



Evaluating Jihadist Narratives

David Webber, University of Maryland

START Annual Meeting

September 18, 2014

This research was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs and Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) through START. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented here are solely the authors' and are not representative of DHS or the United States Government.

General Content Analysis

- 300 transcripts of Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda affiliated video and audio propaganda (2004-2009)
- Coded for the occurrence of 10 central themes
 - Recurring themes identified through a reading/discussion of initial subset of transcripts, and derived from psychological theories of radicalization (i.e., Quest for Significance; Kruglanski et al., 2014)

INGROUP: Shared Muslim identity

I say to the Islamic Ummah, advising her truthfully and with affection for Islam and its people, your first enemy is the Crusaders among the Americans and NATO.

They are those who raided the people of Islam in Afghanistan and Iraq; helped the Jews to occupy Palestine; killed the people of Islam, orphaned children, and displaced women and the elderly; and looted Muslim fortunes other than the American and their allies.

No Muslim who is able to do jihad, which is a duty of the individual, is excused to sit idle for fear of capture and so on. Instead, this makes the matter more urgent.


OUTGROUP: Identifying opponents

OUTGROUP: Specific negative acts by the outgroup


CONTEXT: location

CALL TO ACTION: duty/obligation

Results



Results: Presence of various emotions



Initial Findings

- Prominent themes
 - Outgroup, ingroup, speaker validity
- Uncommon themes
 - Intimidation of the enemy, calls to action
- Preponderance of negative emotions

Extreme Language / fanaticism expressed by al Qaeda leadership

– AQ Core



Usama Bin Laden



Ayman Al-Zawahiri



Abu Yahya Al-Libi

– AQ Iraq



Abu Musab
Al-Zarqawi



Abu Omar
Al-Baghdadi



Abu Hamza
al-muhajir

Methodology

- Computerized text-analysis identified sentences that express absolute and fanatic ideas
- Human raters coded these sentences to identify the concept being modified by the extremizer
- Main analyses
 - Regional differences (Iraq vs. Afghanistan)
 - Speaker differences (bin Laden vs. al Zawahiri)


Example

- The Muslim Ummah has always suffered from every western regime.
- Homogeneity of victimized ingroup
- Longstanding nature of their suffering
- Uniformity (negativity) of the enemy

19 Extremization Categories (sampling)

- Extremizing the enemy
 - The enemy is entirely homogenous/extremely negative
- Extremizing the doctrine
 - We should adhere perfectly to the doctrine; My ideas are best OR closest to the doctrine
- Extremizing the ingroup
 - We are entirely innocent/good/virtuous; We suffer tremendously from the enemy


AQ Core vs. AQ Iraq



AQ Core



AQ Iraq




Summary of Findings


- Differences between AQ Core and AQ Iraq are consistent with other evidence
 - Bin Laden chastised AQ Iraq for not adhering to the true doctrine
 - Somali leaders blamed Zawahiri's doctrinal "snobbery" as irrelevant unhelpful, and divisive
- Differences are subtle—the use of each category is highly correlated across regions ($r = .94$, $p < .0001$)

All Speakers


IELEX Ideological Component By Speaker (Normalized)



al Zawahiri vs. bin Laden



al Zawahiri



bin Laden



Summary

- Differences between bin Laden and al Zawahiri are consistent with Abbottabad documents expressing bin Laden's frustration with al Zawahiri's granting of "affiliate status" to groups that did not understand Islamic law (Cruickshank, 2012)
- Overall, these differences are very subtle

Conclusions

- Propaganda messages are remarkably similar across speakers and regions (Universality?)
- Long program:
 - Which components are most persuasive? Best at bringing about action?
 - Subtle regional differences a result of tailoring the message best for a specific audience?
 - Inoculate at-risk populations
 - Design counter-propaganda messages



Think AgainTurn Away @ThinkAgain_DOS · Sep 5

. @Aalaw_ More proof that Muslims worldwide reject #ISIS brutal ideology-ISIS stands alone #thinkagainturnaway



Think AgainTurn Away @ThinkAgain_DOS · Sep 5

Iraqi teenager, given by #ISIS to fighters as a "gift," escaped before she could be sold
goo.gl/kGt5Bf #thinkagainturnaway



14



2



The Research Team

University of Maryland

- Arie Kruglanski
- Michele Gelfand
- Noa Schori-Eyal
- Max Babush
- START interns

John Jay College (CUNY)

- Shuki Cohen

Contact

David Webber

dwebber2@umd.edu

Arie Kruglanski

kruglanski@gmail.com