



START

Syria Barometer Survey: Opinions about War in Syria and about Radical Action

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Science and Technology Directorate,
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About This Report

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About START

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Executive Summary

A telephone survey of Syrians was conducted by market research company GfK from a European calling centers between May 6, 2016 and May 27, 2016. The survey was completed by 101 Syrian males between the ages of 18 and 71; although 87 percent of participants lived in an area controlled by Bashar al-Assad's forces, 52 percent were Sunni. Questions included opinions about life in Syria and in participants' hometown since the beginning of the civil war; opinions about which political actor was responsible for the killing and suffering in Syria; opinions about justifiability of suicide bombing and support for ISIS; opinions about U.S. foreign policies; and attitude toward the idea of a "united states of Islam."

Results indicated that most participants experienced significant hardships since the onset of the civil war in Syria. Surprisingly, most participants did not blame the Assad government, Russia or Iran for the war, and instead blamed the United States, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Turkey. Suicide bombing and support for ISIS received almost zero endorsement. Most participants believed the United States is waging a war on Islam and that U.S. foreign policies are dictated by Jewish interests. Comparisons with a recent survey of U.S. Muslims as well as correlations among some of the items offer potentially useful implications for military and security officials. Notably, Sunni participants did not differ from other religious traditions in support for the Syrian government.

Introduction

The survey was commissioned by the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security to test the practicality of using telephone polling to learn more about Syrians' beliefs about the causes of the Syrian civil war, as well as their ideas about radical actions such as suicide bombing.

Methodology

The survey was conducted by telephone in Arabic with $n=101$ Syrian males aged 18 years or older. A dual-frame sample design was used, with landline and mobile telephone numbers randomly generated from a comprehensive list of pre-war Syrian telephone exchanges. Calls to Syrian exchanges for interviews were made by native Arab-speaking interviewers outside Syria. As the current demographic characteristics or geographic distribution of the Syrian adult male population with working telephones on Syrian exchanges is not known, no sample stratification or weighting has been applied. GfK, one of the leading market research organizations worldwide, provided translation of the English survey to Arabic, supervision of survey interviews in Arabic, and translation of interview responses into an SPSS .sav file.

Random digit dialing into Syrian telephone exchanges tried 27,623 numbers, of which 1,127 were usable and 26,496 were unusable. Of the 1,127 usable numbers, 843 refused the survey, six had language problems and could not complete the questionnaire, and 278 (25%) completed the questionnaire. Of the 278 who completed the questionnaire, 177 were not qualified as they were not over 18 and/or were not currently living or had not lived in Syria during the past 12 months. Thus 101 participants completed the main survey, representing 36 percent of those completing the questionnaire and 9 percent of usable numbers called. Participants were 101 males over the age of 18; all were residing in Syria at the time of the interview. Participants were interviewed mostly via cell phone (70%) rather than land-line (30%). There were no differences between cell and land-line participants on any opinion question and only a few small differences in demographics. Below are demographic characteristics of the sample.

Age. Participants' ages ranged from 19 to 75, with average age of 40 (SD=13.6).

Residency. Of the 101 participants, the majority (87, 86%) lived in the same town since before the war began; the rest (14, 14%) have changed their place of residence since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.

Most locations counted only one or two people each, with the largest numbers in Damascus (12, 13%), and Aleppo (6, 6%). (See Appendix B for a list of participants' current and original locations and number of participants reporting each location).

Participants were asked to report which actor controls the town or city where they were located. Most (88, 87%) reported that Bashar Assad's government forces controlled their town; four (4%) reported that Kurdish forces controlled their town; one (1%) reported that Daesh controlled their town; three (3%) reported that some other group controlled their town; and five refused to answer or were not sure.

Changes in their home town. In response to a question, “Over the past 12 months, do you think living conditions in your home town have become harder, easier, or has there been no change since the war began for residents living there?” most participants (76, 75%) said life has become harder. Four participants (4%) felt that life has become easier; 17 (17%) said there has been no change; and four (4%) said they were not sure.

Similarly, when answering about availability of jobs in their home town, 51 (51%) said work has become harder to find; 22 (22%) said work has become easier to find; 24 (24%) said there has been no change since the war began; and four (4%) said they were not sure.

When asked whether their home town has become more safe, less safe, or there has been no difference since the war began, most participants (46; 46%) said their home town has become more safe; 27 (27%) said their home town has become less safe; 25 (25%) said there has been no difference; and three (3%) were not sure or refused to answer. There were no significant differences on any of the survey questions between participants who have moved since the onset of the war and those who have stayed in their hometown.

Education. About one third of participants (31%) had not completed high school. About 47 percent of participants had attended college or received a college degree or an advanced degree. On average participants have completed 12.49 years of formal schooling (SD=4.16).

Marital status. Most participants (78, 77%) were married. Of these, nearly all (76, 75%) reported that their wives resided with them at the time of the survey. Additionally, 58 participants (58%) reported other members of their family living with them at the time of the survey.

Religious tradition. A majority of participants reported their religious affiliation as Sunni Muslim (47, 52%). Four participants (4%) were Shi’a Muslim; six (7%) were Alawite Muslim; four (4%) were Druze; two (2%) were Roman Catholic; 26 (26%) reported their religious tradition as “other”; and nine (9%) refused to answer. Participants were asked to specify what they meant when they answered “other” to the question about religion. Out of 26 participants who did so, two self-identified as Orthodox Christian, one identified as Christian; the remaining 23 participants wrote “Muslim” or “Islam” or “Syria Muslim” or “Love Syria.” (See appendix for the break-down of responses within the “other” category.)

In sum, Syrian survey participants are overwhelmingly married (77%), living with their wives (75%), living in a town controlled by government forces (86%), the same town they lived in before the civil war began (87%), a town in which living conditions were harder since war began (75%). About half (52%) are Sunni, with many other religious traditions represented. Surprisingly, there were no significant differences between participants self-identified as Sunni and those who self-identified as any other religious tradition on any of the questions related to radical opinion or to assigning blame for the war.

Although our participants are predominantly stay-at-homes, most (64%) know someone who has moved from their hometown since the civil war began: to another town in Syria (45%), to Europe (44%), to Lebanon (35%), to Turkey (30%), to Jordan (25%), and to Iraq (10%).

Results

In this section, we review descriptive results for all survey questions; we then explore correlations among these questions, including a factor analysis to show the pattern of these correlations.

Who is responsible for the civil war in Syria?

Seven questions assessed participants’ opinion about who was responsible for the civil war in Syria. Potential targets of blame included Bashar Assad; ISIS (Daesh); Iranian-backed groups, Turkey; Russia; the United States; and Kurds. Overall, results suggest that survey participants largely blamed ISIS, Turkey, and the United States but assigned very little blame to Assad, Iranian-backed groups, Russia, or the Kurds. Detailed breakdowns of the responses are provided in the figures below.

Figure 1: How much do you blame Bashar al Assad for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame him very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 1 (above) shows that nearly two-thirds of participants did not blame Bashar Assad for the killing and suffering in Syria. On the other hand, Figure 2 (below) shows that most participants blamed ISIS (Daesh).

Figure 2: How much do you blame Sunni militant groups like al-Qa’ida and Daesh for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame these groups very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 3: How much do you blame Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame these groups very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 3 (above) shows that most participants did not blame Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah for the killing and suffering in Syria. Figure 4 (below) shows that most participants blamed Turkey.

Figure 4: How much do you blame Turkey for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame Turkey very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 5: How much do you blame Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame Russia very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 5 (above) shows that most participants did not blame Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria. Figure 6 (below) shows that most participants blamed the United States.

Figure 6: How much do you blame the United States of America for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame the United States very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?




Figure 7: How much do you blame the Kurds for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame the Kurds very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?





Figure 7 (above) shows that participants were divided in their opinion about the Kurds’ responsibility for the killing and suffering in Syria.

Figure 8 (below) compares percent of participants who blame “very much” for the killing and suffering in Syria: the United State, ISIS, Turkey, Hezbollah, Russia, Bashar Assad’s government forces, and Kurds. It is clear that most participants do not blame Bashar al-Assad or his allies Hezbollah and Russia; they blame al-Assad’s challengers—the United States, ISIS, and Turkey.

Figure 8: Percent of participants blaming actor "very much" for the "killing and suffering" in Syria



How popular are radical Islamist ideas?

Participants were asked several questions that have been used with U.S. Muslims by the authors of this research. These questions, with both Syrian participants' and U.S. Muslim participants' responses to them, are represented in this section. Directly quoted questions appear in italics; results for each question then follow in regular font.

Some people say that Muslims living in predominantly Muslim countries would be better off if all these countries joined together in a nation of "United Islam" stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. Do you personally agree or disagree with this idea?

About one-third (34, 34%) participants agreed with this statement. Half (50, 50%) disagreed; 13 (13%) said they were not sure; and four (4%) refused to answer.

For comparison, the corresponding percentages in response to the same question in our February 2016 sample of 200 U.S. Muslims were as follows: 77 percent of participants agreed with the idea of a United Islam, and only 23 percent (about half the Syrian percentage) disagreed with it.

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

Syrian participants were near unanimous in rejecting suicide bombing: 97 participants (96%) said this kind of violence is never justified. One participant (1%) said it is “often justified”; one participant (1%) said it is “sometimes justified”; and one participant (1%) said it is “rarely justified.”

The corresponding results for our February 2016 U.S. Muslim sample were: Never justified (84%), rarely justified (6%), sometimes justified (7%), often justified (6, 3%). Thus our Syrian participants are like U.S. Muslims in their strong rejection of suicide bombing.

What is your opinion of the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as Islamic State or ISIS or ISIL? Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of this group?

Syrian participants again had a near-unanimous response: 100 participants (99%) said they had an “unfavorable” opinion of ISIS; one participant (1%) said he was “not sure.”

The corresponding results for our February 2016 U.S. Muslims sample were: 80 percent reported an “unfavorable” opinion; 11 percent reported a “somewhat unfavorable” opinion; 4 percent reported a “somewhat favorable” opinion; and 5 percent reported a “very favorable” opinion. Here again Syrian participants are like U.S. Muslims in their strong rejection of ISIS.

Some people say the United States of America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ is a war against Islam. Do you feel the U.S. is fighting a war on terrorism or a war against Islam?

Most participants (57, 56%) said they believe the United States is waging a war against Islam. Thirteen participants (13%) said it was “both.” Three (3%) said they believed it is just a war on terrorism. And 28 (28%) said they were not sure or refused to answer.

The corresponding results for our February 2016 U.S. Muslims sample were: 47 percent seeing the war on terrorism as a war against Islam, 17 percent seeing it as a war on terrorism, and 36 percent unsure. This question shows about half of both Syrians and U.S. Muslims seeing a war on Islam.


Some people say that United States of America’s foreign policies are dictated by Jewish interests. Do you believe that U.S. foreign policies are or are not dictated by Jewish interests?

A large majority of participants (90, 89%) agreed that U.S. policies are dictated by Jewish interests. Only three participants disagreed with that statement, and eight (8%) said they were “not sure.”

In contrast, in the 2016 sample of U.S. Muslims only 21 percent agreed with this statement; 36 percent disagreed; and 43 percent said they were “not sure.”

Figure 9 (below) compares percentages of Syrian participants and U.S. Muslims endorsing the most radical responses to these three items.

Figure 9: Percent of U.S. Muslims and Syrians giving most radical answer on each of five questions assessing radical opinions



Correlations among opinion questions

To try to understand what predicts radical opinion, we correlated the above five questions about radical opinion with one another and with other questions on the survey. Because two of these questions had almost zero variability (suicide bombing and opinion of ISIS), these two questions failed to produce meaningful correlations with other items.

The other three items did show significant correlations. Opinion that Jewish interests dictate U.S. foreign policy correlated significantly with seeing the war on terrorism as war on Islam, $r(72)=-.24, p=.05$. In other words, participants who believed that Jewish interests dictate U.S. foreign policy also believed the United States is waging a war on Islam.

Additionally, belief that the United States is waging a war on Islam correlated significantly with blaming the United States for the killing and suffering in Syria, $r(69)=-.29, p=.02$. Thus, participants who believed the United States is fighting a war against Islam also believed the United States was responsible for the killing and suffering in Syria.

Similarly, belief that Jewish interests dictate U.S. foreign policy correlated with blaming the United States for the killing and suffering in Syria, $r(88)=.28, p=.01$.

The question about a nation of United Islam also produced significant correlations. Thus, it correlated with blaming Assad for the killing and suffering in Syria ($r(75)=.42, p<.01$). Likewise, it correlated with

blaming Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria ($r(78)=.27, p=.02$), and with blaming Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah ($r(71)=.31, p=.01$). It correlated negatively with blaming Turkey for the killing and suffering in Syria ($r(79)=-.24, p=.04$). Therefore, endorsement of a United Islam was predictive of blaming Assad, Russia, and Iran for the war in Syria, and NOT blaming Turkey. Recall that a majority of participants assigned responsibility for civil war suffering to the United States, ISIS, and Turkey but not Assad, Russia, or Iranian-backed groups.

Assigning responsibility for the Syrian war to al-Qa'ida or ISIS correlated with belief that life has become harder for residents of participants' hometowns, $r(87)=.27, p=.01$.

Similarly, perception that work has become harder to come by in participants' hometown correlated with blaming Assad's forces for the killing and suffering in Syria ($r(83)=.22, p=.05$); with blaming Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria ($r(87)=.29, p<.01$); and with blaming Kurds for the killing and suffering in Syria ($r(66)=.25, p=.04$).

Factor analysis of opinion correlations

To simplify these patterns of correlation, we conducted a factor analysis with Oblimin rotation and an extraction of two factors using questions about who to blame for the war in Syria (Russia, Turkey, U.S. Assad or Iran); questions about whether life in the participant's hometown (has it become more difficult, and has work become harder to come by since the civil war began); and questions about radical opinions that showed variability in responses (Jewish interests controlling U.S. foreign policy; U.S. waging a war on Islam; and support for a nation of United Islam). As expected, the solution obtained through factor analysis converged in four iterations, demonstrating a good fit with the two-factor model observed in the pattern of correlations. The two factors did not correlate significantly ($r=.02, ns$). Please see Appendix C for factor loadings of the two factors.

The first factor contained questions that assigned blame for the war in Syria to Russia, Iran, and Assad's government. It also contained support for the "United Islam." Thus, the pro-Western position about the war's culprits is related to endorsement of a nation of United Islam.

The second factor contained questions that assigned blame for the war in Syria to the United States. It also contained questions about Jewish interests dictating U.S. foreign policy, about the United States' waging a war on Islam, and about living conditions in one's hometown getting harder since the beginning of the war.

Therefore, the beliefs consistent with the West' representation of events in Syria—that the war was caused and fueled mainly by Assad's government forces, Russia and Iran—are both rare in our Syrian sample and also predictive of endorsement of a Nation of Islam.

On the other hand, beliefs consistent with the Assad's government's representation of the war in Syria as being the United States' responsibility correlated with belief that the United States is waging a war on

Islam, that the U.S. foreign policy is controlled by the Jewish interests, and perception that life has gotten harder for people in one's hometown.

To see whether the two opinion factors are related to which political actor controls the participant's town of residence, we correlated the question about controlling power with the factor scores. Factor scores assign a number to each participant based on how correlated his responses were with the rest of the sample's responses on the items which loaded on each factor. Thus each participant got two scores, one for each factor.

Factor score for Factor 1 (pro-Western opinion about the war's causes; support for the United States of Islam) correlated significantly with whether the participants' town was controlled by the government ($r(34)=.64, p<.01$). Thus, participants who were NOT residing in government-controlled towns were much more likely to blame Assad's government forces, Russia and Iran for the war; they were also more likely to support the idea of a United Nation of Islam than were participants who resided in government-controlled towns.

The correlation between Factor 2 and the power controlling one's town was not significant, $r(34)=.20, ns$. Therefore, participants were equally likely to blame the United States; to believe in the United States' waging a war on Islam, or that Jewish interests control the U.S. foreign policy--regardless of whether their town was controlled by the government or by one of other political players on the ground in Syria.

Discussion

The survey of Syrians had a two-fold objective. The first was to determine whether a quick turnaround telephone survey was feasible in a country racked by civil war. The second was to assess opinions about the civil war in Syria, about the United States, and about radical Islamist ideas and actions.

Utility of quick turnaround telephone survey during civil war

The Results section of this report details substantive findings from the survey. Several results were unexpected and in sharp contrast with comparable data obtained in a recent survey of U.S. Muslims. These data speak to the feasibility but also to the added intelligence value of using the polling methods tested here. As a pilot test of a new method of learning about Syrian opinions, our survey can therefore be considered successful: a quick-turnaround telephone survey from European calling centers is possible even in a Middle Eastern country suffering civil war.

A major surprise about our survey participants was that about half were Sunni and living in Syria in the same town they were in before the civil war began. According to the CIA World Factbook, the pre-war Syrian population was Sunni 74 percent; Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13 percent; Christian 10 percent (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian); and Druze 3 percent. It appears that, in government controlled areas, Sunni remain the predominant religion but opinion results indicate that remaining Sunni are pro-government.

Another surprise about our participants was that one hundred percent were living in Syria. We had expected that many refugees from Syria would still be using their Syrian telephones; indeed we included survey questions about knowing other refugees and where they had moved to. Most of our stay-at-home participants indeed did know others who had left town since the civil war began.

Surprises in opinion results

Among the unexpected findings were opinions about who is responsible for the killing and suffering in Syria. In contrast to popular opinion in the West, Syrian participants mostly did not blame Bashar al-Assad, Russia, or Iranian-backed groups. Instead, the majority of participants assigned responsibility to the United States, to ISIS, and to Turkey. This result should be carefully weighed against the fact that most participants reported their town to be under the control of Assad's government forces. In fact, the correlation between factor analysis scores that contained questions about assigning blame for the war and the question of who controls participants' town showed a very high correlation (.64). This correlation indicates that the pro-Western position about the causes of the war was mostly held by the few participants who were not in government-controlled areas of Syria.

One possible interpretation is that there is convincing pro-government propaganda on the ground in government controlled areas—through news controlled in television, radio, or print media.

Another possibility is that survey participants were self-selected on the basis of their positive attitude toward Assad's government, with the self-selection taking place when they chose to stay in their hometown rather than flee an area of government control. The great majority of participants (87%) reported that they have lived in the same town since before the civil war began. At the same time, most knew someone who has moved to a different location since the beginning of the war. Taken together, these two results suggest that participants chose to stay when others chose to leave their town, possibly because they agree with the government and welcomed government control over their town.

A third possibility is that those living in government-controlled areas were afraid to express opinions contrary to the interests and interpretations of Bashar al-Assad and his government. Without additional research, it is not possible to evaluate this possibility empirically (see Discussion), but we think it is unlikely that fear controlled opinions in a telephone survey (mostly cell phones) in which participants were never asked for their names. In particular, as most participants reported knowing someone who had left their town, individuals fearful of the government would have left town when they had the chance.

In sum, we believe that the majority of participants were indeed pro-government and did not share the views of most Western observers or most U.S. Muslims about who is responsible for the killing and suffering in Syria.

Recently 51 U.S. diplomats signed an internal memo criticizing President Obama's policy on Syria and urging the U.S. to carry out military strikes against the Bashar al-Assad's government forces.¹ If

¹ Landler, M. (2016), 51 U.S. Diplomats Urge Strikes Against Assad in Syria. *New York Times*, June 16.

implemented, this suggestion would produce casualties among Syrian civilians like our participants, who already blame the United States for most of the civil war's killing and suffering. Increased anti-U.S. radicalization would be the predictable result of anti-Assad escalation by the United States.

Another surprise in our results came from questions about support for suicide bombing and opinion of ISIS. Syrian participants showed a near zero level of radicalization on these questions, lower than that of U.S. Muslims. This result is again consistent with the idea that our survey participants were Syrian government supporters who see ISIS and its suicide bomb tactics as a threat to the government.

Perhaps the most important surprise in our results is that religion, specifically Sunni versus non-Sunni, was not associated with any of our opinion items. The civil war in Syria is often seen as a response by a Sunni majority to domination by a minority coalition of Alawites, Shi'a, Druze, and Christians. It should be a caution to this perspective to find Sunni no different from non-Sunni in our results. An important element of the conflict is thus between Sunni factions: Sunni who support the government and Sunni who support Islamic State. This kind of in-group conflict has recently been highlighted for Sunni in Iraq, some of whom support Islamic State while others support the Shi'a dominated government of Iraq.²

Finally, unexpected findings came from (1) a question about U.S. foreign policy being controlled by Jewish interests (most Syrian participants agreed, while most U.S. Muslims disagreed); (2) a question about the United States' waging a war on Islam (about half of both Syrian participants and U.S. Muslims agreed with this statement); and (3) a question about a desire for a "nation of United Islam" (most Syrian participants rejected it, whereas most U.S. Muslims endorsed it).

Diagnostic value of unexpected findings

Taken together, these findings paint an interesting picture. The two most explicit questions about radicalization—endorsement of suicide bombing and support for ISIS—proved useless in assessing the radicalization of Syrian participants, because their responses were near unanimously anti-radicalization.

More useful is the fact that three more implicit questions related to radicalization—that the United States is waging a war against Islam, that U.S. foreign policy is controlled by Jewish interests, and support for a united Nation of Islam—were predictive of participants' responses about who is to blame for the Syrian war. Participants who held pro-Assad government position on the Syrian War—that the United States, ISIS, and Turkey were to blame—were more likely to agree that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam; that U.S. foreign policy is controlled by Jewish interests; and to reject the notion of a United Nation of Islam.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/syria-assad-obama-airstrikes-diplomats-memo.html?_r=0

² Arango, T., & Hassan, F. (2016), A War of Brothers in Iraq: 'I Will Kill Him With My Own Hands.' *New York Times*, June 18. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-sunnis-sectarian-falluja.html?_r=0

On the other hand, the minority pro-Western position on who is to blame for the war in Syria was also predicted by these implicit questions, though the relation was inverse. Thus, disagreeing that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam, that U.S. foreign policy is controlled by the Jewish interests, and agreeing that there should be a united Nation of Islam was related to blaming Assad and Russia for the war in Syria, and exculpating the United States and Turkey. A pro-Western position was also predicted by two questions unrelated to political opinions, namely perception that life has become harder since the war in one's hometown and perception that work has become harder to come by since the war began.

Perhaps in considering granting asylum to refugees from Syria, these questions can be useful in determining whether individuals are harboring views hostile to the United States and its allies, and which individuals are instead holding genuinely pro-Western views. A question about supporting a united Nation of Islam, for instance, may elicit more truthful responses than if the desired answer was more obvious.

In summary the survey was successful in determining that a quick turnaround telephone surveys are feasible and useful in Muslim countries, even in the midst of civil-war violence. The data obtained in this survey suggested several interesting implications for security efforts.

Limitations and Future Directions

In future surveys of Syrians the limitations presented by having 87 percent of participants living in government-controlled areas should be addressed. This can be done through strategic sampling of participants from areas diverse not only in geography but also in political actors that control them. It might also be informative to sample Syrian refugees in refugee camps in Turkey or in Europe, to compare their responses to those of Syrians living in Syria.

Additionally, future surveys of Syrians might use meta-opinion questions (opinions about opinions of others, i.e. "thinking now not about yourself, but about other Syrians, how many would you say agree with the following statement..."). Previous research by the investigators suggests that meta-opinion questions can allow some guarded participants to express their opinions more openly.

Appendix A: Syrian Barometer Survey questionnaire

2016 Syrian Barometer Survey Bryn Mawr College WBS# 310.209.00924.1

Account Executive: Karl Feld
Project Manager: Ryan Tully
Contracted Length of Interview: 10 minutes
Start Fieldwork: 05/06/2016
End Fieldwork: 05/23/2016
Document Name: 310.209.00924.1_2016 Survey of Syrians via Syrian Telephone Exchanges_v10

Scripter: Please create DOV_TeleSource', and use the following values:

1. Landline
2. Cell Phone

I. INTRODUCTION

Hi, this is _____ calling from GfK, an independent global market research firm. Today, we are conducting a research survey nationwide across Syria on issues which impact you and your family. If you qualify, the survey takes less than 10 minutes. This is not a sales call, and we are not selling anything. We are a marketing research company and your identity and all of your responses will remain totally anonymous.

We realize that you may not know the answers to some of our questions or may not be comfortable answering some of our questions. You can indicate that you are 'not sure' of the answer or would 'prefer not to answer' for any of our questions.

INTROB [S]

May I please speak to a male in your household who is 18 years of age or older?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

1. Yes
2. No

Base: Show if INTROB=2 'No' or -1 'Refused'.

INTROC [S]

Is there a better time or date where we could call back to speak with a male in your household, who is 18 years of age or older?

Scripter: Please terminate following response.

II. SCREENER

Base: All Respondents

QAGE [Q, RANGE - 1900 - 1997]

Thank you for speaking with me today. I first have a few questions about your general background.

In what year were you born?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

Year [RANGE – 1900 - 1997]

- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Scripter: Please terminate if the respondent is born after 1997 or if they are not sure or refuse to provide their year of birth.

Base: All Respondents

Q1A [S]

Are you currently living in Syria?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: Show if Q1A=2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or 99 'Refused'

Q1B [S]

Have you lived within Syria at any time over the past 12 months?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Scripter: Please terminate if Q1B=2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or 99 'Refused'

Base: Show if Q1B=1 'Yes'

Q1C [S]

In what country are you living in today? Are you currently living in...

Interviewer: Please read the following list.

- 1. Turkey
- 2. Lebanon
- 3. Egypt
- 4. Jordan
- 5. A European country

6. Some other country, not in Europe

98. Not sure [VOLUNTEERED]

99. Refused [VOLUNTEERED]

Base: Q1A=1 'Yes'

Q1D [S]

Do you currently live in the same city or town in Syria that you lived in before the civil war began?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

1. Yes

2. No

98. Not sure

99. Refused

Scripter: Please create DOV_ResStat, use the value label 'Respondent's Syrian Residency Status, and use the following values:

*IF Q1A=1 'Yes' and Q1D=1 'Yes' THEN DOV_ResStat=1 'Syrian resident still living in hometown';
IF Q1A=1 'Yes' and Q1D=2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or 99 'Refused' THEN DOV_ResStat=2 'Syrian resident living in new hometown';
IF Q1A=2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or 99 'Refused' and Q1B=1 'Yes' THEN DOV_ResStat=3 'Syrian living outside of Syria';*

Base: Ask if DOV_ResStat=1 'Syrian resident still living in hometown' or 2 'Syrian resident living in new hometown'

Q2A [O, SMALL TEXT BOX]

What city or town do you currently live in?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

City/town [INSERT SMALL TEXT BOX]

98. Not sure

99. Refused

Interviewer: If respondent refuses, please use the following prompt: 'We would appreciate your response to this question. Your responses will remain anonymous and we will not share this information with anyone.'

Interviewer: Please ensure that you clearly record the city or town since it will be used for the remaining survey questions.

Base: Ask if DOV_ResStat=1 'Syrian resident still living in hometown' or 2 'Syrian resident living in new hometown'

Q2A1 [S]

Which of the following powers today controls [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 OR 2 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 OR 2 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2A USE 'YOUR CURRENT CITY OR TOWN']? Is it controlled by...

Interviewer: Please read the following list.

1. Bashar al-Assad's government forces?
2. A Sunni militant group like Al Qaeda or Daesh?
3. An Iranian-backed group like Hezbollah?
4. Russian forces?
5. Kurdish forces?
6. Turkish forces?
7. Some other group?
98. Not sure [VOLUNTEERED]
99. Refused [VOLUNTEERED]

**Base: Ask if DOV_ResStat=2 'Syrian resident living in new hometown' or 3 'Syrian living outside of Syria'
Q2B [O, SMALL TEXT BOX]**

What city or town in Syria did you live in before the civil war began?

Interviewer: Do not read responses.

City/town [INSERT SMALL TEXT BOX]

98. Not sure
99. Refused

Interviewer: If respondent refuses, please use the following prompt: 'We would appreciate your response to this question. Your responses will remain anonymous and we will not share this information with anyone.'

Interviewer: Please ensure that you clearly record the city or town since it will be used for the remaining survey questions.

Base: All Respondents

Q3 [S]

In what governorate or muhafazah was [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2B; IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2A USE 'YOUR CURRENT CITY OR TOWN'; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2B, PLEASE DEFAULT TO 'THE CITY OR TOWN IN SYRIA THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN'] before the civil war began? Was the governorate or muhafazah in...

Interviewer: Please read the following list.

1. Aleppo
2. Damascus
3. Daraa
4. Deir ez-Zor
5. Hama
6. Al-Hasakah
7. Homs
8. Idlib

9. Latakia
10. Quneitra
11. Ar-Raqqah
12. Rif Dimashq
13. As-Suwayda
14. Tartus
15. Some other governorate or muhafazah
98. Not sure [VOLUNTEERED]
99. Refused [VOLUNTEERED]

Base: All Respondents**Q4[S]**

Over the past 12 months, do you think living conditions in [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2B; IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2A USE 'YOUR CURRENT CITY OR TOWN'; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2B, PLEASE DEFAULT TO 'THE CITY OR TOWN IN SYRIA THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN'] have become harder, easier, or has there been no change since the civil war began for residents living there?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Harder
2. Easier
3. No change
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q5[S]**

Over the past 12 months, do you think finding work in [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2B; IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2A USE 'YOUR CURRENT CITY OR TOWN'; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2B, PLEASE DEFAULT TO 'THE CITY OR TOWN IN SYRIA THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN'] has become harder, easier, or has there been no change for residents living there since the civil war began?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Harder
2. Easier
3. No change
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q6[S]**

Over the past 12 months, do you think [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2B; IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2A USE 'YOUR CURRENT CITY OR TOWN'; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2B, PLEASE DEFAULT TO 'THE CITY OR TOWN IN SYRIA THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN'] has become more safe, less safe, or has there been no change since the civil war began for the residents living there?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. More safe
2. Less safe
3. No change
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q7[S]

Some people say that Muslims living in predominantly Muslim countries would be better off if all these countries joined together in a nation of “United Islam” stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. Do you personally agree or disagree with this idea?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Agree
2. Disagree
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q8 [S]

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified.

Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Often justified
2. Sometimes justified
3. Rarely justified
4. Never justified
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q9[S]

Some people say the United States of America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ is a war against Islam. Do you feel the U.S. is fighting a war on terrorism or a war against Islam?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. War on terrorism
2. War against Islam

- 3. Both
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q10 [S]**

Some people say that United States of America's foreign policies are dictated by Jewish interests. Do you believe that U.S. foreign policies are or are not dictated by Jewish interests?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. U.S. policies are dictated by Jewish interests
- 2. U.S. policies are not dictated by Jewish interests
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q11[S]**

What is your opinion of the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as Islamic State or ISIS or ISIL? Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of this group?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. Favorable
- 2. Unfavorable
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q12[S]**

How much do you blame Bashar al Assad for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame him very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. Very much
- 2. Somewhat
- 3. A little
- 4. Not at all
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q13[S]**

How much do you blame Sunni militant groups like Al Qaeda and Daesh for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame these groups very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Very much
2. Somewhat
3. A little
4. Not at all
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q14[S]**

How much do you blame Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame these groups very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Very much
2. Somewhat
3. A little
4. Not at all
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q15[S]**

How much do you blame Turkey for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame Turkey very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Very much
2. Somewhat
3. A little
4. Not at all
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents**Q16[S]**

How much do you blame Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame Russia very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Very much
2. Somewhat
3. A little
4. Not at all
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q17[S]

How much do you blame the United States of America for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame the United States very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. Very much
- 2. Somewhat
- 3. A little
- 4. Not at all
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q17A [S]

How much do you blame the Kurds for the killing and suffering in Syria? Do you blame the Kurds very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. Very much
- 2. Somewhat
- 3. A little
- 4. Not at all
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q18[S]

Besides yourself and your family members, do you know anyone from [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2B; IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2A USE 'YOUR CURRENT CITY OR TOWN'; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 AND NO RESPONSE WAS GIVEN FOR Q2B, PLEASE DEFAULT TO 'THE CITY OR TOWN IN SYRIA THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN'] who moved to another place after the civil war began?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: Ask if Q18= 1 'Yes'

Q18A [GRID, S PER STATEMENT]

Please answer 'Yes' or 'No' to the following questions.

Do you know anyone from [IF DOV_RESSTAT=1 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2A; IF DOV_RESSTAT=2 OR 3 INSERT NAME OF CITY OR TOWN INDICATED IN Q2B] who moved to...

Interviewer: Please read the following list.

Statements in rows:

- Q19. Another town in Syria?
- Q20. Lebanon?
- Q21. Jordan?
- Q22. Turkey?
- Q23. Iraq?
- Q24. A European country?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

Answers in columns:

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q25 [Q, 0 - 20]

How many years of school did you complete?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

Years [RANGE - 0 - 20]

- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q26[S]

Are you married?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 98. Not sure
- 99. Refused

Base: Ask if Q26=1 'Yes'

Q27 [S]

Is your wife living with you now?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Yes
2. No
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: Ask if Q27=1 'Yes'

Q28A[S]

Not counting your wife, are other members of your family living with you or near you now?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Yes
2. No
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: Ask if (Q26=2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or 99 'Refused') or (Q27=2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or 99 'Refused')

Q28B[S]

Are members of your family living with you or near you now?

Interviewer: Do not read responses below.

1. Yes
2. No
98. Not sure
99. Refused

Base: All Respondents

Q29 [S]

Which religious tradition are you part of?

Interviewer: Please read the following list.

1. Sunni Moslem
2. Shi'a Moslem
3. Alawaite Moslem
4. Druze
5. Roman Catholic
6. Adventist
7. Chaldean (Kaldani, Kaldean)
8. Other [INSERT SMALL TEXT BOX]
9. Not part of any religious tradition
98. Not sure [VOLUNTEERED]
99. Refused [VOLUNTEERED]

Scripter: If the respondent is terminated for Q1B for 2 'No' or 98 'Not sure' or '99 Refused', please use the following prompt:

Thank you for your participation. Those are all of the survey questions.

If the respondent successfully completes the survey, please use the following prompt:

Thank you for participating in our survey today. We want to remind you that your identity and your responses will remain anonymous. Have a good [morning/day/night].

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Appendix B: Demographic Frequencies

Frequencies of demographic questions about:

- participants’ town of origin;
- participants’ present location;
- participants’ location in the beginning of the war;
- participants’ contacts with any Syrians who have moved to various locations since the beginning of the war in Syria;
- break-down of open-ended responses to “other” in the question about religion;
- pattern matrix of factor analysis of questions about assigning blame for the war and questions about radical opinions.

Q2A What city or town do you currently live in?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
' طرطوس @ Tartus	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
[جنديرس @ Jandairis	1	1.0	1.0	2.0
Al Damaat @ Damat	1	1.0	1.0	3.0
Al Ma'eenah @ Al Ma'unah	1	1.0	1.0	4.0
Al Qaherah @ Al-Qahira / al-Safa	1	1.0	1.0	5.0
Al Sham @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	5.9
Al Suwayda @ Al-Suwayda	2	2.0	2.0	7.9
Aleppo @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	8.9
Aleraa @ 'Ira	1	1.0	1.0	9.9
AlLatheqieh @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	10.9
Allepo @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	11.9
alsoweda @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	12.9
Alswaida @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	13.9
Amneh @ Amneh	1	1.0	1.0	14.9
Auqwadie Barada @ Wadi Barada	1	1.0	1.0	15.8
Dair Hannah @ Dair Hannah	1	1.0	1.0	16.8
Damas @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	17.8
Damascuc @ Damascus	2	2.0	2.0	19.8
Damascus @ Damascus	3	3.0	3.0	22.8

Damasucus @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	23.8
Dara @ Dara'a	2	2.0	2.0	25.7
Dara @ Daraa	1	1.0	1.0	26.7
Demashq @ Damascus	2	2.0	2.0	28.7
Edraa @ Daraa	1	1.0	1.0	29.7
Garamana @ Jaramana	1	1.0	1.0	30.7
Halab @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	31.7
Halb @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	32.7
Haleb @ Aleppo	3	3.0	3.0	35.6
Hama @ Hama	4	4.0	4.0	39.6
Homs @ Homs	2	2.0	2.0	41.6
Latakia @ Latakia	2	2.0	2.0	43.6
Lathqiyeh @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	44.6
Lathqyeh @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	45.5
Not sure	1	1.0	1.0	46.5
Refused	8	7.9	7.9	54.5
Salamiya @ Salamiyah	1	1.0	1.0	55.4
Tartos @ Tartus	2	2.0	2.0	57.4
Tartous @ Tartus	1	1.0	1.0	58.4
Usal Alward @ Usal Al Ward	1	1.0	1.0	59.4
فرج ابو @ Abu Faraj	1	1.0	1.0	60.4
الره ائل @ Tall Ad Dirrah	1	1.0	1.0	61.4
ازرع @ Izara'a	1	1.0	1.0	62.4
الادقية @ Latakia	2	2.0	2.0	64.4
الاذقيه @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	65.3
الحزقي @ Al-Hasakah	1	1.0	1.0	66.3
الحسكة @ Al-Hasakah	1	1.0	1.0	67.3
الحسكه @ Al-Hasakah	1	1.0	1.0	68.3
الدرباسية @ Ad Darbasiyah	1	1.0	1.0	69.3
السويداء @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	70.3
الضير @ Der	1	1.0	1.0	71.3
العباسيين @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	72.3
الرومانيه القلعه @ Busra Al Sham	1	1.0	1.0	73.3
الكاففات @ Al-Kafat	1	1.0	1.0	74.3
اللاذقية @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	75.2

اللاذقية @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	76.2
النبول @ Nubl	1	1.0	1.0	77.2
الشرقية النشوة @ Eastern AL-Nashwa	1	1.0	1.0	78.2
بانياس @ Banyas	1	1.0	1.0	79.2
حلب @ Aleppo	4	4.0	4.0	83.2
حمه @ Hama	1	1.0	1.0	84.2
حمص @ Homs	1	1.0	1.0	85.1
درعا @ Dara'a	1	1.0	1.0	86.1
درعا @ Daraa	1	1.0	1.0	87.1
دمشق @ Damascus	5	5.0	5.0	92.1
دير الزور Deir Ez Zor	1	1.0	1.0	93.1
زرمانة @ Jaramana	1	1.0	1.0	94.1
ساقطة @ Safita	1	1.0	1.0	95.0
سويده @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	96.0
صيدنايا @ Sednayah	1	1.0	1.0	97.0
لقتايا @ Liftaya	1	1.0	1.0	98.0
الودار مسود @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
الحو مشته @ Mashta Al-Helu	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	101	100.0	100.0	

Q2A What city or town do you currently live in?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
طرطوس' @ Tartus	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
جنديرس @ Jandairis	1	1.0	1.0	2.0
Al Damaat @ Damat	1	1.0	1.0	3.0
Al Ma'eenah @ Al Ma'unah	1	1.0	1.0	4.0
Al Qaherah @ Al-Qahira / al-Safa	1	1.0	1.0	5.0
Al Sham @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	5.9
Al Suwayda @ Al-Suwayda	2	2.0	2.0	7.9
Aleppo @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	8.9
Aleraa @ 'Ira	1	1.0	1.0	9.9
Allatheqieh @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	10.9
Allepo @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	11.9

alsoweda @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	12.9
Alswaida @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	13.9
Amneh @ Amneh	1	1.0	1.0	14.9
Auqwadie Barada @ Wadi Barada	1	1.0	1.0	15.8
Dair Hannah @ Dair Hannah	1	1.0	1.0	16.8
Damas @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	17.8
Damascuc @ Damascus	2	2.0	2.0	19.8
Damascus @ Damascus	3	3.0	3.0	22.8
Damasucus @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	23.8
Dara @ Dara'a	2	2.0	2.0	25.7
Dara @ Daraa	1	1.0	1.0	26.7
Demashq @ Damascus	2	2.0	2.0	28.7
Edraa @ Daraa	1	1.0	1.0	29.7
Garamana @ Jaramana	1	1.0	1.0	30.7
Halab @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	31.7
Halb @ Aleppo	1	1.0	1.0	32.7
Haleb @ Aleppo	3	3.0	3.0	35.6
Hama @ Hama	4	4.0	4.0	39.6
Homs @ Homs	2	2.0	2.0	41.6
Latakia @ Latakia	2	2.0	2.0	43.6
Lathqiyeh @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	44.6
Lathqyeh @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	45.5
Not sure	1	1.0	1.0	46.5
Refused	8	7.9	7.9	54.5
Salamiya @ Salamiyah	1	1.0	1.0	55.4
Tartos @ Tartus	2	2.0	2.0	57.4
Tartous @ Tartus	1	1.0	1.0	58.4
Usal Alward @ Usal Al Ward	1	1.0	1.0	59.4
فرج ابو @ Abu Faraj	1	1.0	1.0	60.4
الره اتل @ Tall Ad Dirrah	1	1.0	1.0	61.4
ازرع @ Izara'a	1	1.0	1.0	62.4
الادقية @ Latakia	2	2.0	2.0	64.4
الادقيه @ Latakia	1	1.0	1.0	65.3
الحزقي @ Al-Hasakah	1	1.0	1.0	66.3

الحسكة @ Al-Hasakah	1	1.0	1.0	67.3
الحسكه @ Al-Hasakah	1	1.0	1.0	68.3
الدرباسية @ Ad Darbasiyah	1	1.0	1.0	69.3
السويداء @ As-Suwayda	1	1.0	1.0	70.3
@ Der الضير	1	1.0	1.0	71.3
العباسيين @ Damascus	1	1.0	1.0	72.3
@ Busra Al الرومانيه القلعه Sham	1	1.0	1.0	73.3
@ Al-Kafat الكاففات	1	1.0	1.0	74.3
@ Latakia اللاذقية	1	1.0	1.0	75.2
@ Latakia اللاذقيه	1	1.0	1.0	76.2
@ Nubl النبول	1	1.0	1.0	77.2
@ Eastern AL- الشرقية النشوة Nashwa	1	1.0	1.0	78.2
@ Banyas بانياس	1	1.0	1.0	79.2
@ Aleppo حلب	4	4.0	4.0	83.2
@ Hama حماه	1	1.0	1.0	84.2
@ Homs حمص	1	1.0	1.0	85.1
@ Dara'a درعا	1	1.0	1.0	86.1
@ Daraa درعا	1	1.0	1.0	87.1
@ Damascus دمشق	5	5.0	5.0	92.1
Deir Ez Zor الزور دير	1	1.0	1.0	93.1
@ Jaramana زرمانة	1	1.0	1.0	94.1
@ Safita ساقطة	1	1.0	1.0	95.0
@ As-Suwayda سويده	1	1.0	1.0	96.0
@ Sednayah صيدنايا	1	1.0	1.0	97.0
@ Liftaya لفتايا	1	1.0	1.0	98.0
@ Damascus الودار مسود	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
@ Mashta Al-Helu الحلو مشتته	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	101	100.0	100.0	

Q3 In what governorate or muhafazah was [answer to Q2A/Q2B] before the civil war began?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Aleppo	16	15.8	15.8	15.8
Damascus	16	15.8	15.8	31.7

Daraa	9	8.9	8.9	40.6
Deir ez-Zor	1	1.0	1.0	41.6
Hama	9	8.9	8.9	50.5
Al-Hasakah	6	5.9	5.9	56.4
Homs	6	5.9	5.9	62.4
Latakia	10	9.9	9.9	72.3
Quneitra	1	1.0	1.0	73.3
Rif Dimashq	10	9.9	9.9	83.2
As-Suwayda	6	5.9	5.9	89.1
Tartus	6	5.9	5.9	95.0
Some other governorate or muhafazah	1	1.0	1.0	96.0
Not sure	1	1.0	1.0	97.0
Refused	3	3.0	3.0	100.0
Total	101	100.0	100.0	

Q22 Do you know anyone from [answer to Q2A/Q2B] who moved to Turkey?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	30	29.7	46.2
	No	31	30.7	93.8
	Not sure	4	4.0	100.0
	Total	65	64.4	100.0
Missing	System	36	35.6	
Total	101	100.0		

Q23 Do you know anyone from [answer to Q2A/Q2B] who moved to Iraq?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	11	10.9	16.9
	No	49	48.5	92.3
	Not sure	5	5.0	100.0
	Total	65	64.4	100.0
Missing	System	36	35.6	
Total	101	100.0		

Q24 Do you know anyone from [answer to Q2A/Q2B] who moved to a European country?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	44	43.6	67.7	67.7
Valid No	18	17.8	27.7	95.4
Valid Not sure	3	3.0	4.6	100.0
Valid Total	65	64.4	100.0	
Missing System	36	35.6		
Total	101	100.0		

Q29 Which religious tradition are you part of? Other

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	75	74.3	74.3	74.3
Islam @ Islam	2	2.0	2.0	76.2
Islam @ Muslim	1	1.0	1.0	77.2
Ismail @ Ismailis	1	1.0	1.0	78.2
Moslem @ Muslim	1	1.0	1.0	79.2
Moslim @ Muslim	2	2.0	2.0	81.2
Muslim @ Muslim	2	2.0	2.0	83.2
سوريا حب @ Love for Syria	1	1.0	1.0	84.2
سوري @ Syrian	1	1.0	1.0	85.1
سوريا مذهب @ Syrian	1	1.0	1.0	86.1
مسلم @ Muslim	10	9.9	9.9	96.0
سوري مسلم @ Syrian Muslim	1	1.0	1.0	97.0
مسيحي @ Christian	2	2.0	2.0	99.0
اراندطس مسيحي @ Orthodox Christian	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	101	100.0	100.0	

Appendix C: Factor Loadings

Pattern Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
Q16 How much do you blame Russia for the killing and suffering in Syria?	.860	
Q14 How much do you blame Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah for the killing and suffering in Syria?	.844	
Q12 How much do you blame Bashar al Assad for the killing and suffering in Syria?	.829	
Q15 How much do you blame Turkey for the killing and suffering in Syria?	-.565	
Q7 Some people say that Muslims living in predominantly Muslim countries would be better off if all these countries joined together in a nation of “United Islam” stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. Do you personally agree or disagree with this idea?	.505	
Q5 Over the past 12 months, do you think finding work in [answer to Q2A/Q2B] has become harder, easier, or has there been no change for residents living there since the civil war began?	.376	.342
Q17 How much do you blame the United States of America for the killing and suffering in Syria?		-.759
Q10 Some people say that United States of America’s foreign policies are dictated by Jewish interests. Do you believe that U.S. foreign policies are or are not dictated by Jewish interests?		-.706
Q9 Some people say the United States of America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ is a war against Islam. Do you feel the U.S. is fighting a war on terrorism or a war against Islam?		.660
Q4 Over the past 12 months, do you think living conditions in [answer to Q2A/Q2B] have become harder, easier, or has there been no change since the civil war began for residents living there?		.394

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.^a

a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.