the phase of motivation (individual begins to question his/her involvement in the group; phase of disengagement (decision to quit and contact EXIT); phase of establishment (attempting to enter normal life); phase of reflection (may suffer from anxiety, etc); phase of normalization (entering a normal life). This program also uses formers, or individuals that were formerly engaged in right-wing extremism. Christensen argues that a former must undergo personal change and reformulate one’s past before the individual can help others and to become useful knowledge for organizations. She states that this can be accomplished when an individual engages in social practice and interacts with others in a self-reflective manner. Thus, participation and social interaction are viewed as critical components of a disengagement program. Christensen argues that change in a mentee occurs as an outcome of the interaction between the mentor and mentee and their social and natural surroundings. The variety of activities including informal dialogue creates the opportunities for the development of social skills and the transformation of a participant’s identity.


How has the post-9/11 environment changed the management systems of cities? The authors of this article use a case study of Manchester, UK between 1996 and 2006 to illustrate how operational changes have influenced the rebordering of the city as a result of the perceived risk of terrorism. The term rebordering is derived from an academic literature that refers to the defense or “bordering” of cities against crime and terrorism. Thus, the case study includes
interviews with those individuals who were responsible for the design and management of public space in Manchester and the rebordering of the city in response to safety concerns. The focus of this study is on the community resilience efforts, meaning efforts that focus on preparedness to increase recovery and response capabilities of communities to an emergency such as a terrorist event or preparations for a major event such as the Commonwealth Games. These community resilience efforts, however, often exclude community voice, meaning that decisions are made by powerful institutions without the consent of the citizens. The authors explore the implications of this for the public to engage in urban development.


How can the US gain insight regarding counterterrorism strategy? The author of this article uses a comparative analysis of the UK's Prevent strategy and Saudi Arabia's PRAC program to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of these programs. The article contrasts the two different programs, one with roots in Islamist ideology and the other with roots in British values. The author concludes that the US can look at these two strategies to apply in the US context.


What role does the government play in countering violent extremism? Demant and Graaf explore government actions to counter terrorism in the Netherlands through a case study analysis. The authors compare the government's response to the Moluccan, indigenous inhabitants of the Maluku Islands, actions in the 1970s and Islamic radicalization in the post 9/11 world, concluding that government interventions and the discourse that is produced or reinforced by such interventions can have a substantial effect on deradicalization efforts. This means that government efforts, depending on how they are framed, can sometimes increase radicalization when it is generalized to the entire Muslim population, rather than targeted towards radical factions within society. Thus, one of the lessons learned from this analysis is to avoid generalizing the terrorist threat to an entire population, but rather implement a strategy that targets myths and misrepresentations promoted by terrorists.


Deradicalisation in practice. *Amsterdam, Netherlands: Leiden University, Anne Frank House.*

This report is an assessment of deradicalization pilot programs targeting right-wing extremism that were implemented in 2007 and 2008 in the cities of Eindhoven and Winschoten in the Netherlands. The purpose of these pilot programs was to determine if programs similar to the
ones in Germany and Scandinavia could be applied in the Netherlands. The assessment covers how the programs were implemented and the results from the experimental study. The authors followed the pilot programs through various phases, including attending public meetings during the initial phase of the programs. Participants of the program were offered assistance through social service provisions, such as assistance in finding a job, a place to live, and schooling. In addition, the police and other local partners conducted discussions with participants concerning the consequences of their actions. To analyze the effects of the programs, the authors followed the young people after they completed the program. For the program in Winschoten, a participant was thought to be deradicalized if the person changed his/her radical behavior, which included assessments of the individual’s membership in extremist group or public displays of extremist sentiments. Based on the study, 15 of the 22 participants stopped their right-wing extremist behavior, or in other words deradicalized. In Eindhoven the project was not implemented since the program organizers could not locate a target group for the program. The authors acknowledge, however, limitations in the research design since they could not determine that the program caused the change in behavior versus another factor.


Using the Netherlands and the UK as case studies, Eijkman reviews the preventive counterterrorism measures in the EU and their potential discriminatory side-effects. The author highlights the implications of the policies for the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, ethnic and religious minority rights, among others. Unlike other articles, this article emphasizes the legal and policy reforms that have taken place due to the counterterrorism strategies. The article calls for an empirical evaluation of counterterrorism programs that is transparent and unbiased.


In this book, El-Said overviews the experience of radicalization and the response by the state of five countries: Australia, Mauritania, Singapore, Sudan, and Turkey. For each country, the author describes the rise of radicalization within the country and the root causes of radicalization. Next, El-Said presents each nation’s response to violent extremism, which covers both prevention and de-radicalization programs. In these descriptions, details concerning the outputs of the programs are provided when available to give a more complete understanding of the content of the various programs. When available, the author also presents recidivism rates and terrorism incident rates within the country as a means to gauge the success of the programs. The author finds mixed success of the various programs in each country given these statistics, although as the author
cautions, these conclusions should be viewed carefully, since many of these statistics are provided by government officials and in some cases, there are no means to verify the validity of the statistics provided. As such, it may be the case that the statistics that were provided to the author are either inaccurate or misrepresentative. For instance, in recidivism rates that are provided, it is unclear what is exactly meant by recidivism.


This is the first book in a two part series that describes the experience of radicalization and the various responses by Muslim majority states. Focusing on Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, the authors seek to understand the macro-level conditions that lead to successful counter and de-radicalization programs. The factors under analysis are: the presence of a charismatic leader at the state level; strong state developmental capacity; strong state political capacity; dynamic and active civil society; and positive external environments. Using a qualitative, comparative approach, the authors first spend time explaining the historical background of radicalization in the countries and then proceed to analyze government efforts to curb radicalization.


This article presents quantitative data on a total of 46 male and female Muslim adolescents who participated in an intervention training program to empower and strengthen their empathy in order to counter violent radicalization. The training program, named Diamant, took place in the Netherlands and consisted of three modules (Turning Point, Intercultural Moral Judgment, and Intercultural Conflict Management) that were conducted over a three month period. In the first module, participants worked on their social and professional skills. In the second and third modules, “participants reflected on their own opinions about what is good and bad behavior in comparison to what is acceptable behavior in society as a whole” (p. 402). Through pre and post self-reported evaluations conducted after each module, the authors found that the training increased participants’ reported self-esteem, agency, and empathy, and decreased participants’ attitudes toward ideology-based violence and personal violent intentions. The questions attempted to measure perceptions of individual relative deprivation, collective relative deprivation, self-esteem, agency, narcissism, empathy, perspective taking, attitude toward ideology-based violence by others, and own violent intentions. The study concluded that the
individuals who participated in the program did not show signs of radicalization, but were rather individuals that were “possibly vulnerable to radicalization” (408).


This edited volume explores the different rehabilitation and prevention programs in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Iraq, Yemen and Pakistan. These programs range from ad hoc efforts as found in Algeria and Egypt to fully comprehensive state-led programs in Saudi Arabia and Singapore. The latter two include aftercare programs that help assist in the detainees’ transitions back into society. Each chapter provides an overview of the context of radicalization within each country and the programs. Certain factors were identified as contributors to the successful deradicalization of groups, including the influence of the leadership of the group as demonstrated in the deradicalization of AIS in Algeria and IG in Egypt. Some chapters provide more information concerning the evaluation of the programs versus others, such as the chapters on Saudi Arabia, while others focus more on the root causes of radicalization within the country as found in the chapter on Pakistan. Overall, the volume provides an informative outline of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs across these 7 countries.


This comprehensive report analyzes the programs conducted by youth offending teams (YOTs) in the United Kingdom as part of the 2008 Prevent Strategy. The report includes 12 case studies out of 48 total project sites, the collection of data concerning project interventions and activity, 71 interviews with practitioners among all 48 sites, and a systematic literature review. In terms of the projects, most projects involved some type of dialogue and debate and worked with young Muslim males, sometimes those exclusively in the prison system. Of the 48 projects, 22 projects were more geared towards youth inclusion/engagement, while 26 projects were directly related to preventing violent extremism. The authors find that the most common method used by the projects to evaluate the programs was the use of written feedback forms completed by the participant. Out of the 48 projects, 12 projects used pre- and post-intervention measures to determine if participants’ attitudes had changed. Overall, the authors note that generally positive provisional findings were found for the projects based on these evaluations, although no more detail was provided.

Horgan and Altier summarize the history of deradicalization programs and whether or not they work. The authors emphasize the lack of research on the actual effectiveness of these programs minus government reports from countries such as Saudi Arabia that claim that they are very effective. The authors attribute the lack of studies on this topic to the lack of reliable data on the programs themselves and the lack of transparent concepts and metrics for measuring success. However, the authors believe that these types of programs hold promise.


Horgan and Braddock present the results of a one-year pilot study and discuss the evaluation and effectiveness of deradicalization programs found in Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. The authors advocate the use of Multi Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT) as a promising new empirical tool to evaluate similar initiatives once more data becomes available. This tool identifies and weights the goals and objectives associated with a program and then the tool is used to assess how well that program meets those expectations.


This report is an evaluation of the Tower Hamlets Prevent Projects in the United Kingdom funded between 2008 and 2011. The report chronicles the experiences of the community organizations in implementing these projects, and practitioners’ perceptions of these programs. The study includes interviews with key stakeholders, project leads, in-depth field research of projects and interviews with participants. The interviews highlighted in some instances a lack of central guidance and a decreased emphasis on learning and monitoring mechanisms. In terms of delivery of the programs, two types of changes that took place during implementation: changes in design of project activities and changes in the approach to delivery. The successes reported included the ability for practitioners to reach out to young people and the implementation of a model that addressed a range of socio-economic needs of young people or other activities, such as sports and youth clubs. The programs also expanded collaboration and built relationships among agencies and organizations that normally do not work together. Projects reported an increased level of community understanding of the UK’s counterterrorism efforts and increased capacity building, especially among mosques.

Can sports programs be used to counter extremism within communities? The authors of this report evaluate the “More than a Game” program, which aimed to promote community resilience in Melbourne, Australia. The research assesses whether the intense experiences and emotions experienced in team sports can break down barriers of social difference and facilitate experiences of mutual trust. Using a mixed method post-evaluation approach to measure the impact and effectiveness of the program, the authors collected information from the participants of the program. Based on the pre and post evaluations of 21 participants, the authors determined that the participants' attitudes towards different cultures improved after their participation in the program.


The authors of this article analyze the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)’s Kenya Transition Initiative between 2011 and 2014. This program is presented as a pilot program for the CVE concept. The program included small grants that were dispersed to individuals and organizations to fund a broad range of activities with the objective of reducing violent extremism. These activities included counselling, community debates, and others. Two conclusions are reached: first, a more comprehensive understanding of violent extremism by practitioners in relation to the local context was needed, and second, more top-level guidance from donors was also needed. Additionally, the authors conclude that the program’s efforts contributed to dissuading certain individuals from radicalizing, although more detail in this regard was not provided given the sensitive nature of the program.


This report is an external evaluation of Lambeth’s Young and Safe program in the United Kingdom. The program targets people aged 8-19 who are either at risk of becoming involved in violence or criminal activity or who have entered the criminal justice system. The program provides services such as social welfare services to these individuals in an intervention-type setting. Between 2009 and 2011, 530 referrals were made to the program. In terms of evaluation of the program, the program uses performance measures to track the service performance data,
including the number of assessments carried out and the number of cases referred to a social welfare provider. To evaluate the program, the authors collected data from interviews, observations and available documentation regarding the program. Although the authors set out to conduct pre and post intervention interviews with participants, given the changing nature of the programs, the authors were unable to conduct these interviews for all 58 respondents. The evaluation interview of participants consisted of questions concerning the participants’ opinion of the program, an attitude survey to measure conformity with social norms, and general characteristics related to the individual. Although a positive change in the attitude scores were observed, given the inability to conduct pre and post tests for the individuals and the small numbers involved in the surveys, the results are not statistically significant.


Kundnani summarizes the different components of the Prevent strategy found in the UK highlighting the allocation of funding and the areas where Prevent efforts are targeting. This article points to the many weaknesses with the earlier versions of Prevent, especially concerning the allocation of funding to areas based on demographics. Another concern that emerged from this study is the perception that the government only worked with certain Muslim organizations based on their religious moderate views. Kundnani argues that such counterterrorism efforts undermine the goals of the UK’s strategy. The author puts forth several recommendations, including that the government refrain from promoting certain interpretations of Islam and limit Prevent funds for purely counterterrorism focused initiatives.


Contributing to the literature on the UK's Prevent strategy, Lakhani conducts qualitative empirical research between October 2009 and June 2010 of 56 male respondents to assess the perception and reception of the UK's policies amongst the individuals that are involved in such interventions. The author finds that respondents hold a number of grievances but three main themes of grievances emerge from the interviews: concerns around funding, confusion about the strategy; and concern about the use of the programs for intelligence purposes. However, it must be noted that the majority of respondents were individuals who were not necessarily the target of the policies. This article illustrates the difficulty in obtaining an unbiased and large sample of interviews.


Lambert reviews collaboration between London-based police programs, part of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), and Muslim community programs. These efforts exemplified soft-power
tactics and a bottom-up approach to convince youth within London to reject the recruitment efforts of groups like AQ. Lambert concludes with a discussion of the implications of associating terrorism with all Islamic ideologies, a concern that is echoed by numerous other scholars.


How has the Prevent policing programs been implemented on the ground? Lamb explores the implementation of Prevent policies through a case study analysis of the West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit. The author uses 16 interviews of police officers as the primary data collection technique of the study. Given the limited nature of the interviews, the conclusions reached by the study are most appropriately viewed as preliminary. However, the strength of the article is that the author gives a detailed overview of the implementation of counter terrorism initiatives within the West Midlands. Officers meet with community groups and are explicit about their work within the community while attempting to engagement and interact with the community. Next, the officers try to gain the trust of the community members by addressing community concerns. Finally, the officers talk to the community about terrorism through an interactive workshop.


The literature on counter-narratives in the fight against global Jihad is scant compared to the rest of the literature on counterterrorism. The authors provide an overview of the different narratives that can be used by Jihadists to recruit new members: the political narrative, the moral narrative, the religious narrative, and the social-psychological narrative. The authors use the narrative pyramid, a pyramid that depicts the different categories of supporters toward Global Jihad narrative from neutral individuals at the bottom to personal moral obligation individuals at the top. The authors also use a pyramid to explain the actions of individuals with inactive individuals at the bottom and terrorists at the top. Examining poll data from the UK and US, the authors argue that they and the literature know very little about why some individuals are more receptive to one element of the narrative than another. Moreover, the links between the two pyramids do not necessarily correspond. More research on the relationship between these two concepts is needed. The main point of this piece is that counter-narratives can either target from the top-down of the pyramid or from the bottom-up. Typically, counter-narratives target from the top-down, but the authors argue that a bottom-up approach is needed. They argue that radicals and terrorists are difficult to reach and to convince to change course.

The purpose of this article is to assess the Danish counter-radicalization policies and the intended and unintended consequences of those policies. The analysis is based on Denmark’s 2009 Common and Safe Future action plan. The author describes various initiatives associated with the 2009 strategic plan and their status in regards to implementation. The author supplements the study with seventeen interviews of Danish Muslims, who express skepticism concerning the effectiveness of the programs, although a few were broadly positive towards the programs.


Translation by Tanya Silverman, Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Retrieved from:

https://annalenalod.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/exit-evaluation-2010-lodenius.pdf

This report provides an overview of Exit Fryshuset in Sweden projects. Exit in Sweden’s main focus is to support individuals who want to defect from Neo Nazi extremist groups. As part of a formal government evaluation in 2010, the author provides information from interviews with key stakeholders associated with this program including clients. The actual transcripts of the various interviews are provided in the appendix and provide an insightful background on the activities associated with Exit in Sweden. Although the author notes that there are limited evaluations conducted on the clients themselves to analyze the effectiveness of the programs, the author does provide general recidivism statistics within the analysis.


Researchers and governments have claimed that radicalization is associated with social isolation and insufficient community cohesion. As a reaction, government policies in the UK have attempted to desegregate schools in an effort to promote community cohesion and diversity. Through school mergers, local governments have attempted to merge majority white pupils with ethnic minority pupils. Miah analyzes the consequences of these decisions to desegregate schools in the areas of Burnley, Blackburn, Leeds and Oldham and she finds, based on anecdotal evidence, that instead of improving cohesion, the forced integrations via school mergers has resulted in increased racial tensions. Miah argues that these mergers have increased feelings of insecurity among Muslim pupils and have increased racial attacks on these pupils.

What impacts do UK policies regarding radicalization have on Muslims in England? Are these policies creating more problems than reducing risks? Although the authors cannot fully answer this question, this article tackles this question in regard to the impact that policies have on the identity and political values of young British Pakistanis located in Northwest England. The findings are based on focus group discussion and interviews conducted with British Pakistanis in 2007. Most of the participants believed that racism and victimization were prevalent and most had first-hand experiences of how they had been treated negatively. Moreover, the participants expressed concern about counterterrorism legislation and practice within the UK.


Advancing Hillyard’s (1993) term ‘suspect community,’ this article examines how Muslims have replaced the Irish as the new ‘suspect community’ in the UK. The legislation that has emerged to counter terrorism, such as the 2000 Terrorism Act, identifies Muslims as the target of government efforts especially when government strategy identifies the threats posed by radical Islam. Similar to other arguments on this subject (e.g. Lambert 2008), Pantazis and Pemberton argue that categorizing Muslims as suspect is undermining security efforts rather than assisting in the fight against terrorism. In support of this argument, the authors draw from the experience of the Irish community as a suspect community and the resulting radicalization and alienation of the Irish within the British population, which they argued prolonged the conflict.


Powers provides an overview of a UK program in Calderdale named “Things Do Change.” In an interview with Sail Suleman, an Interfaith Counselor at the Calderdale city council and the founded of “Things Do Change,” Suleman discusses the purpose of the program and its content. The program is composed of ten modules that offer the opportunity to promote dialogue around issues of religious extremism in an effort to establish dialogue across communities. This program is positively viewed, but details concerning the audits of the program are unavailable. The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the important role of youth development in countering violent extremism and the need to promote community-led initiatives.

This article presents an overview of counterterrorism efforts in the United Kingdom. The authors conducted interviews and focus groups sessions with law enforcement personnel to learn about the various efforts in the United Kingdom. The authors provide information concerning community policing and community engagement initiatives with the objectives to reduce the threat of violent extremism. The premise of the article is to provide the US with the best practices from the United Kingdom in preventing terrorism. The authors make several recommendations, including (1) that there is a need in the US to create relationships with the Muslim community built on trust and respect; (2) a need to reach out to the three tiers of the Muslim community (religious leaders and community organizers, Muslim adult parents, and Muslim children); (3) a need to stop criminalizing Muslim youth, a need for Muslim police officers; and (4) a need for cultural training.


In this report, Romaniuk outlines various CVE efforts found across the globe while distinguishing between first wave and second wave CVE efforts. Although improvements have been made since early CVE efforts began, additional modifications can be made to current politics. As such, the report also analyzes publically available evaluation research on CVE to determine what lessons can be learned from previous efforts. The main lessons that are presented include to “know your audience, avoid stigmatizing communities, send clear messages, and engage broadly and partner strategically” (v). The article concludes with a discussion about best practices for evaluating CVE programs.


This article evaluates the Prevent Program implemented within Southwark, United Kingdom. The authors conduct an evaluation of the 18 projects that were funded by the Prevent Pathfinder Fund for 2009/2010. The program was evaluated based on themes from a prior evaluation completed in 2008/2009 which consisted of: networks and partnerships; spaces for dialogue; media and arts; celebration and events; capacity building; citizenship and cohesion; youth; learning; and parents and intergenerational work. Based on interviews, the authors evaluated the program across nine themes: a strong network of Muslim and non-Muslim organization in Southwark; access to spaces for dialogue concerning difficult conversations; opportunities for the positive portrayal of Muslim people within the media to combat negative media attention; the existence of celebratory events that provided communities the opportunity to be recognized and celebrate; the allowance of some groups to apply for funding targeted towards capacity building; project that promote citizenship and projects that work with the youth; and increase in
opportunities for learning and for parents. Overall, the authors state that the Southwark approach has prioritized the engagement with the Muslim community and the program has improved greatly based on prior recommendations from 2008/2009 and evaluating the program based on the National Framework used to assess Prevent Programs which evaluates programs based on a score from 1 (ad-hoc basis of program) to 5 (fully self-sustaining program). The Southwark program was scored within the 3 and 4 ranges within the themes.


This report provides an evaluation of the Muslim Council of Wale’s preventing violent extremism program, titled the Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women and Imams’ Active Development (ADFYWIAD) program. The program was originally launched in 2009 with the objectives to build the capacity of the Muslim community, increase Muslim participation in civic life, develop leadership skills of Muslim youth, and to decrease the risk of violent extremism amongst Muslim youth. The program consisted of several different projects that each aimed to achieve the overall program’s objectives. The authors collected data regarding the program through interviews and focus group discussions with participants of the program and program organizers. The report also includes results from an online survey of Muslim institutions concerning awareness of the program. Of the 29 responses to the survey, only about half of the respondents were aware of the various projects association with the program. In terms of the success of the program as a whole in achieving the objectives, the authors found some evidence that the projects helped participants better support Muslim communities, and limited evidence that taking part in training had resulted in increased partnerships between the Muslim communities and statutory agencies. The authors were unable to evaluate whether or not the program led to increased civic participation due to problems in recruitment of interview participants, and only limited evidence that participation in the programs decreased the vulnerability of youth to violent extremism. However, participants viewed the programs, especially sports projects, as a way to keep healthy and a way to promote community cohesion.


Bringing insider knowledge of the lived experiences of those that are the targets of CVE policies and those that implement the policies to the forefront, Spalek’s insightful book, which is the result of five years of qualitative field-research, provides the reader with an overview of the implications of CVE policies to the community and state. With over 130 interviews, the author finds that there is a need to build trust amongst partners, increase the credibility of those involved in CVE, and increase the engagement between the state and non-state actors. The interviews provide a foundation for the reader to understand the different types of interactions
that occur between the state, namely the police, and community members and the consequences. After overviewing the top-down versus bottom-up approaches to counterterrorism, Spalek emphasizes some of the consequences that can occur with the participation of the community members in these programs. Although, the author is an advocate of more soft-approaches to counterterrorism, she illustrates the complications that can arise using such an approach including the unintended risks for those community members that decide to participate.


The authors of this report review community policing within the UK along with the difficulties associated with such policing techniques. The authors supplement their study with information from 17 semi-structured interviews of individuals either closely involved or affected by counterterrorism policies. The research team finds that open communication, equality, transparency, and trust between police and the community are emphasized as the keys to the successful use of community policing techniques to counter terrorism. However, given the small sample size of the interviews that were conducted, the results of the interviews must be cautiously viewed. Similar to other articles on community policing, key challenges are addressed, but one in particular, public debate over community policing is emphasized as potentially jeopardizing community policing efforts. The article also overviews innovations to community policing including the inclusion of specialist youth workers with the UK's Pursue strategy.


This report summarizes the CVE strategies, key characteristics and common challenges in four European countries: UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. Among the challenges, the authors identify a lack of clear metrics to assess the success of the programs, difficulty in finding reliable partners within the local Muslim communities, the difficulty in identifying individuals at risk. In the review, the authors provide a description of each program, its history, key components, how funds are allocated, and an assessment of the successes and failures of the programs.

Studies on the Evaluation Process of CVE Initiatives:

This article is written by the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Lead for Preventing Violent Extremism, Sir Norman Bettison. This article provides the police perspective concerning the UK's government's response to the 7/7 attack. The author stresses that the government's strategy to deal with terrorism is not a police-led endeavor. However, the police's response is built on two premises: to build better engagement with the community and to generate and share intelligence with information flowing two-ways between the community and police. Both of these premises are fulfilled through neighborhood policing conducted by police community support officers, police sergeants, and police constables. The article concludes with measures of success that the police plan to use to evaluate the efforts. These measures do not include standard quantitative metrics, but rather qualitative assessment tools that can be used by police. Evaluation of these programs can take place along the following dimensions: an understanding of the community; understanding of risk levels of violent extremism; the extent to which appropriate personnel are trained; the extent to which the police are engaged in a partnership with local authorities and local partners; evidence of collaboration; presence of Prevent coordinators; and a method in place to evaluate the programs.


This policy brief overviews three possible evaluation methods communities can use to evaluate counter-terrorism efforts, but the brief concentrates on three monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tool kits that scholars can use. The first toolkit involves asking formal evaluation questions, while the second toolkit involves the methods to answer those questions through standard field research methods including interviews, surveys, etc. Finally, the last method, involves using new technologies to carry out these monitoring and evaluation efforts. The authors show how all three tools can be used by highlighting the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Quality Standards for Development Evaluation framework. The DAC framework evaluates programs based on five criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance, and sustainability. This technique has been applied to other situations such as peace-building and security-sector reform programs.


This edited volume is a compilation of the current findings of studies that discuss violent extremism, prevention of violent extremism and deradicalization efforts as well as ways to minimize support for violent extremism. Explanations of the underlying processes and factors of violent extremists are presented, including a discussion of the relationship between violent extremism and state terrorism. In addition to offering possible solutions to counter violent extremism, several articles discuss the past lessons learned in regarding to countering violent extremism and ways to apply these lessons to current strategies. Various authors emphasize
partnering with a variety of community actors. Overall, the volume touches on preventative efforts as well as deradicalization and disengagement efforts, while offering policy recommendations for these areas.


Lindekilde examines the various counter-radicalization programs within Denmark and the subsequent problems with analyzing the effectiveness of these programs. Although he outlines the challenges of empirical research, he also concludes by offering suggestions for more systematic assessments on the impact of these policies for future research. These suggestions include: incorporating data triangulation into studies, making policy objectives less abstract and complex to allow for evaluation, and incorporating comparative case studies within the evaluation to control for other possible confounding variables.


One of the main questions that remain to be answered in the CVE literature is, how effective are CVE programs at reducing the threat of radicalization? As with every policy, an evaluation of CVE initiatives is needed to understand if the programs are achieving what they set out to do. However, one of the main challenges of finding an answer to this question is determining how exactly to evaluate these programs. This article is the byproduct of a conference held in Ottawa, Canada that aimed to understand the measurement challenges associated with evaluations. As explained in the article, the participants learned from other areas of study such as conflict resolution that also rely on evaluations. This article summarizes various different kinds of evaluations that CVE practitioners can use to evaluate the wide range of programs.


The authors of this report highlight some of the key questions that still need to be answered regarding detention and the radicalization process that takes place within prisons. The authors argue that without learning more about this phenomenon, policy design in regards to rehabilitation and deradicalization will be imperfect. Although the authors propose some recommendations as the way forward for research on this topic including the use of structured data, the authors also outline the challenges facing researchers who are studying this topic. These challenges include: the lack of clarity of the concepts, such as radicalization and extremism,
which makes them hard to define and measure; the difficulty in establishing causality for the role prisons play in the radicalization process, among others.


The authors of this article present a framework that can be used to evaluate deradicalization programs. The authors walk through the entire evaluation process from identifying the program to communicating findings and presenting recommendations. The central feature of this framework is the use of a utilization-focused evaluation perspective. In accordance with this framework, the authors argue that the primary dependent variable of these evaluations should be a measure of post-detainment terrorism engagement. However, since there is no consensus on how the outcome variable should be measured, the authors argue that how this should be left up to the stakeholders to decide. In addition, the authors include an evaluation self-assessment tool and an evaluation checklist that practitioners can use to evaluate such programs.

**Studies that Overview CVE and Counterterrorism:**


What is the EU’s approach to counter radicalization? Is this a comprehensive and consistent approach given what is known about radicalization? The author compares the EU’s counterterrorism strategy with the current knowledge on radicalization and counter-radicalization. This article concludes that, although the EU’s Strategy is comprehensive and consistent, it has been unevenly implemented across member states.

This article defines terrorism and the various tools used to counter terrorism with a focus on “lone wolf terrorism.” Barnes discusses the strategic shift in counterterrorism from treating terrorism as a crime to something that can be prevented. The tools most relevant to law enforcement include: community engagement; use of informants; surveillance; "denial of means"; and efforts to increase physical security. However, the author points out that traditional law enforcement tools are unhelpful in deterring lone wolf terrorism drawing the conclusion that a heavy-handed security approach is unnecessary.


http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc87235/m1/1/high_res_d/R42553_2012May31.pdf

This report provides examples of the Obama administration's CVE activities and programs, and it highlights some of the risks and challenges associated with these activities. The discussion highlights the difficulties that may arise when implementing the US Government CVE strategy given the structure of the strategy. This report is beneficial for the reader who is interested in understanding the content of the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP), the role that various federal agencies play in implementing the strategy, and the implications of this strategy for the future.


What is the typical background of a radical individual? How should counterterrorism strategy respond to this? The author of this article puts forth the argument that the reliance of typologies or profiles of terrorists are problematic from a counterterrorism perspective. There is not a one size fits all description of a terrorist; rather individuals who radicalize come from a variety of backgrounds. Hence, counterterrorism policy that relies on these stereotypes of a typical terrorist allows for many to go undetected because they do not meet this stereotype. Instead, the author postulates that dynamic continuums rather than static positions should be used when forming counterterrorism policy. The implications of this for counterterrorism are that preventive strategies should be formed to meet the needs of specific drivers, and these strategies should be varied because different programs may have different implications for different people. Thus, targeted interventions that meet the needs of a specific individual may prove a more fruitful approach than a one size fits all counterterrorism strategy.


The purpose of this article is to summarize the lessons learned regarding counterterrorism in the United Kingdom. Written prior to the changes in the UK’s counterterrorism policy in 2011, the
article makes three recommendations: increase community partnerships, invest in people rather than projects; and focus on preventive and deradicalization work rather than community development. The author emphasizes that police need the consent of communities in order to be an effective force. This article also overviews the evolution of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy from the Preventing Extremism Together or PET initiative that was started after the 7/7 attacks to the 2009 release of the revamped CONTEST strategy, the United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism that addressed all forms of extremism. Overall, the author argues that community engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy, but Prevent needs to take this approach more seriously.


Briggs argues that in the UK, Muslim participation in democratic politics has increased in recent years. Is the increased political activism a positive sign? Briggs argues that democratic participation in various forms is a necessary component for countering violent extremism efforts. This research supports the broader argument by terrorism scholars that democracy decreases the threat of terrorism, because democratic expressions of belief offer an alternative to violence. Although this is contested within the literature, Briggs argues that political activism and civic entrepreneurialism provides space for young Muslims to express their views and participate as British citizens.


This report summarizes de-radicalization programs in 8 Muslim majority countries, provides lessons learned from these programs, challenges that arose in regards to implementation, and the role of the United Nations. The overview of these programs is a result of a literature review and interactions with a wide range of experts, academics, government representatives, United Nations officials, and the International Peace Institute's Countering Global Terrorism project. The countries reviewed in this report include Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.


Cordesman argues that the demise of counterterrorism efforts will be fighting terrorism as if a clash of civilizations is occurring. Rather, the author argues that the only way to defeat violent extremism is to continue to maintain and strengthen partnerships between the West and Islamic nations. This article provides statistical information about terrorism including, estimates of the
number of foreign fighters who are fighting in Syria and Iraq and differences in the patterns of terrorism across countries.


Much of the current research on counterterrorism focuses on Islamic extremism. However, what programs exist for other types of terrorism? This article analyzes the use of exit programs by Sweden and Germany since the 1990s. These programs were an effort to promote disengagement amongst far-right extremists. This article points to the contrast between programs that target far-right extremists to programs that target Islamic extremists. The author argues that these White Supremacist “exit” programs allow participants to act as a victim and express their grievances with society. This article criticizes use of former neo-Nazis who are used to encourage others to disengage. The author points out the lack of empirical work on these programs as well as programs that are aimed at combatting Islamic extremism.


In this White Paper on Counterterrorism, scholars from across the field with varying academic backgrounds weigh in on a variety of sub-topics. This report explores the dynamics and root causes of radicalization in addition to counter-radicalization and disengagement programs. The report also explores the role of ideology within the context of violent non-state actors.

Readers interested in the root causes of terrorism may find the article by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko on individual and group mechanisms of radicalization and the article by Anthony Lemieux on the psychological factors or triggers as informative.

Of notable importance to those interested in disengagement and deradicalization prison programs is the article by Anne Speckhard. Speckhard briefly overviews prison programs in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, UK, US, and Turkey. Speckhard herself was involved in the development of a 2006 program in the US.

Additionally, Albert Jongman provides a comprehensive overview of the Dutch experience regarding radicalization and deradicalization. The review includes a discussion of the public awareness campaign initiated by the government, the threat of terrorism within the Netherlands, and an overview of the different immigrant groups within the country.

The incorporation of former militants in deradicalization programs is a highly debated counterterrorism tactic. However, this article describes two militant groups in Egypt, al Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and Al Jihad Al Islamiya, that have been utilized in deradicalization programs in Egypt. Unlike other programs, Egypt's deradicalization program is a byproduct of the efforts of former leaders of militant organizations themselves. For instance, one program involves a dialogue with extremist leaders in which they correct prior misperceptions of Islam.


What exactly is community resilience and how is it used in the UK’s strategy for counterterrorism? Resilience is defined as the "ability to absorb the impact of, and then recover from, a shock or disturbance" that is uncertain or unpredictable (79). The author observes that while the benefits of resilience-building activities may increase the capacity of communities to respond to challenging circumstances (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2013), resilience activities also may potentially decrease government accountability when communities are encouraged to take their own responsibility for risk management (Mackinnon and Derickson 2013). The author ultimately questions the costs of shifting responsibility to communities in counterterrorism efforts, not only in the UK but in other countries as well.


What factors lead to a successful counterterrorism approach that counters the narrative of groups such as AQ? In this short piece, Holtman argues that the answer lies in several important factors that states need pay greater attention to, including the need to define key concepts, incorporate both Muslims and non-Muslims to debate the radical narrative, reinforce the counter-narrative with actual actions rather than cheap talk, and garner expertise to guide policy.


This article provides an overview of the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that attempt to counter terrorism. Using Bjørgo et al's framework for the root causes of terrorism, the authors match the OSCE's efforts against various proposed root causes to conclude that the OSCE's efforts are comprehensive. OSCE's efforts have ranged from organizing workshops with leading experts on the subject to promoting public-private partnerships in countering terrorism.

Rather than emphasizing non-violent tactics to counterterrorism, Kurtulus focuses on the lethal operations association with what he terms "new counterterrorism." Referencing Israel and the United States, the author also focuses on the ideological-religious dimension associated with new counterterrorism discourses. He outlines the shift from labeling terrorism as a crime to terrorism as an act of war. This article brings to the forefront the oftentimes violent responses to terrorism by states. However, what is missing from this article is the non-violent programs and initiatives that these countries are increasingly using to prevent terrorism.


The speakers of this lecture series overview the status of CVE efforts within the US. The speakers whose backgrounds range from academics to CVE practitioners engaging in pioneering CVE efforts discuss topics ranging from a section on countering AQ propaganda to addressing new strategies that can be used to counter violent extremism within the US, among others. This lecture series is a chance for readers to learn from the leading CVE practitioners about the status of current CVE efforts. One of the main perspectives given in this lecture series is the need to collaborate with US communities in order to form communities that are resilient. The report echoes current consensus that the key to CVE efforts is putting the community first. Under this perception, federal efforts that take on a supportive role of local capabilities and programs are the way forward in order for CVE efforts to be successful.


In this book chapter, Lindekilde explores possible negative unintended consequences, as he terms backfire mechanisms, of both hard counterterrorism policies and soft radicalization prevention instruments. The author categorizes backfire processes into three categories: strategy process, interaction processes, and identity processes. These three categories are related to three main types backfire mechanisms: environmental, relational, and cognitive. For soft radicalization prevention instruments, Lindekilde explains how a strategy process refers to events that can alter a target group strategy in a counter-productive way. He gives an example of an incident when certain Muslim actors withdrew from public debates as a result of Danish radicalization programs. This incident is counter-productive because the government lost potential important allies in the fight against extremism. Interaction processes refer to the ways in which radicals
behave either in their interactions with the authorities or within their networks. Thus, soft radicalization prevention policies can change the way radicals interact. For example, discriminating policies may result in counterproductive feelings of discrimination amongst the target population and negatively changes the way that population interacts with authorities. Finally, counterterrorism policies may also influence collective identity formation. Government efforts to create an “ideal” citizen may backfire and instead push individuals toward radicalization. This chapter is an illustrative overview of the possible negative consequences of counterterrorism research, but more empirical research is needed to better validate and identify these different mechanisms.


What role do Muslim youth workers play in the fight against terrorism? McDonald explores the ways Muslim youth workers help young people resist terrorism and extremism by helping the younger generation formulate their own identities. The work of Muslim youth workers counteracts government efforts to streamline faith provision. Essentially, as described by the author, Muslim youth workers are resisting both state and AQ discourse and negotiating new space for identity formation to counteract the negative effects of the two discourses. Additionally, these youth workers are assisting young people to do the same through establishing safe spaces and opening dialogue with the young people.


What role should the police take when dealing with terrorism? Although a general shift from more traditional policing approaches that are rooted in paramilitary tactics to a community policing approach has taken place, the author of this article fears that in a post- 9/11 environment policing tactics will revert back to the traditional model. Murray argues that police should reject the traditional model of policing and instead continue to pursue a community policing approach that is based on increasing trust and communication between law enforcement and the public. Murray highlights the dangers of relying on a traditional policing method which includes the potential for distancing the police and society. When attempting to fight terrorism, the police cannot accomplish this task alone and need the assistance of the public, and, the author suggests, community policing tactics are capable of forging this much needed relationship.

Does the UK’s Prevent strategy threaten Britain’s liberal democracy? The author of this article believes so. Pantucci explains what he describes as the "how" and "why" of the UK's Prevent strategy. Then, he provides an overview of the threat these policies pose to Britain's democracy, specifically in regards to freedom of speech.


Poole argues that US government outreach efforts have been a complete failure since the Clinton administration. Overall, Poole is against the use of ex-members of terrorist groups and ex-war criminals in forming and playing a role in US CT policy. Although no data distinguishes between the benefits and risks, this article brings up an interesting question as to whether ex-extremists should be strategically used by governments within counterterrorism programs and to consult to formulate US policy.


Some scholars and political actors, including Daniel Fried, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, have identified secular alienation as a root cause of extremism. Although this is clearly not the only root cause and the exact influence of alienation on the prospects for radicalization is unknown, this edited volume explores the efforts of European countries that aim to increase the integration of Muslim immigrants into European society. An increasing number of Muslims have resided within European borders, as demonstrated in France, where Islam is the second leading religion behind Catholicism. Consequently, European countries are promoting integration efforts as a means to counter radicalization within their borders. This edited volume explores the issues of integration and the various efforts by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This volume also includes testimony concerning Islamic extremism in Europe to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs on April 5, 2006. The volume concludes with an overview of US-EU counterterrorism cooperation including an outline of various agreements such as cooperation on data collection and enforcing anti-terrorism financing efforts.


*Stanford Law Review, 64*, 125.

One concern of current counter-radicalization programs in regards to government involvement is that such involvement, especially in the US, threatens the separation of church and state as granted under the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution. This author discusses various
concerns of counter-radicalization policies and the potential consequences of establishing an "Official Islam" or a government view of what mainstream Islam is and should be by means of promoting alternatives to radical ideology. A possible solution to these concerns, although not a complete solution, is the community-centric approach to counter-radicalization where communities rather than the government combat terrorism. But, like all strategies, this too has downsides.


Richards challenges the utility of radicalization as the basis of counterterrorism efforts. Focusing on the UK, the author points to the lack of a consensus on what explains why some individuals radicalize while others do not and the relationship between radicalization and terrorism. The author then applies these concerns to the case of the UK's Prevent programs that is based off of the assumption that radicalization and terrorism are related.


What are the consequences of using ill-defined terms or terms that are not properly defined in the field of counterterrorism? Richards argues that the merging of terms such as terrorism, radicalization, and extremism has larger consequences for UK counterterrorism efforts. Specifically, UK policy that combines notions of extremism of thought with extremism of method unnecessarily unites two phenomenon that may not be necessarily related. The larger implications is that counterterrorism policies may alienate large sections of the population who do not support the methods of groups such as AQ and ISIS, but are still seen as a problem given their non-violent radical ideology. Moreover, the lack of inclusion of non-violent radicals into counterterrorism policies may be a missed opportunity for counterterrorism efforts that seek to prevent terrorism.


The authors take a critically reflective approach to analyzing normative questions regarding engaging Muslims for purposes of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization. Rather than focusing on particular religious identities, such as moderates, the authors propose that the government should develop forms of engagement that are the most effective for counterterrorism. Engagement, the authors argue, involves work that is mutually beneficial for both parties rather than one party imposing values onto another. Moreover, the authors advocate for the inclusion of Muslim voices, especially those at the margins, in the policymaking process.

This article is an earlier version of Stevens (2011) article on the implications of the funding of moderates by the UK government. Stevens does not believe that the government should attempt to counter terrorism on an ideological level by directly or indirectly promoting religious ideas. His reasoning is that the relationship between religion and joining a terrorist group is unclear and there is a lack of empirical evidence affirming that government intervention is an effective for counter terrorism efforts.


Should the government support certain Islamic groups such as moderates? The author of this article contributes to the literature on the use of moderates to fight terrorism by arguing that supporting one group increases the risk of extremism. The author argues that the UK's Prevent strategy is based on an assumption that individuals join radical groups because of the religious ideas themselves, but this assumption, as he claims, is inaccurate. Therefore, state involvement in this arena of religious ideas is not an appropriate method for countering terrorism. Rather, Stevens argues that non-intervention produces moderation and stability within society. Drawing from the economic school of religion (e.g. Iannoccone 1991 and the experiences of Christian churches), Stevens argues that government support of religious groups will lead to rent-seeking behavior and ultimately decrease productivity of state sponsored churches due to their reliance on the state for support leading to lower levels of religious participation and a shift of membership from moderate churches to more radical churches. On the other hand, non-regulated religion-similar to non-regulated markets- will increase efficiency, increase the services provided by churches, and increase moderation.


How do Arab American’s perceive law enforcement actions to prevent terrorism? This report seeks to answer this question with a survey of 810 Arab Americans conducted in the 2003 Detroit Arab American Study. The authors find that the majority of Arab Americans showed weak to modest support for aggressive law enforcement practice, especially those targeting Arab Americans. The respondents' attitudes were significantly related to their ethnic identities and religion. Additionally, the respondents' feelings about law enforcement coincided with support in the federal government.

Contributing to the literature on outlining the development and implementation of the UK’s Prevent Strategy, this article identifies and explores the key problems associated with the UK’s strategy. The key problems that Thomas identifies include: the focus on Muslim communities, the connection between the various programs and the use of the programs for surveillance and intelligence purposes as well as the design of the program that has led to conflicts to arise amongst different agencies at the local level.


Based on fieldwork, this article analyzes how communities have responded to violent extremism by analyzing the policy response in the neighborhoods of Oost in Amsterdam, Moabit and Soldiner Kiez in Berlin, and Tower Hamlets in London. The primary focus of this study is how local authorities perceived and identified the threat of extremism. Based on observations of these programs, the author finds that authorities target the entire Muslim community rather than specific individuals within that community. This research reflects the concern within the terrorism literature of the creation of suspect communities. However, the author finds that the diversity amongst the Islamic partners that worked with the programs, probably decreases the chances of stigmatizing the community. Additionally, the author proposes a framework for others to use to study Europe's policies in regards to countering violent extremism.


The authors review the status of the three CVE pilot programs in the US and identify the key challenges to the US strategy on CVE: a lack of federal funding, a lack of a lead agency, and resistance from Muslim communities. The authors suggest that general preventive measures should only be implemented in limited cases, especially since American Muslim communities are already generally well-integrated into American society in comparison to Europe. Rather, the authors argue that the focus for the administration should be on interventions.

Written in the beginning of the Obama administration's term, in this article, Von Hippel recommended that the administration should construct a new approach to counter terrorism abroad. Van Hippel called for (1) a development strategy (with an emphasis on good governance, anticorruption, and social service provision) and (2) innovative tools and new partners to implement and disseminate it.


Weine describes both the community resilience efforts in the US and his research on Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St.Paul in an effort to illustrate what building resilience to violent extremism means in the US. Based on his research, he developed a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), to inform prevention strategies. The model suggests that policies should focus on three risk opportunity levels: "youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and contact with recruiters"(84).


This volume is composed of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism Research Conference in 2014 in Abu Dhabi, UAE. The articles within this volume touch on the push and pull factors leading to radicalization and recruitment, counter-narrative strategies pursued by states, disengagement and deradicalization processes, and community-centered approaches to CVE. The cases analyzed in this volume span the globe ranging from Stevan Weine and Ahmed Younis' article on CVE programs in LA to Martine Zeuthen's research on CVE pilot programs in the Horn of Africa. The majority of the articles are a brief overview of the larger projects pursued by the different scholars, thus this volume provides an overview of the new and emerging research on CVE that is taking place across the globe.

**Literature Reviews:**


This article reports on the results of a systematic review on evaluation research of counterterrorism strategies. The strategies under review range from airport screening practices to
the hardening of targets. Even when the authors used a liberal definition of what a counterterrorism strategy was, the authors find that evaluation research on these programs are rare and in the studies that do include some type of evaluation, the programs either did not achieve their objectives or actually increased the likelihood of terrorism. In fact, of the nearly 20,000 articles consulted for the review, only 21 studies appeared to connect an outcome with a program through a minimally rigorous scientific test. Of the 21 studies, only 7 studies could be categorized as using a moderately rigorous scientific test. These reports included the following: Landes 1978; Cauley and Im 1988; Enders, Sandler and Cauley 1990; Enders and Sandler 1993; Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994; Enders and Sandler 2000; Barros 2003.


This article is a review of Clark McCauley (2012)'s paper in which McCauley analyzes radicalization of US Muslims via a survey poll. McCauley concluded from his findings that radicalization is linked with an individual's opposition to US policy in Muslim countries. The implications of these findings are that CT policies that aim to improve the domestic situation of Muslims are unlikely to impact the rates of terrorism. However, this insight assumes that radical ideas necessarily lead to violent action, which may not be the case. Mullins acknowledges this in his review of the data limitations of McCauley's study, but, nonetheless, Mullins notes that policymakers must be cognizant of the limitations of a "war on ideas."


This report provides a post-2000 literature review of research regarding countering violent extremism. The authors take time to define the key concepts found within the literature. After reporting the key theories, debates, and discussions found within terrorism studies, the authors indicate key gaps within the literature which include: lack of empirical studies, lack of primary sources, lack of field research, etc. The report concludes with recommendations for future research and scholarship. This report is helpful for the readers who need an introduction to the various theories of CVE and terrorism found within the literature and a broad overview of the literature including both the strengths and flaws of the research.

This report is a survey of the literature on counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, and countering violent extremism with a focus on Africa. The focus of the literature review was on empirical evaluations of policies designed to counter violence or terrorism. Some of the key findings of the report include: a recognition of the lack of empirical evaluation of policies; the assertion that target hardening does not generally result in a decrease in violence; and the observation that deradicalization programs are often the primary targets for empirical evaluations.


This report provides an overview of the literature on radicalization and deradicalization since 1970. Topics covered by this report include: defining key terms of the subject, the state of the literature for radicalization, deradicalization, and countering violent extremism, identification of major gaps within the literature and areas for future research.

**Studies on Radicalization:**


How does radicalization discourse function in policy? The author argues that the identification of the Muslim community as the source of radicalization and the subsequent target for government reform has been the result of radicalization discourse. Britain’s counterterrorism policies have created the concept of the “Muslim community” as a governable entity and subsequent target of intervention and management. Through government policies, the author argues that the government has helped define what it means to be Muslim.


What exactly is the role of religion in the radicalization process? Using Silber and Bhatt's four-phase radicalization model, the authors examine a case study of an Australian convicted terrorist, Jack Roche, to determine the role of religion. Silber and Bhatt's model was based on their evaluation of five homegrown terrorism cases within the US and their association of the jihadi-Salafi ideology with radicalization. The four-phase model included the following phases: the pre-radicalization phase; the self-identification phase; the indoctrination phase; and the jihadization phase. Thus, under this model, it is assumed that radicalization leads to terrorism. In evaluating Silber and Bhatt's model, although the conclusions reached by this study must be skeptically
viewed due to the evaluation of only one convicted terrorist, the authors find that religion plays less of a role in the radicalization process than suggested by the model. Religion may not be the primary motivator for individuals to join terrorist groups, rather the social and ontological aspect of joining JI became a motivating factor for Roche.


This article contributes to the scholarship regarding radicalization. What exactly is the relationship between terrorism and radicalization? Does radicalization necessarily lead to acts of terrorism? Borum reviews theories regarding the processes of terrorism involvement and offers some possible frameworks to understand how these processes may lead to terrorism. Both conceptual and empirical studies of radicalization are included in the overview. The author notes that there are different pathways to terrorism and radicalization does not necessarily serve as a proxy for terrorist behavior. Rather, radicalization is only one possible pathway to terrorism involvement.


How are the youth recruited to join terrorist groups abroad? This article addresses this question by focusing on the discourse used by terrorist groups to recruit young people. Using insights from social movements, the authors examine the way that terrorist discourse constructs youth identities that are embedded in their militant social movement. According to the authors, youth are created as a social group within the larger militant organization in order to build a collective identity and cohesiveness amongst recruits. The authors analyzed approximately 290 texts from AQ leaders to understand the discourse used by the group. The article concludes with some recommendations for counter extremism discourse which included recommendations to dilute the importance of the youth’s collective identity and its exploitation by extremist groups.


If people deliberate well together will political integration follow? This article looks at Muslims in Britain to see the relationship between deliberation and political integration. Typically, scholars believe that deliberation leads to political integration, which implies that if individuals are treated as equals they are more likely to become involved in politics. However, the authors find that this may not be the case. The authors argue that even though Muslims do not deliberate
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well, they are still politically active. Muslims are just as likely as other political actors to use acceptable language and to provide a valid argument to support their positions, but they are less likely to appeal to the general interest. The authors use network analysis to display what types of people and actors Muslims position themselves with and those that they are distant from. Despite the lack of Muslims that appeal to the general interest, the authors find that "Muslim actors appear in around a third of cliques of support and dissent" (p. 446), thus, concluding that Muslims are reasonably well integrated.


Why have more people not become terrorists? Cragin argues that it is impossible to form policies to attempt to prevent people from becoming terrorists without first knowing why individuals resist violent extremism. Cragin constructs a conceptual model that can be used for further research on this subject. He emphasizes four factors: moral repugnance, perceived costs, perceived ineffectiveness of violence, and absence of reinforcing social ties as factors that contribute to individuals’ resistance of violent extremism. The author concludes that resistance, radicalization, and disengagement are substantially different phenomenon and must be treated as such by law enforcement and government actors.


What is known and what is not known about radicalization in Europe? This article is an overview of the literature that covers this topic and attempts to answer this question based on the empirical research that has focused on radicalization. The author finds three different groups of explanations that attempt to explain radicalization: scholars who place causal weight on sociological background factors, labeled as French sociology; scholars who argue that dynamics of social networks and social interaction serve as explanatory variables, labeled as social movement and network theory; and others who focus on specific individual level factors such as individual needs, labeled as empiricism. After offering both strengths and weaknesses of the different studies, the author includes suggestions to help refine our understanding of radicalization including: the use of control groups, conducting interviews with individuals who have not been radicalized, and conducting interviews with family members of those who have radicalized.


This thesis uses critical discourse analysis to understand how the concept of radicalization is used in the terrorism literature within the time-frame of 2004 and 2013. The authors determine
that the study of radicalization should be separated from Muslims and Islam in order to form a new conceptualization of the term radicalization.


The authors of this article overview the literature on the causes of radicalization and suggest how research from the psychology of religion studies can be used to further understand the radicalization process. The authors summarize research on religious conversion motifs outlined by Lofland and Skonovd (1981) and Rambo (1993) to encourage others that are interested in learning about radicalization to explore these motifs and how they may apply to the radicalization cases.


What exactly is an ideology and what is the set of beliefs embodied in Al Qaeda's (AQ)'s ideology? The author attempts to dissect AQ's vision and in doing so addresses the challenges of countering this ideology for the United States. This article is particularly helpful for those studying AQ's strategy and the group's radical interpretation of Islam. How should the US counter groups such as AQ? The author believes the answer lies in countering the ideology and creating the space for a 'marketplace of ideas' to emerge and challenge the radical ideology.


Many have pointed out the difficulty for governments in identifying targets of their counterterrorism strategies and have emphasized the dangers of targeting Muslim communities. This article explores these concerns by analyzing the discourse of radicalization through the lens of a critical risk perspective. The author explains how the concept of radicalization and the assumption of the existence of a radicalization process form the basis of the British counterterrorism model. The author argues that the concept of radicalization is strategically used by policymakers to control Muslims as a means of governance. The author concludes that the lack of empirical data on radicalization is troubling for counterterrorism strategies that are based upon unproven radicalization theories.

This article argues that defeating radical jihadi terrorism in Southeast Asia requires both short-term counterterrorism measures and long-term measures that target the jihadi narrative. This article is particularly helpful for the reader who is interested in the history of radical Islam in Southeast Asia emphasizing the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah and the transition from national to global jihad.


The main argument of this article is that there are three types of people: those that oppose terrorism; fence-sitters or those that are sympathetic but not violent; and those that engage in terrorism. Saggar argues that the policies needed to target fence-sitters are different or should be different from policies that target the other groups of people. The author argues that there is a continued need to understand and address the wider causes and symptoms of security threats. Moreover, to take a more fine-grained approach to CT, the author states that we must make a closer examination of the reasons why people engage in terrorism. The article implies that the relationship between radicalization and terrorism is not entirely random.


Sedgwick provides varying definitions of radicalization and argues that the use of the term is problematic because it is used in three different contexts: the security context, the integration context within Europe, and the foreign-policy context. These different nuances can create confusion. For instance, an Islamic group in Europe that argues against homosexuality would be considered radical in the integration context, but this group would not pose a threat in the security context. Consequently, the author recommends that the term radicalization as an absolute concept be abandoned.


The authors of this article use social movement theory to understand radicalization and the factors that facilitate radicalization. Although the authors acknowledge that there are many different pathways to radicalization, the authors emphasize the importance of factors such as free spaces, the development of affinity groups, and the role of perceptions and the likelihood of targeting by social control agents as factors that can lead to radicalization. This article is also helpful for understanding the process of radicalization within the social movement literature.

Minneapolis-St.Paul is host to one of the three CVE pilot programs within the US. But, what exactly is happening in this area and what is the threat of radicalization in the area? The authors of this study use qualitative research methods to overview the CVE programs taking place within Minneapolis. Unlike much of the other work on CVE, these authors combined field research within the community itself to more fully understand the threat of radicalization and foreign fighter recruitment and the function of the CVE programs within the Minneapolis-St.Paul communities.


What factors have caused the rise of the far-right in the US? Vertigans conducts a historical overview of the far-right and its rise within the US. His main motivation of writing this piece is to convince people to avoid over-emphasizing the material explanations of the rise of right and to look to other reasons. Essentially, there are many different reasons that contribute to why people join and radicalize. However, events that the author attributes to the rise of the right include the perceived failure of Bush to deliver electoral promises and the Democratic Party's success in the 2006 mid-term elections.