Global Conflict & Terrorism Trends

National Press Club
Monday, September 14, 2009
Peace and Conflict Ledger and Conflict Trends

Joseph Hewitt
CIDCM
University of Maryland
Over the past two years, the risks of instability and conflict have increased significantly in the regions of the world where those dangers were already very high.
What is one of the most serious threats to international stability?

The recurrence of armed hostilities in conflicts that have recently come to an end.
Peace and Conflict 2010

• Making cutting edge academic research accessible to the policy community
• Open-source data
• Commitment to transparency
• Available from Paradigm Publishers
Peace and Conflict Ledger

• What does the Peace and Conflict Ledger measure?

• The risk of an instability event occurring in a country in the next three years.
Some Key Details

• The focus is on how \textit{structural attributes of states} influence the risk of instability

• \textbf{Four domains} of government activity (economics, politics, security, and social)

• Estimated a \textit{statistical model} on data from 1950-2003 (training data)

• \textbf{Obtain country risk estimates} by inputting 2007 values for all countries
# Indicators – The Usual Suspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Social</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Extent of factionalism</td>
<td>State repression of citizens</td>
<td>Male secondary enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Citizen participation in selecting gov’t</td>
<td>Size of military budget</td>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP 3-year growth rate</td>
<td>Gov’t revenues as % of GDP</td>
<td>Number of active armed personnel</td>
<td>Access to water supplies/ sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI annual change</td>
<td>Duration of present regime</td>
<td>Peace Duration</td>
<td>Youth literacy rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary commodity dependence</td>
<td>Regime Consistency</td>
<td>Conflict in contiguous states</td>
<td>Immunization rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of trade to GDP</td>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>Conflict in region</td>
<td>Male/female literacy ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rates</td>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>Number of IDPs</td>
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**Source:** Center for International Development and Conflict Management
## Indicators – The Usual Suspects

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Risks of Instability, 2008-2010
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Partial Democracy</th>
<th>Economic Openness</th>
<th>Infant Mortality</th>
<th>Militarization</th>
<th>Neighborhood Conflict</th>
<th>Risk Score</th>
<th>Confidence Range</th>
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<td>Highest Risk</td>
<td>Moderate Risk</td>
<td>High Risk</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
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<td>33.1</td>
<td>21.3 - 47.6</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>19.0 - 45.6</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
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<td>29.1</td>
<td>18.0 - 42.5</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>18.2 - 38.0</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
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<td>25.9</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>12.4 - 37.7</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
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<td>22.7</td>
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<td>⬤</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.6 - 33.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- ⬤: Highest Risk
- ⬤: High Risk
- ⬤: Moderate Risk
- ⬤: Some Risk
- ⬤: Low Risk
## Instability Risk: Top 25 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regime Consistency</th>
<th>Partial Democracy</th>
<th>Economic Openness</th>
<th>Infant Mortality</th>
<th>Militarization</th>
<th>Neighborhood Conflict</th>
<th>Risk Score</th>
<th>Confidence Range</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.3 – 32.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<td>12.0 – 28.8</td>
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<td>11.7 – 30.1</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<td>11.6 – 26.0</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.6 – 28.0</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.7 – 25.4</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>8.8 – 27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.5 – 22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.2 – 25.9</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>10.5 – 22.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.6 – 21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ● Highest Risk
- ○ High Risk
- □ Moderate Risk
- ● Some Risk
- ● Low Risk

Confidence Range:
Significant Increase in Risk

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**
- Transition to partial democracy
- Poor performance on other indicators

**BURUNDI**
- Democratic transition begins in 2005
- Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007)

**NIGERIA**
- Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007)
- Transition to partial democracy
- Poor performance on other indicators

**MAURITANIA**
- Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005
- Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria

**DRC (2007)**

Legend:
- Increase of more than 100%
- Increase of 50-100%
Sources of Increased Risk?

Democratization

Recurring Armed Conflict
New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007

Number of Conflict Onsets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Recurring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

Legend:
- Blue: New
- Red: Recurring
Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for Recurrence, 1946-2007

Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts

- No Recurrence History
- Recurrence History
Conclusion

- Devastating costs of state failure
- Stay tuned
- Diagnostic tools for policy-makers to support effective policies to mitigate conflict risks
Costs of State Failure

- 87% Cost to neighbors
- 12% Cost of poverty
- 1% Cost of civil war

Global estimated cost of state failure: $270 billion*

* Anke Hoeffler, Peace and Conflict 2010
Conclusion

• Devastating costs of state failure
• Stay tuned
• Diagnostic tools for policy-makers to support effective policies to mitigate conflict risks
• Frequency of terrorist attacks is on the rise worldwide, including an increased number of fatal attacks
• Terrorist activity has been especially more frequent in the Middle East and Asia this decade
• Countries emerging as “terrorist hotspots” are not necessarily the countries at risk of instability
The Global Terrorism Database

• Originally compiled by PGIS
• 82,000+ attacks, 1970 to 2007
• Open source, unclassified
• Drawn from electronic databases (e.g., Lexis/Nexis); wire services (e.g., Reuters); newspapers (e.g., Washington Post); Radio/TV Transcripts; Terrorism Chronologies; Government Reports
• Includes Domestic Data

www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Defining Terrorism

The GTD defines terrorism as acts by non-state actors involving the threatened or actual use of illegal force or violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.
Attacks and Fatalities by Foreign Terrorist Groups Identified as Threats to the United States

Includes all domestic and transnational attacks for 52 designated groups

Source: LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw (2009)
Comparison of all attacks vs. fatal attacks vs. mass-casualty attacks

Source: Global Terrorism Database

N = 81,799
Fatalities per Attack, 1970-2007

Percent of Attacks

Number of Fatalities per Attack

55.17%
19.47%
13.39%
6.97%
3.50%
1.49%
Terrorist Targets, 1970-2007

Source: Global Terrorism Database

Private Citizens Property: 19.82%
Government: 16.98%
Business: 15.95%
Other: 9.95%
Police: 9.62%
Transportation: 5.56%
Utilities: 4.60%
Religious Figures/Institutions: 4.39%
Military: 3.15%
Unknown: 2.62%
Journalists and Media: 2.59%
Educational Institutions: 2.47%
Other: 2.30%
Terrorist Tactics, 1970-2007

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Percentage of Attacks by Tactic by Year, pre- and post-2001

Source: Global Terrorism Database

- Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite: 43.68%
- Firearms: 36.22%
- Incendiary: 7.65%
- Melee: 1.98%
- Chemical: 0.26%
- Other: 0.37%
- Unknown: 9.84%

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Terrorist Usage of IEDs

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities by Region, 1970-2007

- **South America**: 20% incidents, 15% fatalities
- **Asia**: 25% incidents, 20% fatalities
- **Europe**: 10% incidents, 15% fatalities
- **Middle East & North Africa**: 20% incidents, 25% fatalities
- **Central America & Caribbean**: 15% incidents, 15% fatalities
- **Sub-Saharan Africa**: 10% incidents, 15% fatalities
- **North America**: 5% incidents, 15% fatalities
- **Russia & the Newly Independent States**: 2% incidents, 10% fatalities
- **Australasia & Oceania**: 1% incidents, 5% fatalities

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Terrorist Activity by Region, 1970-2007

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Longevity of Terrorist Groups, 1970-2007

Source: Global Terrorism Database
## Twenty Top Countries for Terrorist Activity, 1970 to 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Attack Count</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fatality Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6,770</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>17,475</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>6,040</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>14,166</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>13,520</td>
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<td>India</td>
<td>4,273</td>
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<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza Strip</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database
Trajectory Analysis of Total Attacks, 1970 to 2006
# Emerging Terrorist Hotspots

- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Indonesia
- Iraq
- Kashmir
- Nepal
- Rwanda
- Thailand
- West Bank/Gaza
Emerging Terrorist Hotspots and Risk of Instability

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Iraq
Kashmir
Nepal
Rwanda
Thailand
West Bank/Gaza
Trajectories of Attacks on United States by Anti-U.S. Terrorist Groups, 1970-2004

- Episodic (44%)
- 21st Century Boom (4.3%)
- 80's Boom (29.3%)
- 70's Boom (22.4%)
Shifting Adversaries

21st Century Boom
al Qaeda
Taliban

80s Boom
Shining Path
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front

70s Boom
Red Brigades
People's Liberation Forces

Sporadic
Popular Liberation Army
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Thank You

Gary LaFree
START Director
Tel: (301) 405-6600
glafree@start.umd.edu

GTD Online at:
www.start.umd.edu
Political Organizations in the Middle East and the Use and Non-use of Violence

Jonathan Wilkenfeld
CIDCM, START
University of Maryland
Ethnic Identity in the World

- More than 5,000 ethnic groups globally (UNDP 2004)
- Two-thirds of the world’s countries have at least one minority that is 10% or more of its population
- The Minorities at Risk project (MAR) has identified nearly 2,000 socially significant ethnic groups that comprise at least 100,000 people or 1% of a country’s population
- MAR estimates that nearly 1 in 7 people in the world face some sort of discrimination based on ethnic identity
Why study ethnic organizations?

- 7 of the 10 deadliest organizations have ethnically based ideology or membership, in full or in part (1998-2005 data)
- MAR data demonstrates some broad preconditions for ethnic groups to use violence or terrorism, not which specific organizations may use terrorism
- Most ethnic groups are represented by multiple organizations that use different mixes of strategies (violent and nonviolent).
• Key problem with terrorism research is its *exclusive focus* on organizations that engage in terrorism.

*This limits the questions we can ask.*

• By focusing on ethnic organizations around the world, we have a *natural control group*:
  • We can now ask why some organizations choose violence and terrorism and others do not
  • We can ask why some groups start and why some groups stop using terrorism
Countries with at least one militant, ethnically based organization
The MAROB project collects and analyzes data on organizations that have their core support in ethnic groups. MAROB includes both violent and nonviolent organizations. Currently, complete data available for the Middle East and North Africa, 1980-2004. Additional regions to be released soon include post-Communist states, Western Europe and Latin America.
Growth in Middle East Ethnic Organizations

Number of Ethnic Organizations, by year
Ideological Change - Middle East

% Rightist  % Leftist  %Nationalist  % Democratic  % Religious

START
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
Political Strategies Among Middle East Ethnic Organizations

- % Electoral Politics
- % Protest
- % Violent

Years: 1980 to 2004

Legend:
- % Electoral Politics
- % Protest
- % Violent
Why Ethnic Terrorism

- Organizations professing a democratic ideology are significantly less likely to engage in terrorism.
- Organizations with the following characteristics are more likely to engage in terrorism:
  - Separatism
  - Rhetoric justifying violence
  - Foreign Support
  - State Repression
- Organizations that do not have a democratic ideology and have all the factors above have an 89% likelihood of engaging in terrorism.
Changes in Ethnic Terrorism

Percent of Organizations Using Terrorism
(1980 - 2004)
Global Conflict & Terrorism Trends

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