Russian Clients and Global Foreign Policy Strategy: Evidence from Foreign Military Sales

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About This Report

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Executive Summary

Using a new database that documents all active foreign military sale contracts involving Russia as the seller which were either ongoing or started between 2008 and 2015, START researchers evaluated the following questions:

1. Who are Russia’s allies and clients and where is it seeking to extend its influence within the EUCOM AOR?
2. How do foreign military sales effect Russian cooperation and conflict with the United States?
3. Will Russia become more assertive as its military capabilities continue to improve?

We found that of 206 states identified as a being a part of a combatant command, Russia has a buyer-seller security relationship with 66 of them since 2008, roughly one-third of all states. Of the top four buyers from Russia—India, China, Venezuela and Algeria—two of them are part of the “BRICs”: the “rising” powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Providing extensive military sales to BRICs countries is consistent with an oft-stated Russian foreign policy goal that Russia wants a more multipolar balance of power. In addition to multipolarity, the foreign military sales data indicate that a top Russian foreign policy interest lies in cultivating friendship with countries with whom it shares extensive energy resource development opportunities. This includes both the Caspian Sea region, in which Russia has relied heavily on international law and regional cooperation, as well as development in Algeria and Nigeria.

While Russian foreign military sales to states do not change the balance of either its cooperation or conflict with NATO, a principal aim of Russian foreign military sales is to empower those states that will challenge American predominance either economically, militarily or both. There is little evidence from the foreign military sales data to suggest that Russia will become more assertive from its improving capabilities.
Introduction

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START) was tasked with this project as a Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiative. The project team is seeking to identify patterns of crisis instability, conflict and cooperation between Russia and members of NATO currently, projected out over the next decade. Specifically, these capabilities should enable the EUCOM to examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identify where U.S. strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Russian and other interests worldwide.

For this contribution to the broader project, START examined data on Russian foreign military sales since 2008 to a variety of clients, allies and partners around the world. START’s analysis of these military relationships will aid in modeling how factors detailed by other teams within the SMA effort interact within EUCOM AOR. Specifically, this report answers the following questions:

1. Who are Russia’s allies and clients and where is it seeking to extend its influence within the EUCOM AOR?
2. How do FMS effect Russian cooperation and conflict with NATO and/or the US?
3. Will Russia become more assertive as its military capabilities continue to improve?

The data analysis and collation for this report was completed between May and late August 2015. The project team included:

Principal Investigator: John Stevenson
Project Manager: Garett Tippin
Research Assistants: Patrick Bresette, Andre Short, Tiara Goode, Usha Govindaraju, Greg Schuck, Eduardo Goncalves

The Russian Foreign Military Sales List (RFMSL) is a new database that documents all active foreign military sale contracts which were either ongoing or started between 2008 and 2015. Using this database, START researchers were able to analyze ongoing supplier-recipient relationships between Russia and over 40 countries.

Our analysis is limited to foreign arms sales and does not encompass all conventional arms transfers. Conventional arms transfers—when one or more internationally recognized states produce weapon systems for use in a recipient-country—are a staple of power politics and state-to-state relations.1 Arms transfers, conventionally, incorporates all forms of weapons transfers between countries; in contrast, the RFMSL tracks a specific type of arms transfers: foreign military sales.

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1 See: Freedman, Lawrence. "British Foreign Policy to 1985. IV: Britain and the Arms Trade." International Affairs 54, no. 3 (July 1978): 377-392. Also note that conventional arms transfers excludes unconventional weapons and technology transfers, such as nuclear assistance. (See Kroenig, Matthew. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." American Political Science Review, 2009. 103, no. 1:113-133.)
The term “foreign military sales” encapsulates only those government-to-government arms transfers which are regulated by an economic contract, purposely excluding grant and alliance transfers of weapons systems outside of market relationships. The concept of foreign military sales also purposely excludes “assistance programs” that a broader term, such as international arms transfers, would include. We use the term “foreign military sales” in part due to its clarity and in part due to the fact that many states, particularly the United States, possess programs denoted as “foreign military sales” (FMS) programs.² As these programs and contracts are often defined by statute and legal contract, we treat these particular forms of conventional arms transfers as distinct processes in international politics.

Foreign military sales are important to the study of international politics because of the effect they have on the distribution of military capabilities between states.³ There are three existing conceptions of foreign military sales as important building blocks of international politics. One, some theorists depict foreign military sales as a form of payment for strategic exchanges.⁴ An infamous example of this was the World War II so-called “Destroyers for Bases Agreement” between the United States and Great Britain. In this arrangement, the United States Navy transferred 50 destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for land rights on British possessions.⁵ More recently, to circumvent U.S. sanctions and combat rising food prices, Russia and Argentina signed an agreement in which Argentina would exchange wheat and beef for 12 aging Russian supersonic attack planes with laser-guided missiles.⁶

A second conception of foreign military sales is as a form of national economic stimulus, in that a critical function of military spending is a form of military-led industrial policy.⁷ In these theories, foreign military sales are an internationally-regulated way to infuse cash into the national economy because arms sales represent a lucrative set of market expansion opportunities for manufactured goods.⁸ In addition, patterns of procurement, as well as research and development serve as economic foundations and stimulus in the aerospace, communication, nuclear and high-tech industries, which promote the development and capitalization of those industries relative to basic manufacturing and energy companies.⁹

⁷ Markusen, Ann. "The militarized economy." World Policy Journal (1986): 495-516. To be clear, this literature does not argue that this form of industrial policy is effective at building a healthy diversified economy, only that it is a form of stimulus.
⁹ Markusen, Ann. "The militarized economy." World Policy Journal (1986): 495-516. To be clear, this literature does not argue that this form of industrial policy is effective at building a healthy diversified economy, only that it is a form of stimulus.
Third, some theorists categorize foreign military sales “as a means to maximize the collective strength of a military alliance.” As such, evidence of foreign military sales is proof of both a domestic national security strategy as well as cooperative military relationships within the larger international system. Although these three theories do not agree on why states contract for foreign military sales, they all postulate that we should expect states to use foreign military sales as a part of their most important power politics behavior, especially for countries, such as the United States and Russia, which have some combination of far-flung interests and treaty commitments. From seeking economic influence to providing formal, but non-institutionalized strategic partnerships with “enemies of enemies,” theorists of international politics expect foreign military sales to remain regular international behavior with important implications.

Through the tracking of Russian foreign military sales, researchers can investigate the complex mixture of political and economic influences on Russia's grand strategy and its role in the international system.

**Data and Methodology**

The Russian Foreign Military Sales List database emerged out of an earlier START database, called the External Weapons Transfer (EWTL) database. These databases collate and organize weapons sales between countries. Whereas the EWTL focused on buyer-seller relationships in which at least one of the contracting parties was in PACOM AOR, the RFMSL collects all contracts that either began or were ongoing in 2008 wherein Russia was the seller, regardless of which combatant AOR the recipient country was located in. Foreign military sales are especially important for Russia: The Russian defense program would have “collapsed without arms sales”; strong weapons exports have become a “main source of revenue until the present and will play a key role in Russia's ongoing attempt to regenerate its armed forces while winning friends and influence abroad.”

Tracking and recording global Russian foreign military sales to then place in context of their arms sales within EUCOM AOR generates several important insights for this multi-layer assessment. First, the RFMSL shows the patterns of the weapons, services, and equipment upgrades buying countries desire but cannot produce themselves. The assumption of many models of conflict is that defense production is domestic, which, as an assumption, is increasingly becoming untrue in a globalized world.

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11 Cooperative military relationships, rather than the more formal term alliances, are used here because these sales may take place in what has been called “security communities” or may simply be evidence of less competitive forms of balancing and security competition.


Second, the RFMSL reveals interlocking security and economic network ties between Russia and various countries. Generally, scholars explore and operationalize security ties and cooperation between countries through studying the dynamics of basing relationships. Implicit in this view is that formalized security cooperation requires commitment and trust. The RFMSL allows for systematic examination and operation of contractual security relationships outside of formal basing arrangements and defense treaties. The locations of buyers is just as important for thinking about security ties and sympathies as the patterns of buying are for observing security policy.

The database currently covers transfers to 65 countries across all the combatant commands, including buyers in EUCOM. For these 65 countries, the RFMSL includes all purchases ongoing in or initiated after 2008. The database also details the specific weapon system. Specifically, the database records the following key variables:

1. **Years of Delivery**: This is the date range over which the weapons were delivered to the buying country.
2. **Weapon System**: The official designation of the weapon system (e.g. Mi-2/ Hoplite (N), Panhard M-3 VTT).
3. **Type**: This category describes the broad category into which the weapon system falls (e.g. Fighter Aircraft, APC, etc.)
4. **Version**: The name that the buying country gives the weapons system, or the name of the modified weapon system series designed for the buying country's needs.
5. **Asset**: refers to the types of geographies the weapons system is best suited to project military power (e.g. Air, Land).
6. **Number Delivered**: How many of the weapons systems are in the full delivery. These numbers are not directly comparable count units, as missile deliveries are often numerically larger than armor deliveries, but that doesn’t make the missiles necessarily more dangerous than the armor.
7. **Capabilities**: This is a more granular description of what the weapons system does. For example, the Mi-2/ Hoplite (N) “provides infantry transport and CAS for ground troops with light rockets.”


20 START researchers will be providing the formatted data at the end of the period of performance to interested parties.
The unit of analysis is the weapon system-country transfer year. Each of the database units comes from an economic contract between two countries with explicit delivery dates, prices, and the service necessary for a country to use that product.

Using open-source data portals such as Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI), Jane’s Defense, Defense Review, we identified the contracts and its terms. All non-clandestine weapons contracts have to be registered on a weapons market. We cross-referenced some of the upgrades with the ship registry system that live tracks vessels.21 In addition to the terms of delivery, and the services rendered, the contracts also specify the dates of delivery. The biggest defense industry companies will often have the actual text of the contracts on the web, serving as a primary document.22

**Russia’s Global Allies and Clients**

The overall pattern of Russian foreign military sales shows that Russia is, in fact, a global arms seller, that is also relatively most heavily invested in the Middle East/CENTCOM AOR. Overall, of 206 states identified as a being a part of a combatant command, Russia has a buyer-seller security relationship with 66 of them since 2008, roughly one-third of all states. Using that as a baseline, Table 1(below) shows the distribution of Russian foreign military sales organized by US Regional Commands to better assess relative levels of Russian influence and/or interest..

**Table 1: Distribution of Clients by Regional Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Regional Command</th>
<th>Number of Russian Clients in the AOR</th>
<th>Total Number of States in the AOR</th>
<th>Percentage of Russian Clients in the AOR (based on total number of states)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50 (excluding Russia)</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7 (excluding US)</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aggregate pattern in the data reveals that:

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21 For example: Marinetraffic.com; vesselfinder.com
22 For example of a contract, this is a contract between the United States and India for the Harpoon in 2014. http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/india-ugm-84l-harpoon-missiles
• PACOM, AFRICOM and NORTHCOM AOR are fairly close to the 32% mark, which means about the number of clients we would expect from a global arms dealer
• SOUTHCOM and EUCOM are very low, relative to the 32% benchmark
• Russia sells to the overwhelming majority of countries in CENTCOM AOR

Because of the nature of our data—with the database only incorporating contracts that were ongoing or began in 2008 or later—it is impossible to determine if this relatively high concentration of Russian clients in CENTCOM is a recent occurrence. Moreover, because of the relative recent data, it is difficult to determine the best explanation for this high percentage of buyers of Russian weapons, such as whether there are regional specific effects in CENTOM—e.g. many economically challenged countries with limited domestic military production capacity—or a concerted effort by Russia to maintain an active foreign policy in CENTCOM.

These caveats having been stated, many foreign policy experts stress that the world regions within CENTCOM AOR, namely the “near abroad” of Central Asia, the Transcaucus and the Persian Gulf, have been of supreme strategic important to Russia since at least the collapse of the Soviet Union. Central Asia’s importance stems from the cornucopia of natural resources, especially near the Caspian Sea, and energy shipping contracts and opportunities across the region. The Caspian Sea, a landlocked body of water bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, contains at least 17 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, in addition to three of the involved states being former Soviet republics.

Russia has concluded multiple foreign military sales contracts since 2008 with each country bordering the Caspian Sea, suggesting in part that the motive of its foreign military sales is to maintain or increase positive relations with these states. In the Persian Gulf, Russian foreign policy has pursued a strong Russo-Iranian strategic partnership in part to have an export relationship for the Russian atomic industry and in part to reduce Iranian incentives to support restive Muslim populations in the Caucasus regions that it borders.

Of the top four buyers from Russia—India, China, Venezuela and Algeria—two of them are part of the “BRICs”: the “rising” powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Providing extensive military sales to BRICs countries is consistent with the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, as well as the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. These documents stated that “Russia shall seek

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23 According to our database, in CENTCOM AOR, Russia concluded at least one contract with the following countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, UAE and Yemen. The countries that Russia did not sell to during this time period are: Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan.

Russian Military Transfers and Arms Sales
to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations” to address its significant concern with a global distribution of power concentrated in American and American-led alliance hands, as well as making clear that the enlargement of NATO was a threat to the Russian Federation. Similarly, countries, like Venezuela, which are not rising powers but evince a fair amount of anti-American dissatisfaction comprise many of Russia’s largest foreign military sales.

We will profile the Russian security relationships with India, Venezuela and Algeria in the following subsections. Before that, however, we should offer a brief note about the other end of the spectrum of Russian penetration: Russia’s foreign military sales relationships in EUCOM, which are relatively low because of its 1990s “retreat from Europe” and the concurrent EU and NATO expansion in to post-Soviet spaces. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, through the Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev presidencies, Russia was learning to live “within borders that had hitherto never existed...surrounded by weak states” as it watched much of Europe, and with the accession of the Baltic republics, some of the former Soviet Union join regional institutions of which it was not a member. NATO assistance and EU membership draws these countries out of Russia’s orbit. Whereas the EU is concerned mostly with spreading liberalism, democracy and the rights of Muslims (outside the EU, naturally), Russia’s foreign policy concerns are generally issue-specific, pragmatic and pro-War on Terror (especially in Chechnya). In addition, local issues between EU countries and Russia, such as constructing an acceptable visa regime for Russians crossing EU territory to travel to and from the Kaliningrad exclave, and political transitions in countries like Georgia and the Ukraine, create a considerable amount of foreign policy distance between EU countries and Russia which further limit the opportunities for the successful conclusion of foreign military sales contracts.

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To briefly elaborate on why the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad is a source of friction between the EU and Russia,

**Map 1** displays how Kaliningrad is sandwiched between Poland to the south and Lithuania to the north and east. It became a part of the Soviet Union at the end of 1945 and delimited from Poland, by treaty, in 1957. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it became an exclave below lists all 10 states in EUCOM AOR which have purchased Russian armaments via foreign military sales, with the top recipients being Azerbaijan and Belarus.
Table 2: Distribution of Contracts within EUCOM AOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Clients in EUCOM AOR</th>
<th>Number of Contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to detailing Russian’s military and strategic relationship with its top buyers (India, Algeria and Venezuela), we will also detail Russia’s relationship with Azerbaijan and Belarus to see how the military relationships are different from those with its top sellers, as well as how they are similar.

**Top Recipient: India**

India is one of the largest military equipment importers in the world, with Russia as one of its leading long-term suppliers. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, India and Russia signed numerous trade agreements emphasizing continued bilateral arrangements. These agreements show strong emphasis on military trade and arms exports from Russia to India. Around this time, India also initiated its Look East Policy, indicating a strategic shift in their outlook. India and Russia’s historical alliance has deepened over time. This relationship began with defense and security agreements comprised mostly of joint military exercises. It grew into energy resource prospecting and development involving natural gas and oil, nuclear energy, satellites, outer-space exploration, along with the development and production of

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weapons. In 2007 President Vladimir Putin signed a decree making Rosoboronexport responsible for all arms exports. The same year India and Russia signed an agreement to jointly develop and produce the fifth generation fighter aircraft PAK FA T-50.

According to the RFMSL and EWTL, between 2007 and 2008, contracts were set for the export of over 2000 weapons systems to India. Rosoboronexport currently accounts for more than 90 percent of Russia’s annual arms sales; India is a major client and other leading clients include China, Algeria, Syria, Vietnam, Venezuela and recently Iraq, once again emphasizing Russia’s efforts to sell weapon systems to countries who are at political odds with the U.S. or have ideological differences from the U.S.

Although India is also not formally a part of the long-standing American security architecture, given its non-alignment during the Cold War and persistent criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, India has welcomed a larger role for the United States in South Asia and Southeast Asia, especially after the “United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act” and the Defense Framework Agreement in 2005. The friendliness without dependence on the United States has enabled India to secure weapons from a wider variety of suppliers than other countries in the region that are friendly with the United States. Reference source not found. below summarizes India’s long-term relationship with Russia (and other major arms exporters). It’s second largest suppliers are the United States and a EUCOM country, Israel.

Table 3: Comparative Stats on Foreign Military Sales to India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-2004*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-Present</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on year contract began

As Table 3 shows, in recent years (i.e., the second half of Bush II Administration and the Obama Administration), India has increased the number of foreign military sales contracts with the United States, but Russia remains its largest sole supplier. If trends continue, Israel is the main emerging EUCOM competitor to Russia, and the combination of American and Israeli foreign military sales will eclipse the long-stand Russian relationships. Because India and Russia have had extensive cooperation since the days of the Soviet Union, the continued relationship should not be seen as an extension of Russian influence. In fact, it is not assured that Russia and India will continue to cooperate as closely in the future.

For example, 2006 Russia backed out of a plan to lease India a nuclear submarine and instead 200 Indian naval officers began training at a submarine training center near St. Petersburg.  

**Top Recipient: Venezuela**

In testimony to Congress in March 2014, Ilan Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council cautioned that Russia’s provocative actions in Ukraine were distracting from a much more important foreign policy development: a growing military presence in central and South America. Although Russia’s “pivot” to Latin America began in 1997, the pace of weapons sales in Latin America accelerated in 2004. In 2008, President Medvedev indicated that Russian relationships with Latin America are “privileged” in the same way that Russia’s relationships to CIS countries are. What this means for Russian foreign policy is that Russian foreign policy elites see Latin America as a bloc of countries eager to be mobilized to support challenges to American dominance of world affairs, to a “pluralist multipolarity.” Much of the practical effect of Russian engagement in Latin America has been in support of international counter-narcotics cooperation, which has had notable successes such as dismantling a gang linked to the Mexican Los Zetas cartel.

Indeed, much of Russian military engagement with Venezuela under Chavez was consistent with selling Venezuela the weapons necessary to host temporary Russian military bases, including submarine bases, while supporting the global narcotics trade. Venezuela is second behind India in terms of weapon sales from Russia since 2008: “Between 2001 and 2013, Venezuela is estimated to have purchased more than three-quarters of the $14.5 billion in arms sales carried out by Russia in the region.” Venezuela is the largest importer of weapon systems in the Western Hemisphere and is second to the U.S. in terms of percentage of GDP allocated for the military. Much of Venezuela’s additional spending has not come in the form of larger defense budgets through the annual appropriation process, but rather through extra-budgetary purchases of foreign weapons and supplies with petro-pesos. These military sales to Venezuela has been consistent with President Medvedev’s vision of the BRIC countries promoting “a

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genuine multipolarity and weaken[ing] of U.S. hegemony in international financial institutions and the global economic order."\(^{49}\)

**Top Recipient: Algeria**

Algeria has a long standing military relationship to Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. During the Cold War era Moroccan-Algerian conflict, Algeria purchased roughly $9 billion worth of conventional weapons from the Soviet Union between 1975 and 1988, as well as hosted roughly 1,000 Soviet military personnel to train Algerian troops in the use of Soviet equipment.\(^{50}\) Although this military relationship dwindled in the immediate post-Cold War era due to both countries facing internal problems—the Algerian Civil War against the Islamists and Russia’s myriad problems under Yeltsin—Russian-Algerian relations picked up again under President Putin: “In March 2006, Russia signed an $8 billion deal with Algeria to cancel that country’s debt for past arms sales in exchange for a commitment to buy Russian military equipment.”\(^{51}\) The 2006 breakthrough deal had been long in the making. Presidents Bouteflika and Putin resumed dialog in 2000 about the prospect of Russian arms sales and increased Russian involvement in the modernization of Russian fuel and power sectors.\(^{52}\) Ultimately, between “2003 and 2012 Rosoboronexport and the Russian military complex increased sales by more than 10%, making Algeria the third most important customer for Russian weapons.”\(^{53}\)

Russia’s strategic interest in Algeria stems in part from its energy development plans. Gazprom, the Russian state-owned natural gas company, and National Petroleum Corporation, the Nigerian state-owned petroleum company, signed a memorandum of understanding in 2008 concerning oil and gas exploration and transportation.\(^{54}\) This also involved preliminary talks about a trans-Saharan pipeline that would transport Nigerian gas across Niger and Algeria for delivery to Europe via Algerian export terminals.\(^{55}\) Together, Russia and Algeria are the major non-European natural gas suppliers to the EU market. Due to the potential for monopolistic control over the non-European sources of natural gas that are critical to the EU market, foreign policy elites in Europe developed “concern that Russia and Algeria, in particular, will act together to raise the price that Europeans must pay for gas,” despite many energy experts arguing that this possibility is quite remote.\(^{56}\)

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Finally, similar to Russia’s approach to other embattled regimes, Russia offered the Algerian government unconditional support through the Arab Spring and kept international cooperation going even during difficult times for the regime. Russia’s non-judgmental persistence has paid dividends as well: Gazprom, the Algerian-owned energy company Sonatrach and the Algerian military regime cooperated to explore and develop 30 fields that comprise one-fifth of Algeria’s territory; in addition, to aid Algeria in the development of civilian nuclear power, Rosatom, the Russian state agency in charge of nuclear energy, and the Algerian ministry of energy have entered into agreements concerning the construction, operation and servicing of nuclear power and research in Algeria.  

**Top EUCOM Recipient: Azerbaijan**

Unlike Belarus, Azerbaijan’s military relationship with Russian weapons imports is more from a lack of geostrategic partners rather than a preference for Russia. Besides Russia, Azerbaijan’s choice of political partners include: Europe/the EU, Iran and Armenia. For a variety of reasons, none of these potential partnerships preserves Azerbaijani autonomy over its domestic and international affairs.

While Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has openly stated that he wants “Azerbaijan to be as close as possible to Europe,” the EU’s approach to geostrategic partnerships is the limiting factor in that relationship. Much of Europe’s foreign policy militates for transformational, comprehensive, multi-sector reform in the areas of human rights, democracy and civil society. In exchange for the wholesale transformation of Azerbaijan’s political regime, the EU has not offered Azerbaijan an important concession that it has offered to many of Azerbaijan’s neighbors: The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) has declined to give explicit recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity similar to what Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine have received. Although issues of energy access and the potential route of the Trans-Adriatic pipeline have and will continue to keep the EU and Azerbaijan in conversation with each other, the combination of Azerbaijan’s human rights record coupled with the EU’s lack of diplomatic support for what Azerbaijan considers to be the territorial status quo are significant obstacles to a more harmonious relationship.

Iran’s relationship to Azerbaijan is dominated by elite Azerbaijani fears that Iran is looking to export its Islamic state model. Cooperation with Armenia is notoriously limited by their past war and ongoing territorial dispute in the form of Nagorno-Karabakh. This ongoing dispute “has created an arms race between the two states” which has the “potential to drag in other region[al] players—Russia, Turkey and

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Iran—if renewed warfare were to break out.” Purchasing weapons from Russia, especially for its land forces, offers Azerbaijan a way to keep up with the ongoing arms race with Armenia, while also holding at bay the threat of domestic political transformation emerging out of Iran and the EU.

**Top EUCOM Recipient: Belarus**

Russia and Belarus are two of the closet post-Soviet allies, revolving around extensive foreign policy coordination and military cooperation. This alliance is constituted by a formal treaty regime. Beginning with an understanding from President Aleksandr Lukashenko, the alliance evolved into a Non-Aggression and Consultation Pact through the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation of 1995, and reached its apogee in the 1997 Defense Pact which expanded the alliance treaty relationship to include joint military planning in the context of several additional treaties providing a framework for day-to-day business as well as long-term planning. The treaty regime included specific agreements between the Russian and Belarusian military establishments: They cooperate "on the basis of the Joint Military Doctrine since 2001, having previously also adopted a Concept of the Common Defense Policy, a Security Concept and a Concept of the Union's Border Policy" buttressed by supranational organs such as the Border Committee. This inclusive treaty regime covered everything from the use of military installations, joint air patrols and missile warning stations to joint control of Belarus' borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

Under the first Putin presidency, Belarus was a beneficiary of significant Russian-sponsored regional institution-building through CIS. In February 2003, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Common Economic Space agreement to eliminate trade barriers and forge shared energy transport policies. There has been extension cooperation on counter-terrorism as well: "In April 2003, six states—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia—formed the College Security Treaty Organization, pledging to pool their resources to fight terrorism in the area."

This idyllic two decades of cooperation began to slow during Medvedev’s presidency. The first major disagreement between Belarus and Russia involved a Belarusian boycott of a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSO) designed to facilitate the creation of the CSTO’s Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF) that Medvedev argued would be “well trained and equipped, adequate in size, and on a par

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with NATO forces.”\textsuperscript{68} This force was to be used within the territories of CSTO member states for defending against military aggression and conducting counter-terrorism, counter-smuggling and counter-narcotics operations, in addition to serving as an emergency response force against natural disasters. Moreover, although “NATO has been perceived by the Belarusian leadership for a long time as a hostile bloc, Belarusian leadership has never seen the EU in such terms.”\textsuperscript{69} Belarus’ chief objection to the CORF was that it did not see the possible death of its citizens as a justifiable cost for CORF operations, given relatively lower levels of integration within CSTO compared to NATO and the EU.

In addition, Belarus has pointed declined to extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a top foreign policy concern of Moscow, despite many other Russian allies, such as Venezuela doing so.\textsuperscript{70} The strong military ties between Russia and Belarus have not dampened Russian foreign military sales to Belarus, even as it has exposed divergence of strategic preferences between Russia and some its closest allies.

**Top-Selling Russian Weapons Systems**

Having described the international and strategic dimensions of ongoing buyer-seller relationships, it is also important to analyze the technological specifications of the weapons systems being purchased. Looking at the technical foundations of these military relationships makes it possible to identify how Russian foreign military sales are altering the balance of power between states in the regions in which they are most active. These technological foundations also reveal the demand side of the buyer-seller relationship: Through detailing the weapons systems, we can analyze which capabilities these states desire but often lack the domestic production to manufacture.

**To India:**

Since independence, India has been increasing the productive capacity of its domestic military-industrial complex, despite heavy reliance on foreign imports since the Sino-India War.\textsuperscript{71} For Indian defense elites, expanded military industrialization, especially of the nuclear and space programs, will allow for more autonomy in international politics, as well as enhance its prestige as a rising power.\textsuperscript{72} Despite these moves toward self-reliance, India is still heavily reliant on foreign military sales for radar systems (surveillance and fire-control), airframes, and missile technology. India appears to be emphasizing its naval modernization and upgrade program as it now views a Chinese naval encroachment as more of a threat than a traditional land war with China. As its relationship with the United States grows, India is trying to balance procurement from a number of suppliers: India purchased 12xSu-30K fighter jets from

Russian but turned down the Russia bid of the Mi-28H Night Hunter attack helicopters for the U.S. Apache AH-64D Longbow.\textsuperscript{73}

**Table 4: Russian Foreign Military Sales to India by Weapons Systems Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Weapons Systems (22)</th>
<th>44%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Weapons Systems (9)</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Weapons Systems (19)</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The details of the weapons purchases are below:

- **Land Systems**
  - 2001 to 2013-700 to 800xT-90S MBT\textsuperscript{74}
    - Export version of Russian T-90 MBT
  - 1999 to 2013-25,000 to 37,000x 9M113/AT-5 Spandrel (N) TOW ATM

- **Naval Systems**
  - 2013-1xModified Keiv-Class Aircraft Carrier
    - INS Vikramaditya
    - Displacement-4,500tons
    - Military Lift
      - 36xAircraft (MiG-29K, K-28/31 helicopters)
  - 2011 to 2013-3xModified Krivak III Class Frigate
    - Talwar-Class Frigate
    - Displacement-4,035 tons
    - Multi-purpose Frigate that can engage surface, sub-surface and air targets
  - 1998 to 2013-32xAK-630 30mm Naval Gun
  - 2012 to 2013-12xMR-90/Front Dome AD System
  - 2012 to 2013-100x9M317/SA-17 Grizzly (N) LORAD System, Naval Variant
  - 2008 to 2013-750x9M311/SA-19 Grison (N) SHORAD

- **Air Systems**
  - 2015-12xSu-30K
    - Multi-Role fighter
  - 2011 to 2013-80xMi-17V-5
    - Multi-Purpose Helicopter
      - Export version of Mi-8MTV-5
      - Armed Version/Transport Helicopter

\textsuperscript{73}Pravda, “India prefers USA’s Apache to Russia’s Night Hunter”, 26 October 2011. Accessed at: \url{http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/26-10-2011/119442-india_russia-0/}

\textsuperscript{74}In this style of report, this should be read as .700 to 800 units of the T-90 main battle tank between 2001 and 2013. The “x”s in these lines are interchangeable with “of a type.”
Russian Military Transfers and Arms Sales

To Venezuela:
Air defense capabilities comprise the bulk of Russian foreign military sales to Venezuela. Most of the land weapon systems—which means that they are used by infantry and ground forces—are mobile air defenses. These air defense systems specialize in countering traditional air threats and ballistic missiles. Much of the nationalistic discourse emerging from the last two Venezuelan administrations centers on countering “foreign aggression” and these administration’s arms purchases give credence to the Venezuelan belief that it is facing an existential threat, usually from the United States due to its active sanctions against the country.75

The fact that these recent air defense acquisitions would not be much of a deterrent against an actual U.S. airstrike may not be the point. Venezuela did buy a large assortment of air to air missiles and anti-ship missiles between 2006 and 2008. Venezuela argued that these weapons purchases were designed to “prevent” a U.S. naval/amphibious attack on the country during the Bush-Cheney Administration. Their naval capabilities seem to be taking a backseat to upgrades and modernization of their land forces. This may be in part due to the fact they don’t have any major energy resources to protect off their coast line.

Table 3: Russian Foreign Military Sales to Venezuela by Weapons Systems Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons Systems Type</th>
<th>2008 Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Weapons Systems (0)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Weapons Systems (19)</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Weapons Systems (11)</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The details of Venezuela’s weapons purchases are below:

- Land Systems
  - 2009-2013xS-300VMK/Antey 2500/SA-23 Gladiator/Giant (N) ADA System
    - 2013-75x 9M82M/SA-23A Gladiator (N) SAM
      - Intended to defeat tactical, theater and medium range missiles and air tracks
      - Detection-400kmx30km
      - Range-200kmx30km
    - 2013-150x 9M83M/SA-23B Giant (N) SAM

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- Intended to defeat tactical and theater missiles and air tracks and short and medium ranges
  - Detection Range-400kmx30km
  - Targeting Range-200kmx30km
  - 2011-2014-11xS-125 Pechora-2M ADA System
    - Launcher for the V-600 SAM
  - 2011-2014-550x V-600/SA-3B Goa (N) SAM
    - Medium Range
      - Range-35kmx18km
  - 2009-2010- 2000x9K338 Igla-S/SA-24 Grinch (N) MANPADS
    - SHORAD
      - Range-5.5kmx3.5km
  - 2012-2000x 9K338 Igla-S/SA-24 Grinch (N) MANPADS
    - SHORAD
      - Range-5.5kmx3.5km
  - 2011-2013-123xBMP-3M IFV
    - Armament
      - 1x100mm Main Gun
  - 2011-2013-1000x 9M117 Bastion/AT-10 Stabber (N) LB ATM
    - For the BMP-3M
    - Range-4KM
    - Warhead-HEAT
  - 2013-92x T-72/T-72B1 MBT
    - Armament
      - 1x125mm Main-Gun
      - Does not include ATGM capabilities
  - 2011-2013-48x 2S19 MSTA-S 152mm Artillery, SP
    - Range-28km
    - ROF: 6-8 rpm
- Air Systems
  - 2008-50xKh-29/AS-14 Kedge (N) ASM
  - 2008-50XKh-31P/AS-17 Krypton (N) ASM
  - 2008-50xKh-59ME Ovod/AS-18 Kazoo (N) ASM
To Algeria:
Russia’s foreign military sales to Algeria increased dramatically in 2010. Combined with Egypt’s “pivot” to Russia in the wake of post-coup sanctions from the United States, Russian foreign military sales currently support two of the largest militaries in north Africa.  

Algeria’s purchases have focused on the rapid modernization program of their military capabilities as the data shows with an emphasis on large land systems (T-90S MBT) and naval platforms (Kilo-Class SSK and Tiger-Class Corvette) and both attack and transport air systems (Mi-26T2, Mi-28NE Night Hunter).

Algeria’s land and air purchases appear to offer the regime greater capacity for internal crackdowns, without sacrificing any military power for defense against external threats. The purchase of Mi-26/Halo (N) Transport Helicopters and Mi-28/Havoc (N) Attack Helicopters will give their military the ability to quickly react to external and internal threats by putting large number of troops on the ground and providing immediate CAS (Close Air Support). The purchase of the modern and capable Su-30/ Flanker (N) FGA will give them the capability to support troops on the ground with accurate and overwhelming fire-support and to attack enemy positions. Their naval assets purchases from Russia seem to emphasis the ability to control their territorial waters and coast lines from both the threat of smaller targets (smugglers, terrorist infiltration by coast-line) and larger targets that may threaten the integrity of their territorial waters.

Table 4: Russian Foreign Military Sales to Algeria by Weapons Systems Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons Systems Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Weapons Systems (8)</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Weapons Systems (10)</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Weapons Systems (11)</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The details of Algeria’s weapons purchases are below:

- **Land Systems**
  - 2015 to 2020xT-90S MBTs
    - Export version of Russian T-90 MBT
  - 2012 to 2013-120xT-90S MBTs
    - Export version of Russian T-90 MBT
  - 2006 to 2008-185xT-90S MBT
    - Export version of Russian T-90 MBT
  - 2012 to 2014-38x96K9 Pantsyr-S1/ SA-22 Greyhound (N) SHORAD Systems
    - 2012 to 2014-750x 9M311/SA-19 Grison SAMs for Pantsyr-S1
- **Naval Systems**

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To Azerbaijan:
Land weapons systems have been Azerbaijan's import focus. Their land-based modernization efforts have been relatively broad-based, including new modern battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, as well as anti-tank capabilities with anti-tank missile and anti-tank guided missile purchases. When it comes to their air defense artillery, there has been an emphasis on SHORAD and medium-range (against enemy helicopters and fighter ground attack aircraft) and controlling their immediate air-space.

Azerbaijani air asset purchases have also been in support of this land-based mission: The regime has purchased large numbers of attack and transport helicopters, which has enhanced their ability to transport large numbers of troops quickly to an area of conflict with immediate CAS (Close Air Support). This continues tradition of legacy purchases as their military has been reliant on either Russian or Russian-type weapon systems especially in the use of military air and land assets.

Table 5: Russian Foreign Military Sales to Azerbaijan by Weapons Systems Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptive Statistics of Russian Foreign Military Sales to Azerbaijan since 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Weapons Systems (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Weapons Systems (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Weapons Systems (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Land Systems
  - MBTs
    - T-90 MBT
  - IFV

- Air Systems
  - 2015 to 2016-12xMi-26/Halo (N) Transport Helicopter
  - 2011-16xYak-130 Combat Trainer Aircraft
  - 2015-42xMi-28/Havoc (N) Attack Helicopter
  - 2011 to 2012-16xSu-30/Flanker (N) FGA
Russian Military Transfers and Arms Sales

To Belarus

Most of Belarus’ cooperation with Russia comes through its treaty relationships and membership in regional organizations. Because so much of its military capacity has been delegated to Russia, Belarus purchases comparatively few weapons systems in relationship to other purchasers profiled here.

Belarus’ main purchases are ADA systems, primarily LORAD and SHORAD. Six of their eight land weapon transfers are ADA systems. Their emphasis appears to be to monitor external tracks and control their immediate air-space with both LORAD and SHORAD radar sensor systems. While their SAM do propose a threat to enemy aircraft it is the radar systems of the S-300 and the TOR that will allow them track both fast-moving enemy targets such as long-range bombers and ballistic threats as well as low-flying targets such as helicopters and cruise-missiles.

Conclusions

The evidence from Russian foreign military sales, and the rhetoric that has accompanied it, suggests that Russia wants to maintain and increase its global influence, as well as to alter the distribution of capabilities to be more “multipolar.” In other words, Russia’s ideal global system is one in which
international balances of military and economic power do not favor any one country or alliance, especially not the United States and its allies.

In addition, the activities and capabilities of NATO, especially in relationship to countries that border Russia, clearly worry Russian foreign policy elites. This is partially why Russia has been so eager to expand and promote its foreign military sales in Latin America, going so far as to say that Latin America holds the same priority for it as the CIS countries in the near abroad.

Russian foreign military sales are an important part of the economic recovery strategy. Weapons sales and the structural militarization of the economy are an important part of Putin's economic agenda for stimulus. In fact, Rosoboroneksport is an “industrial behemoth that is monopolizing whole sectors of...industry on behalf of the state.” Domestic economic stimulus through militarization also dovetails with Russia’s foreign policy interest of cultivating friendship with countries with whom it shares extensive energy resource development interests. This includes both the Caspian Sea region as well as development in Algeria and Nigeria.

From the foreign military sales data, this report answered the following questions.

1. Who are Russia's allies and clients and where is it seeking to extend its influence within the EUCOM AOR?

Russia's clientele base for its weapons systems and service-training contracts are truly global, though its interests are most having concentrated in CENTCOM (of all the regions) due to presence of the Caspian Sea and attempts to counter-balance an Iranian-Iraq Shiite regional alliance. In EUCOM AOR specifically, Russia is trying to deepen cooperation amongst its allies through regional institutions to serve as a military foil to NATO forces. Of the EUCOM relationships, the most extensive institutional relationships are with Belarus and the largest volume of weapons sales are to Azerbaijan. Both countries have difficulties with American allies. Belarus is suspicious of NATO (though not the EU) and Azerbaijan cannot get what it needs from the EU, which is for the EU to take its side in the territorial dispute with Armenia.

2. How do foreign military sales affect Russian cooperation and conflict with the US?

A principal aim of Russian foreign military sales to empower those states that will challenge American predominance either economically, militarily or both. U.S.-led sanctions against the Russian defense industry do little to curb this market strategy, as it further ties Russian defense exports to countries with limited or poor diplomatic relationships to the United States. In the long-term, however, this strategy of dominating the anti-American market is self-defeating. As more of Russia’s clients rise—such as India

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77 Stephen Blank, Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry, Strategic Studies Institute, Jan 2007, p. V.

78 These questions were given directly to SMA from EUCOM.
and China—their need to rely on Russian weapons decreases as their own domestic production capabilities increase.

3. Will Russia become more assertive as its military capabilities continue to improve?

There is little evidence from the foreign military sales data to suggest that Russia will become more assertive from its improving capabilities. However, as American capabilities decline relatively—that is, as the global distribution of capabilities is less in the United States’ favor—Russia will likely become more assertive in its use of international institutions to thwart the United States objectives.