Violence Perpetrated by Supporters of al-Qa’ida and Affiliated Movements (AQAM): Fatal Attacks and Violent Plots in the United States


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About This Report

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Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of violent incidents and plots committed or attempted by supporters of al-Qa’ida and affiliated movements (AQAM) who targeted the United States between 1990 and 2013. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, countering the dynamic threat of future AQAM attacks has understandably been a top priority under the broader homeland security mission. A key to terrorism prevention is developing a comprehensive understanding of the patterned nature of the AQAM threat in the United States. Such an understanding begins with clear definitions and rich descriptions of AQAM-related offenders and incidents. There have been several efforts to chronicle successful, failed, and foiled AQAM-related plots against the United States. We believe, however, that the systematic definitional, data collection, and analytical approaches and procedures we have used allow us to fill key gaps in what is known about violence perpetrated by supporters of AQAM.

The data on AQAM-related violence analyzed in this report come from the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). These data are unique as they include information on violent crimes in which AQAM supporters were indicted at either the state or federal level. These data also cover successful fatal attacks and unsuccessful plots involving both lone actors and group-based offenders who support AQAM. Finally, and importantly, violent crime data from the ECDB allow for the disaggregation of two types of planned but ultimately unsuccessful violent incidents based on whether general or specific targets were identified. Each event that involves a spatially unique target, whether general or specific in nature, is considered a separate incident or plot.

We found that violent AQAM supporters committed 35 homicide events between 1990 and 2013. The majority (80%) of these lethal attacks occurred on or following September 11, 2001. Lone actors, who were often fueled by combinations of ideology, personal grievances, and serious mental illnesses, perpetrated approximately 34 percent of AQAM-related homicide events. Most homicide events targeted single victims, which makes mass casualty events like 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 terrorist attacks anomalies. Distinct from other forms of domestic terrorism, frequent targets included the general public. Finally, although bombs and other forms of explosives were used in some of the most deadly attacks, approximately 75 percent of AQAM-related homicide events were committed with firearms.

We also found that AQAM supporters were responsible for 196 failed and foiled plots against both general and specific U.S. targets. Targets consisted of both human victims (e.g., political leaders) and inanimate structures (e.g., infrastructure). The majority of plots were uncovered following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and specifically, in the years 2006, 2009, and 2011. Significantly, over half of the identified AQAM-related plots were planned by lone actors, and many of the perpetrators simultaneously

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1 If prosecutors dropped charges against the perpetrators or perpetrators were acquitted on all related charges, they are not included in this report. Perpetrators who were killed carrying out violent attacks are included.

2 When examining homicides, the “event” is our unit of analysis. For example, the September 11, 2001 attacks consisted of four homicide events.
conspired to attack several different types of targets. The most common types of targets identified by AQAM supporters whose plots were foiled or failed were military-related (e.g., specific U.S. bases, recruiting centers, the Pentagon complex); political and government figures or structures; and modes of transportation (e.g., New York City subway stations, Washington, D.C. metro rail). Perhaps unsurprisingly, most intended targets were located in New York City or Washington, D.C. By far, the most common types of intended weapons were bombs and other forms of explosives. This suggests that most failed and foiled plots were intended to be mass casualty events.
Introduction

This report provides an overview of violent incidents and plots committed or attempted by supporters of al-Qa'ida and affiliated movements (AQAM) who have targeted the United States since 1990. Our examination of the violent incidents and plots by AQAM supporters fills important gaps in the prior literature. First, by using the approach pioneered by LaFree and Dugan (2007), among others, we systematically collected data to construct a comprehensive database on terrorist and extremist criminal incidents. Our database relies upon clear inclusion criteria that we use to produce empirical findings.

Second, our inclusion criteria capture a large number of fatal attacks committed by AQAM supporters and thus provide a more complete picture of their violent crimes. For example, we include attacks committed by violent lone actors who were supporters of these movements and crimes that were subsequently prosecuted on the state level. Other terrorism databases and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) use definitions that often exclude such incidents.

Third, we begin to address methodological obstacles and extend previous studies by better examining foiled and failed plots. Law enforcement has recently thwarted a growing number of violent plots, designed to kill and maim hundreds, by AQAM supporters inside the United States. While these activities have generated media and academic attention, such accounts are often incomplete. Some studies focus on the individual perpetrators or on the clusters or groups behind each plot, while others examine incident attributes or the characteristics of the targets of the attacks. This report extends prior research by innovatively collecting information on multiple units of analysis, housing it in a relational database, and presenting findings on both perpetrator and plot characteristics. We've also created a typology that better captures the reality of thwarted and unsuccessful attacks. We believe this typology has the potential to provide benefits to law enforcement and others charged with defending the homeland.\(^3\)

Below we first define the key terms used in this report. We then describe how we built the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), from which we draw our data. We then present findings about the violent attacks and plots committed or attempted by AQAM supporters inside the United States.

Defining Key Terms

In this section we define the key terms and concepts used throughout the remainder of the report. Our findings focus on supporters of al-Qa’ida and associated Salafist violent extremist organizations that have committed, attempted to commit, or planned to commit violent acts inside the United States. For an act to be included in the ECDB, it must first pass a two-pronged set of inclusion criteria (see also Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014).

\(^3\) Though this report focuses on plots against specific and general targets in the United States, the ECDB also collects information on financial schemes used to support violent attacks overseas and cases involving the stockpiling of weapons. As no targets were identified in these cases, they were excluded from this report.
The first prong of the inclusion criteria requires that offenders have been indicted on charges of committing a homicide, attempting to commit a homicide, or planning to commit some sort of violent crime inside the United States between 1990 and 2013.

- **Violent crimes** are operationalized homicide events, or planned attacks by one or more offender operating in the United States. Planned attacks consist of both **failed and foiled plots** inside the United States.
- A **failed plot** is a violent incident that was set into motion and stopped either through perpetrator failure or law enforcement action during the final stages of the planned act.
- In contrast, a **foiled plot** is a violent incident that is stopped either through perpetrator desistance or law enforcement action prior to the final stages of the planned act. For the remainder of this report, failed and foiled plots will be referred to simply as “plots” unless otherwise noted.

We further separated plots into two categories defined by an intended target’s level of specificity.

**Plot Category 1: Specified People or Targets** consists of planned acts in which one or more specific persons or targets to be attacked (e.g., the President, the Brooklyn Bridge, the New York City subway system) is named. The intended target(s) must be characterized by specific spatial and temporal characteristics. Further, the offender(s) must engage in overt action toward the execution of a specific plot (e.g., the construction of a dirty bomb). Many plots involved multiple targets. For a plot to be included in this report, evidence of overt action was necessary for only one of the targets. We also include acts that were charged as attempted homicides and suicide missions that resulted in no deaths other than those of the offenders in this plot category.

**Plot Category 2: Unspecified People or Targets** consists of planned acts in which one or more general intended targets (e.g., persons of Jewish descent) is named. In addition, some spatial and temporal characteristics, even if vaguely mentioned, for the planned violent act must be provided. Naming a state or region of the United States in which the intended target(s) is located (or the entire country) satisfies the spatial requirements, and a very general time frame for attacking the intended target(s), even if it covers several years, satisfies the temporal one. Again, the perpetrator(s) must engage an overt action toward the execution of some aspect of the plot (e.g., purchasing weapons).

The second prong of our inclusion criteria is attitudinal, and requires that, at the time of the crime, one of the perpetrators subscribed to elements of the violent extremist belief system endorsed by supporters of al-Qa’ida and other affiliated movements.⁵

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⁴ If prosecutors dropped charges against the perpetrators or perpetrators were acquitted on all related charges, they are not included in this report. Perpetrators who were killed carrying out violent attacks are included.

⁵ These violent extremists were linked to a variety of groups such as al-Qa’ida, al-Fuqra, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, Pakistani Taliban, al-Shabaab, and others.
United States Extremist Crime Database

As this report relies solely on data from the United States Extremist Crime Database to generate our findings, we briefly explain how this database was created (see also Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014). Again, only criminal violent acts (homicides, attempted homicides, and violent plots) perpetrated by one or more supporters of AQAM were analyzed for this report.

Data Collection Process

For this report, we collected extremist crime data for ECDB using a multi-stage process. The first stage involved reviewing over 50 distinct sources to identify violent crimes that met our inclusion criteria. We reviewed official sources such as the FBI’s *Terrorism in the United States* annual report and the National Counterterrorism Center’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System database to identify violent crimes. Second, we looked at data collected by private watch-groups, such as the *Southern Poverty Law Center* and organizations like *The Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation* and *The Investigative Project on Terrorism*. These sources provide chronological and incident information through online articles, reports, and press releases. Existing terrorism databases, such as the American Terrorism Study and the Global Terrorism Database, were the third source type examined. Additional sources like the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents include many relevant incidents and rich data on indictments and other court proceeding documents. Relevant incidents were extracted for the ECDB. Fourth, scholarly and journalistic accounts were also reviewed. Close attention was paid to works that focused on crimes committed or attempted by violent extremists, especially studies that provided chronologies and information about specific events, perpetrators, and victims related to these crimes. Finally, media publications provide important open source materials, and we conducted systematic searches for additional incidents in a variety of general newspaper and locally archived newspaper databases.

In the second stage, each violent criminal incident and the related perpetrators and victims were systematically searched across 31 web-based search engines as well as existing terrorism databases, official sources, and watch-group reports. Project “searchers” used key information about the crime, perpetrator names, and victim names to conduct online searches. To ensure that the searches were thorough, our searchers used different combinations (and spellings) of the relevant individuals’ first and last names. The searchers also systematically searched by location, when necessary, to identify relevant court documents. To capture the most relevant media accounts, the searchers focus on obtaining information from national outlets as well as the newspapers specific to the region where the event occurred or where the perpetrator or victims resided.

These searches uncovered all published open source materials on each case, such as media accounts, government documents, court records, indictments, appellate court decisions, videos, blogs, books,

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6 Please see Freilich et al. (2014, appendix) for a listing of these sources.
7 Please see Freilich et al. (2014, appendix) for a listing of these web-engines.
watch-group reports, movement-produced materials, and scholarly accounts. This information was digitally archived, and searchers organized it by source type, starting with the most reliable.

In the final stage, the open source information was provided to coders, who searched their assigned cases to verify that the original searches were complete and did not miss important information. The ECDB is relational, and it consists of data on multiple units of analysis including incidents, perpetrators, victims/target, and the social ties between and among the perpetrators and victims/targets. The coders used the open source materials to code variables related to all of these units of analysis, which are connected to an online database.

Reliability of Open Source Data

Searches occasionally uncovered documents from different source types containing conflicting information. These discrepancies evidenced reliability issues related to source type. In these situations, greater weight was granted to the more "trusted" sources. Similar to Sageman (2004, p. 65) "in decreasing degrees of reliability... [we favor] court proceedings subject to cross examination, followed by reports of court proceedings, then corroborated information from people with direct access to information provided, uncorroborated statements from people with that access, and finally statements from people who had heard the information secondhand." Table 1, shown below, lists the source types by decreasing degree of reliability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Ranking of Sources by Degree of Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Appellate court proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Court proceedings subject to cross examination (e.g., trial transcripts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Court proceedings or documents not subject to cross examination (e.g., indictments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Corroborated information from people with direct access to information provided (e.g., law enforcement and other key informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Uncorroborated statements from people with that access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Media reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Watch-group reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Personal views expressed in blogs, websites, editorials or Op-Eds, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In addition, because the ECDB relies on the services of multiple project “coders,” it's important to address potential issues related to inter-rater (i.e., coder) reliability. Unlike some projects that collect data at one point in time, the ECDB and other terrorism databases are large-scale ongoing efforts. The ECDB updates values as new information becomes available. Due to the unique data collection processes involved, it is difficult to engage in standard inter-rater reliability practices. Nevertheless, we address this important issue in a number of ways. First, coders are trained. New coders initially code previously coded cases, and both sets of values are compared. Second, coding abnormalities are continually checked across coders.

Third, open source coding occurs in stages, which increases the chances that all available information from open sources is captured. Conducting targeted searches based on information uncovered during the initial search presents another opportunity for coders to recheck the past work of fellow coders. Fourth, filling in values for certain ECDB variables requires little interpretation as the variables capture basic facts such as a perpetrator's race, age, or gender. Fifth, and significantly, we validated all violent incident records used for this report, verifying that coders systematically applied the coding rules when creating relational records for perpetrators, victims, targets, and their networks.

**Units of Analysis**

The unit of analysis when analyzing AQAM-related crime data in this report is most commonly the “criminal event.” Events are distinguished both temporally and spatially. Spree attacks that involve the same offenders perpetrating attacks at multiple locations and time points may consist of several unique AQAM-related criminal events if, for example, attacks occur in different parts of a city over several hours or days. Because the ECDB is a relational database and collects information on victims, non-human targets, and offenders, it is possible to analyze data on any of these units of analysis. It will be noted in the findings when the unit of analysis is not the event.

Importantly, because failed and foiled plots lack conventional temporal and spatial dimensions, the ECDB considers the general or specific intended victims or targets to be the units of analysis for Category 1 and Category 2 plots. Because of this, it is possible for a single AQAM offender or AQAM cell that plans to attack several targets to be responsible for several unique plots.
Findings

In this section we present findings regarding the 231 violent attacks and failed and foiled plots perpetrated by supporters of AQAM in the United States between 1990 and 2013.\textsuperscript{8}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th># Violent Incidents or Plots</th>
<th># Unique Perpetrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide Events</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plots with Specified Targets</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plots with Unspecified Targets</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 2 demonstrates, we have identified 35 homicide events, 145 Category 1 plots, and 51 Category 2 plots. We first describe the fatal attacks perpetrated by AQAM supporters before moving on to discuss plots.

Homicide Events

The findings discussed in this section relate to 35 homicide events perpetrated by AQAM supporters. Fortunately, AQAM-related homicide events remain extremely rare events in the United States.

There were seven AQAM-related homicide events committed during the 1990s or in 2000, while the remaining 28 attacks occurred on or after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks (see Figure 1). AQAM-related homicide events were scattered from coast to coast in the United States. Due in large part to the 15 unique homicide events perpetrated by the “Beltway Snipers” in 2002, the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area has experienced a disproportionate number of AQAM-related homicide events.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{8} A complete list of these incidents is included in the Appendix.
\textsuperscript{9} Homicides, attempted homicides, and violent plots targeting the United States overseas during this period are not included in these analyses.
\textsuperscript{10} Although this is a complex case that involved more than one motive, these attacks met the ECDB’s inclusion criteria. Information from multiple open sources indicated that both John Allen Mohammed and Lee Boyd Malvo expressed support for the 9/11 hijackers and for future al-Qa’ida-inspired attacks on America through verbal and written statements, as well as through drawings.
California and New York also experienced more fatal AQAM-related attacks, four and five respectively, compared with other states. Most states that did experience an AQAM-related homicide event had one or two attacks in their state.\(^{11}\)

In total, 44 unique offenders were responsible for all AQAM-related homicide events examined for this report. Lone actors perpetrated twelve of the homicide events, or approximately 34 percent of all fatal AQAM-related attacks. If you remove the Beltway Sniper spree killings from the analysis, lone actors perpetrated over half of all AQAM-related homicide events. In terms of their demographic characteristics, all lone actors were non-White males. However, what is more remarkable about this group of lone actors is the frequency in which serious mental illness surfaced as an antecedent factor to the AQAM-related homicide event. Notably, Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich (2013a; 2013b) have also found this to be true of “loner” far-right terrorists. Most of the lone actors fit what we refer to as a “loner” profile, as they appeared to be self-radicalized and have little or no face-to-face relations with organized terrorist groups. Ideologically driven justifications for committing their homicidal acts were often combined with personal grievances and conspiracy theories.

Two high-profile AQAM-related multiple-event attacks, the Beltway Sniper homicide events and the homicide events associated with the 2013 Boston Marathon, were perpetrated by what we refer to as “wolf packs,” or small cells of like-minded individuals. In both cases, offenders perpetrated their deadly attacks in groups of two. Also in both instances, offenders were involved a close personal relationship involving an older mentor and younger protégé accomplice.

Although rare, AQAM-related homicide events that occurred as the result of broader conspiracies were disproportionately deadly. Eight conspirators were linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that killed six and injured over a thousand others. More recently, 27 conspirators, including the 19 hijackers,
were linked to the 9/11 attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania that killed and injured thousands.

Seventy-one percent of AQAM-related homicide events targeted the general public (see Figure 2). In this way, AQAM-related attacks are different from other forms of domestic terrorism, which often target government entities, social minority groups, and businesses. If the Beltway Sniper attacks are excluded from the analysis, 50 percent of homicide events targeted the general public, 25 percent targeted law enforcement and correctional officials, 15 percent targeted the military, and 10 percent targeted social minorities.

![Figure 2. Target Types in AQAM-Related Homicide Events](image)

Other than the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the 9/11 attacks—which resulted in numerous deaths—the death tolls for most AQAM-related homicide events were usually small. In nearly 69 percent of all fatal attacks, only one victim was targeted and killed. Though single victim attacks drop to 45 percent of all homicide events when the Beltway Sniper attacks are removed, it is important to remember that the four attacks on September 11, 2001 were truly anomalies in regards to the number of deaths they caused.

In terms of the types of weapons used, approximately 75 percent of the AQAM-related homicide events involved the use of firearms by offenders (45 percent when the Beltway Sniper attacks are removed). Though explosives are often associated with terrorism, especially AQAM-related terrorism, bombs were rarely the weapon of choice for the AQAM supporters who perpetrated successful homicide events. In addition, two offenders relied on knives (or other sharp objects) to kill their selected victims, another relied on an automobile, and airliners were used in the 9/11 attacks. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings were the only successful homicide events that AQAM supporters operating in the United States committed using explosives.

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12 Some fatal attacks included multiple types of targets. In these instances, we attempted to assess the primary type of target. Attacks against the general public in which law enforcement officers were also killed were coded as having “general public” targets. Attacks against social minorities in which members of the general public who were not of a minority status were also killed were coded as having “social minority” targets.
Failed and Foiled Violent Plots

The ECDB has also identified 196 AQAM-related violent plots between 1990 and 2013 that either failed or were foiled by law enforcement. While there were no plots uncovered in the United States for several years during the 1990s, the number of AQAM-related plots per year increased substantially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with approximately 95 percent of them uncovered following these attacks (see Figure 3).

The years with the most AQAM-related plots were 2009 (27 plots), 2011 (26 plots), and 2006 (25 plots). Although in Figure 3 it appears that the number of plots decreased dramatically in 2013, we hesitate to make such a conclusion, as it is possible that very recent plots have not yet been identified by the ECDB. What can be stated conclusively is that AQAM supporters continue to plot against the United States and that a year in which there are only nine or 10 uncovered plots may be followed by a year with 25 or more. As shown in Table 3 below, 74 percent of the plots were labeled as Category 1 while 26 percent of the plots were considered to be Category 2. Further, around 47 percent of AQAM-related plots were planned by multiple offenders, which means that over half of all plots involved lone actors. The average number of perpetrators per plot was 2.6, and approximately 30 percent of plots were planned by two to four AQAM supporters.

The region of the country targeted in each plot was designated based on the U.S. Census categories. The majority of the AQAM supporters intended to strike against targets in the northeastern and southern regions of the United States. In the northeast, the most frequently targeted city was New York City, though targets in nearby New Jersey cities were also identified. Another commonly targeted city and

13 Again, Category 1 plots include plots with specific intended victims and/or targets, while Category 2 plots include plots with general intended victims and/or targets.
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surrounding metropolitan area was Washington, D.C., which is considered to be in the southern region of the United States by the Census Bureau. Though there were several plots against targets in Los Angeles, Seattle and other western cities, the numbers were small compared with plots that targeted cities on the East Coast.

### Table 3. Characteristics of Failed and Foiled AQAM-Related Plots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Plot</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 1</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple AQAM Supporters Indicted</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region of Country</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, several AQAM supporters identified Chicago as a desirable target, though it appears that AQAM supporters have generally not focused on the middle regions of the country when planning terrorist attacks. A particular region of the country was not identifiable from available information for nearly 9 percent of the plots.

As shown in Figure 4, the most common type of target selected by AQAM supporters whose plots were foiled or failed were military targets, including specific local recruiting stations and high-profile targets like the Pentagon. Political and other government targets were the second most common target type. The intended government targets of AQAM-related plots were often general (leading them to be designated Category 2), including federal buildings and political figures. As for transportation targets, subway stations in New York City and Washington, D.C. were frequently suggested as possibilities.
Interestingly, AQAM supporters often simultaneously considered multiple targets. That is, they conspired to attack political/government buildings (e.g., The World Bank), infrastructure (e.g., bridges), businesses (e.g., shopping malls), and social minorities (e.g., Jews). In some cases, offenders intended to commit ambitious spree attacks against multiple targets. More often, though, intended targets changed as the plotters weighed their various options and the planning process evolved over time.

By far, AQAM supporters planned to use bombs and other explosives more than other types of weapons (see Figure 5).

For our purposes, “bomb” is used as a general category for various types of explosives. In some cases undercover FBI agents were involved in selling inert explosive materials to would-be terrorists as part of...
sting operations. Guns were the second most common type of intended weapon. Furthermore, even those AQAM supporters conspiring to use bombs against selected targets were also often interested in acquiring firearms. Vehicles, which terrorists rarely intended to use, included both automobiles and aircraft.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our examination of AQAM-related violence is based on data related to 35 homicide events and 196 failed and foiled plots identified by the ECDB. Importantly, the ECDB data collection strategies yielded important dividends, as the vast majority of violent crimes we identified and subsequently included in our analysis would likely not have satisfied the inclusion criteria of the FBI and other existing domestic terrorism databases. For example, violent lone actors committed approximately half of the AQAM-related plots examined in our analysis. The F.B.I.'s terrorism definition and inclusion policies, though, have historically required that an act be committed by a terrorist group. Moreover, because the ECDB considers both state and federal terrorism cases, we were able to capture a more comprehensive picture of AQAM-related violence from 1990 to 2013 in our analyses.

We found that the majority of fatal attacks and plots occurred after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and targeted large urban centers, such as New York City and Washington, D.C. With the exception of the years 2001 and 2002, the number of homicide events committed by AQAM supporters has remained consistently low, while the number of AQAM-related failed and foiled plots has increased over the last decade. Interestingly, the West Coast has been the target of a relatively large number of plots but only six AQAM-related homicide events, which occurred in the states of California and Washington. Further, while failed and foiled plots have targeted Chicago and several other cities further away from the coasts, we did not see any AQAM-related homicide events occurring in these places.

During the last several years, AQAM supporters have largely focused their plotting efforts on high-profile military; political and government; and transportation targets. In contrast, the majority of fatal AQAM-related homicide events have targeted the general public. While there are likely to be multiple explanations for this finding, we could speculate that attacks against the general public are more likely to be successfully executed compared with attacks against more protected targets, which may require more sophisticated planning.

The type of weapon most commonly used by AQAM supporters who committed homicide events was firearms. On the other hand, those who planned (but failed) to attack the United States generally intended to use bombs and other explosive materials. It is important to note, however, that this may be partly due to undercover FBI agents successfully embedding themselves or informants into AQAM-

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14 In some cases, plots involved the planned use of multiple weapons. In such instances, the most deadly type of weapons was used in the analysis.

15 Of the 16 homicide events recorded in 2002, 15 were perpetrated by the Beltway Snipers.
related plots since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Discerning whether AQAM supporters preferred bombs and other explosives or, on the other hand, FBI operatives and informants simply made these weapons available to offenders is difficult.

Our findings underscore that AQAM-related lone actors remain a significant threat to homeland security, with 34 percent of all homicide events and 53 percent of all failed and foiled plots attributed to lone perpetrators. In response to this, more comparative research needs to be done on potential precipitating factors associated with lone actors, offenders operating in small cells, and group-based actors. In particular, the role of mental illness in the process of radicalization to violence should be more closely examined. Open source materials revealed that several lone actors who perpetrated homicide events suffered from severe mental illnesses prior to their attacks.

Finally, many have suggested that attacks committed by violent AQAM-related lone actors are more difficult to prevent than group-based attacks. Nonetheless, over half of all failed and foiled plots involved lone-actor offenders. Moreover, it does not appear that “successful” fatal attacks were much more likely to be perpetrated by lone actors. Future research will use ECDB data to look in more depth at the different ways that violent plots by AQAM-related lone actors, small cells, and large group-based actors have been prevented.

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16 Preliminary analyses indicated that approximately 33 percent of plots were foiled by FBI operatives, and approximately 23 percent were foiled with help from FBI informants.
References


