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TERRORISM AND COUNTER-WMD**

**Protecting the Homeland from International and
Domestic Terrorism Threats:**

*Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the
Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization
and Disengagement*

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Preface (Brigadier General Raymond A. Thomas III)

If there are any key insights resulting from renewed study of the causes and potential solutions for terrorism, it is that there is no simple formula for either the individual or group radicalization phenomenon. While epidemiology and law enforcement provide useful insights on terrorism, they fall short in recognizing the inherent complexity of what is fundamentally a system-of-systems problem. That is, stopping or abating the terrorism phenomenon is not merely an issue of identifying and intercepting the perpetrators of terrorist violence. To be truly effective, strategies and tactics must also be focused far to the left, to address the factors that lead to radicalization in the first place. These efforts should span the perpetrators, the instigators, and the population that both actively and passively supports terrorism (the oft referenced "green layer"). These dynamics occur and inter-relate across many levels. For example, terrorist groups can in some cases gain the support of others by providing public services (e.g., water, medical care), often filling critical gaps where the government is failing to fulfill basic needs. Any strategies to decrease terrorism-related violence need to be tailored to address all the elements of this system-of-systems. Successful counter-radicalization strategies include programs that target entire communities, especially targeting the vulnerable segments -- the unemployed, the disenfranchised, and the youth (especially under 25 year old males). Social connectedness is a powerful factor, even if one is connected to another's struggle. Successful de-radicalization/rehabilitation programs generally include the family of the perpetrator, enlisting them to ensure compliance as well as including them in financial compensation, etc. In short, addressing a complex and multi-faceted problem requires a multi-faceted solution.

In addition, counter-terrorism strategies must address the entire continuum of radicalization, including the fundamental reasons that people are drawn to participate, in whatever form, in terrorism. That is, strategies need to be devised to counter the simple, popular messages that resonate with people (e.g., focusing on social injustice issues or collective grievance like the state of occupation by a foreign power – deprivation creates breeding grounds for terrorism) including a powerful and captivating image based on innovation, empowerment, and dramatic action and, in the cases of transnational organizations, the global (inherently inclusive) character. These strategies could focus on inconsistencies and weaknesses, such as sources of internal dissent within the organization (e.g., lack of consensus on tactics that target civilians) or the legitimacy of the organization as a governing body and lack of validity of political vision (i.e., if the current government is inadequate, what will take its place?).

Ideology may not be the key driver in motivating terrorism; nonetheless, it cannot be ignored. While some current research points to ideology as more of a framing device or tool with which to explain or rationalize violence or a rallying point, nevertheless ideology must be addressed in any counter-terrorism collection of strategies. Religious ideologies are difficult to distinguish from political ideologies as a motivating factor. Both are based on socially shared beliefs about reality and the basic nature of being human, and both are often convolved (i.e., a group purporting to act based on a religious ideology may actually be acting based on long standing perceived political or socio-economic grievances). Some scholars actually espouse the view that, in some cases, a group's ideology (e.g., Marxist) rides on top of the religious beliefs, allowing the religion to reinforce, justify, and in essence become the ideology. Religious ideologies can and are used to serve a number of social functions that have nothing to do with religion itself (e.g., basis for class or ethnic identity, justification for racial oppression, civil

rights movements, engagement, or escape from the world). Behaviors are often attributed to ideological motives, both peaceful and violent. However, because of the convoluted relationship between religious and political ideology, religious and former movement leaders can and should be part of the solution. This is particularly true where the opposition to the local government is strong; that is, the legitimacy of the government is in question.

Achieving any success in diminishing the global terrorism phenomenon will require a new understanding of the inherent differences and complexities in what is a system-of-systems and requires an approach that addresses all its key elements. Particular attention needs to be paid to the key frames (and underlying environmental conditions) that make individuals attracted to these groups/movements, with comprehensive approaches across the continuum of radicalization and violence. In addition, recognizing that ideology (whether religious and/or political) matters and understanding the sources of legitimacy are critical in developing effective, lasting solutions.

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Executive Summary: The Global Terrorism Phenomenon – What Do We Know, How Do We Know It, and What Do We Not Know - But Need to? (Editorial Board)

It would be comforting to be able to find some constants, some footholds in our understanding of terrorism. It is, in fact, the element of mystery as to what drives people to collective violence that makes us uncomfortable -- that fills us with terror. Researchers, policy makers, those who must combat terrorism, and the public hope for some simple formula for radicalization, a program or set of programs that will prevent groups of people from deliberately targeting other people in order to meet their needs (political, economic, social, etc). There is no magic formula within this paper collection, but there are a variety of perspectives that, either in isolation or when integrated, provide new ways to think about terrorism and potentially to inform decisions that will abate this global phenomenon, not exacerbate it.

This paper collection entitled, “Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement,” seeks to add insights without needlessly repeating what has been heard and read elsewhere. What separates this paper collection from the many others on this topic is the multiplicity of perspectives represented, both domestic and international, that span the spectrum of social sciences. To do this, over forty authors were asked to provide perspectives on various aspects of terrorism: root causes, dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs), the role of ideology in terrorism, and potential solutions for counter-radicalization, deradicalization, and disengagement from terrorism.

This paper collection builds on and substantially augments the recent RAND publication entitled, “Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together.” The RAND report looked at root causes, why people become terrorists, support for terrorism, how terrorism ends, disengagement and deradicalization, and strategic communications using the approach of surveying relevant literatures and then synthesizing the information – in many cases in very helpful factor trees that distill and show interrelationships between key factors. This collection has a few survey papers bolstered by numerous empirical analyses as well as comprehensive papers on select topics (e.g., Pakistan) and papers by international authors expressing essentially “first person” perspectives on key terrorism issues, particularly ideology and counterterrorism solutions. This allows for greater “drill down” in some areas as well as an understanding on what current empirical research shows us about terrorism.

The viewpoint throughout is that terrorism, and indeed what we know about terrorism, is DYNAMIC. There is no formula (condition a + grievance b + group dynamic c + ideology d = collective violence) that applies. Terrorism is the result of interactions between human beings – who live in an environment with other individuals and groups, with a government that does or does not meet their needs and expectations, who interact on a daily basis with others, who they may increasingly identify with radicals based on a variety of reasons, who may have experienced trauma and/or perceived discrimination either first hand or indirectly (e.g., Internet videos), who may meet a charismatic leader and/or hear a resonant message that meshes with their psychological vulnerabilities. The message may frame their grievance in terms of an all-encompassing worldview that fosters a sense of a conflict they are currently experiencing as a “cosmic war” in which they can (and indeed must) participate in a noble fight against a

demonized enemy.¹ It can start in a variety of ways and it can also end, as the recent RAND report outlined, in a variety of ways: the actors can change their minds about the ideology that justified their actions, give up or be arrested or killed or appeased by the government, or lose so many group members that it is no longer feasible or worth carrying on the fight. It is a (non-linear, complex, or even chaotic) fluid dance with many moving parts; thus, it cannot be expressed in simple “if-then” statements or simple causal diagrams. This paper collection also boldly steps into the deafening silence on the topic of “do ideology and/or religion motivate terrorism?” and provides some surprising thoughts on this controversial topic.

To frame the topic being addressed, we start with a definition of terrorism and an assessment of the current threat posed by terrorism, both internationally and domestically. There is a plethora of definitions for terrorism – a 1988 study by the U.S. Army counted 109.² The two offered here are consistent with the key elements found in most definitions. Terrorism is defined by U.S. Law (U.S. Code Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f(d)) as the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” and by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorising or condition of being terrorised.” Fundamentally, terrorism occurs when non-state organizations employ violence for political purposes and when the target of that violence is civilian (or military in non-combat settings), and the immediate purpose is to instill fear in a population.

“Bumper sticker” insights from the overall paper include...

- No “one size fits all” in terms of a terrorist profile, radicalization trajectory, level of extremism, motivations, organization characteristics, and counter-terrorism responses or solutions
- Our understanding of terrorism can and should be based on empirical data, as well as case studies, to best inform strategy and policy
- Terrorism is not new, but new technology is a “game changer” in terms of motivation (e.g., Internet videos provoke experience of trauma, like in conflict zones), recruiting, training, potential lethality, and even tactics selection
- Root causes are necessary in terms of the susceptibility for the emergence of individuals or groups likely to use terrorism as a tactic, but not sufficient
- Group dynamics are necessary as are charismatic leaders or instigators, but not sufficient
- Credible messages and leaders/counselors are necessary for deradicalization/disengagement, but not sufficient
- Ideology is important at least as a way to frame issues and justify actions

¹ Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). *Terror in the mind of God*. University of California Press, 163.

² Schmid, A. P., Jongman, A. J., et al. (1988). *Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 5-6.

- Individual solutions exist but must be tailored to the level of extremism and role (instigator, perpetrator, and supporter) and be combined to truly combat radicalization and terrorism

This collection is organized in five sections, each of which contains papers that address key aspects of the contemporary terrorist phenomenon and what is known about those that engage in terrorism: instigators, perpetrators, and supporters. The collection begins with an overview that sets the stage for where threats exist and are emerging. The next section reviews research on the root causes of terrorism and provides diverse views concerning the economic and political conditions and new information environments that foster terrorism. The next section on dynamics of violent non-state actors (VNSA) considers social networking and group dynamics that foster and support terrorism. Ideology is increasingly implicated in terrorism, and the section on Ideology and VNSAs covers diverse viewpoints on the role of ideology as a cause or consequence of terrorism. The final section provides several information and perspectives on the effectiveness of various counter-radicalization, deradicalization and disengagement programs and research on their likely effectiveness in combating or de-escalating violent activity. The first three sections provide important updates to the established literature on terrorism.

Prologue – Global Terrorism Overview

How serious is the current global terrorism phenomenon? Rik Legault's [\(P.1\)](#) review informs us that while terrorist attacks since the turn of the century have become progressively more dangerous worldwide, with an increasing likelihood of death and injury in a terrorist attack, they are still very rare – 100 times rarer than homicides in the U.S. Attacks on the U.S. are more likely to be on foreign soil and target selection is primarily a function of proximity.

According to James Lutz [\(P.2\)](#), the greatest domestic (U.S.) threat is from extreme right wing groups, including radical environmental groups. He points out that the underlying issues that motivate white supremacist, anti-abortion, tax resistor, and animal rights groups have not gone away, nor have the groups. Furthermore, the election of an African-American president may fuel the grievances and fears of white supremacist organizations. While there have been a few homegrown militant Islamist terrorist cells spawned in the U.S., in New York, Virginia, New Jersey, and Florida, the groups that were serious and capable enough to plan and execute attacks appear to be the exceptions.

At the time of this writing, the situation in Pakistan is rapidly evolving. Bokhari's paper [\(P.3\)](#) relates that the current conflicts in Pakistan are based on a central issue: the relationship between the state and religion and debate about the role Islam should play in society. Jihad, in Pakistan, initially focused on fighting the Indian army and the Hindu nation over the territory of Kashmir and shifted to focus sequentially on the Soviet enemy, freeing Muslim lands (including Palestine and Chechnya), and removing the “infidels” from Afghanistan. However, the current focus has switched to fighting the “apostate” Pakistani government and its institutions, directly questioning state legitimacy.

A number of disparate VNSA groups, with different leadership and different views on local and international issues, banded together in 2007 under the umbrella of the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This coalition emerged over time as groups began to network together, resulting in better coordination and more effective targeting of key military and intelligence installations. The constituent groups in the TTP share a common enemy, the U.S., and are pro al Qaeda (AQ), but their tribal differences and disagreement on issues present fault lines and

potential vulnerabilities. Bokhari provides valuable background for understanding the varied faces of the Pakistani Taliban, and their often-competing allegiances. She describes key actors in the Pakistani Taliban movement - and details the successful creation of a nexus of cooperating VNSA organizations capable of challenging the central state authority of Pakistan.

In terms of the threat posed by AQ, Schweitzer [\(P.4\)](#) chronicles recent shifts in AQ activity from a decrease in violence in Iraq to escalating actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is still viewed as the leader of the global militant jihad movement and the role model for affiliates. They focus on showcase attacks, using terrorism as “propaganda in action” as part of a global propaganda system that also effectively uses Internet and video production. Iraq has provided a useful distraction for AQ, diverting attention from post 9-11 pressure and stoking propaganda efforts centered on Iraq as an arena for the “war on Islam” and providing a training ground for the global jihad.

Afghanistan and Pakistan provide a base for joint planning between al Qaeda and the Taliban for attacks on Pakistani forces. Al Qaeda’s influence is notable in the increase in suicide bombings (e.g., Danish embassy bombing in Islamabad). Schweitzer notes as trends: the post 9-11 shift from a more centralized to a more distributed organization, the inspiration of loosely affiliated organizations to act, AQ activity in areas where the central government lacks full control and effective enforcement, the undermining of central Muslim states and the replacement of “heretical” regimes (e.g., Pakistan), and the continued use of dramatic mass-casualty attacks to establish preeminence. Schweitzer also details the anti-Israeli propaganda boost resulting from the latest Israeli incursion into Gaza (Operation Cast Lead) and increased efforts to penetrate the Israeli border with Lebanon as a likely launching point for an attack on Israel.

Invited Perspective Paper: LGen Honoré

Lieutenant General (Ret) Russel L. Honoré’s [paper](#) frames many of the issues in this collection. Based on his 37 years experience as a military commander, he has dealt first-hand with issues of inequality and political oppression, the conflicts these create, and how a transition to civilian government can mitigate social instability. Gen. Honoré first notes that terrorists themselves are not necessarily impoverished, marginalized, or driven by religious dogma. Especially with regard to beliefs, Gen. Honoré notes that “ideology doesn’t create extremists, it supports them.” Therefore, ideas, poverty, and social marginalization are not direct causes of terrorism. Islamic radicals come from societies where Western power and influence threatens those who have traditionally dominated. Their radicalized response is to justify the killing of innocents through the use of terrorist tactics.

Gen. Honoré explains that the antidote to radical terrorism is to provide the security and basic opportunity that people worldwide desire. Precision bombs kill innocents and play into terrorist rhetoric. Counter-ideologies often play into the hands of terrorists by giving the impression that outsiders are attempting to colonize and dominate. While U.S. actions may be necessary to initiate the transition to a sustainable civil society, such a transition must ultimately occur through the people themselves. If the U.S. and others are to be successful in security, stabilization, and reconstruction operations, then personnel must be fluent in the language of cultures in which they operate. Otherwise, setbacks and failures will occur.

In summary, Gen. Honoré argues that the way to combat terrorism successfully is to deny those who use terrorist tactics what they need: a population vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. This is done by realizing how people in other societies can provide for their own security and

political and economic opportunities in culturally appropriate ways, helping them to achieve this stability, and by leaving when the job is done.

Invited Perspective Paper – Captain Wayne Porter

Captain [Wayne Porter](#) (USN) argues that the United States is not fighting the war of ideas against militant jihadis effectively. He notes that the al Qaeda ideology is the focal point for like-minded extremists with a shared vision of establishing a caliphate that would be antithetical "to human rights, modern rule of law, freedom of expression and self-determination." He argues that combating this spreading ideology requires addressing the legitimate grievances of many Muslims around the world. He points out that to be effective, this cannot be done by Westerners acting alone, but must be done in partnership with moderate Muslims.

Section 1 – Root Causes of Terrorism

Researchers have long sought the root causes underlying terrorism, and this section presents new developments including empirical analyses and recent research highlighting findings from a variety of disciplines including political science, psychology, and neuroscience. The recent RAND counterterrorism report mentioned above covered this quite thoroughly and concluded that a systems approach that considers a multitude of factors operating in a context-sensitive manner is required for an understanding of the broad array of phenomena we classify as terrorism. This section offers restatement of previous findings, but takes a closer look at types of radicals, including a discussion of the key distinction between those that perpetrate (execute) violence and those that instigate it, types of radicalization mechanisms, and psychological factors. This section also identifies new factors that underlie the propensity for people to employ terrorist tactics, including the role of emotion in escalating violence and the relationship between neurobiology, crime, and violence.

Rieger's paper [\(1.1\)](#) describing the "Anatomy of a Swamp" documents the results of empirical analyses based on Gallup World Poll data from 140 countries. The survey data on attitudes, beliefs, and opinions was used to develop a model to classify radicals and non-radicals. Two types of radicals were identified. Type One Radicals tended to be "intolerant" individuals with political grievance who lack confidence in national and local leaders due to unmet expectations for basic services, elections, and judicial systems who had also experienced hardship and tended to live in areas where fears about personal safety were common. Type Two Radicals tended to be victims of intolerance, downscale in terms of income, leader and ideology seeking, and espoused a willingness to sacrifice their lives for a cause. Countries with Type One or Type Two radicalism levels of at least three percent experience three times the amount of violent activity of those with lower levels of radicalism.

The next paper, by McCauley and Moskalenko [\(1.2\)](#), outlines a series of mechanisms for individual and group radicalization. Individual mechanisms, enabling an understanding of how individuals join a radicalized group, include radicalization through personal grievance (harm to self or loved ones), political grievance (strong identity with victimized group), the "slippery slope" resulting from increased identification with "in-group," relationships (a family or loved one is radical), status or thrill-seeking, and "unfreezing" (the elimination of prior commitments that triggers the need for connection). Group level mechanisms, those that move a group to political radicalization and collective violence, include group polarization (the tendency for likeminded individuals to become more polarized ("us" versus "them"); radicalization resulting from competition either with the state, other groups, or within a group; and radicalization based

on the social reality power of isolation. McCauley and Moskaleiko conclude, like the RAND study editors, that there is no one path to political radicalization and that graduation to illegal political violence depends, among other things, on culture, time, and place.

Lemieux' paper (1.3) on psychological factors states that, although there are several psychology factors including trauma, humiliation, narcissism, and altruism that predispose them to violence and/or terrorism, it is the integration of individual level psyche, and that of small groups, that informs the "how" of terrorism. He emphasizes the importance of understanding the triggers that operate at an individual level in the appropriate intergroup and environmental (e.g., poverty and inequities) context and posits that identity (social, cultural, religious, and political) may be at the heart of understanding the motivations for terrorism. He further notes the sizable body of research that links in-group/out-group polarization, categorical thinking, and the dehumanization of "them" to an imperative to take action, intergroup violence, and terrorism. Psychology informs the understanding of how individuals process messages and how they are framed, a key in understanding the resonance with an ideology.

Speckhard's paper (1.4) on contextual and motivational pathways to radicalization reinforces the importance of the need to understand radicalization as a process that engages on multiple levels: group (political grievance, and motivation for action), individual (vulnerabilities and motivations for involvement), ideology, and society. She highlights key differences in the ways violent radicalization occurs between those in conflict zones, often motivated by trauma and a desire for revenge (loss of homes, loved ones, jobs, and opportunities), and non-conflict zones, in which radicalization is highly contextual and varies according to local grievances (e.g., discrimination, socio-economic inequality, alienation, and marginalization) and which involves vulnerable individuals looking for adventure, sense of meaning, and/or belonging or protection. She states that, when coupled with a charismatic recruiter with messages of a potential mission, excitement, sense of meaning (a classic example of an "instigator" – see Mandel's paper), the vulnerabilities of the individual mesh with the goals of a group. She states that exposure to violence (e.g., in homes or gangs) can effectively bring conflict zone effects into non-conflict zones and highlights an important difference in terrorism today – that modern technology, including the Internet, also serves as a mechanism for experiencing trauma and motivating revenge (as in a conflict zone).

Less discussed, but equally important, is the role of emotion in the escalation of hostility. Matsumoto (1.6) relates that group emotions serve as motivations for group behaviors, making attributions about in-group and out-group(s) and regulating social behaviors. As such, understanding key emotions such as anger and, specifically, the progression from anger to contempt to disgust is important in understanding the dissociation and breakdown of relationships and progression from aggression to hostility and violence. Tracking the change in emotions and understanding the mechanism by which hatred based on anger, contempt, and disgust is propagated (stories, narratives, and speeches made by leaders) across time provides a mechanism to look for and interpret intergroup behaviors and the propensity for hostility and collective violence.

Another field of research that is less often mentioned when discussing the root causes of terrorism are neurology and criminology. O'Connor (1.7) argues that a distinction should be made between grievance and unfairness, in that the latter is subjective, contingent on the reference group and sense of relative deprivation, and depends on the social setting. General

strain theory is unique in criminology in its emphasis on feelings of unfairness and grievance. Biosocial criminology, which draws on psychiatry, psychology, and medicine, has identified a number of factors related to violence including brain functioning (e.g., the correlation of criminal behavior with amygdala dysfunction combined with executive deficits), childhood development (e.g., traits that are strongly predictive of anti-social and violent behavior), and hormones/neurotransmitters (e.g., abnormally high levels of norepinephrine, acetylcholine, and endorphins result in the need for arousal, often through violence). Because unfairness, grievance, injustice, inequity, envy, and spite have been proven to have biological connections, it is imperative to consider both sociological and biological factors in understanding the propensity to engage in terrorism.

The empirical study of Victoroff and Adelman (1.5) found that perceived discrimination and employment status is a powerful factor in influencing individuals to justify violence. Their analysis of the Pew Muslim American Study data found that the belief that violence against civilians (i.e., terrorism) is justified to defend Islam was correlated with perceived discrimination for both European and U.S. Muslims. However, in the case of the European Muslims, direct experience of discrimination was the key factor, whereas for U.S. Muslims general discrimination (e.g., general suspicion or having been called names) was correlated with support for terrorism. They also found differences between European and U.S. Muslims on the question of whether unemployment was related to support for terrorism in that, for European Muslims worry about employment was correlated to support for terrorism whereas for U.S. Muslims, actual employment status was the key factor in support for violent behavior. Their results were compelling, albeit based on a small data set, and bear attention as well as providing focus for further research.

It is critical to make the distinction between instigators (originators of collective violence) and perpetrators (those who carry out violence) when considering the individuals who participate in terrorism. Mandel (1.8) identifies several key characteristics of instigators: non-interchangeability, their role as catalysts of violence and propagators of nationalism, and their possession of power across the spectrum (low/physical to medium/wealth to high/information grades). These characteristics speak to the uniqueness of the instigator role, their capability to accelerate and direct the focus of followers -- increasing their propensity to engage in collective violence, their ability to bridge the power gap between shaping the information space (people's attitudes and reactions to events) to control over external and organizational resources, and their ability to create a compelling call for action by framing social identity and motivating individuals -- often by reinforcing a sense of collective humiliation. Mandel posits that instigators of terrorism are motivated by threatened egotism and totalistic thinking (intolerance of ambiguity, undifferentiated views, and absolute confidence in the veracity and moral soundness of beliefs and belief in corruptness of alternative views).

While root causes are certainly important and necessary in that they underlie a susceptibility on the individual and group level to radical messages - a call for action to right a collective grievance or social injustice - they are not sufficient to explain why individuals engage in collective violence. The distinction and interplay between instigators and perpetrators of terrorism, in part, motivates the need to consider the dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA), the topic of the next section. We need a more nuanced understanding of the roles of individuals and intra and intergroup dynamics to understand why terrorism arises in some places and situations and not in others.

Section 2 – Dynamics of VNSAs

One key insight researchers have gained through studies of terrorism is that the phenomenon is inherently dynamic. VNSAs undergo a dynamic life cycle, individuals undergo a dynamic process of radicalization, the relations between VNSAs and their state opponents are constantly evolving, and the networks through which VNSAs operate are dynamically shifting. The contributions in this section review a variety of VNSA dynamics.

Based on an empirical analysis of sixty-three incidents linked to al Qaeda (AQ), Sageman's preliminary conclusions (2.1) are that only two of them can be properly attributed to AQ and that most are the work of autonomous local groups acting on their behalf, essentially constituting a leaderless jihad of "young people seeking thrills...trying to build a better world (and)...willing to sacrifice themselves for it." He states that mobilization of these groups is not based on poverty, criminality, etc., but rather on friendship and kinship. Radicalization is based on a sense of moral outrage (e.g., rapes, killings, and unfair police actions), specific interpretation of the world (e.g., "the War against Islam"), resonance with personal experiences (social, economic, political, and religious factors – for example unemployment) and mobilization through networks (both face-to-face as in student groups, mosques, study groups as well as virtually via the Internet). He states that these new "terrorist wannabees" or a "leaderless jihad" cannot be controlled by AQ (since the members of the disconnected networks are unknown) and, since the appeal of the AQ social movement is limited due to the reality of its manifestations (e.g., limitations, problems associated with Taliban, Anbar Province), he concludes that the threat is self-limiting. However, he cautions that containment strategies must neutralize the main drivers of radicalization including the appeals to thrill/glory seekers and that all counter-terrorism messages need to use vocabulary carefully and be backed up by consistent actions.

As a counterpoint to the "leaderless jihad" argument, Hoffman (2.2) reasons that the terrorist violence in Mumbai was planned, premeditated, and executed by trained people operating under command and control and using sophisticated weapons and tactics in an extremely effective manner – thus, this event had all the fingerprints of an existing mature, capable organization with training camps, a headquarters, and leadership to plan and direct the operation, knowledge of surveillance tradecraft, and members with the ability to repel determined counterattacks, namely al Qaeda. He acknowledges that there are existing threats from homegrown terrorist groups (and mentions the foiled attacks in the Bronx and Fort Dix, New Jersey as examples), but emphasizes that the most consequential current threat is from an established terrorist organization with strong leadership; that is, al Qaeda.

Beasley (2.3) states that terrorism is a social movement tactic, the result of well-integrated individuals and organizations. She outlines three key sociological approaches to understanding how social movements arise: political process, resource mobilization, and framing. Political process theory posits that movements emerge in the presence of key factors: increased opportunity for participation in state systems, evidence of political instability, existence of splits within elites, and the presence of influential allies. She explains that responses to the opening of (political, etc.) systems are key in forecasting whether movements may use terrorism. For example, democratization may be interpreted as a sign of goodwill or as a system weakness, resulting in nonviolent mobilization or terrorism respectively. Resource mobilization holds that translation of grievances to action requires availability and use of organizational resources (e.g., membership, communication, and external support). Framing theory addresses

the production of meaning for potential and current social movement members, critical for recruiting and building solidarity among members by providing a rationale for mobilizing and increasing belief in group efficacy. Three framing types - diagnostic, prognostic and motivational - serve to establish that problems/guilty parties exist and movement participation is necessary for change to occur. The efficacy of framing is dependent on the framer's knowledge of the target communities (e.g., the Taliban is adept at incorporating key narratives and poetry). These sociological approaches provide insight into mobilization tactics – the political process informs the perception of opportunities, resource mobilization informs the potential exploitation of opportunities, and framing informs the messages and understanding necessary for movement participants to act.

An empirical analysis by Perliger, Pedahzur, and Kornguth (2.4) highlights some key characteristics of terrorist groups based on incidents/attacks in the “fourth wave of terrorism” and identifies some epidemiological analogies and potential solutions for terrorism. David Rapoport identified four waves of terrorism since the late 1800s: anarchist groups, decolonization movements, guerilla groups, and the current groups who focus on achieving maximum casualties, operate primarily on a domestic level, and aim attacks at occupation forces, emphasizing nationalist and separatist ethnic goals. Perliger et. al's research focused on organizational factors: year of (organization) foundation, guiding ideology (nationalist, religious, right/left wing, Islamic), and group structure (network or hierarchal). They concluded that there is a clear trend of proliferation of militant Islamic terrorism, that Al Qaeda groups have shifted from hierarchal structures to network structures, and that attacks are increasing in lethality (this echoes Legault's assessment in the Prologue). They identify four basic organizational configurations involved in militant jihadi violence: paramilitary, AQ, sleeper cell, and homegrown networks. The configurations vary in structure, recruitment mechanisms, and member profiles. They compare the social network recruitment patterns of sleeper cells and homegrown networks to the dissemination of biological infection agents or metastases of cancer cells and the recruitment of new members through friendship/kinship in homegrown networks to the infection due to direct contact from proximate cells exhibited by viruses, bacteria, or tumor cells. Consistent with this epidemiological analogy, they counsel the need for robust countermeasures for infectiousness -- attacking the social identity of the terrorist group (a la a binding analogy) and access to mass media and communications critical for spreading ideas (ala altered metabolism), essentially focusing on the environments in which terrorism (like disease) thrives and blocking the key nutrients for its spread.

Beyond the identification of top-level trends based on organizational characteristics, Asal (2.5) identifies key factors that impact the decision made by an organization to turn to terrorism. He asserts that ideology is the most important factor behind an organization's decision to use terrorism and hypothesizes that this is because ideology can lead to strong or weak “othering” of potential targets; that is, securing a positive identification of “us” at the expense of stigmatization of “them” or the “other.” Both nationalist and religious ideologies are correlated with a propensity to use terrorist tactics, although ideology can also serve as a constraint against targeting. Other key factors are organizational capabilities and resources (with a key one being external support) and state behavior (e.g., concessions or repression).

Ballard (2.6) provides a method for assessing organizational characteristics in order to ascertain their potential to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or Weapons of Mass Victimization (WMV). The salient characteristics are Ideology, Knowledge, Management,

Audience, Social Distance, and Symbolic Value (IKMASS). Assessment of Ideology involves the identification of ideological fracture lines as potential indicators for the increased potential for violence. The Knowledge factor involves an evaluation of whether an organization can gather and comprehend the necessary information for deployment of WMV (e.g., fuel cycle, materials, etc.). Management includes assessment of the organizational longevity, size, level of effectiveness, ability to get funding, and the provision of logistics support. Audience involves an assessment of the organization's understanding and use of "front stage" and "backstage" behavior. Social Distance involves the evaluation of the distance between the organization and the target population based on relative religious differences, racial/ethnic differences, cultural differences, and/or social/economic differences. Finally, Symbolic Value assesses the use of symbolic targets to convey a message.

Duval (2.7) educates the reader on the importance of network analysis as a method with which to analyze, detect, and monitor terrorist organizations and VNSA's, essentially providing a way to describe and visualize the social structure of violent actors as networks, identify central actors and vulnerabilities, and ascertain the organizational structure (which clearly has some ramifications for their propensity to engage in terrorism) and avenues of recruitment. Network analysis has proven to be a useful tool; for example, Sageman used it to identify substructures in al Qaeda Central, Southeast Asia, Maghreb, and the "Core Arabs," and it was instrumental in the hunt for Saddam Hussein and the "Virginia Jihad" network.

It is important to consider the impact of group behavior in decision-making processes since people who take part in collective violence are often acting out of broad community concern rather than acting from their own private motivations. Gupta (2.8) explores why some ideas, particularly radical political ideas, spread. He reminds us of the three broad forces discussed in Malcolm Gladwell's 2000 book *The Tipping Point*: messengers, messages, and context. Political entrepreneurs translate grievances into actions by framing issues so that boundaries between "us" and "them" are clear, providing the impetus to overcome reticence toward collective action. Messengers, which include "mavens," connectors, and salesmen are accumulators of knowledge, know and are known by lots of people, and attract followers, respectively. Osama Bin Laden demonstrates characteristics of all three. "Sticky" messages, those that endure and have impact, must be simple, concrete, credible, with contents that are unexpected, appeal to emotion, and contain a compelling storyline. The message that "Islam is under attack," is simple, credible (especially when bolstered by pictures of occupied lands, civilian victims of conflict), unexpected (e.g., the dissonance caused by not being a political or economic power), evokes fear (based on the implicit understanding that fear is typically the primary motivator for collective action), and contains a storyline peppered with powerful references (e.g., "crusades," "Hulagu Khan"). The context - sociopolitical, historical, and cultural - determines the "stickiness" of the message. In Rapoport's "fourth wave of terrorism," the context is an interpretation of recent events that points to the "timing being right": the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, manifestation of millenarian vision in the form of the Iranian Revolution, and the victory in the Afghan War. Terror cells are born when radicalized members of a group find a way to act upon their convictions, when inspiration meets opportunity.

The paper from Shellman and Asal (2.9) looks at the dynamics between actors: Violent Non-State Actors, Non-State Actors, and government that affect inspiration and opportunity. This innovative empirical analysis goes beyond the standard studies of correlates of conflict (based on "static" factors which are measured annually) and builds on the work of Enders and

Sandler in which terrorists are assumed to be rational actors trying to maximize a shared goal (e.g., provoke media coverage, political instability, or generate fear) with constrained resources. This analysis that explores interdependencies and decisions by all key actors, enabling an analysis of direct and indirect effects and unintended consequences. For example, counterterrorism policies in India decrease armed attacks but increase bombings, essentially motivating a tactic change from overt attacks to covert due to increased police and military power. In addition to modeling only “terror” activities, modeling all Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) activities enable the systematic exploration of how government policies and tactics affect the choices and behaviors of VNSAs, other NSA’s or segments of the population. A consistent finding is that government repression is an important explanatory variable for terror attacks.

Two final papers in the Dynamics of VNSA Section provide some unique insights into the characteristics and strategies of terrorist organizations: one focused on terrorism and financial strategies and a second one on relationships and similarities between terrorists and criminals. Lemieux [\(2.10\)](#) points out that terrorist organizations not only seek short term funding to support logistics and operations but also engage in strategic financing to support long term activities such as recruitment, training, propaganda, maintenance of facilities, and community infrastructures. Terrorist organizations invest in economic development to maintain the allegiance of the community and to establish legitimacy by filling a gap created by a government failure to provide basic services. The appropriate model here is the “club model” of organizations (examples are the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), Irish Republican Army (IRA), Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah). They obtain donations from an extended network (radicals who share the same goals) and sympathizers. Funding strategies employed include capitalizing on opportunities from emerging markets, trade of legal/illegal good and services (often tobacco, gems, food), and acquiring and operating companies and non-profits (e.g., textile businesses and cattle ranches help to fund Hamas activities and Hezbollah’s obtains funds from cigarette smuggling between Virginia and New York which exploits breaches in market structures). In weak states, lootable resources (e.g., diamonds and drugs) and unlootable resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) fuel civil wars and domestic terrorism (e.g., Peru and Angola). Terrorist groups trade with a wide variety of partners, developing financial alliances, maintaining trade relations, and exploiting loose economic structures. It is extremely hard to enforce laws forbidding trade with terrorists as they are often hard to recognize and markets often do not discriminate. The potential impact of terrorism on markets is mixed – in places with resilient markets and low intensity terrorism, the recovery is faster; however, in places with limited foreign investment, the impact on the economy could be more severe.

Mullins and Dolnik [\(2.11\)](#) explore the overlap between terrorism and crime, since there are a number of similarities in organizational structure, systems of social influence, methods, motives and profiles. Terrorist organizations and organized crime often collaborate when it is mutually advantageous (e.g., drug cartels use of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, to guard cocaine plantations). Some terrorist organizations engage in both organized (e.g., Hamas, Hizballah, FARC, Provisional Irish Republican Army, etc.) and petty crime (e.g., the Madrid bombers financed the operation with drug dealing and car thefts) as a way to generate funding and cut out middlemen. Criminals are often recruited by terrorist organizations. Both terrorists and criminals use similar methods (e.g., fundraising, intelligence techniques), have similar (profit) motives albeit different goals, and similar profiles (e.g., predominantly young

men). Social affiliations are the key route into both terrorist and criminal activities, and shared identity - belonging to a larger collective - is crucial for continuing participation. Membership in a criminal network is transient, whereas in a terrorist network members experience intense pressure to stay in order to sustain organizational size and maintain group stability. Disengagement strategies (for more on this see Section 4) need to address both the “push” (negative consequences of continued participation) with “pull” (attractive factors).

There are those who believe the key motivation underlying the current global terrorism phenomenon is ideology, particularly religious ideologies that are thought to advocate violence or legitimize terrorism, and there are some who believe that ideology is a mechanism useful for rationalizing violence that was motivated by grievances, etc. Regardless of whether ideology is, indeed, to blame for collective violence, there is no denying that the framing of radical messages often involves sophisticated communication strategies which artfully employ images, narratives, and ideological memes (e.g., cultural ideas, symbols, or practices) that resonate with susceptible individuals and/or groups. The next section provides some perspectives on the messages and strategic communication strategies of VNSA’s as well as thoughts on the role of ideology in terrorism.

Section 3 – The Role of Ideology in VNSA

Many studies of terrorism and VNSAs explain some variance in the data but invariably leave substantial areas of behavior unexplained. One commonly sees researchers invoke ideology as a causative factor to explain that variance. In this section, we present diverse views on how ideology may operate and whether ideology is a cause or consequence (symptom) of terrorism.

According to Dauber (3.1), terrorists use three forms of communication: discursive (language), visual (images), and symbolic acts (behaviors that send a message) often with the goal of changing public opinion and political will or to recruit, fundraise, or “rally the troops.” Common discursive communication mechanisms used to persuade include rhetoric, argument, and narrative frames. To fully understand the language, cultural referents need to be understood. Visual images are powerful due to the non-linear fashion in which they are absorbed. They have a visceral, powerfully emotional impact and, when in the news, are commonly regarded as objective truth. Symbolic acts are akin to terrorism “theater,” sending messages to multiple audiences simultaneously. Dates, locations (e.g., 9/11 attack on Pentagon is an obvious example), or the attack mechanism (e.g., anthrax attacks on politicians) can all be symbolic. New media and communications editing technology are contemporary “game changers” in terms of enabling more sophisticated influence messaging.

Despite the tendency to interpret the target audience of VNSA strategic communications literally (e.g., interpreting the target audience of Osama bin Laden’s videos to be solely the U.S. or the U.S. President), these communications can, and often do, have multiple target audiences. Harlow (3.2) identifies several potential target audiences: foreign publics, foreign policymakers, domestic audiences, existing VNSA group members, and potential recruits. Two aspects of VNSA’s suggest that the latter two are the true audiences of most strategic communications – the fuzzy boundaries of most VNSA groups and the types of activities in which they engage to reach decisions (at the same time they are evading capture, etc.). Bonafide groups have fuzzy edges best negotiated by public communication (i.e., broadcasting messages). These groups engage in task processes, relational activities, and topical focus activities to reach decisions. Large

broadcast type communications serve to maintain group relationships on a large scale or support problem solving and they are efficient for internal group communications.

The insightful paper by Paz (3.3) states that the Internet is used as a “soft power” vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching, in part due to persecution and the difficulty in disseminating messages, and in part to promote transnational global solidarity. It is the best means for consolidating a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and conveying the image of a large volume of activity. The first priority of militant jihadi websites is to target youth in order to indoctrinate them and build a collective identity. In this vein, the Internet is effectively a global madrassa or open university for militant jihadi studies. This has resulted in two contradictory developments: the appearance of a consolidation/solidarity (opinion, doctrine, etc.) process and, at the same time, the emergence of a growing number of debates (especially regarding more controversial activities such as targeting civilians, Islamic state in Iraq, etc.). The doctrinal sources of the militant jihadi Salafism on many radical websites are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine. They emphasize the Takfir principle, the labeling of (and treatment of) infidels - Muslims who do not follow “correct” doctrines. Internet scholars have emerged, some of whom have considerable influence. Scholars like Al-Libi, who advocates “total jihad,” discussion of Algeria as a “model” for jihad, and videotapes from Iraq “hotwire” the imagination of radicalized youth. Contrary to those that criticize the pedigree of these websites, their function as a primary tool for open indoctrination dictates they must be credible and thus they are valuable for analysis.

Hairgrove and McLeod (3.4) provide a case study on Hizbut Tahrir (HT) and their use of strategic communications for recruiting, training, and to reinforce and solidify membership. HT is currently non-violent, but does not rule out their use of violence in the future, with the potential plan being the establishment of a Caliphate in Indonesia or in any of the mid-Asia “stans” essentially being a “green light” for the commencement of a violent “jihad phase” including attempts to overthrow non-Islamic governments. HT is adept at strategic communications, utilizing halaqa (small study groups) as a key method for recruitment and training with specialized indoctrination materials that can be downloaded. The group utilizes a variety of communication media/mechanisms including websites, translated books, magazines, cell phones, international conferences, music, demonstrations, and television. Their website is the fifth most popular in Indonesia, accessed actively during office hours.

Lia (3.5) argues that the key to al Qaeda’s (AQ) continuing appeal is three key factors: their propagation of a simple message that resonates strongly with deeply held grievances in the Muslim world, their powerful and captivating image as the world’s most feared organization – an attractive force on young people seeking thrills and meaning - and finally, AQ’s global character, open to virtually anyone irrespective of ethnic background or nationality as long as one can accept their radical ideology. The simple message, which focuses on foreign “Crusader” occupation, religious desecration of Islam’s holiest places, and economic imperialism and plundering of Islam’s natural resources (e.g., oil) resonates with Muslims because it rings of being true and plays on a list of widely shared grievances. Images are increasingly used by AQ due to new information technologies. Young people spend much of their time in cyber-space and are exposed frequently to powerful images. AQ is exceptionally adept at attracting mass attention to sensational acts and the U.S. response to 9/11 reinforced notions about Western aggression and the power of AQ to provoke the world superpower. Finally, the global reach and multinational and multiethnic character of AQ reinforces the credibility of its pan-Islamic

rhetoric, validated by the number of cooperative Muslim groups, some of whom have renamed themselves as AQ. The Internet has been key and its role in fostering AQ's widespread appeal cannot be understated. It contains a huge volume of materials available to cater to the needs of sympathizers, recruits, operatives, and recruiters. The biggest AQ weakness is the internal schisms/dissent resulting from the use of controversial tactics and its unwillingness to prepare for a future transition to politics. Lia asserts that, at some point, the image will fade, as all extremist ideologies have a finite life span, and being a militant jihadi will cease being "cool."

In addressing the issue of the role of ideology of terrorism, Zuhur (3.6) states that radical Islamic messages would not be compelling in the absence of: resistance to political or ideological domination by the West, failures of Western-style governments to create national loyalties and to meet needs, the shock of modernization, rural-urban migration, continued poverty, failures of social movements to right grievances, etc. All of these circumstances push radicals into activism and promote recruitment. Extremist ideology is attractive, in part, because other ideologies fail to attract or actually repel. Zuhur elucidates key aspects of the new jihad ideology include *hakimiyya* (true sovereignty of Allah as compared to nation-states or civil laws), Islamic society and upholding *hisba* (commending good, forbidding evil) by following shari'ah (enforcement of pious vs. materialistic, status-driven behavior based on group interpretation), the necessity for jihad (highlighting the doctrinal differences between justification for jihad in response to attack or to foster expansion of Islam versus insistence on the inevitability of jihad and necessity due to global conflict – also the debate regarding jihad as an individual [including women and children] or collective duty), occupation of Muslim lands (used as rationale for jihad as individual duty), martyrdom (linked with jihad and glorified through videos, poetry, songs, and internet postings), and *takfir* (labeling of governments as "infidels" and thus an object of jihad as a result of their weakness in being influenced by and subservient to western powers or due to their corruption). The best ideological responses to terrorism come from people who were part of a movement and recanted versus the government clerics (ulema). Clerics can back truces or an end to violence, but their influence varies. In areas where the opposition to the local Muslim government is strong, the involvement of clerics or former movement leaders is more likely to be effective.

Seitz (3.7) proposes a computational model of ideology in his paper based on the definition of a paradigm as the set of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by members and the concept of the role of ideologies as serving to reflect the consciousness of groups in various socio-historic circumstances, inform us about man, society, and the state, and provide direction for political action. Both paradigms and ideologies provide standards and criteria of legitimacy. The inputs for the ideology computational model would include conditions that foster VNSAs and weak and failed states (e.g., inequality of resources, rapid changes in the division of labor). The field of action of the model includes a group's perception of other groups. Ideologies are essentially throughputs between environments and the field of action. This model could enable hyper-games in which ideologies were varied to reflect actors' perception of different worlds with different forces at work, and adoption of different strategies for addressing problems and different fields of action utilizing different data structures to filter information and different inference engines. The field of action, inference engine and filtering lens could all be simulated with the field of action defining how information is given meaning and how the inferencing engine leads to new actions. This simulation model could represent propaganda, the minds of

terrorists, uncommitted people, how leaders use metaphors to frame events and communicate to followers, etc.

A provocative evolutionary psychology paper by Mort, Lawson, and Gous (3.8) discusses the role of ideology in motivating terrorism or violence as essentially a mechanism to rationalize violent behaviors resulting from an aggregation of cognitive mechanisms selected as a result of evolution that have been triggered by certain environmental cues. They state that religion, in and of itself, does not cause anything. Apparent examples of religiously motivated violence (e.g., pipe bombs exploding in Derry (Ireland), suicide bombings in Gaza, drowning of “witches”), upon inspection, often correlate with reported or apparent beliefs, motivations, or rationalizations that have a religious component. However, there is no evidence for religious beliefs causing violent behavior, rather, the evidence supports that explicit beliefs are often by-passed or undermined by folk psychological mechanisms. The connection between violent behavior and religious thought and behavior is likely the existence of common cognitive mechanisms.

Consistent with Mort et. al., Sandstrom (3.9) uses a cultural materialist paradigm to argue that due to the large variability between and within religions in terms of how followers behave, and the difficulty in separating religious behaviors from other behaviors or aspects of culture, religion should not be used to account for or explain behaviors. Rather he advocates the use of the cultural materialist paradigm to provide a causative explanation of human behavior based on material conditions and the context of people’s lives (e.g., economic deprivation, military conquest, political repression, market dynamics, and blocked social mobility).

The next section focuses on programs to counter radicalization and terrorism or to deradicalize or disengage radical individuals and groups, assess key elements and their efficacy. These programs in various ways seek to address environmental (root cause) factors, psychological factors and ideological understanding and commitment with individuals and groups.

Section 4 – Existing and Proposed Deradicalization and Disengagement Programs

Most studies of VNSA neglect or minimize attention to efforts to counter radicalization or prevent terrorism through education, counseling, and social services, as well as the programs aimed at disengagement or deradicalization. In this collection, we highlight studies of counter radicalization and disengagement/deradicalization programs in order to bring attention to this frontier of combating terrorism. The issue of deradicalization is complicated by the confusion between deradicalization, which involves re-orientation of a person’s political views, and disengagement, which involves the abandonment of violence alone. Researchers and practitioners debate the possibilities of both and these competing views are discussed in this section. This section will highlight some of the issues, as well as some potential solutions, in this area of counter-terrorism efforts.

Jongman (4.1) provides a comprehensive look at radicalization, counter radicalization, and deradicalization from the perspective of the Netherlands, a microcosm in which we can view the effects of demographic/ethnic changes, government policies, and responses on radicalisation. He details how recent events, including several assassinations, have heightened tensions with non-indigenous segments of the population, particularly Muslims. The 2006 elections reflected general dissatisfaction with the national government and was key in the subsequent formation of a new non-indigenous party which has a platform that supports abolishing the mandatory integration course (for immigrants), pardon for asylum seekers who have lived in country at least

five years, and entrance of Turkey into the European Union, etc. The flip side of this is the recent swell of support for parties who seek to exploit undercurrents of frustration by pushing an agenda to limit immigration, asylum, etc.

In response, the Dutch launched a tailored (e.g., focus on youth and prevention of radicalisation) phased campaign to reduce tensions and intolerance. A new National Counter Terrorism Coordinator, who is responsible, in part, for an annual threat assessment, made numerous changes in organizational coordination processes (e.g., CT Infobox effort collocated agencies to foster the reduction of tensions and intolerance), and in increased Internet surveillance for awareness and early warning of potential attacks. The arrest and trial of members of the Hofstad group, a homegrown terrorist group foiled when a member assassinated a controversial filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, resulted in a number of changes to antiterrorism legislation, including redefinition of crimes (including membership in a terrorist group) and criminals (including supporters/financiers of terrorism) and judicial, law enforcement, legislative, and intelligence reforms that focus on pre-emption and anticipation versus reaction.

The view of the Dutch government is that a holistic approach is warranted for terrorism, one that deals with the underlying grievance causing the violence (e.g., poverty, alienation, marginalization, and segregation) – a hard-learned lesson from violence events in the 1970s related to grievances held by the Moroccan immigrant community. This approach is based on a more nuanced understanding of radicalization and is broader than simply regarding terrorism as a law enforcement problem – resulting in new ways of counterterrorism coordination and cooperation within the Netherlands. Their strategy is to focus on prevention of radicalization in Muslim youths and abolishing “hotspots” to accomplish three goals: prevent attacks, be adequately prepared for a large attack, and pay attention to the causes of terrorism. Some policies, like restrictive immigration and asylum policies have unintended consequences: more illegal immigrants. The four cities in which the majority of Muslims live, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, all have tailored initiatives to improve relationships between groups and deal with socio-economic problems and counter segregation.

Jongman talks about various national and local level metrics to assess the efficacy of government counterterrorism efforts including national surveys assessing the level of fear of terrorism and feeling of security and reduction in social problems in urban “hotspots” (including school dropout and poverty rates, rates of dependence on social security, segregation levels, and crime). Biggest current worries are the lack of integration of African first and second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands (especially Somalis, who are clannish and tend to be more lonely/alienated), the Moroccan community (responsible for majority of crime and violence problems), and the threat of retaliatory attacks by al Qaeda in the Netherlands.

Flannigan (4.2) examines how VNSAs employ social welfare services to win hearts and minds. Community services, education, health, and provision of social services are tools that terrorist organizations use to gain acceptance in their community. The amount of power that a terrorist organization gains from providing services is related to the availability of these services elsewhere. Provision of services can be radicalizing, increasing support and numbers of recruits and serving to silence those in the community who oppose the terrorist activities. Hezbollah is widely respected for its charities and social services, in spite of its violent activities. Terrorist organizations sponsor community services as a way to socialize and recruit new members. They are more likely to be engaged in providing services when they are not clandestine or have

military arms. Strategies for preventing deradicalization or radicalization due to service provision include political inclusion (which prevents service provision by minority providers), proactively providing aid where violent organizations have not gained a foothold, and moving a community to passive support/genuine acceptance and active participation. It is also good to support legitimate state actions in effective community service provision (e.g., Hezbollah's provision of services after the bombardment of southern Lebanon) or ensure that other apolitical mainstream organizations are able to provide quality services.

Community services were critical in preventing radicalization in Brixton (south London). In Lambert's (4.3) paper, he details a program in which community police and Salafi managers of the Brixton mosque collaborated to counter street crime and prevent petty criminals and other vulnerable individuals in the area from becoming involved in terrorism as foot soldiers. Recruiters and propagandists for al Qaeda, including Abdullah el Faisal, were active in the area and offered high status and religious rewards to black Muslim converts, but they met their match in Abdul Haqq Baker et. al. in that they had both religious authority as well as "street" credibility. These clerics explained their position and role by saying that they "don't disagree with the grievances, but explain how Islam tells you to act responsibly." The program was (and continues to be) successful, despite the fact that two extremists, Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui (the former an impressionable petty criminal radicalized in prison and motivated to revenge U.S. government policies, the latter an extremist expelled from the Brixton mosque and motivated by trauma related to a friend's death in Chechnya), did arise from these communities. Indeed, the program tried to deal with both individuals, but they were too radical already and could not be turned back from their extremist paths.

Al-Huda's paper (4.4) educates the reader about the power of religion in serving to counteract radicalization and extremism and to bring about resolution and reconciliation through peace building (establishing sustainable peace by addressing root causes of conflict through dialogue, institution building, political and economic transformation, and reconciliation) and peacemaking (reducing tension, resolving, managing and/or mediating conflict, and negotiating and/or find common ground). Religious leaders are the key actors in peacemaking and can serve as mediators, observers, protectors, advocates, educators, and conflict resolution specialists (e.g., Maha Ghosannada, who led a march in Cambodia that demonstrated popular support for elections, and the "Amman Message," a statement designed to educate about Muslim and peace and the irresponsibility of Muslims to judge others as "takfir" that was developed by Muslim scholars throughout the Middle East). Peacemaking involves a variety of methodologies (e.g., forgiveness, recognition of pain, public confession, addressing the image of "other," and use of arts to express mutual respect) to reconstruct relationships, reconcile parties, negotiate agreements, and reconstruct a vision of peace. Islamic peacemaking is based on the fundamental principles integral to Islam, which espouse non-violence, peace, sacredness of human life, equality, and the pursuit of justice. To counteract radicalism and prevent or reduce recruitment, it is important to leverage resources including *qadi* (religious judge who interprets/enforces shari'ah), *urf* (customary conflict/dispute resolution practices), *mukhtar* (third party mediators), *wasta* (intermediaries to represent parties), *hudna* (truces), and *atwah* (compensation to victims). In order to counter radicalization or enable deradicalization, there is a need to understand the identification of communities with either victim or hero/savior, engage radicals with respect, giving the right to express reservations, fears, uncertainties, and grievances and make sure non-violent leader's voices are heard.

A paper written by a UK imam (4.5) seeks to dispel the myths and misconceptions that people commonly have about Salafi Islam. He writes anonymously due to his support of counter and de-radicalization efforts. He states that Salafi Islam has been wrongly blamed as the cause or motivation for terrorism when, in fact, the perpetrators were not following the dictates of Salafi Islam or even attending Salafi mosques or study groups. He argues that Salafi Islam is, in fact, a protective factor and that “the more strict and serious the Salafi, the less likely that person will fall into radicalization.” He educates the reader that Salafi Islam is non-political, that Salafis frown on political parties or groups, holding clandestine or secret meetings, pledging allegiance to heads of organizations or political parties, or staging revolts or rebellions. He points out that Salafis take into account the benefits and harms of actions and do not agree with the targeting of innocent people. The issue is the confusion between Salafi and militant jihadi or extremist narratives. Militant jihadi organizations effectively use Salafi narratives or claim to be Salafi as a means to gain legitimacy or be perceived as authentic. Numerous well-known, credible Salafi scholars have taken stances against terrorism, extremism, and political agitation stating (these are) “...extremely great crimes the world over....”

Speckhard’s paper (4.6) on prison and community based disengagement and deradicalization is encyclopedic, describing several community based counter radicalization programs and surveying the prison disengagement or deradicalization focused “rehabilitation” programs. She starts by stating that there are a variety of strategies that need to be employed singly or in combination to disengage or deradicalize an individual or group: one must delegitimize ideologies, tailor strategies to address the recruiting conduits, disengage recruits from active roles (e.g., intimidation, arrest, amnesty), deradicalize/rehabilitate through prison programs, and prevent radicalization at the societal level focusing on vulnerable populations (e.g., youth, gangs, military members).

She describes street programs in the Netherlands and the UK focused on working with youth, through dialogue and outreach, to prevent the spread of radical militant jihadi ideologies. The UK program categorizes extremists and interdicts potential militant jihadis, mobilizing social services to address their needs. The prison “rehabilitation” programs in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, UK, Yemen, Turkey, and Iraq (U.S. program) are described, including their unique features (e.g., Singapore’s low recidivism is, in part, due to the size of the island and their ability to monitor prisoners after release; Egypt and Malaysia use brutal treatment and even torture to motivate compliance). Of special interest is the description of challenges faced by the author in planning and implementing a U.S. deradicalization program (with both ideological and psychological components) for Iraqi prisoners/detainees. She summarizes key features that are important for successful prison programs addressing militant jihadis. Paramount is the ability to establish rapport between the prisoner and a credible mentor/leader (i.e., a highly regarded cleric, imam, psychologist, or team member or someone who has “walked the walk” such as a former militant jihadi). Speckhard emphasizes the importance and efficacy of using both religious and psychological treatment to challenge the legitimacy of militant jihadi ideology and address psychological motivations, vulnerabilities, and traumas to reorient the individual toward a nonviolent identity and solutions. Likewise, family involvement during and after release from prison, economic incentives for the prisoner and their family (e.g., jobs, cash, cars), and monitoring and follow-up are important.

Gunaratna’s paper (4.7) describes the Singapore prison rehabilitation program. He emphasizes that operational terrorists can only be delegitimized by ideological and theological

refutation; thus, the Singapore Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) staff is 50 percent Muslim of which 25 percent are clerics or scholars. Singapore believes that detainee rehabilitation and community engagement are strategic tools to safeguard the next generation of youth from radicalization. The prison program, based on a partnership between the government, Muslim community, and academia, differentiates between leaders, members (ala instigators and perpetrators), and supporters/sympathizers and tailors the treatment to each category. The ulema (scholars) are at the core of the program strategy, helping to dismantle the justification for violence. All detainees are classified in terms of high, medium, and low risk. The “high risk” group includes spiritual leaders; thus, prominent scholars are needed to challenge the beliefs and ideological understanding of these detainees. Even so, this group is most likely to return to violence. “Medium risk” individuals include operatives who are active ideologically but can more often be rehabilitated. Active and passive supporters of terrorism are labeled as “low risk” and they, in general, are not as knowledgeable about ideology. Public education and awareness campaigns are used to complement the prison rehabilitation program.

Boucek’s paper [\(4.8\)](#) provides more detail on the Saudi prison disengagement “Counseling Program,” the first and longest running program of its kind. This program is a unique Saudi solution in that it incorporates traditional Saudi methods of conflict resolution and conflict management and leverages extended social networks (recognizing the importance of treating families, not just the prisoner) and time honored methods of social control making use of “family honor” and social hierarchies. Ideally, the program helps those with takfiri (declaration of other Muslims as apostates) beliefs to repent and abandon terrorist ideologies. In fact, the program focuses on those individuals responsible for terrorist propaganda or providing support or logistics assistance – those with “blood on their hands” are currently barred from the program.

The program engages the prisoners in religious debates to correct an “incomplete understanding of Islam” and provides psychological counseling. In addition, the program provides a salary for the prisoner’s family, finds jobs, housing, provides job training, and start-up funds for released prisoners to start businesses. The released prisoners must continue to meet with religious scholars and they are encouraged to settle down and marry. The prisoner’s family is responsible for the prisoner after release. Half of those participating in the Counseling Program renounce their radical beliefs and are released. Overall, the Saudi program claims an 80-90 percent success rate.

Conclusion

We may not, as a research community, agree on the nature of the global terrorism threat, but we can certainly agree a serious threat exists, domestically and internationally, and must be reckoned with, using a portfolio of solutions based on a rich contextual understanding of the people involved in it.

There is no “one size fits all,” no simple formula or easy answers in understanding terrorism; however, there has been substantial progress in increasing our understanding of terrorism, in part due to increased availability of large databases and thus increases in empirical research. This research is starting to shine a spotlight on the critical dynamics that fuel terrorism: the interaction between an individual or group and their environment (including the government behaviors/policies/responses and the importance of the perception of group and/or government legitimacy), interactions and roles within the group and with other groups, interactions between messages/worldview/ideology and group behaviors (including recruiting

and mobilization), and the role of emotion and neurobiology and the effects of new technologies including those that exploit the ability of visual images to impact individuals at a more visceral, emotional level (especially as a trigger for increased radicalization and call for action). A variety of techniques and tools are available to enable an analyst, planner, or decision maker to understand, for a given situation and set of actors, what the salient factors, interrelationships, and dynamics are, the impact of missing information and/or assumptions, and identify potential levers for solutions at the societal, institutional, organizational, and individual levels.

The key in understanding the role of ideology is to know that ideology, including religion, serves as a resonator which, in the presence of a vulnerable individual or group, frames grievances and impels action as the only appropriate response to right an injustice or inequity within an (often apocalyptic) worldview. However, it is also important to know that religion does not cause terrorism, since religious behaviors are inconsistent and subject to interpretation. Many of the violent behaviors associated with terrorism are, in fact, likely due to human susceptibilities triggered by environmental cues. Any behaviors, including terrorist behaviors, must be viewed through a contextual lens (i.e., underlying conditions such as repression and relative deprivation). However, this does not mean that ideology should be ignored. The worldview, beliefs, and language in which they are expressed are critically important in understanding and effectively countering radicalization and terrorism. Also a caution is in order - loosely or erroneously applying labels to a terrorist threat, for example "Salafi Islam" for the militant Islamist terrorism threat, over simplifies and inappropriately generalizes, diverting the focus from the real, more complex problem. Further, too broad or inappropriate labels in many cases serve to alienate those constructive voices (e.g., Salafi clerics) who could serve as powerful agents for counter radicalization and deradicalization or disengagement.

A number of solutions exist for countering terrorism or radicalization, disengagement from terrorism, or deradicalization, but they are not "one size fits all" either. Solutions must be tailored to the level of extremism, organizational role, culture, age, etc. Counterterrorism programs, to be successful, need to be executed by credible (ideologically and street-wise) individuals who, individually or in combination, consider all the needs/vulnerabilities (familial, ideological, psychological), perceptions and worldview of the individual and or group. Law enforcement, those engaged in prevention and rehabilitation and their communities, need to work hand-in-hand to foster a real, lasting change.

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Prologue: Global Terrorism Overview – The Middle East and Islamist Terrorism and Beyond

P.1 Where is Terrorism Happening? Numbers, Locations, and Representative Histories (Richard Legault)

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Terrorism, as a concept, has existed for some time, but its meaning has changed considerably since it was first used to describe organized political behavior in the wake of the French Revolution (Hoffman, 1998). What is not so clear, however, is how to define terrorism as it exists as a concept in our current understanding of political action, strategies, and tactics. There is an active debate among scholars who study terrorism about the best way to define the concept but very little agreement. Nonetheless, there are some generally accepted ways to think about terrorism that are based on observation, systematic classification of events, and then making a decision about whether an act should be considered terrorism based on predetermined criteria. Using this method to measure terrorism tends to be far more productive in advancing our understanding of terrorist acts and actors as well as their characteristics. Data that have been developed by using these methods have also provided new information about basic questions such as when and where terrorist attacks occur. In order to answer these questions, it is important to understand the data and data sources being used, make decisions about how to use these data, and describe the events that involve terrorism.

Characteristics of terrorist events can be observed and recorded by using set criteria to study terrorist events historically. This is the method used by a number of open source terrorism databases to record a variety of information about terrorist incidents and allows researchers, policy makers, planners, first responders, or other interested parties to find and study the characteristics of a single terrorist act or to examine trends and categories of terrorist activity. This empirical technique may seem simple at first glance, but it has provided an important first step in understanding terrorism in a way that moves beyond speculation and provides concrete data upon which we can begin to test some of the assumptions that we have had about terrorism. The application of these quantitative, scientific techniques to the study of terrorism is relatively recent. For example, in a recent Campbell Collaboration systematic review, Lum and colleagues (2006) examined 6,041 peer-reviewed publications and found only seven that used statistical tests sufficiently robust for effective evaluation of counter-terrorism policies.

Table 1. Characteristics of Selected Incident-Level Databases on Terrorism

DATABASE	SCOPE	PERIOD	# INCIDENTS
GTD (Synthesis)	Domestic & International	1970-2007	86,595
ITERATE	International	1968-2000	10,837
TWEED (Europe)	Domestic	1950-1999	10,498
U.S. Dept. of State	International	1980-2001	10,026
RAND	International	1968-1997	8,509
TRITON	Domestic & International	mid 2000- mid 2002	2,452
RAND-MIPT	Domestic & International	1998-2001	5,340
GORGON	Domestic & International	2000-2001	1,569
COBRA	International	1998-1999	1,041

It is useful then to rely on standardized data that have been systematically collected based on set, predetermined criteria to discuss trends in terrorist activity and answer basic questions about the quantity, location, and patterns of terrorist incidents. There are a number of databases that collect information about transnational *or* domestic terrorism, terrorism in a specific part of the world, or events over a short period of time. A selection of these databases and their respective coverage is listed in Table 1. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is currently the only database that includes both domestic and international terrorism over such a long period of time. The time component is important for a variety of obvious reasons, but it is of even greater importance to include domestic incidents as well as international incidents. This is because research that has compared the two has consistently found domestic terrorism to be much more common than transnational terrorism (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2007; Schmid, 2004; LaFree & Dugan, 2007). This database will provide the information for a discussion of terrorism trends and locations as well as some of the characteristics of terrorist events. Further, because most unclassified terrorism databases have included only transnational terrorist attacks, the U.S. State Department has claimed that one-third of *all* terrorist attacks are directed at the United States (Crenshaw, 2006:8). This is especially relevant for the United States because the U.S. has long been perceived as being the target of an inordinate number of terrorist attacks. The inclusion of domestic attacks changes this viewpoint substantially.

Because the GTD is described in detail elsewhere (LaFree and Dugan, 2007), only a summary of some of its important characteristics are detailed here. The original platform for the GTD was the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) database. From 1970 to 1997, PGIS trained researchers to identify and record terrorism incidents from wire services (including Reuters and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS]), U.S. State Department reports,

other U.S. and foreign government reporting, U.S. and foreign newspapers (including the *New York Times*, the *British Financial Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*) and information provided by PGIS offices around the world. In more recent years, PGIS researchers increasingly relied on the Internet. PGIS defined terrorism as events involving “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.” Based on coding rules originally developed in 1970, the persons responsible for collecting the PGIS data excluded criminal acts that appeared to be devoid of any political or ideological motivation and also acts arising from open combat between opposing armed forces, both regular and irregular. Data collectors also excluded actions taken by governments in the legitimate exercise of their authority, even when such actions were denounced by domestic and/or foreign critics as acts of “state terrorism.” However, they included violent acts that were not officially sanctioned by government, even in cases where many observers believed that the government was openly tolerating the violent actions.

A more recent iteration of the GTD includes data from 1998 – 2007 and is based on set criteria that were derived from the original PGIS definition of terrorism. In order to be included in the GTD2 an event must have met three criteria:

- Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
- Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
- Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e., the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).

The most recent data effort of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has been to combine the GTD1 and GTD2 datasets into a single, combined resource, the Synthesized GTD.¹ These data offer the most comprehensive description of terrorist activity that is available from open source material and are used for each of the descriptive analyses included here.


The analyses included here are descriptive of the GTD data. There are no tests of statistical significance, independence or the relationship between terrorism and indicators or variables that may be related to terrorism, and the analyses are not intended to imply cause or correlation. Instead, descriptive analyses of terrorism incidents provide a baseline from which more complex multivariate analyses are launched that do not rely on speculation, overly complex interpretation or an educated guess.

Trends in Terrorism

Prior to the construction of datasets like the GTD, levels of overall terrorist activity were largely unknown. Even basic knowledge such as the number of terrorist attacks worldwide was cause for speculation due to a lack of useful information. Figure 1 details the total number of terrorist attacks as well as deaths and injuries resulting from those attacks from 1970 – 2007.

¹ These data are not publically available as of this writing; however, they are expected to be available for review on the START website by the end of spring 2009. See <http://www.start.umd.edu>

There are a number of interesting observations to be made from this information. First, terrorism, overall, was much more prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s than it was at the turn of the century. Second, although the number of deaths and injuries appears to follow the more general trend of terrorist attacks they do not appear to be perfectly related to one another and even diverge at times. Finally, it appears that the decrease in terrorism, leading into the 21st century may be beginning to reverse direction in the last few years. This begs the question, is terrorism becoming more deadly?



Evidence presented by LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (In Press) would suggest that terrorism is indeed becoming more deadly among groups that are officially named a threat to the U.S. They find that three different and distinct waves of terrorist activity have occurred over the last 40 years, and that the most recent wave has been by far the deadliest. Waves one and two consisted mainly of groups who committed fewer attacks that resulted in death or injury. The groups that LaFree et al. (In Press) refer to as the 21st Century Boom are much more deadly than groups in the 70s and 80s who were considered a threat to the U.S. According to Rapoport (2001), the goals of terrorists have shifted from a desire for broad public exposure without a main focus on killing anyone to a desire for broad public exposure as well as a high body count.




Figure 2 presents the rates of deaths in injuries as a result of terrorist attacks. This perspective shows an interesting observation when compared to the perspective of the first figure. In this case, we can see that the number of persons killed or injured per terrorist attack is increasing over the life of the series. This lends support to the notion that terrorism is becoming much more deadly overall in the last 10 years or so. While terrorism, like many problems throughout the world, is of general concern to the United States, it would be a greater concern if the U.S. were more often the target of terrorist attacks.

Figure 3. U.S. Citizens Killed and Wounded in Terrorists Attacks (1970 - 2007)





Figure 3 details the number of U.S. deaths and casualties compared to all terrorist attacks worldwide. By examining these data we can see that only a very small proportion of all terrorist attacks result in U.S. casualties, and that the frequency of U.S. casualties has remained fairly constant in this time period. However, if we limit the terrorist attacks to only those made against U.S. interests these attacks look very much like the pattern of worldwide terrorism with the exception of the deaths caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These attacks are detailed in Figure 4.

In fact, these attacks serve to obscure the true numbers of attacks suffered by U.S. interests over this time period.



the 1984 Salmonella attack in Oregon (over 700 illnesses), 1993 World Trade Center attack (over 1,000 injuries), and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (165 killed, 400 injured). To draw a contrast, the numbers of non-terrorism related murders in the U.S. in 1984, 1993, and 1995 were

18,692, 24,526, and 21,606, respectively. It is also important to keep in mind that two of these three large-scale attacks were purely domestic in nature and committed by Americans.

Overall, terrorist attacks are extremely rare events; however, when a terrorist attack does occur, a single attack may result in a large amount of death or injuries. The likelihood of death and injury in terrorist attacks is increasing over the time period for which data exist, and terrorism since the turn of the last century has become increasingly dangerous worldwide as indicated by the increase in the rate of casualties per attack. This being said, it is important to keep in mind that terrorism is still about 100 times rarer than homicide is in the U.S.²

Where is Terrorism Happening?

There is a modern conception among some that terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. We know that this is not the case. Similarly, there is a conception among many that terrorism comes from a specific part of the world. This also is untrue. Terrorism has proven a useful tactic among many groups that hope to influence a larger audience through violence and intimidation.

Figure 5. Total Terrorist Attacks by Region (1970 - 2007)




Figure 5 displays the percent of terrorist attacks that have occurred in various regions of the world from 1970 - 2007. Figure 7 lists the 30 geographic areas in the world with the highest number of terrorist attacks from 1970 – 2007.

In Figure 5, Central and South America (33% combined) and Western Europe (17.2%) dominate the chart. The Middle East and North Africa represent 16.9% of attacks and South Asia about 14.9%. This is not in keeping with public perceptions of where terrorism actually occurs. Although only 2.2% of terrorism cases occurred in North America, in a 2007 Gallup poll 44% of respondents reported that they were worried when asked if “you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism” (Maguire & Pastore, 2009). It is also difficult to understand the American public’s view of where terrorism occurs, and the relative threat of a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil because, in a 2007 Pew survey 57% of respondents reported that U.S. government was doing well at reducing the threat of Terrorism (Maguire & Pastore, 2009).

² This statement is based on the author’s calculation of terrorism incidents from the GTD in the world population vs. U.S. homicide rates from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) as reported in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Maguire & Pastore, 2009).

In sum, it is important to note that, while public perception has focused on the threat of Islamist terrorism that originates (at least ideologically) in various areas in the Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan and North Africa, these areas have not had the greatest amount of terrorist activity in the period covered by these data. South America is still the leader with the highest level of attacks and when combined with Central America almost represents a majority of all attacks from 1970 – 2007. In other words, terrorism is not simply a problem of the Middle East.

Figure 6. Top 30 Geographic Areas by Terrorist Attacks (1970 - 2007)





Figure 6 lists the top 30 geographic areas where terrorist attacks occur as well as the levels of deaths and injuries in those areas. While recent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan place them in the top 30, no one region of the world dominates the list. Furthermore, there is no pattern to the top 30 countries with respect to economic wellbeing, size, diversity of population, type of government, religion, or any of the other potential contributing characteristic that might explain participation in terrorism.

Figure 7. Total Terrorist Attacks by Region (1997 - 2007)



If we focus on terrorism over the last few years, however, a more detailed picture emerges. The difference in these long-term data and any recent activity may be the rise of the jihadist terrorism in the 1990s. Prior to this, some terrorism in Europe was international, from the Middle East and North Africa, but was dominated by neo-Marxist groups made up of Europeans. Groups like Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhoff, the IRA, and ETA as well as a number of similar, less famous groups, participated in


most of the activity. Even groups with transnational agendas (such as colonial natives in the

Netherlands) were usually citizens of the country in which the activity took place. It is also difficult to differentiate between domestic and international cases. Questions arise, such as, “Is a group that claims responsibility for an attack against a local business in their own country because the local business has contracts with another country (like the U.S.) a domestic or an international attack?” The attempts to completely differentiate between domestic and international terrorism are very difficult. Terrorism is still, as far as we can see with the open source data, a local affair (LaFree et al., In Press).

Figure 7 details the same data as Figure 5, but is restricted to only the last 10 years of the data (1997 – 2007). In this case, we can see that the most recent wave of terrorism is focused on very different regions. For instance, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia completely displace South America and Western Europe as the leading regions for terrorist activity.

Figure 8 is yet more telling of the change in the focus of terrorist activity over the last few years. In this case, we can observe the change in location of terrorist attacks and the increase in the correlation of these attacks and the deadliness of these attacks by listing the top 30 geographic areas to suffer from terrorist attacks from 1997 – 2007. Many of the countries in this list reflect the regional shift in terrorism from South America and Europe to the Middle East and North Africa.

Figure 8. Top 30 Geographic Areas by Terrorist Attacks (1997 - 2007)



Recent research by LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (In Press) examined the trajectories of foreign terrorist groups that have been identified by the U.S. State Department and other government sources as a particular threat to the United States. In examining data on over 16,000 terrorist attacks from the GTD, they found that over 99% of attacks on the U.S. occurred in foreign countries against U.S. interests and over 90% of attacks by these groups were in foreign countries and did not target U.S. interests. This indicates that foreign groups that are named specifically as a threat to the U.S. most often attack local targets in their own countries. These findings indicate that helping foreign governments to successfully combat terrorism in their own countries is indeed a valid and necessary strategy in fighting terrorism because proximity to the target is in fact one of the most important target selection factors among terrorists (Clarke &

Newman, 2006). Terrorism is difficult, then, to describe as simply a domestic or international issue because there is a great deal of overlap in the activity and intent of groups that use terrorism as a tactic.

Conclusion

Terrorism is difficult to define, track, or simplify in a meaningful way, but there are a few meaningful observations that can be made about trends and locations of terrorism from data that are collected systematically for scientific purposes. By using these data to develop an empirical understanding of the patterns of terrorist events geographically and over time, a more informed and detailed understanding of terrorism is possible.

Terrorist attacks and activity have followed patterns of three major waves over the last 40 years or so. Current activity is part of the most recent wave, described by LaFree et al. as the 21st Century Boom. The activity during this period is characterized by an increased lethality of incidents as evidenced by an overall increase in the rates of killing and injuries from terrorist events. The number of U.S. citizens who are victims of such attacks has remained relatively low, however. Attacks within the U.S. are relatively rare, as much as 100 times rarer than the rarest violent crime. Large-scale incidents that produce casualties do have a long-term, adverse effect on the public and require a great deal of public resources, nonetheless.

Terrorist attacks are a popular tactic among groups all over the world. The regions with the most terrorist attacks in the last 40 years include South and Central America with the Middle East coming in a distant second with South Asia close behind. While some geographic areas suffer much less terrorism than others do, it is widespread. There is no region in the world that has not experienced terrorism in the last 40 years. Iraq and Afghanistan³ are among the top 30 geographic areas for terrorist attacks, but these areas represent a number of countries throughout the world. Finally, perhaps the most important factor in a terrorist groups' target selection is proximity. Most of the attacks perpetrated by groups who are named as a particular threat to the U.S. are in foreign countries against local targets.

In sum, terrorist attacks are rare but widespread. Viewing terrorism as a recent problem that is limited to a particular region of the world is simply misguided based on the bulk of evidence about terrorism that has been compiled over the last few years. A better way to view terrorism, in light of empirical evidence, is as a threat that has a long history and has become more deadly in its most recent incarnation.

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P.2 Dangers of Domestic Terrorism in the United States (Jim Lutz)

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At the present time, domestic terrorist activity in the United States is relatively infrequent. The most important threats domestically appear to be from right-wing extremists, radical environmentalists and animal rights groups, and militant jihadi extremists. Violence from a variety of other groups is also possible. While domestic terrorism from any source was limited since the attacks of 9/11, increased surveillance and concern over security after the attacks has probably led to all types of groups restricting the activities that they might have considered attempting. In addition, it is possible that the attack of 9/11 may have had the additional psychological impact of deterring domestic groups from using terrorist tactics for fear of being linked with al Qaeda.

The greatest domestic threat remains extreme right-wing groups. There are a multitude of such organizations such as various splinter groups from the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), the Aryan Nations, and some militia groups -- and their hatred and fear of ethnic and religious minorities and foreign cultures has not abated (Michael, 2003). It is likely that members of some of these organizations have participated in backlash attacks against Arab-American, Muslims, and members of other "foreign" groups in the aftermath of 9/11. Such activities and hate crimes may, for the moment, be the limit of their activities, but such activities are also indicative of the continuing threat. The generalized suspicion that has fallen on foreign immigrants and residents may even have given these groups some hope that a portion of their desired policy changes may occur without continuing to resort to violence. The recent debates over limiting immigration to the United States and controlling borders may have provided some additional hope to the groups that 'foreign' elements would be excluded.

While there have been limited activities by the right, the situation may not continue indefinitely. Eventually, it will become clear that the racially pure society, cleansed of foreign

ideas and influences that the extremists hope to create, will not be achieved. The election of President Obama, no doubt, has been seen by at least some elements of the extreme right as an indication that national policies are going in the wrong direction and that violence may again be “necessary.” The diffuse nature of the groups on the extreme right and their penchant for lone wolf and leaderless resistance styles of operations (Michael, 2003, p. 115; Smith, 2000) means that such groups will be difficult to infiltrate and guard against on a consistent basis, even though some potentially serious attacks have been stopped by authorities in the past (Pitcavage, 2001).

Radical environmental groups such as the Earth Liberation Front and rights extremists such as the Animal Liberation Front are the so-called “eco-terrorists.” They also pose a continued threat. These groups in the United States have generally limited their attacks to property, although some observers fear that there is a danger of eventual escalation to violence against people if the property attacks fail as has already occurred with some animal rights and ecology groups in Europe (Ackerman, 2003). These groups have been effective in the past with their property attacks, and these activities have led companies to change their practices. The attacks have directly caused millions of dollars in damages, and they have also led the targeted companies to either expend funds for greater security in order to avoid damages in the future or to forgo the use of animals in ways that the animal rights groups oppose in order to avoid these security costs (Lutz & Lutz, 2006). Given the past successes, these groups are likely to continue the same types of activities. The activists in these groups have also utilized the leaderless resistance style of activity in their campaigns (Joose, 2007).

There was a great fear that there would be domestic violence by individuals who identified with al Qaeda and global militant jihad (Kushner with Davis, 2004), but this fear has not been borne out by later events. The domestic Arab and Islamic communities in the United States have not been hotbeds of religious extremism, and there have been only a few instances of extremists identifying with the global jihad. A group in Buffalo (the Lackawana Six) had apparently decided against any action before their arrest. The group in Liberty City, Florida that was infiltrated by the FBI probably would never have been able to launch any kind of serious operation on their own. There were groups in northern Virginia and New Jersey, however, that were apparently more serious about planning attacks, but they seem to have been the exceptions (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). As has been suggested elsewhere, the greatest danger from militant jihadi groups is more likely to come from the more radicalized, and thus more inclined to violence, sections of Islamic communities in West Europe than from American Muslims.

The groups in Western Europe have been less well integrated into society and face more discrimination (Leiken, 2005). These individuals or groups remain a danger to the United States since, as European passport holders, they can easily travel to the United States.

There have been other groups that have been violent in the past and could continue to be so in the future. Anti-abortion groups have successfully relied on property damage to clinics in the past to disrupt abortions. More extreme members of these groups, however, have opted for intimidation, assaults, and even murder (Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 21-4). These operations have reduced the availability of abortions (Laqueur, 1999, p. 229) and, as long as abortions remain legal, such actions may continue. The Jewish Defense League and similar groups were once active in terrorist operations against Soviet interests and those that disagreed with their aims (George & Wilcox, 1996, p. 306-12), but now they appear to be dormant. Puerto Rican nationalists have also periodically launched bombing campaigns on the mainland and on the

island an effort to achieve independence. Another series of such attacks by these nationalists is quite possible, especially as the effects of 9/11 fade into the past and the groups are less fearful of being compared to al Qaeda or being considered allies of that organization. Other groups active in the past have included émigré groups unhappy with policies in their homelands (Lutz & Lutz, 2007, p.104-5, 125-6), and it is also possible that similar émigré organizations could reappear. It is always possible, of course, that currently new or unforeseen groups with new agendas and complaints could appear and elect to use terrorism in order to achieve their goals.

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P.3 Explaining the Strength of the Pakistani Taliban (Laila Bokhari)

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On 7 August 2009 it was reported that the leader of Beitullah Mehsud, with one of his wives, had been killed by a U.S. drone in South Waziristan. The details are not confirmed, yet there seems to be an intense power struggle as to who would take on the leadership role. The confusion around his death shows how difficult it is to get reliable information out of the area, while the power struggle in the aftermath of his death is proof of how diverse and split the organisation really is. Mehsud was the leader that managed to unite these different groups and it could be the beginning of the end of the united group unless they find a leader just as uniting and charismatic as Mehsud. The death of Mehsud is seen as an important victory for the Pakistani leadership.

Introduction – Pakistan, a Myriad of Militant Groups

In spite of its rather young history, Pakistan has experienced several waves of political violence, many related to various forms of sectarian, ethnic, tribal or more recently, from so-called global *Jihadi* movements. Together these movements are fighting various agendas, local sectarianism, regional jihads -- notably in Afghanistan and in India, and a more global jihad towards the West and western interests. At the very core of much of the tension and violence that the country has experienced, has long been the key question about what Pakistan is to be based on – the relationship between the state and religion and the very interpretation of the role Islam should play in society. The creation of Pakistan as a Muslim country in contrast to its large “Hindu” neighbour, India, formed much of the initial thinking and platform. The image of Hindu (or rather non-Muslim) India as the ‘enemy’ has formed much of the rationale for the many Kashmiri groups we have seen – where “Jihad” was a fight against the Indian army and the ‘Hindu nation’ over the territory of Kashmir with its majority Muslim population. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave a whole different flavour and momentum to the groups: mujahideen from all over the world passed through Pakistan on their way to Afghanistan, many of whom stayed behind in the region after their “glorious victory over the Communists”. Furthermore, the different schools of Islam present in South Asia (Barelvi, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith to name only some Sunni variants) have had an influence, creating support that resulted in friction at both local and national levels. And finally, the 1980s saw an underlying conflict between Shi’as and Sunnis intensify – and groups defining their rationale in terms of sectarian struggles rose to the centre stage. These are still the groups that have taken the biggest toll on Pakistani people: sectarian groups of Sunnis targeting Shi’as and vice versa.

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Several observers point to a fundamental legitimacy crisis regarding the state and its institutions as being the very trigger for these continuous waves of tension (see Cohen, 2004; Abbas, 2005). It is, arguably, the very authority of the state that is also at stake in today's struggles in the border areas to Afghanistan. The question as to what structures will fill the void left by the state is central here. As was seen in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit the northern areas of Pakistan in 2005 and in the aftermath of the ongoing humanitarian crisis following the military offensive in the Swat valley, a number of Islamic charities have been both willing and able to fill these gaps. Some of these are seen to have ties to militant groups. Furthermore, the failure of the state in fulfilling many of their developmental agendas has led to continuous existential crises for successive regimes. Islamisation of the state, most clearly evidenced by General Zia ul-Haq in the late 1970s/beginning of the 1980s, with his promotion of Islamists in the, until then, relatively secular Pakistani Army, were clear signs of a change, one seen in a number of Muslim countries. The increasing Islamisation of both the Pakistani state institutions and the general society, coupled with the Afghan war, were clear turning points in the role of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. A more codified and strict Wahhabi Islam from Pakistan's close ally, Saudi Arabia, was imported into Pakistan through the funding of religious schools and mosques, an effect still strong and visible on Pakistani society today. The 1990's was also a decade when sectarian groups, Kashmiri-Jihadi groups, and more globally defined groups flourished – both in terms of membership and outlook. Underlying much of this, as previously mentioned, was the country's security build-up towards India, its large Eastern neighbour. Both moral and explicit support to a number of militant movements have been seen as part of a foreign policy tool, which arguably has now come back to haunt the Pakistani state apparatus and society.

The build-up of the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be understood without keeping the Pakistani theatre in mind. Both the Taliban movement and its support from Pakistan are based in the ideological wish of certain sections of society for a true Sunni Islamic Shariah state in Afghanistan and the national political aim of strategic depth into the hinterland of the Afghan territory. Thus, the roots of the Taliban were bolstered by the support - financially, ideologically and logistically - of the Pakistani Sunni groups and political religious parties (such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan). Recent years have seen the militant nexus focus on Pakistani territory: The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) has emerged as a power in itself, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is seen as the base for much of the Taliban and al-Qaida leadership. Importantly, the links are seen increasingly into the Pakistani "main land" – exemplified through the recent attacks and operations in the major cities of the province of Punjab.

In the post 11 September 2001-era, Pakistan has seen the banning of a number of militant groups and the arrests and targeted killings of key al-Qaida and related militants. This is a result of not only pressure from the international community, most notably the United States, but also from a domestic realisation that the very survival of the state itself was at risk. Moreover, several assassination attempts on the lives of previous prime ministers and the country's president have led to increased efforts to clamp down on militant movements in the country. However, the banning of groups and arrests of key al-Qaida operatives (many of them local militants involved in international networks) has not hindered new groups and fractions from both appearing and re-appearing. Recent years have seen an intensified hunt for militants, interpreted by many Pakistanis as an American-driven military incursion into the tribal areas of Pakistan. This has

often backfired with increased attacks on the Pakistani Army both in the form of counter attacks by the militants, which resulted in colossal casualties in the Tribal Areas, and in the form of direct attacks at regional and national military head quarters.

Arguably, as of late 2007 we have seen the re-focusing of many of the militant movements towards the Pakistani homeland. While Afghanistan and the foreign forces operating there remain a key “front line,” a key enemy and *raison d’être* for the many groups, the aim and agenda of the most vocal and active actors in the Pakistani theatre have also shifted to focus on the Pakistani Army, the “Apostate State” and its institutions as the enemy. This provides the very backdrop for the most recent development in Pakistan on which this article will focus.

This study argues that over the last few years, groups and actors operating under the name of the Taliban - with more local Pakistani traits - have increasingly been seen developing relations with local tribes and gaining ground in new areas, such as the previously peaceful valley of Swat. This has led to a nuanced and more local focus. The question, however, remains as to whether this is a temporary arrangement – a result from the backfire of recent events - or a more long-term shift. Recent changes in the local reactions to the militants may indicate that the militants may have gone too far, and that the support is not as deep as previously thought. And vitally: is this reflected in terms of defined enemies and goals of a struggle? An analysis of the Deobandi umbrella movement the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) below and some of its actors will try and exemplify some of the issues here at stake. With the highly publicized “U.S. surge” in the region, however, one has seen indications of a provoked and stronger unified Taliban in Pakistan. Although it may be too early to ascertain as the Pakistani government has increased its focus and determination to clamp down on the Taliban threat to the state.

The Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP)

a. Who Are They?

In December 2007, an umbrella organisation of Pakistani local groups active in the tribal areas announced the formation of the Pakistani Taliban movement - *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP). A *Shura* of 40 senior Taliban leaders was to guide the umbrella organisation, and militant commander Baitullah Mehsud was appointed its *Emir*. Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan was appointed as Mehsud’s deputy, and Maulana Faqir Mohammad from Bajaur Agency was named his third in command. Finally, Maulana Omar was named the TTP’s official spokesperson. Among its constituent groups are the Movement for the Implementation of Muhammad’s Shari’ah (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi - TNSM) and the Waziristan Mujahideen. The TNSM is a Pashtun-based group led by the then jailed cleric Maulana Sufi Mohammad and now run by his vocal nephew Mullah Fazlullah, also called ‘Mullah FM’ due to his active use of local radio stations to spread his messages (Abou Zahab & Roy, 2002). The Waziristan Mujahideen refers to the group representing the militants that initially signed the Waziristan Accord with the Pakistani government in 2006 (Bokhari, 2006).

The geographical reach of the umbrella group surprised researchers, diplomats, local politicians and others. Not only did the TTP have representatives and membership from all the seven agencies constituting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, they also included representatives from other regions such as Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand (Abbas, 2008). According to the Pakistani newspaper *Daily Times* (2007), as many as 27 militant fractions and groups had agreed to centralized control under Baitullah Mehsud. Many of the groups who joined the TTP have long

been involved in violent confrontations with the Pakistani army in the tribal areas. They are seen to have grown out of local settings and local circumstances, led by their own distinct – often tribal – leaders, with their unique leadership style. The TTP is thus seen as mainly made up of local groups with local commanders as leaders. However, observers point to signs of possible inspiration drawn from other Pakistani groups and an influx of militants from other groups in Pakistan (including groups seen as based in “mainland Pakistan,” Punjab). Importantly also, even if the many extremist factions are operating under local leaders and commanders, they are very different, often characterised by deep tribal differences. Furthermore, while many of these leaders and commanders share similar anti-U.S. and pro-al-Qaida worldviews, they are also known to express conflicting opinions on local, domestic and international issues, some of which will be exemplified below. Also, many of the components of the TTP have historical links with Pakistani Islamic groups and political parties. The *Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi* (TNSM), led by Fazlullah Muhammad in the Swat valley, for example, was formed by cadres from the Pakistani political parties Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), which broke away because they were disenchanted by JI and JUI’s willingness to compromise on the demand of an immediate enforcement of the Shari’ah. Much of the ideological basis of the TNSM can, however, be seen to stem from these political parties.

While the groups constituting the TTP appear distinct, they are influenced by and augmented by members of other Pakistani groups. The umbrella group is made up of many local Deobandi groups in the Tribal Areas. They have been able to sustain and expand their influence largely due to their contacts with established Sunni extremist networks, based in the heartland of Pakistan, mainly Punjab (interview, Peshawar, June 2008). To what extent the umbrella of the TTP and its key actors have developed their own and distinct character with its own ideology – its own fault lines, defined aims and enemies - is a key question which will be explored below. Another question to be addressed is what initial fault lines and debates have been seen within the TTP membership and between the TTP and external actors. It may be too early to say, but the initial debates may provide some indications as to what key issues and conflicts may develop.

b. Why This Development?

While the Pakistani Tribal Areas have long been seen as safe havens and training grounds for the Afghan Taliban-insurgency and foreign fighters/al-Qaida elements operating from Pakistan, it is now also increasingly admitted that there is also an *indigenous* Pakistani movement operating under the label Taliban. This new generation of young militant Taliban is present and active on Pakistani soil, demonstrating not only a new aggression, but also a new willingness and confidence in taking on the government.

According to the author Hassan Abbas (2008), the move from being “Taliban supporters and sympathizers to becoming a mainstream Taliban force in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) commenced when many small militant groups operating independently in the area started networking with one another. This sequence of developments occurred while Pakistani forces were spending the majority of their resources finding ‘foreigners’ in the area linked to al-Qaida (roughly in the 2002-2004 period).” According to Abbas, as more and more groups were made illegal in Pakistan, a number of individuals joined the Taliban in FATA “some as followers while others as partners. During this period, they developed their distinct identity. From their perspective, they intelligently created a space for themselves in Pakistan by engaging in military attacks while at other times cutting deals with the Pakistani government to establish their

autonomy in the area. By default, they were accepted as a legitimate voice in at least two FATA agencies – South Waziristan and North Waziristan.” This development seems to have spread over the last year. According to a number of observers, the deals “expanded the political space of Islamists without producing peace, effectively providing them a sphere of influence in the tribal areas and some settled districts of NWFP, including Swat (...)” (ICG Report, 2006; ICG Report, 2009).

It has long been known that the foreign Taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming increasingly entrenched in the region and beyond - many having spent their time there since the first Afghan Jihad against the Soviets. Additionally, many married into local families and integrated into the tribal structures. Since then, however, we have seen a continuous stream of new and young militants settling – or spending time – in the tribal areas from other areas of Pakistan. Pakistani military commentators have pointed to the aggressive expansion of their influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province) (interview, Islamabad, March 24-25, 2008).

The year 2007 witnessed a number of serious episodes in Pakistan (including the Lal Masjid event and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) which, combined, resulted in increased lack of trust in the decisions and policies of President Musharraf and declining public support. This was also observed after the change of government with a significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army, resulting in the reluctance of soldiers deployed in the area to engage tribal gangs militarily. Observing this, many militants associated with local Pakistani Jihadi groups moved to FATA to help their “brothers in arms” and also to benefit from the sanctuary. The last year has also seen increasing attacks in Punjab, notably bigger attacks in Lahore and Islamabad.

While some view that the primary focus of the TTP effort in creating an umbrella organization of Taliban on Pakistani soil is on de-linking the Taliban from al-Qaida (from foreign elements) and bringing them back into the Pakistani sphere of influence, others argue that it is impossible to separate the two movements, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan (CSIS, 2008). A continuous “turf-war” has also characterised these very issues between the various groups and actors in the region. Attempts by several individuals in the Taliban leadership to unite the many strands have been observed and to refocus the fight towards Afghanistan, but as attacks continue in Pakistan, these efforts seem to have been in vain. Questions such as what to do with foreign fighters present in the Tribal Areas (e.g., the Uzbeks), who the main enemy is, and where battlefield should be, have both divided and united the different groups – and caused great discussion.

The Tribal Areas are among the most underdeveloped areas of Pakistan. They are also semi-autonomous and lack any real political representation. This is due to historical political arrangements specific to these areas. Arguably it is this very lawlessness of the area that has paved the way for alternative authority structures and given room for militant movements to act freely in these areas. While there have been Government efforts at introducing economic and political development projects in the areas, few are viewed as successful. Observers blame both the lack of will and ability of both local and national governments to focus on these areas. This has arguably provided fertile ground for militancy to flourish – filling the gap left by the lack of governance.

c. What Do They Want? The Hierarchy of Jihad and Enemies

While it is seen that most members of militant Islamic groups such as the Pakistani Taliban, discussed here, and other jihadist groups have almost the same anti-United States and pro-al-Qaida view of the world; the difficulty, according to the journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, has been the very myriad of “extremist factions operating under different leaders and commanders who sometimes express conflicting opinions on domestic and international issues” (Yusufzai, 2008).

Who the enemy is and what the Jihad is to be targeted at have been continuous debates both within the TTP and between its key actors. This reflects a continuous debate among the militant movements operating from Pakistani soil. During the “first” Afghan jihad, the enemy – the Soviet Union -- was priority one. After the Soviet Union retreated and the Taliban emerged, the focus of Jihad as interpreted by a number of Pakistani militant groups was to be carried out against whoever was in power in Kabul until Pakistan found a friendly government in place in the Afghan capital. Anti-Western, anti-American rhetoric and desire for Jihads to free Muslim lands of Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir from occupation were the topics during Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 – 2001. Since 2001, removing the infidels (foreign troops and puppet leaders) from Afghanistan became priority one for Jihadi groups operating from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yet, due to ambivalent policies of the Pakistan military in dealing with the militants and the tribes in FATA, the military is often accused of harsh and seemingly indiscriminate attacks - with many civilian casualties. These factors have led to increased public questioning of the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts of the government.

Arguably, a new and younger generation of Pakistan Taliban has now emerged in FATA and the adjacent areas. These young commanders and fighters are seen as not willing to follow the script of the traditional Pakistani militant groups. While the older generation of Afghan Taliban was a by-product of the Soviet invasion, the new Taliban is a result of American intervention and Pakistani support – and, as such, a different rhetoric is used. The Pakistani government response to events in Afghanistan (a U-turn in terms of support to the Taliban regime) and the handling of domestic Pakistani affairs, has led to the situation whereby many militant groups aim violent jihad not just at ‘infidels occupying Afghanistan,’ but also the ‘local infidels’ who are ruling and running Pakistan and maintaining ‘the secular values of Pakistani society and an apostate State’. Two aims are thus expressed. First, the cleansing of Pakistan as a society, the aim being to turn it into a pure Islamic state, and, second, since the beginning of the Pakistani Army operations in the Tribal Areas and the Jamia Hafsa/Lal Masjid event in summer 2007, an increased focus on targeting the Pakistani government and establishment.

Has Jihad against the Pakistani establishment, therefore, become priority one for the Pakistan Taliban, and has the government of Pakistan become enemy number one? In December 2007, following the establishment of the TTP, the Pakistani newspaper *Daily Times* (2007) reported that, through a number of demarches, the centralized control of the many militant fractions and groups (as many as 27 were reported to have joined) had expressed the following goals for the new umbrella movement:

1. Enforce Shari’a, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform “defensive Jihad against the Pakistani army;”

2. React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat Valley and North Waziristan Agency;
3. Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area;
4. Demand the release of Lal Masjid's leader Imam Abdul Aziz; and
5. Refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan.

Since then, many of these points have become the focus of negotiations between the TTP and the Pakistani government. However, they also mark fault lines and questions of debate within the Pakistani Taliban, many of the groups operating and growing out of very tribal contexts. Their demands are issues that have the potential of raising debates intrinsic to the Pakistani society in all its complexity and immaturity (interview with retired military officers, Islamabad, 24 – 25 March 2008).

The enforcement of Shari'a law in Pakistan has been a returning question for the state of Pakistan since the beginning of its existence. Sayyid Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi was one of the thinkers who laid the foundations of this debate in the South Asian context through his writings and the establishment of the Jamaat-e-Islami party on the sub-continent in 1941. Mawdudi was an important early twentieth-century figure in the Islamic revival in India, and then after independence from the British, in Pakistan. Mawdudi (1967, 1976) believed that Islam was all encompassing, and, "Everything in the universe is Muslim for it obeys God by submission to His laws... The man who denies God is called Kafir because he conceals by his disbelief what is inherent in his nature and embalmed in his own soul." Mawdudi also believed that Muslim society could not be Islamic without Sharia, and Islam required the establishment of an Islamic state. This state should be a "theo-democracy," based on the principles of tawhid (unity of God), risala (prophethood), and khilafa (caliphate). Because Islam is all encompassing, Mawdudi (Jihad in Islam) believed that the Islamic state should not be limited to just the "homeland of Islam," but for all the world.

The two Pakistani political parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jami'at-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) have both played a role in forming the ideological debates and fault lines in Pakistani society. Until the 1980s, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Mawdudi, as described above, enjoyed a virtual monopoly on political Islam and served as a link between the Pakistani army and pro-Pakistan Afghan mujahideen of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. Even the JI leader, Qazi Hussein Ahmed is seen to have kept an eye on the recruitment of young Afghan militants. Jamaat-i-Islami has always respected the rule of law and has clearly chosen a political path, but its ideological radicalism has declared Pakistan's status as an Islamic state to be the sole reason for its existence (interview, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, Lahore, December 2005).

The other party, Jami'at-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), a Deobandi-based party, was established in 1945 and although from a conservative background, soon developed more radical traits consistent with the radicalisation of Pakistani society observed in the latter part of the 1980s. The militant sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and, in turn, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi emerged from JUI. The cornerstone of their ideology involves not giving up on the aims of complete introduction of Sharia law and regarding the Shias as the main enemy.

These two parties have given rise to a number of militant groups and splinter groups inspired by the ideology of these two "mother parties" but disappointed with their willingness to compromise on certain key aims. The issue of the immediate imposition of Sharia law in the

Pakistani society is one such issue; the other is the issue of when the time is ripe for a violent Jihad – and towards whom.

This latter issue relates both to the ambiguous issue of previous Pakistani governments making a “Jihad in Kashmir against the Indians” or a “Jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan” a national agenda item. While a number of Pakistani militant groups have used the terminology “Jihad” before – against the Shia-Muslim population of Pakistan, against Indian “kuffars” (a derogatory term for nonbelievers, non-Muslims) etc., the term “defensive” Jihad is now being used also increasingly against the Pakistani government, the state and its institutions. An example of this is quoted as one of the key reasons for the establishment of the TTP: “the defensive Jihad against the Pakistani army” (Daily Times, 2007). This must be seen against the backdrop of the incursions of the Pakistani army into the tribal areas over the past years. Arguably, this has both radicalised the local population and attracted militants from other parts of the country to the Tribal Areas (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2008; Beg & Bokhari, 2009). “Defensive Jihad” relates to this being a reaction to the behaviour of the Pakistani army against its own people. This was a point made in an interview with the TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud, aired on Al-Jazeera TV, 25 January 2008 (MEMRI, 2008):

“The goal of our coalition is to conduct defensive jihad. The Pakistani army is induced by Bush to send its forces here, and it bombs our homes and fights us. Therefore, we established this coalition in order to provide security to Muslim individuals and Muslim society. The Pakistani army employs tactics of deceit. It wages war in South Waziristan, while it maintains a truce in North Waziristan. Then it wages war in North Waziristan, and maintains a truce in Bajaur. Then it wages war in Bajaur, and maintains a truce in Swat. This is a policy of deceit. We established this coalition in order to confront the deceit of the army and its soldiers’ attacks.”

The definition of an “enemy” has evolved, and a 2008 unilateral ceasefire by the TTP and the willingness of the umbrella organisation to enter into (secret) peace talks with the new government of Pakistan demonstrates the certain trait of flexibility on this point. While the negotiations officially collapsed in late April 2008, the TTP spokesperson Maulvi Omar emphasised that they would be willing to negotiate, but only if the government met the demand to withdraw Pakistani troops from Waziristan (Graham, 2008; The News, 2008). A key demand from the Government was that the TTP would promise to lay down its weapons. Moreover, a recent statement by the TTP deputy leader Maulana Faqir Muhammad shows that the Pakistani Taliban would be willing to make a deal with the government, and even the military, as their primary goal was to fight the U.S. and other “occupying forces” in Afghanistan. Accordingly, Maulana Faqir Muhammad warned, once the TTP had signed a peace deal with the government of Pakistan, then it would gladly free its fighters to join the Afghan Taliban and from there continue launching attacks inside Afghanistan (Yusufzai, 2008).

However, the TTP has shown that despite being an umbrella organisation, they are disparate and not monolithic in their outlook and priorities. Some of the debates discussed below are indications of this. According to the Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai (2008), “Its components had to make decisions with regard to the needs of local politics in their respective areas of operation”. The overview below of some of the key actors within the leadership cadre of the TTP may give some indications as to the various components, debates and possible fault lines that could trigger further disagreements and rifts.

Who Are the Main Actors and What Do They Want?

As stated previously, when the umbrella group known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan was established, Baitullah Mehsud was appointed as its head with Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadar of North Waziristan as the deputy, and Maulana Faqir Mohammad from Bajaur Agency third in command. Other key TTP related individuals in terms of influence include two vocal personalities, Maulana Nazir and Maulana Fazlullah. A biographical outline is provided for each of these key actors including mention of topics and issues in the discussions connected with these actors. Some of the issues involve whether the TTP is seen as a unifying force or rather overshadowed by tribal fractions. While the 27 members of TTP agreed on the need to unify under one umbrella, it is questionable how “unified” they really are. Some of the fault lines displayed will be discussed below.

a. Baitullah Mehsud

At the age of 34, Baitullah Mehsud was named the head of the newly formed Taliban Movement of Pakistan in December 2007. Shortly after, he was also identified by the Pakistan government and the CIA as the key suspect behind the murder of the former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a claim that is still disputed.

Baitullah Mehsud is from the South Waziristan Agency and belongs to the Broomikhel tribe, an offshoot of sub-tribe Shabikhel, which again is part of the larger Mehsud tribe. The Mehsud tribe is one of the four Waziri tribes bordering the Afghan-Pakistani border (The Post, 2007). He was born in Landidog in South Waziristan and has four brothers. According to Sohail Abdul Nasir, Baitullah “even though not well educated, is known for his political and military maneuvering and skills” (Nasir, 2007). He is also known to be an inspirational and charismatic leader, “who has a great ability to infuse vitality among his followers” (Nasir, 2007). Although described as more of a military leader than a thinker, he did, however, attend a local madrassa in South Waziristan, the name of which is unknown. It was during this time, inspired by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, that he “went as a volunteer to join the Taliban’s enforcement of Sharia law” (meeting with officials in Pakistan, 24-25 March 2008). He grew to become known first and foremost as a commander but also a strong tribesman and leader.

In 2005, Baitullah signed a deal with the federal government of Pakistan where he and his associates laid down arms at a tribal jirga meeting. This was interpreted by the government as surrender, while he, himself, described this as part of a negotiated temporary peace agreement. The agreement obliged Mehsud and his fellow tribesmen not to provide assistance to al-Qaida and other militants present in the area – and, importantly, not to launch further operations against government forces (The Nation, 2005). Critics of this agreement and the whole wave of agreements that followed claim that with the peace agreement Baitullah, and people like him, were strengthened by this deal and could more easily create their own platforms and enhance their standing in the lawless Tribal Areas. Baitullah Mehsud, to his defense, argues that the intrusion of the Pakistani military with a military offensive into South Waziristan in July 2007 named *Operation Silence* after the peace agreement was signed had, in any case, violated the agreement, and attacks on military installations were therefore legitimized (The Post, 2007). Furthermore, in a September 2007 interview, his spokesperson is to have said on his behalf that: “Just as the government side has put my people on trial and sentenced them to imprisonment, I will put the soldiers of the Pakistan Army on trial. I have my own courts and we will try the soldiers for violating the peace agreement” (The Post, 2007). Baitullah Mehsud and his group is

known for having set up alternative structures “of preventing vice and promoting virtue” in South Waziristan.

From the few interviews that Baitullah Mehsud has given in the recent years, there are clear signs of changing priorities as to what the fight should be and who the main enemy is. Why this is so, is unclear, but often seems to reflect external factors and circumstances. Below are some excerpts from interviews with Baitullah Mehsud (Daily Jasarat, 2007):

‘Americans and their allies are coming to Pakistani areas and violating its sovereignty by waging war and bombing, so to safeguard the Muslims of the region we have formed TTP. We are fighting a defensive jihad.’ (...)

‘Jihad is an injunction of Allah. Jihad is obligatory against oppressors. If there is an oppressor in the United States, the jihad becomes obligatory there. We will wage jihad everywhere where oppression is going on against the Muslims, be it Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan, or any place around the world.’ (...)

‘Our fighting is not with the Pakistan army. We do not want to fight them. We are fighting them because they are the allies of the U.S. The friend of enemy is your enemy.’ (...)

In interviews from early 2007, Baitullah Mehsud was clear that his main goal was of freeing Afghanistan through Jihad (BBC, 2007). Back in 2005, in the aftermath of heavy fighting between the Pakistani Army and local militants in the tribal areas, Baitullah Mehsud had stated that they had started a resistance against the operation of the Pakistani Army in the area: “during this operation innocent people were killed and injured and the tribesmen suffered billions of rupees losses as their houses were demolished and standing crops were affected” (BBC, 2007).

Again, in an interview with Al-Jazeera TV, 29 January 2008, Baitullah Mehsud legitimises his cause as “rooted in Islamic law” – he says he believes it serves as a *defensive Jihad* against the Pakistani army and its head President Musharraf, who he believes is subjugated to the command of the American president Bush and his administration. He also says that: “the ultimate result of this alliance <the TTP>, which we basically formed as a defense, will be the implementation of Islamic Sharia Law all throughout Pakistan.”

His emphasis is clearly on *defensive Jihad*: “Right now our Jihad is defensive. Pakistan fights us, and we are on the defensive.” He is however also occupied with the idea of a *wider purpose*, that of changing the constitution and laws of Pakistani society: “We do not intervene in details, and Allah willing, the day will come when we will change the Constitution of Pakistan – and we will apply the Islamic Shari’a literally” (Al Jazeera, 29 January 2008).

Mehsud has said several times that he owes allegiance to Mullah Omar, the head of Taliban in Afghanistan. In October 2007, he was quoted as saying that Mullah Omar was his declared leader (New Taliban, 2007). Their relationship has, however, been subject to a major debate as to who is the main enemy. In January 2008, Mullah Omar’s spokesperson announced during a press conference held after the establishment of TTP, that “Mehsud had nothing to do with them since their priority is waging Jihad against the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and not against the Pakistan militancy” (Press conference, Taliban). This is increasingly a fault line – exemplifying the question of *whom and where do we fight first*: is the *main enemy* on Pakistani or Afghan soil – and *who* is this enemy? Claims were made after the press conference that the Afghan Taliban had distanced themselves from the Pakistani militants (the TTP) led by

Baitullah Mehsud, and they would not support any militant activity in Pakistan (Dawn, 2008). Furthermore, later it was reported that a spokesperson for the Taliban in Afghanistan had said that, “Had he been an Afghan we would have expelled him the same way we expelled Mansoor Dadullah for disobeying the orders of Mullah Omar. But Baitullah is a Pakistani Talib and whatever he does is his decision. We have nothing to do with it” (Dawn, 2008).

Another topic of debate is the question of what to do with the hundreds of foreign fighters who are said to be part of Mehsud’s and others private militias. The fighters are said to be mostly Uzbek (loosely connected to the IMU) who had fought in Afghanistan and fled over the border to the Tribal Areas in Pakistan after the bombing in Afghanistan started in the Autumn of 2001. Government-led discussions with militants and tribal leaders in the Tribal Areas oftentimes centre on this issue. This is also a recurring issue with other parts of the leadership structure of the TTP.

b. Maulana Faqir Mohammad

Maulana Faqir Mohammad is based in northwestern Pakistan’s Bajaur Agency of FATA, which borders on the Kunar province of Afghanistan. He belongs to the large Mommand tribe. He started his early education in a local madrassa and was taught by the scholar Maulana Abdu Salam, who is widely respected as a religious scholar in North West Frontier Pakistan (NWFP). He used to belong to the Deobandi school of Islam, but is now said to have adopted a Salafi-inspired view and has also shifted his school to Peshawar (Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism News). Even though he is best known for his leadership as a commander, he is also a Muslim cleric. Like most of the leadership of the TTP, he is relatively young - merely 39 years old.

Faqir Mohammad was deeply inspired by Maulana Abdu Salam – and became his student at one of the most prestigious religious schools in the Central Peshawar Valley. It was here, at this school in Peshawar, that he became interested in fighting in Afghanistan. It has been acknowledged that Maulana Sufi Mohammad (the founder of TNSM) was Faqir Mohammed’s first jihadi teacher and mentor who introduced him to militancy in Afghanistan in 1993. It is thought that the TNSM heavily inspired the Afghan Taliban. After fall of Taliban in late 2001, Faqir Mohammad played a vital role in helping al-Qaida and other militants get access the Tribal Areas, and especially his home Agency, Bajaur.

Maulana Faqir Mohammad, in addition to being one of the top leaders of the TTP, is also a key member of the TNSM (Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad’s Sharia law). He has always been close to the al-Qaida leadership, and is also said to have hosted the dinner-party in Damadola, Bajaur, in January 2006 that the U.S. targeted with the dramatic Predator attack in which it was said that al-Zawahiri escaped (Washington Post).

Maulana Faqir Mohammad is known to address his tribe and his followers through long political speeches given in large public rallies, often at religious venues. Through these public speeches, he transmits messages, such as his belief that the biggest enemy of Pakistan is the former American president George W. Bush and, that as part of the war on terrorism, Pakistan has become a puppet of American policies. He also believes that as part of this “selling out of the country” the Mujahideen have the right to “wage Jihad against the rulers in the nook and corners of the country as a result of continued operations against them” (Nasir, 2006). He also said that while he does not want to topple the government, as such, he would like to see the imposition of an Islamic system in the whole country.

c. Maulana Fazlullah

Another young commander and leader in the new umbrella of local Taliban groups is Maulana Fazlullah. The 28-year old man leads the outlawed Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). His father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad, was the group's original leader who, until recently, was in jail.

Maulana Fazlullah is from the valley of Swat, part of the North West Frontier Pakistan (NWFP). He runs a madrassa in Iman Deri in the Swat valley and is viewed as a very charismatic and inspiring leader. He has managed to inspire a large following, partly out of fear.

Maulana Fazlullah is known to have 'revitalized' the TNSM through his frequent use of an illegal FM radio station, where he transmits his messages and, in this way, reaches a new and younger audience. For an hour a day he broadcasts his interpretation of the holy book, the Koran, and at night he and his men distribute newsletters. He is known for his strong direct and often threatening messages directing CD shops and barbers to shut down or else they will be burnt down. During several of his FM radio broadcasts, he has ordered mothers not to let their daughters out of the house or not to give them access to an education.

Previously, Maulana Fazlullah's aggression was largely aimed against NATO forces in Afghanistan and the U.S. but since the bombing of a local madrassa in October 2006 (in Swat) and the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, there appears to have been a shift towards targeting Musharraf and the Pakistani army. The Lal Masjid incident was of particular importance to Fazlullah and his supporters as many students at the madrassa came from Swat.

Maulana Fazlullah has given a number of public speeches and radio broadcasts. He is vocal and, compared to the TTP-head Baitullah Mehsud, not at all media shy. A recent interview conducted by The Dawn (a daily English newspaper in Pakistan) journalist, Syed Irfan Raza, gives some interesting insights into his views. Some of the key issues are mentioned below.

On the question of what Maulana Fazlullah means by Jihad, he underlines that the basic objectives of "human creation is to establish the Khalifat and that the imposition of Shariah law is a key objective. Its approach should be through Abdiyat (submission and obedience) and in order to get it achieved Jihad is the only way which is possible through unity. The spreading of religious values is possible only through Jihad, and it is the most important responsibility of all Muslims and it is what the prophets did" (interview via email, Syed Irfan Raza).

An important message of Maulana Fazlullah is that, in his opinion, Islam is not being implemented in a true (proper) fashion in Pakistan, and that the leadership and elites have become servants to a Western agenda. In his broadcasts, he emphasizes the need to react to a government he views as infidel: "We are bound by Islam and we do not want to go by our own will. (...) We will defend our religion in every way and would readily die for it. This is what Islam taught us, to defend ourselves and our religion. (...) And this is a government of infidels. When the officials are attacking us we will defend ourselves and when we kill them we are martyrs, and they the other way round" (interview via email, Syed Irfan Raza).

A recurring topic of debate has been that of entering into peace talks both with previous and present governments. While the local militants in Swat have signed accords with the local government, the question has often been who violated the agreement first: "The prophet Muhammad solved most of the issues and problems through discussions and accords. So we are also bound to honour accords. We have reached agreement with the government and we are

bound by it. It is un-Islamic to violate the agreement, but the government has adopted an approach involving the killing of the Taliban, religious scholars and have also bombed the mosques and seminaries. This is not acceptable to people in Swat, including its women. Though I (Maulana Fazlullah) have reached an agreement with the government it does not mean that the entire Swat people are part of this agreement. I am bound by the peace agreement and I am not going to violate the accord and whenever I want to violate the agreement I will directly announce my disengagement with the agreement. But the power lies with the people of Swat.”

Similarly, even if he admits to have told his followers to be prepared to defend themselves through a “defensive Jihad,” he does not take responsibility for attacks that have taken place against government and military personnel. Rather, the attacks are seen as a reaction to operations conducted by the government: “I just told my followers to be prepared for Jihad. Whatever has started in Swat is not related to my announcement, but it is related to the government operation in Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa. And such violent incidents are not limited to Swat district only but it is going on throughout the tribal belt and Pakistan. So it is wrong to implicate me in whatever is going on in Pakistan. It is the responsibility of every Pakistani to rise in arms against those who are bombing their own people” (interview via email, Syed Irfan Raza).

A key disagreement within the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), has existed between Fazlullah and Maulana Sufi Muhammad, the until recently detained former head of TNSM, Sufi Muhammad has several times expressed disagreement with the activities of Maulana Fazlullah in Swat Valley, saying that they were bringing a bad name to Islam: “They are doing no service to Islam by carrying out suicide attacks, but rather damaging the cause for the enforcement of the Shariah in the Malakand region,” he said. Furthermore, “We (TNSM) never intended to pick up arms for the enforcement of Shariah. We can't even think of killing people for the purpose. Peaceful struggle (within the parameters of the Constitution) had been our policy, and I will clearly tell the people to support peace overtures. I will urge people to abandon Fazlullah, who is a rebel” (Jan, 2008).

Maulana Sufi Muhammad was recently released from jail, and it is unknown what the release will mean for the TNSM. He was arrested along with scores of his supporters in November 2001 when they were fleeing to Pakistan from Afghanistan where they had gone to fight against U.S. forces. He and 30 others were tried under the Frontier Crimes Regulations, and Sufi Muhammad was sentenced to 10-year imprisonment in 2002.

In a recent agreement with the government, referred to in the above interview with Fazlullah, the TNSM had pledged to continue its struggle to enforce Shariah law through peaceful means. It is said that one of the demands of this negotiated ceasefire was the release of Maulana Sufi Muhammad. Importantly, in the agreement, Maulana Fazlullah distanced itself from ‘elements’ involved in attacks on government officials, installations and law-enforcement agencies and condemned ‘miscreants’ indulging in such activities (Ali, 2008). The preamble of the agreement released by the provincial government said that the deaths of innocent people in suicide bombings and attacks on government installations and functionaries were against Islam and moral principles and a violation of human rights (Ali, 2008).

d. Maulvi Nazir

Another key actor in the Tribal Areas has been Maulvi Nazir. He has often been seen to be at odds with Baitullah Mehsud, specifically on the issue of how to deal with foreign fighters

present in FATA, and generally on whether to host the mainly Uzbek fighters that have created conflict along tribal lines but also with relation to the Pakistani Army.

Maulvi Nazir is 32 years old and a dual citizen of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although he presently resides in South Waziristan, he is a frequent traveller to Afghanistan's Paktika province and Kandahar, and his extended family lives on both sides of the Durand Line. He belongs to the Kakakhel tribe, which is a sub-clan of the Ahmedzai Waziris (who dominate parts of South Waziristan) (Abbas, 2007).

Nazir is known for his battle experience and guerrilla training and is said to have joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. He is thought to be politically aligned with the Jamaat-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and its leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, but has also been close to the late Mullah Dadullah and Siraj Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran mujahideen and an important leader of the Taliban. Nazir has been an important actor in South Waziristan and the local shura there. When he was announced as the Emir of the local Taliban in the South Waziristan Agency, he was viewed to have an instrumental role in the enforcement of rigid Sharia laws. Apparently able to act unhindered by government forces, in 2006 he directed his supporters not to confront the Pakistani military. He was supported in this endeavour by: 1) about a dozen independent pro-Taliban groups of the area; 2) Punjabi Taliban (mostly members of banned sectarian and Kashmiri militant groups); and 3) his tribe members.

His credentials came from having established some degree of control in the South Waziristan, but he has since been challenged on his views on what to do with the foreign fighters, the "immigrant Uzbek militants" in the area. He aligned himself with the Pakistani army in his operations, and in return, the army provided medical cover to Nazir's forces and also helped him secure the bases vacated by the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks, under Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), suffered colossal losses in these confrontations in spring 2007. His close alignment with the Pakistani army and the government led to disagreements with other local tribes. Interestingly, however, it seems that his motivations for challenging the foreign presence in South Waziristan were both the fact that the foreign militants were involved in the brutal killing and robbing tribesmen, creating local rivalries among tribesmen and increasing the level of crime, as well as economic interests. This is explained by Hassan Abbas (2007): "(...) economic interests are also playing a part in this power matrix. Uzbeks started coming to the area during the late 1980s and early 1990s; however, the major influx began after key developments in 2001. Uzbek families managed to acquire large properties, some of which were bought and some of which were offered as gifts by the local people who entered into relations with them. The Uzbeks worked hard and gradually developed some lands into model farms. This became the bone of contention between the settlers and the locals. Some locals partnered with the Uzbeks in business and also acted as their protectors. Others naturally developed a grudge. On the other hand, Nazir has always looked for economic opportunities, and soon after his first victory over Uzbek militants, he publicly urged the Pakistani government to initiate development work in the area and specifically asked mobile phone companies to start their services in the area."

It is also interesting to note that Maulvi Nazir, by his own confession, had not joined the fight against Uzbek militants as a Taliban emir, but as a member of the Kakakhel tribe, which again indicates the tribal nature of the various actors of the TTP, even if this was before their very naissance (Bokhari, 2007). These conflicts, therefore, may create further tension and splits

along tribal lines within the TTP and a number of pragmatic interests and alliances may play out along tribal lines. Inherent in this dynamic is a history of conflicts that have not been forgotten: family and friends of the assassinated leader Nek Mohammad, a legendary figure, are still supportive of Uzbek fighters and al-Qaeda elements; Mehsud tribesmen (the largest tribe in terms of numbers in the area) under Baitullah Mehsud are also resisting Nazir; and Haji Omar, a senior pro-al-Qaida Taliban commander in South Waziristan and an arch opponent of Nazir, has publicly warned the Pakistani military in becoming party to a very local tribal struggle (Bokhari, 2007).

Signs of Strength: A Unified Force or Tribal Fractions?

Upon the announcement of their establishment, the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* demanded the Pakistani military halt operations in ‘Taliban territory’ and release their members from Pakistani jails. There was a clear message that the Pakistani army and the government would be regarded as the foremost enemy. This message was seen as a shift from the until then active Taliban forces. Several attacks in Pakistan mainland towards Pakistan government targets over the last year have been blamed on Baitullah Mehsud. Moreover, attempts have been made to gather the forces – the fractions – into a more unified struggle (see The News, 2009).

The TTP, however, has also stated it would continue the fight against Coalition forces in Afghanistan: “Our main aim is to target the U.S. allies in Afghanistan but the government of Pakistan’s ill-strategy has made us to launch a defensive Jihad in Pakistan (...) ... The government of Pakistan would be paid in the same coin now” (Roggio, 2007). Therefore, it may seem that the change of focus on Pakistani society and its establishment and institutions as the enemy and battlefield arena may just be a temporary arrangement, designed to gather forces and be able to focus with greater strength on the real enemy. This may be an indication that the fight against the Pakistani leadership is pragmatic and not ideologically based as often thought.

Despite the wish to unite the different groups under the umbrella of the TTP and under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a number of fault lines have been observed. The 27 groups and factions who united to form the TTP consist of a number of different leaders and commanders who have oftentimes expressed very different opinions on both local *and* more global issues. Some of the issues at stake have been whether to launch attacks against the Pakistani Army and whether to engage in negotiations with the Pakistani government. A look at the negotiations themselves and the many attempts and nuances of peace agreements, also show that the contents of each negotiation have been different, again to some extent indicating the pragmatism at play. The fault lines may also be indications that the local conflicts and aims are quite different. At very local levels, conflicts have focused on land ownership and rights, sectarianism and even personality/leadership issues.

A recurring issue is whether the aim of the implementation of Shariah law can be compromised for other short-term, pragmatic interests. In the past, this has often caused both factions and splinter-groups to develop. Already one can see that often the territorial and tribal limits of each Taliban group *and* commander have seemed to be the more decisive. Similarly, “the groups have regional and local political agendas and are under pressure from their tribes and communities not to become involved in wider conflicts that could transform their areas into battle grounds and contribute to suffering” (Yusufzai, 2008).

The geographical reach of the umbrella group has surprised observers. Not only does the TTP cover all the seven agencies constituting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

of Pakistan, they also cover representatives from other regions of the adjacent NWFP (Abbas, 2008). Individual militants from ‘mainland’ Pakistan may have joined under the umbrella of TTP not only as a protest against the handling of issues in the Tribal Areas but also as a reaction of the Lal Masjid event in 2007. Baitullah Mehsud justified the broad reach of the group based on its overarching aim to fight a common enemy: the Pakistani government as an anti-Muslim apostate state. Recent negotiations with the new Pakistani government are, however, already causing fault lines with regard to this aim within the organisation. The very tribal nature of the TTP is shown in its pragmatism, based on the very local dimensions of the conflict. The shift in the militants’ main thrust of the “War against the West” (described by Baitullah Mehsud as a result of “The infidel world launched a war on Islam through agents such as the Government of Pakistan”) and reflected in the shift in focus from Afghanistan to Pakistan, may therefore have local and more pragmatic reasons (Al Jazeera, 2008).

Baitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani Taliban have, however, been able to overcome many of these internal conflicts. Arguably, their unity has been aided by the drone attacks and increased military activity in the border areas (Shah, 2009). This has both united and strengthened them and also possibly made the links with other Pakistani groups more prominent. Until recently, a hesitant and indecisive Pakistani government response to the militants’ activity also led to further unity. This may, however, change as the government appears to be starting to take on the militants with strong and overwhelming force.

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P.4 Trends in al-Qaeda and Global Militant Jihad Activity (Yoram Schweitzer)

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Introduction

In recent years, a serious academic discussion about the al-Qaeda organization (or AQC – al-Qaeda Central) has been underway, one that has also found its way into the popular media. It has focused on whether AQC has ceased functioning as an active organization and turned into an icon only, and whether its role as leader of the global militant jihad has been assumed by a mass movement run by a network of people, groups, and organizations whose members have undergone a process of self-radicalization (Sciolino & Schmidt, 2008). A response to this question may be found in an analysis of the activities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates but also depends on understanding the concept of struggle according to al-Qaeda and its relationship with its affiliates. Al-Qaeda views itself as the leader of the global militant jihad movement and as a role model for its affiliates. As such, the organization has sought to stage dramatic and innovative terrorist attacks that would pave the way for its collaborators without insisting on exclusivity for acts undertaken in the name of global militant jihad. Moreover, al-Qaeda has encouraged independent activity, which is often carried out without its approval or knowledge.

Al-Qaeda, well aware of its limited power and resources, has always viewed its own terrorist acts, and the terrorist acts it encourages others to undertake, as a tool to launch an historic process whose final objective is restoring Islam to its former primacy and glory. Al-Qaeda does not feel it necessary to carry out many attacks and prefers to focus on a limited number of showcase attacks. Terrorism, viewed by al-Qaeda as “propaganda by the Deed,” is the first in a chain reaction meant to enhance its destructive and moral effect and launch a sophisticated, global propaganda system. This system is directed by the organization with the assistance of its production company, al-Sahab, through internet sites and Arab satellite channels, primarily al Jazeera. It is no coincidence that al-Qaeda contributes as many resources and efforts to mounting these productions as it does to mounting terrorist attacks.

The discussion that follows focuses on the central arenas where al-Qaeda and its global militant jihad affiliates were active in 2008, an assessment of the expected trends in their activities in coming years, and an examination of the threat they represent.

Al-Qaeda and Their Affiliates: Theaters of Activity

In recent years, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have focused their activities primarily in Iraq and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as other local arenas.

Iraq

The American-led coalition invasion into Iraq supplied al-Qaeda with a golden opportunity to extricate itself from its difficult position and the pressure exerted on it after the severe blow it and its Taliban sponsors suffered following the 9/11 attacks.

Al-Qaeda did not invest the bulk of its resources or dedicate its most senior commanders to the war in Iraq and most have remained protected in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly in the border area between them. However, al-Qaeda commanders have invested significant informational/propaganda efforts to stress the extreme importance of the campaign in Iraq as the central arena for the contest between the Islamic world, led by global militant jihadists, and the West, together with its Arab allies. With the assistance of recruiting and logistics networks directed by supporters around the world, the struggle in Iraq has become a locus attracting Muslim volunteers worldwide seeking to join the militant jihad activity there. Moreover, the fighting in Iraq over the past five years has largely drawn the coalition forces' attention away from their initial objectives and depleted the resources – in terms of money, manpower, equipment, and time – allocated to wage a focused war against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan.




Figure 1. Suicide Attacks in Iraq 2003-2008 (Institute for National Security Studies - INSS)

terrorist and guerilla warfare for future use in the global militant jihad. Furthermore, the fighting in Iraq afforded al-Qaeda an opportunity to demonstrate and entrench the act of self-sacrifice in the path of God (*istishhadia*) that has become its trademark through intensive use of suicide attackers, most of them from the ranks of the foreign volunteers, who were sent to their targets by al-Qaeda in Iraq (Figure 1) (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

The fighting in Iraq has provided al-Qaeda's elaborate and effective propaganda machine with a wealth of visual material documenting the terrorist and guerilla activities against the foreign forces. In recent years, these materials have served al-Qaeda in its psychological warfare as it celebrates a heroic narrative of the "Muslim mujahidin" rendering powerful blows against the invading "infidels." There is no doubt that the raw materials photographed during the

The massive presence of Western forces in Iraq has helped al-Qaeda operate its affiliates in the country against the invaders. The fact that "the distant enemy" (i.e., the United States and its allies) came to a region considered to be holy Muslim ground (*wakf*) in the heart of the Arab Levant gave al-Qaeda "home court advantage" in attacks. In addition, it helped strengthen its basic narrative: the prosecution of a holy war by means of legitimate "armed military resistance." Al-Qaeda took advantage of this opportunity to prepare highly skilled cadres with combat experience and train them in

fighting in Iraq, posted on many internet sites around the world identified with the global militant jihad, represent one of the concrete achievements of the organization and are likely to serve it in the future.

The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq did not hurt al-Qaeda, as it had viewed him as one of the heretical Muslim leaders who do not lead their lives according to the laws of Islam. However, the rise of the Shiites to the top of the Iraqi regime and their cooperation with the United States and its allies turned the Shia into a legitimate target of attacks. Many Iraqi citizens, particularly those who joined the new regime and the security and police forces, were also placed on al-Qaeda’s enemy list in Iraq and many acts of terrorism targeted them.

Al-Qaeda operatives’ murderous activities and provocative conduct in Iraq against the local population have angered many Iraqi citizens. Thus starting at the end of 2005 (Pitman, 2007), a rift gradually occurred between al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq and the heads of the Sunni tribes there who, until then, cooperated with them. The revolt of these Sunni tribal leaders - dubbed “the revival of the Anbar movement” that was supported and funded by the U.S. and coalition forces and




Figure 2. Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 2000-2008 (INSS)

were strengthened by the surge (Semple, 2007) and aided by Iraqi security forces - bore fruit and helped to weaken al-Qaeda. The year 2007 symbolized a further and more advanced stage of al-Qaeda’s weakened capabilities in Iraq. Based on assessments submitted in 2008 by senior American officers and administration personnel, a guarded analysis suggests that the organization is on the brink of collapse in most parts of Iraq (Samuels, 2008).

Another sign of the organization’s weakness and the blow rendered to its operatives is the rise in 2008 of al-Qaeda’s use of female suicide bombers, the highest in comparison with previous years (Figure 2). Such a step usually attests to operational difficulties in organizations dispatching suicide missions. In addition, al-Qaeda’s declaration of the establishment of Islamic Caliphate in Iraq in 2005, supported by the AQC, has remained an empty slogan, in part because of the organization’s current distress.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the FATA Border Region

In recent years, al-Qaeda has strengthened its hold on the FATA “no man’s land” and enhanced its infrastructure there. The area is formally under Pakistani sovereignty, but functions largely as an ex-territorial autonomous region with the central government in Islamabad wielding no authority over it, both because of its topography and its unique ethnic composition. The evidence thus far points to the fact that this is the area where Bin Laden and most of the senior al-Qaeda operatives are in hiding, along with members of the former Taliban regime who fled

there in late 2001. This region serves as a base for the planning of the joint activities of al-Qaeda and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban (NEFA Foundation, 2008). Since this is presumably the al-Qaeda and Taliban stronghold, the past year saw clashes between Pakistani military forces and Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. Furthermore, since the prevailing opinion was that Pakistan has not taken sufficient steps against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. has carried out aerial attacks there (Pickler, 2007).





Figure 1. Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan 2000-2008 (INSS)

Over the last two years, the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban has grown much closer, to the extent of establishment of joint war rooms, joint planning and participation in raids, and joint fighting against Pakistani regular forces (NEFA Foundation, 2008). The most obvious manifestation of al-Qaeda's influence on the activities of the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban was the upgrading, in both number and intensity, of the terrorist attacks perpetrated by these elements within Afghani and Pakistani cities. The two Taliban organizations added suicide bombing to their repertoire and made it a primary combat tactic. This was particularly obvious in Afghanistan which, until recent years, did not suffer from this type of activity, not even during the ten years of warfare against the Soviet military (1979-89), the subsequent civil war that raged until the Taliban took charge, or during the years of Taliban rule. Starting in 2005, with al-Qaeda's assistance and encouragement, Afghanistan was flooded by a wave of dozens of suicide bombings (Figure 3) in some cases due to the direct involvement of senior al-Qaeda personnel (Warrick, 2009). The total of 249 suicide bombings in Afghanistan over the past three years is an extraordinarily high number, relative to other arenas in the Middle East and around the world, with only Iraq in the same league. Most of the suicide bombers, young Pakistanis recruited at *madrassas*, are joined by a small number of foreign volunteers dispatched by the Taliban, with al-Qaeda's fingerprints all over this activity (UNAMA, 2007).

Likewise, Pakistan, which in the past experienced only a small number of sporadic suicide bombings within its borders, has over the last two years seen a sharp increase in the number of suicide attacks carried out under the influence of the association between al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban (Figure 4). Al-Qaeda has been directly linked – and took public credit – for the suicide attack that took place at the

Figure 4. Suicide Bombings in Pakistan, 2000-2008 (INSS)



Danish embassy in Islamabad on June 2, 2008 in which eight people were killed and twenty-seven injured (CNN, 2008). Al-Qaeda had specifically threatened Denmark, in response to a cartoon in a Danish newspaper that the organization deemed an insult to Islam and an offensive portrayal of the prophet Muhammad (AP, 2008). Furthermore, al-Qaeda, led by the head of the organization’s operational division in Pakistan, Osama al-Kini (Schmidt, 2009) staged a brazen attack at the Marriott Hotel, which killed 54 including five foreigners – among them the Czech Ambassador – and injured 266 (BBC, 2008).

Al-Qaeda Influence on Terrorism in Other Arenas

Al-Qaeda has invested significant efforts in uniting the various militant jihad movements under a single umbrella organization. This was meant to close ranks among the militant Islamic organizations that identify with the idea of global militant jihad so as to be better able to plan and coordinate their activities and promote their joint agenda. This unification trend is not new, with precedents in 1998 when the organization started to launch independent suicide bombings. That same year, al-Qaeda launched the umbrella organization called the International Front for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jews and, in June 2001, the formal unification between al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, commanded by Ayman Zawahari, was made public, and Qaedat al-Jihad was founded.

In recent years, al-Qaeda has also established relationships with other umbrella organizations, in particular with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which includes operatives from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and, of course, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (al-Qaeda in Iraq), which includes Iraqi, Kurdish, and Jordanian operatives as well as volunteers from other Muslim countries. By virtue of these alliances, and through their ties with al-Qaeda, their reciprocal relationships (Lav, 2007), these organizations have upgraded their level of operational activity. This has expanded their scope of activity and the inclusion of strategic, political, and financial targets for attack, such as political leaders, energy targets, infrastructures and tourist areas, international and foreign military forces, with, of course, suicide bombing – al-Qaeda’s trademark – as the preferred method.

While al-Qaeda's activity in Iraq since the 2003 war is well known, its activity in the Islamic Maghreb has aroused growing interest in recent years because of the rise in volume and quality of operations. Its major, though not exclusive, locus of activity has been Algeria. Since the organization announced in January 2007 the unification between it and al-Qaeda (Aljazeera, 2007), it has upgraded the level of its targets to the most senior echelon of the Algerian regime (the president and prime minister) and the country's institutions (the Supreme Court). Furthermore, it has extended its activity against foreign and UN targets (NCIC, 2008). After the unification, the organization started to stage suicide attacks along the al-Qaeda model. Al-Qaeda had similar influence on the Moroccan branch of the umbrella organization and it, too, has intensified its activity in recent years, with several attempts at suicide bombings against targets in the Moroccan regime and security establishment as well as activity against foreigners (BBC, 2007, April 14).¹ Some were successfully executed and some were foiled (BBC, 2007, April 11).² Additional terrorist activity was carried out by the umbrella organization in Tunisia (the hostage taking of Austrian tourists) and Mauritania (a shooting attack against the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott).

Another al-Qaeda theater has been the Arabian Peninsula (Al Saheil, 2008). In Saudi Arabia, authorities succeeded in foiling terrorist activities of the local branch of al-Qaeda by arresting many members of the organization and by launching an aggressive counter-propaganda and reeducation campaign within areas supporting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Further south, the activity this year of the Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) stood out in particular. Even though this organization is not under the direct command of al-Qaeda, it did adopt al-Qaeda's agenda, especially after 2007 when Bin Laden's former secretary became its leader (Ulph, 2005).³ Along with attacks against senior governmental targets in Yemen, the organization staged a dramatic suicide attack against the American embassy in Sana'a in September 2008, killing nineteen (Worth, 2008). In his annual security estimate, the head of the CIA noted that global militant jihad organizations are growing stronger in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Mazetti, 2008).

Africa, too, is an important arena of activity for al-Qaeda and the organization, as it is wont to do, is nurturing its prior connections with local organizations and past operatives to help carry out attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia. The breakdown of the central government in Somalia has encouraged the growth of local militant jihad organizations, some of which have carried out suicide bombings against institutional targets including the presidential palace and foreign targets such as the Ethiopian embassy and UN offices in which 28 people were killed including a senior in the Somaliland (Somalia's northern provinces) government and UN personnel (Edmund, 2008).

¹ On April 14, 2007, two suicide terrorists tried to enter the American Embassy. When a policeman stationed at the entrance refused to let them enter, they blew themselves up. Both terrorists were killed, and one woman was injured in the attack.

² There was a string of attacks in March-April 2007. Two terrorists blew themselves up at an internet café on 11 March 2007. According to the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, during one of the arrests on April 10, four terrorists detonated their explosive belts and killed themselves and one of the policemen. Moroccan sources reported that the suicides belonged to a cell headed by the terrorist who blew himself up at the internet café in March.

³ The current head of the organization is Omaid Masir al-Waha'ayshi, known by his alias abu-Huriya al-Tzanani, who escaped from jail in Yemen in February 2006.

The Islamic Jihad in Uzbekistan (IJU) is another organization to whom al-Qaeda has grown closer and that has accordingly refined its activity to match the agenda of global militant jihad. This organization broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) because of internal differences as to whether to focus on the Islamic agenda in Uzbekistan or to dedicate itself to global Islamic activity and, in recent years, has operated in the FATA region alongside Taliban and al-Qaeda forces (Sandee, 2008). Its operatives have participated in attacks in Uzbekistan, Germany, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. For example, the Afghanistan attack, which occurred on March 3, 2008 in the Sabari district in the eastern Afghan province of Khost, was committed by a German citizen of Turkish descent who carried out a suicide bombing against American soldiers (Gebias, Musharbash, & Stark, 2008). Also, a dramatic attack against American targets in Germany, including a military base and a club frequented by American soldiers, was foiled (Whitlock, 2007). The attack was supposed to be carried out by a terrorist network recruited, trained, and operated from afar by the organization. In Europe, security forces still view terrorist networks directed by al-Qaeda and global militant jihadists as an acute threat after the exposure in 2008 of a number of terrorist networks in Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Turkey (Yusuf, 2008).

Al Qaeda, Global Militant Jihad, and Israel

Loci of Threats against Israel

It is difficult to assess how the horrific photographs from Operation Cast Lead, Israel's 2008-09 Gaza incursion, together with the venomous anti-Israeli commentary broadcast via propaganda networks, especially Arab and Muslim media, might affect the decision of al-Qaeda leaders, some of whom also joined in these attacks (Reuters, 2009), to translate this propaganda into action and try to extract revenge from Israelis and Jews. It is possible that al-Qaeda, or its affiliates, might decide to take advantage of the anti-Israel atmosphere to attack targets identified with Israel as well as earn propaganda points sure to accrue from such actions and in order to refute claims against them that they are doing nothing to assist the Palestinians other than provide verbal support. Kidnapping of Israelis by factions identified with global militant jihad, a threat that skyrocketed in the past year (Shapira, 2008), continues to represent a steady threat because of militant jihadists' desire to demonstrate their willingness to assist the Palestinians and because of their understanding that such actions would touch a particularly sensitive nerve in Israeli society.

Al-Qaeda Seeks to Encroach on Israel

It seems that through its regional affiliates, al-Qaeda has intensified its efforts to penetrate Israel's borders in order to inflict harm on Israeli citizens. It has also tried to attack Israelis visiting Arab countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel (Schweitzer, 2007). A few years ago, a number of attacks against Israeli tourists, attributed to global militant jihadists, were carried out in Jordan and Egypt and especially in Sinai.

Previous rockets firings in the past from Jordan and Lebanon towards Israel should be seen in this context. Lebanon continues to be the arena for global militant jihadists involved in rocket attacks against Israel. In 2008 too, a number of rockets were fired towards northern Israel from Lebanon; the launches were attributed to the al-Ansar Divisions, which identifies itself with the global militant jihad (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009). Also during the IDF operation in the Gaza Strip (December 27, 2008 – January 17, 2009), a number of rockets were fired from southern Lebanon towards northern Israel while others were discovered before

being launched (Intelligence and Terrorism, 2009). At this stage, it is not clear if the attackers were global militant jihadists, but the threat of continued rocket fire towards Israel remains. Interestingly, Bin Laden, who views Lebanon as a convenient springboard to harm Israel, has violently condemned Hizbollah and Iran, calling them allies in a American-Israeli plot in planning the Second Lebanon War. The purpose of this war, according to bin Laden, was ostensibly to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates from approaching Israel from Lebanon's southern border by means of the subsequent ceasefire agreement formulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (NEFA Foundation, 2009). While his notion of a fourfold plot sounds surreal, it reflects his frustration with al-Qaeda's affiliates' limitations in attacking Israel from Lebanon and, at the same time, clearly expresses his intentions. Another arena for locals identified with the global militant jihad stream is the Gaza Strip, where there are a number of groups such as the Army of Islam (relying mostly on members of the Dughmouh clan), the Sword of Islam, and the Army of the Believers – al-Qaeda in Palestine. These groups, whose size is unknown or estimated to consist of a few dozen operatives at most, engage in sporadic terrorist activity. In addition to firing Qassam rockets, these activities include kidnapping foreign citizens, burning schools, harassing internet cafés, and acting as morality police (Kershner, 2007).

Al-Qaeda's hope that Hamas' June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip would allow its own supporters more convenient access to engage in anti-Israel activity was not fulfilled. Because of its desire to be the sole ruler of the Gaza Strip, Hamas has prevented groups in the Strip identified with the global militant jihad to act against Israel autonomously and without its permission out of concern that such a situation might embroil it with Israel at a disadvantageous time and place. Speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the head of Israeli intelligence said that while Hamas has enabled al-Qaeda operatives from abroad to enter the Gaza Strip (Meranda, 2008) and has even allowed groups identified with it to shoot rockets towards Israel from time to time, whenever any of them has challenged its authority, Hamas has not hesitated to use brutal force to suppress the challenge, as happened with the Dughmouh clan (Intelligence and Terrorism Information, 2008).

In the past year, attempts to band together into cells to carry out attacks were exposed in the West Bank region and among Israeli Arabs of Bedouin descent identified with global militant jihad, but these were foiled in time (Fied, 2008; Harel, Azulai, & Schtern, 2008). The difficulties al-Qaeda has in operating against Israel across Israel's borders stems from the fact that Israel's neighbors, foremost Egypt and Jordan, who are also fighting the growing threat of global militant jihad against their own regimes and within their sovereign territories, are acting decisively to stop al-Qaeda activity and to protect their citizens and the tourists visiting their countries. Syria and Lebanon are likewise engaged aggressively in attempts to foil global militant jihadist intentions to operate against Israel within their own territory and areas they control, out of a concern of entering into confrontations with Israel. Even Hamas acts aggressively in the same spirit, and it seems that it will continue this policy in the future, unless circumstances radically change.

The Threat to Israel from Global Militant Jihadists from across Its Own Borders. This threat is ongoing but is not expected to become more severe unless there are significant changes in Israel's relations with its neighbors because of the mutual interest of Israel and its neighbors to avoid embroilments between them.

Egypt and Israel see eye-to-eye on the question of the danger posed by the strengthening of global militant jihadists in Egyptian territory and particularly in the Sinai region. Sinai is not well controlled by Egypt and, therefore, the region is prone to trouble. Nonetheless, recently the region has become the focus of more attention on the part of the Egyptian security services and greater vigilance on the part of Israeli intelligence and security services, which repeatedly issue warnings to Israeli citizens to avoid visiting recreational sites in Sinai.

Jordan and Israel also share a common interest in preventing any global militant jihadist activity within the kingdom and from Jordan against Israel, and cooperate closely in order to foil any such eventuality.

In *Lebanon*, there is a danger of escalation by global militant jihadists who have intensified their activities in both northern and southern Lebanon and who, from time to time, even launch rockets towards Israel. The ability of the Lebanese military to stop their activities will determine the level of threat that these represent for Israel. Paradoxically, Hizbollah shares Israel's interest in preventing the strengthening of global militant jihadists in Lebanon and having them engage in activity against Israel, especially if this is liable to lead to an armed conflict with Israel, which is not to Hizbollah's advantage.

Syria, too, does not allow global militant jihadists to operate against Israel from its territory, first because Syria does not allow any element to operate from within its borders against Israel lest this embroil Syria in a confrontation, and second because it views the militant jihadists as a threat to Syria's own regime. In the course of 2008, Islamists carried out a number of severe terrorist attacks against the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, the Syrian regime enabled global militant jihadists to use its territory as a passageway to the fighting in Iraq and, therefore, particular alertness on Israel's part is required lest these elements attempt to operate against it, against Syria's wishes. Should political contacts between Syria and Israel progress over the next few years, it becomes virtually certain that these factions will launch attacks, hoping to provoke the sort of reaction from Israel that would completely destabilize talks with Syria.

Despite the hostility and violent clashes between Hamas and Israel, Hamas' primary interest is presumably in preventing independent activity against Israel on the part of al-Qaeda and global militant jihadists operating in the Gaza Strip that is outside Hamas' own control. This interest outweighs Hamas' desire to harm Israel and, therefore, unless Hamas-Israel relations suffer a steep deterioration, global militant jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip, and certainly al-Qaeda itself, will not be granted a free hand in operating against Israel from there.

The Threat of a Showcase Terrorist Attack on Israeli Territory. Despite the limitations regarding the possibility of al-Qaeda or its affiliates staging a dramatic attack on Israeli sovereign territory, it is clear that such an operation continues to represent a desirable goal on their part. Their ability to realize such intentions depends largely on their ability to receive internal assistance, (e.g., from Israeli Arabs, Palestinians entering Israel as laborers or as illegal residents), or as has already happened in the past, through foreign citizens (Schiff, 2006). To date, Israel's security services have succeeded in foiling these intentions but, obviously, there is clear and present danger. In recent years, the initiative to act against Israel has come primarily from local Palestinians, and their contacts were mainly in the junior ranks of global militant jihadists and not with al-Qaeda itself. Should this relationship develop, especially with al-Qaeda's mechanism dedicated to staging attacks abroad, the threat level will, of course, rise.

Conclusion

Loci of Global Threats

From the vantage point of late 2008, it is clear that despite the ongoing efforts of the international coalition against terrorism to overcome al-Qaeda and its affiliates, these are still far from conceding defeat and may be expected to be the primary threat in terms of international terrorist activity in the years to come. The main threat from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates stems from their desire to affect the entire system of international relations and to undermine the current world order. To do so, they do not hesitate in carrying out mass terrorist attacks of a level unknown in the past against anyone opposed to their worldview and chosen path.

There are a number of critical threat areas with long-term significance from al-Qaeda and their cohorts in the coming years:

Intensified Activity in Uncontrolled Areas in Fragile States. Al-Qaeda and global militant jihadists are particularly active in places where there are Muslim populations and the central government lacks full control and effective enforcement capabilities. Al-Qaeda takes advantage of this situation to foment trouble among the local populace and to recruit volunteers into their ranks. It thus appears that in the coming years the central arena of struggle of al-Qaeda and its Taliban partners will likely be in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda is preparing for the intensification of the expected war against it and its Taliban associates on the part of NATO forces, the United States military, and Pakistani forces, as reflected in the declarations of senior American officials in the new administration and in the decision to send thousands more American soldiers into the region (Spillius, 2008; Scott, 2008). Al-Qaeda is also expected to contribute to the ongoing spate of suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to undermine the stability of the ruling regimes of these countries.

Activity to Undermine the Regimes of Central Muslim States, Primarily Pakistan – a Nuclear Weapons State. A primary threat coming from al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the border area is that the security situation in Pakistan and its surroundings may deteriorate and ultimately result in the rise to power of radical Islamic elements instead of the current president, Zardari. Such a scenario is liable to allow radical elements access to the country's arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Absorbing New Cadres and Sending Them to the West. Al-Qaeda can be expected to assimilate into its ranks new volunteers from all over the world and, in particular, fighters who are veterans of the war in Iraq in order to insert them into areas of conflict involving Muslims. At the same time, it will likely train the most suitable new recruits to operate under the cover of their foreign citizenships, European or other, to carry out terrorist attacks abroad, whether under the command of al-Qaeda's dedicated terrorist mechanism abroad or as part of independent global militant jihad terrorist networks (Sandee, 2009).

Efforts to Carry out Showcase, Mass-Casualty Attacks in a Western Country. An attack on that order of magnitude would again place al-Qaeda on the map of international terrorism and serve as model for its affiliates. Al-Qaeda's success in carrying out a dramatic large-scale terrorist attack in the near future is largely dependent on its ability to rehabilitate its special division for terrorist attacks abroad. This group was heavily damaged in recent years by the

assassinations and arrests of many of its senior commanders and most experienced veteran operatives. It would seem that al-Qaeda is not going to relinquish the notion of staging such attacks, despite the constraints and pressures applied to it, in order to continue fulfilling its vanguard role. It largely depends on the creation of the suitable operational conditions in one of the arenas where the organization is active. In its annual security estimate, the CIA estimated that al-Qaeda was preparing for a dramatic, spectacular attack (Warrick, 2008).

Continued Efforts to Undermine the Stability of the “Heretical” Regimes in Middle Eastern Countries to Replace Them with Muslim Regimes Ruled by Islamic Law. On the basis of the “Zawahiri doctrine,” al-Qaeda is expected to continue assisting terrorist acts of global militant jihadists against the leaders of regimes and central government institutions in the Middle East as well as Africa in order to replace them with regimes that uphold Islamic ritual law. Attaining the rule of one or more primary Muslim countries in order to establish an Islamic regime is one of the cornerstones of Zawahiri’s philosophy expressed in his book, *Knights Serving Under the Flag of the Prophet*. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North African countries have all been potential candidates.

Al-Qaeda and its Salafi-jihadist militant affiliates will, in the foreseeable future, continue to present multiple threats, on multiple fronts, to the west, its allies, and to prospects of a more moderate global order. Of all the threats they present, none is more pressing for most nations in the world, and for members of all religions numbered among Al-Qaeda's multiplying enemies, than terrorism that could inflict a catastrophe on the human race: unconventional, and, especially, nuclear terrorism. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, then, must be met with a general mobilization of forces that are determined to curb and defeat it. Victory in this struggle is more important to the world's safety today than ever in the past.

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Special Invited Paper: Observations from 37 Years in the Military – A Conversation with Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré (Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Jennifer Robison)

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Terrorism as a Totalitarian Political Tactic

After the attacks on the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the attempted attack on Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, the world scrambled to discover what makes a believer into a terrorist.

The first theory is that extremists are poor, uneducated, and easily led. But Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the attacks, was wealthy and studied architecture at two leading universities. Bilal Abdulla, who was convicted of conspiracy to murder for failed car bomb attacks in Scotland and London in December 2008, is a physician. The next theory is that terrorists are marginalized citizens of oppressed cultures. But David Copeland, who planted bombs in three areas of London in hopes of starting a race war, is white. Michael McKevitt, the leader of the Real IRA who was convicted of directing terrorism, lived a solid middle-class life. A few suggested that religion drives the devout to extremism, but Eric Rudolph, who bombed the Centennial Olympic Park, two abortion clinics, and a bar, killing two people and injured at least 150 others between 1996 and 1998, is a Roman Catholic, a faith that expressly prohibits the use of violence against the innocent - as does Islam.

The more we look at terrorists, the more we have to agree that what unites them are their tactics, not their beliefs. Their beliefs, ideological, religious, and social, drive them, but that cannot be what creates terrorists. Though I am certain that ideology fans the flames – nobody would fly a plane into an office building unless he subscribed to a logically contorted ideology that made the sacrifice worth it – I think ideology does not create extremists, it supports them. I think terrorism is born out of cultures of dominance and the struggle between the haves and the have nots. Terrorists use terror as a means of domination, which their cultures require. When their domination is threatened by the encroachment of other powerful cultures, they inflict violence on civilians as a tactic to maintain power – terrorism sends a message of dominance to the victims as well as the terrorists' own people.

Such dominance almost guarantees poverty and necessitates a dictatorial ideology in the terrorists' culture, though I do not believe poverty and ideology cause radicalism. The Taliban's Afghanistan, Hamas' Palestine, and Omar al-Bashir's Sudan are poor, but so are many other countries. They have strong ideologies, but so do many other peoples. The difference between these terrorist hothouses and other places is that the cultures are totalitarian and believe their power structures to be threatened. So it is a mistake to think poverty, ideology, and religion cause people to radicalize -- those are not causes, they are tools used by exploitative governments -- just as it is a mistake to think that terrorism is new, foreign, or rare.

In every culture, including our own, those with power dominate those without. That is humanity. But in many cases, such as Afghanistan, when under the control of the Taliban, a very few dominated the vast majority *completely* and choked off any hope of future freedom while constructing belief systems positing that it is wrong to want freedom at all. The difference between a believer and a radical is the difference between the willingness to die for a belief and the willingness to kill for it, and the latter are not free to decide the morality of such an act. In free democracies like ours, we teach our young that to die for a belief is a sacrifice borne of honor and courage. In cultures where extremist ideology serves the power structure, they teach their young that to kill innocents is a right and a necessity. The men of our first army, Washington's Army in the Revolutionary War, were willing to die for their belief in freedom, though it was something many of them had never really witnessed -- some of those soldiers were slaves and some of them were indentured servants, but they saw they had the opportunity for freedom. They were willing to die for their belief, but they were not willing to plant bombs in Parliament for it. The theory of freedom as written in our Declaration of Independence made such an act ideologically inconsistent. Extremists believe the opposite.

So, though their religions may celebrate peace, the powerful elite twist those religions into an ideology that requires violence to support the governing structures. And the people most likely to be harmed by such cultures of dominance, in my experience, are the weakest members of the cultures themselves. In my 37 years in the United States Army, stationed all over the world, I have seen that wherever there are large portions of the population that live hand to mouth, live an indigent life - from Rwanda to Ireland to New Orleans - there is more abuse of, and less value to, people's lives than in democracies in which people have educational opportunities, the right to own property, and can take care of their families.

In my opinion, that is why Muslim radicals, who are by no means the majority of Muslims, are so threatened by Western culture. It is not because of what they see on TV, that we are permissive, selfish, colonialist, or immoral, though they do believe that and such is the danger of globalization. Radicals are threatened because the West's economic and military power is a threat to their dominance, and our constitutional freedom from subordination is attractive to their people. Extremists are even more disturbed by the encroachment of competing cultures into their own territory -- there is no strategic reason to bomb co-religionists, who are their natural supporters, other than to maintain dominance. The challenge to their dominance is great enough that radicals feel the only way to defend or expand their hegemony is to scare ordinary people via civilian violence. Such violence maintains their sphere of influence and signals their power and intent to keep it. But it is also an invitation.

The message is clearly that those who transgress against the dominant are in danger. But the subtext is that those who join the power structure will become powerful (and according to the ideology, morally scrupulous) themselves. That is an attractive proposition to those who have little or nothing, including a future.

And therein lies a leverage point. Those opposed to civilian violence cannot win over dominant cultures with competing religious theories or ideologies -- extremists use religions and ideology as motivators, and offering more "attractive" ones supports the dominator's rationale that they are being culturally colonized. The answer to radicalism is political, and the operating principle is opportunity. I very strongly believe, as The Gallup World Poll has found in surveys in 162 countries, that what people, all people in every society, want is security and the ability to

care for their families. That is true everywhere on earth. The single greatest human motivator is the need for safety and the need to feed your children. When people can do that, and when they have the opportunity for freedom, education, health, and the ownership of property, they are much more difficult to exploit. When people have jobs and a safe neighborhood, they are not such easy picking for extremist recruiters and they are less willing to accede to dominators. Essentially, make it harder to exploit the weak, and you undermine dominance. Undermine dominance, and you choke radicalization at the root. If you attempt this overtly or confrontationally, however, you entrench the opposition.

Take, for example, modern military operations in civilian territories. Military operations are meant to achieve a political outcome. It is more difficult to achieve that outcome when the enemy is camouflaged by the civilian population. As in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere a military is fighting guerillas or terrorists, soldiers must sort out the terrorists from the civilians. The only way to do that is to make civilians tell you who the enemy is and is not. That requires human intelligence. Our biggest mistakes in attacking targets have come from basing too much on technical intelligence. A precision weapon is not so precise when it kills 10 or 15 civilians. Our targets know that. And they know that they may die that night, but so will 15 or 20 kids. They know this is going to further their cause and weaken the position of those who seek to kill them. When we were first hunting Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, he hid out in the desert in tents, and then he went to caves, but we generally believe now that if he is alive, he is inside the population some place. He knows that if he is close to civilian targets, the probability of us using a massive air strike to try to kill him is diminished. On the other hand, trying to kill him in a tent in the middle of the desert was pretty difficult with a weapon fired from 2,000 miles away.

The only way to sort out enemies from civilians - and we must, because that is the difference between us and extremists - is for locals to differentiate them. There are two ways to do that. One is to appeal to greed and pay informers. Greed can be a very powerful human motivator. And if we find bin Laden it will probably be because somebody pointed him out for the cash. Appealing to greed is limited, though, because it only works as long as the money lasts, and if the source is scared enough of the radicals, there may not ever be enough money. The other, more sustainable solution is to make the locals safer and more able to care for their families. What makes some resist the psychological domination of extremists can be as simple as running water. Food. Electricity. Security. If you can provide basic needs, your political aim becomes more attractive than the ideology of the radicals. That is exactly why the U.S. military are building roads in Afghanistan. And that is exactly why the Taliban is blowing them up as fast as they are built. But we keep building them because we know that roads will change the culture of a country that imports flour and exports wheat and that exports tomatoes and imports tomato paste. Building new roads and similar activities, I think, explains some of the success we have achieved in Iraq. In the latter parts of the war, we spent a lot of time and resources providing the basic necessities of life and we earned the confidence of the people. Those people, in turn, are the ones who helped point out the terrorists. And then we gave those subordinates the means to protect themselves, which was their awakening. We empowered the tribes and the tribes took back the streets. Success in this area was limited by al Qaeda -- as long as al-Qaeda has free rein, our military intervention cannot secure the society. But it is better than it was a year ago, it is certainly better than it was two years ago, and is a far cry from what it was three years ago.

But no military can provide necessities forever without becoming colonizers -- and it may be important to note that many of today's terrorists grew up in societies that have only recently

shaken off outside colonization: Iraq and Afghanistan have been conquered and reconquered since the time of Alexander the Great. The importation of Scottish Protestants into Northern Ireland starting in 1609 was part of King James I's attempt to colonize the country, resulting in hundreds of years of terrorist reprisals. Racists like Copeland and Rudolph are members of cultures that, until very recently, legally subjugated masses of their citizenry. So colonization, actual or ideological, is a danger to be consciously avoided. A soldier's mandate is security, to allow a government to create an environment in which people can take care of their families. I think that should be the limit of a military objective and it should be tied to a political objective. The aim is not to change the people; it is to get them to a point where they can make their own decisions. Sometimes that backfires on us. As Churchill said, democracy is the worst form of government, except all the other ones that have been tried. There are people in Iraq who say life is better without Saddam, and there are young radicals who say they are being occupied. Americans have never accepted foreign armies occupying our land and we cannot expect others to feel differently, though one may note how little those radicals remember that Saddam Hussein's regime killed thousands of them annually and that he settled differences by sending a regiment of the Republican Guard to cities that offended him to kill everyone in it.

I believe opportunity works. And that is the key. I believe that people will be less amenable to violent ideologies, and less vulnerable to dictators, if they have the tools – education, healthcare, jobs - that let them control their own futures, to secure their own environment. As the society becomes more sophisticated, more educated, and more of its human capital is developed, the people of that society will perceive their unalienable right is to live the way they want and to live without the threat of civilian violence. To use Afghanistan as an example again, in April 2009, 300 Afghan women marched in protest against a law that would have legalized, among other things, marital rape. They were surrounded by three times as many men screaming abuse and throwing rocks. But the women marched two miles to the parliament building and demanded their rights as human beings. That is the sign of a dominant culture being sapped by its own subordinate class. And that is just it - outsiders cannot eradicate the cultures that lead to radicalization - only insiders can. But to get to those insiders, we must do three things: respect the culture, communicate, and ameliorate unintended consequences.

No one, no one, can be forced into a different culture, no matter how much better we say it is, especially extremists. They do not want their beliefs challenged; they want dominance. But more importantly, even the men making bombs in caves want to feed their kids. They want their nephews to go to school. They want their nieces to be able to play outside without setting off bombs. They want safety, the amenities of a decent life, and a future. And they know that if they can provide those things to their people, they will obtain true power. And we know that as more of the people are exposed to a better way of life, the reasonable people will move toward it and away from extremist ideologies. However, when we pressure people to exchange their culture for another, we justify their suspicions of our motives, force them to defend their beliefs, and undermine our own objectives. After the Afghan women's protest, one of the senior clerics of the madrassa that wrote that law said, "We Afghans don't want a bunch of NATO commanders and foreign ministers telling us what to do." That is true of every society, but we must remember that cultures that accept civilian violence react violently to outside pressure.

So, when dealing with individuals in radicalizing environments, you have got to understand and appreciate the culture and work within it. To do that, you have to communicate. If you cannot communicate, you get the total opposite effect of what you wanted. In the military,

if we are not happy with how the troops are responding, some sergeant will get out front, yell at the troops, use a few profanities, and the troops buck up and move on. In some cultures, if you raise your voice to a village chief, you may engender the anger of the entire village because you showed a lack of respect. And it goes without saying that fluency in local languages is essential. We need the respect and assistance of everyone in an environment that permits civilian violence and we cannot get it if we cannot talk to them. Communication is the first step toward cooperation. Cooperation reduces our need to react violently, it furthers our political aims, and it reduces the potential of unintended consequences. And those can be very, very serious.

Soldiers very rarely find themselves in situations in which they can control every eventuality. And now, everything the soldier does can be on CNN by dinnertime. That is how tactical actions become strategic issues. The terrorists were delighted by the photos from Abu Ghraib: because they did not realize how appalled Americans were by the treatment of the Abu Ghraib prisoners, the Iraqi people could easily believe that such is how Americans think about people of Islamic faith. The lack of respect shown by seven soldiers to a handful of prisoners became an effective recruitment tool for the terrorists. An American, Nick Berg, who went to Iraq to fix TV antennas, was beheaded in retaliation. And a small-scale tactical action became a strategic problem for an entire administration, the U.S. military, as well as us as a nation.

That is why we cannot force change – it is disrespectful and counterproductive. We can only offer opportunities. In poor countries with a dominating culture, very few people feel secure or are able to take care of their families adequately. Give them the opportunity to do that and they will not feel forced to defend their ideology to themselves. Help them develop their own human capital, and they will have the power to confront their own dictators. I saw it happen when I was the Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, where an oppressive military regime gave way to a solid capitalist democracy. South Koreans now have a strong working class of artisans, people who can build things and make things, and such a reverence for education that every child gets a chance to go to school. Poor kids still have to work harder to lift themselves up, but a South Korean can change his or her circumstances, much like an American can, through education. That could happen in Afghanistan, though the odds are against it.

South Korea changed relatively quickly – most of the time, sustainable change takes the art of patience. It is hard. It is slow. It is frustrating and it does not always work. But it is the most reliable path to deradicalization we have seen and we are already seeing it work.

And it works in solid democracies such as our own. Eric Rudolph is living proof that cultures of domination can be found in the United States too. To eradicate them, we have to use the same methods that work overseas: understand the culture first -- kids in America do not join gangs for the job experience, they do it because they find in gangs the social and economic support they are not getting at home. Support the systems of opportunity -- invest in Railroad Street as much as we do Wall Street and Main Street. Do not let the dominant exploit the weak because soon, they will come after everybody else. As we have seen.

Again, it is not easy or fast, and it will be frustrating. But we need to be persistent and patient -- even in our own country it has taken over 230 years for everybody to really feel that they have the freedom promised in the Declaration of Independence and the opportunities promised by the Constitution. It is going to take time, it is going to take patience, and it is going to take a relentless effort to reach a political resolution to radicalization, homegrown or foreign.

Those who have nothing to believe in or work toward but an ideology of violence are easily exploited by those who seek to dominate. Those who have hope, freedom, and a future are not such easy pickings. When we give the dominated the opportunity to genuinely support themselves, I believe the dominated become free. Free people dismantle cultures of dominance bit by bit. And as cultures of dominance die away, ideologies of violence fade with them.

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Special Invited Paper (Captain Wayne Porter)

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Much has been written, assessed, analyzed, and postulated since the attacks of September 11, 2001 about the "terrorist" threat posed to the U.S., our allies, and a modern civilization that respects human rights, dignity, and the rule of law. But as a nation, and as a member of the greater international community of nations, we have yet to comprehend and recognize it for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. Consequently, we have yet to devise and articulate, let alone resource, initiate, or wage, a holistic, synchronized campaign to discredit and defeat this threat. We have expended vast resources and sacrificed many precious lives. But absent a comprehensive understanding and a coherent strategy, results have been mixed at best. We lack the means to determine whether we are winning or, for that matter, what victory and failure look like.

While it is clear that violent militant jihadi extremism is not a monolithic movement, core ideological interpretations provide connective tissue that bind radical Islamic movements worldwide. Although al Qaeda is perhaps the one, transnational, and stateless organization that seeks to unite disparate extremists through a franchised global network, there are loosely affiliated movements, organizations, and individuals that share common goals, tactics, funding, training, etc. Whether their ascetic vision of an imagined past is manifested through local insurgencies, regional movements, or global strategies, the threat is real and must be addressed globally—universally—as an affront to modern civilization, perhaps especially within the Muslim world.

In violent militant jihadi extremism, we are facing an implacable, hateful perversion of the Islamic religion, which is antithetical to human rights, modern rule of law, freedom of expression, and self-determination. This extremism is a dangerous and insidious enemy, fanatically committed to implementing a vision of religious piety and purity that places no apparent premium on human life.

Radical militant jihadi dogma is propagated virally, through a highly adaptive, loosely coupled, and pervasive global network. Whether this threat manifests itself through the actions of governments, organizations, groups of malcontents, or disturbed individuals, it is perhaps best approached as a collision of chaos and complexity theories. Couplings will naturally occur through apparently random processes that, when examined more closely, will be seen to satisfy common requirements in discernable patterns.

This global network of the disenfranchised continues to form and grow autonomously and recursively. Perhaps the only way to counter its malignancy is to introduce into the environment benign conditions that satisfy the needs of its constituent members. In other words, change the environment and offer alternatives. This network of ideological radicals cannot be contained or controlled. But it can be discredited.

The stated goal of the most virulent strains of violent militant jihadi extremism, Al Qaeda and related movements, is to establish a caliphate that can challenge western hegemony. If left alone, this complex, adaptive network will succeed in obtaining the capability to satisfy its stated intent. Al

Qaeda and related local "jihadist" movements worldwide, funded and sustained through narcotics, arms, and human trafficking, could eventually pose a significant threat to our national interests and those of our partners worldwide. Further, these movements could cause us to constrain the values we cherish, and that characterize us, as Americans. This, in itself, represents a new definition of "existential threat."

We need to interrupt the network of violent extremism, addressing legitimate grievances by offering alternatives through cooperation with Muslim partners. The first step in our process is to *acknowledge the true nature of the threat and formulate a national strategy to discredit and defeat it*. It is my hope that this white paper will provide the means to begin this process.

Only Muslims can expose the virulent corruption of their religion and cultural ideologies. Non-Muslims in America and worldwide can support this effort by demonstrating even-handed religious and cultural tolerance, addressing those negative stressors that most affect the third world and contribute to an environment in which extremist networks might successfully couple with sympathetic movements and individuals. Critical to this effort is recognizing the nature of the threat and exposing it through healthy dialogue and positive action.

1. Conditions that Foster Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) - Root Causes of Terrorism

1.1. The Anatomy of a Swamp: Predictive Factors of Different Types of Radicalism (Tom Rieger)

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Introduction

Unfortunately, it's nothing new.

Whether in the jungles of Colombia, the mountains of Peru, the subways of Tokyo, the streets of Northern Ireland or the center of Oklahoma City, or across markets, buildings, and schools in Pakistan or Afghanistan, recent history is marred with numerous examples of non-state actors committing acts of unspeakable violence, often at the cost of their own lives, against unarmed civilians.

These acts of violence are not necessarily against government facilities or targets. They are more often than not planned simply to make a point, spread terror, and kill as many innocent people as possible in the most gruesome and spectacular manner achievable.

Certainly, the groups behind these attacks in many cases have specific and different ideological and political goals. However, they all share at least one common characteristic: individuals feel not only justified, but morally compelled to commit these incredibly violent acts.

Much has been postulated and written about the factors that lead to such attitudes and behavior. However, there have been very few if any validated and replicated works that attempt to determine on a global scale, using large-scale representative samples, what the *common* underlying factors are that create the "swamps" from which violent extremists are born.

An opportunity to examine these factors presented itself with the launch of the Gallup World Poll in 2005. The World Poll was by no means ever intended to be an instrument designed specifically to measure the causes of extreme radicalism. However, it provided a survey vehicle that measured, in a consistent manner, attitudes, beliefs and opinions across approximately 140 countries. Sample sizes were sufficient for sample error levels of only +/- 2% or better, since each country included between n=1000 and n=2500 interviews per wave.

From Organizational Barriers to Societal Barriers

The conceptual basis for Gallup's research regarding radicalism came from a somewhat unlikely place. For several years, Gallup had been studying the reasons why managers or departments within organizations create "barriers": policies, practices or behaviors that further their own agenda, often despite the harm created for other departments, or for the organization as a whole. These barriers tended to fall into one of five root causes, including fear of loss (including loss of respect or loss of ability to meet a goal), lack of alignment (either with current leadership or intolerance of other groups), how information is filtered and processed, decisions that provide short-term benefit with longer term consequences, and conflict over resources

(Rieger & Kamins 2006). Since these factors were found to be the root causes behind instances on a micro basis where decisions were made to benefit a small group at the expense of others, it was an intriguing question of whether these same factors could explain similar, though certainly more dramatic, events on a more macro scale.

Model Development

As a first step, Gallup mapped the World Poll 2005/2006 questionnaire against its database of barriers found through its management consulting work and subsequently sought to determine whether these factors were predictive of extreme radical views.

For the dependent variable, a group of respondents were identified who held radical views. Specifically, they strongly believed the attacks of 9/11 were completely justified, strongly believed that attacks against civilians in pursuit of a goal were completely justified, especially those committed by other civilians. To be classified as having radical views, a respondent must have given the strongest possible response to all of these questions.

It is important to note that these political radicals were not necessarily violent non-state actors. Rather, in theory they might be more likely than others to make up the “swamp” – those who provide active or passive support, a center of gravity, safe haven, a potential recruiting pool, financial support, or even just be more likely to look the other way. For the purposes of this paper, these individuals are referred to as “political radicals” since their views, but not necessarily their actions, are radicalized. All other respondents were classified as part of the contrast group. The total sample size for this effort was $n=27,528$ (included countries where all questions were asked and respondents who provided valid responses to all model questions).

Since the objective of the exercise was to classify each respondent into the group that represented the best fit for that individual (radical or non-radical), stepwise discriminant function analysis was used. Initial results of the model in terms of strength of classifying members of the attitudinally radical group were quite strong. Approximately 86% of respondents were classified correctly, and model fit statistics were quite stable (Wilkes’ Lambda = .971, Chi Square = 283.5, sig. at 99%+ CL) (Rieger, 2008, pp. 4-5).

However, further examination showed an interesting pattern. While the model did an excellent job of identifying non-radicals, it only correctly classified a little over half of the radicals. Given that the non-radical group was much larger, these results were still quite compelling. But the false negatives in particular (those that model said were not radical, but in actuality were) were at a relatively high level.

Further analysis of this group of false negatives was quite illuminating. A second, and very different, type of radical was identified. In other words, individuals classified as “political radicals” appear to form two clusters or distinct groups relative to the “barrier” factors (given the focus on political radicals, the model was named “POLRAD”). The two types (the Type One Radicals identified in the original model and Type Two Radicals identified in the residual analysis) showed very different demographic and attitudinal characteristics.

Given that attitudes formed a continuum, it was also possible to identify a group of “fence sitters”, whose attitudes were almost, but not quite, strong enough to classify them as having radical attitudes. This group was named “high potentials,” and may represent the main battleground for undecided hearts and minds.

Model Validation

The original model was developed using data from the 2005/2006 World Poll. Gallup tested the replicability of the model with data from the 2007 World Poll. The 2007 data included a different mix of countries, different respondents, and some additional questions that could be potential additions to the model.

When the analytical process was repeated using 22,068 interviews from the 2007 data, not only was a model found that contained factors that were virtually identical to the first model, but the weights of each factor were also nearly identical to those found in the 2005/2006 model as well. Model statistics in the validation run were also quite robust (Wilkes Lambda = .998, Chi Square = 199, Sig. 99%+ CL) (Rieger, 2008, p. 6).

Characteristics of Type One Radicals

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the Type One Radicals indicated by the data was intolerance or elitism. This group strongly believed that living in harmony with others who were different was completely unjustified, and they were in general intolerant of other groups.

A second strong characteristic found among the Type Ones was a distinct lack of confidence in current governance. This lack of confidence was not limited to just national government but also extended to include local leadership. Often, perceptions of lack of government confidence had roots in a perceived lack of progress, particularly on improving basic services, or dissatisfaction with the electoral process and/or judicial systems.

Other secondary characteristics of the Type One Radicals were that they tended to have experienced some past hardship and also tended to live in areas where people were concerned over personal safety.

Also interesting was what the Type Ones were *not*. This group was not demographically distinct from the rest of the population. In fact, they were very much mainstream in terms of age, income, and profession.

Secondly, while the data indicated they tended to be in favor (in Islamic countries) of having Shari'a play a strong role in legislation, they were not themselves more religious than the rest of the population in that they did not attend services more regularly than other respondents and were less likely than others to say that religion was important to them personally.

In summary, the data indicated that Type One Radicals were highly intolerant mainstream individuals who had little to no confidence in their current government's ability to meet what they saw as a desirable future.

Characteristics of Type Two Radicals

Type Two Radicals were quite different than the Type Ones. While the Type One Radicals were very intolerant, the Type Twos tended to believe they were the victims of the intolerance of others. A "victim mentality" was a strongly defining characteristic of this group.

Secondly, while the Type Ones were more mainstream, the data showed that Type Two radicals were distinctively downscale, especially in terms of income.

In addition, analysis showed that the Type Two Radicals were strongly leader seeking, to the point where they were much more likely than others to indicate that they would leave family

and friends for a leader, go to jail for a leader, and even die for a leader they believed in. In general, this group was also much more likely than the Type Ones to say they would be very willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause. In general, this group tended to have very favorable opinions of virtually any strong or violent action in pursuit of a goal.

Along with leader seeking, this group was also ideology seeking. This finding should not be interpreted as solely applying to an extremist interpretation of Islam (in predominantly Muslim countries). It did not necessarily relate specifically to religion of any type. Analysis showed it could also be some form of nationalism, or some other ideological framework. Ideology in general appears to be a galvanizing force, used by a sought-out leader, to form strong views within this group.

In summary, Type Two Radicals were downscale individuals who viewed themselves as victims and sought a strong leader and/or ideology for hope.

Support for the Concept of Two Types of Radicals

There has been a fair amount of debate over whether radicals are primarily the downtrodden, as is the case with many suicide bombers, or if they are more upscale or mainstream, such as the leadership of Al Qaeda.

An examination of the history and profiles compiled by Post (Post, 2008) shows some support that leadership in many cases tends to show many characteristics of the Type Ones (intolerance toward another group and/or antipathy toward a current government), while the followers tend to show many characteristics of the Type Twos (downscale, victims, leader seeking), although further research is necessary to determine the extent to which this delineation exists.

Other research in Central Asian region by Thomas and Kiser found what they referred to as “ideology entrepreneurs,” who were quite analogous to the Type Ones, who sought to recruit the victimized poor, who were similar to the Type Twos (Thomas & Kiser, 2002).

Additional work by Kuznar regarding deprivation, risk and conflict also found support for two distinct mainstream and downscale groups of non-state actors (Kuznar, 2009).

All in all, there appears to be strong evidence and corroborating support that understanding the etiology of radicalism requires an understanding that not all radicals are the same, and that individuals can become attitudinally radicalized through one of at least two very different and complementary paths.

That said, it is important to note where the model should or should not be applied. The model requires a fairly large number of surveys to be able to identify these groups in sufficient numbers for meaningful analysis. The model cannot be applied in denied areas where research is not possible. In addition, care should be taken to ensure the items are translated properly, and that the sample design is truly representative of the population being studied. Otherwise, the analyst risks making conclusions based on incomplete or un-projectable data. Across the globe, however, there are only a few areas where these limitations exist (such as North Korea, the FATA region of Pakistan, and other denied areas).

Achieving Critical Mass

The critical question that follows from this research is at what point are levels of political radicalization high enough to result in the formation of a “swamp” that fosters activity.

While causality can certainly not be inferred, general guidelines can be determined through examination of radicalism levels (as identified by the POLRAD model described in this paper) relative to incidents reported in the NCTC’s public reporting of terrorist events (National Counter-Terrorism Center Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 2009).

There were sixteen countries from the 2007 World Poll where POLRAD estimates were available in the NCTC 2008 database. In comparing radicalism levels within those countries to the number of incidents in the year *following* data collection, it became very apparent that once 3% of the population became politically radicalized, there was a much greater likelihood of subsequent high levels of activity. While these data do not conclusively show that a causal relationship exists, there is clearly a pattern where areas showing high levels of radicalism today tend to show high levels of activity in the not too distant future. Specifically, countries with low levels of radicalism (greater than zero but less than 3% of either Type One or Type Two Radicals) experienced on average 83 acts of terror in the subsequent year.

Countries with Type One or Type Two radicalism levels of at least 3% experienced on average *971 acts of terror* in the subsequent year. Even if India and Pakistan were excluded as outliers, there was still quite a difference (83 vs. 282). (Note: Iraq and Afghanistan were not included in this analysis, as World Poll data were not available for those countries).




Figure 1. Average Incidents vs. POLRAD Levels

Certainly, these results do not necessarily show that activity will *always* spike once the 3% threshold is hit, but it does appear that radicalization is strongly related to hostile/violent activities in areas with support at approximately 3% of the population.

While these results are quite dramatic, looking solely at country level totals can potentially hide other “swamps” hidden within the population. It is important to note that populations are rarely uniform. There may very well be pockets within a country that have much higher radicalism levels than others, or even within cities among particular ethno-sectarian enclaves. These pockets may form within a particular geographic area, within a religious sect, among a particular ethnicity or tribal group, or even among workers in a particular industry. Application of the model is most useful when sufficient sample size is included to allow for such sub-group analysis.

Conclusion

There are at least two very different types of radicals with very different characteristics. In developing strategies to counter emerging radicalization, it is critical to understand not only which type of radical is being created, but also what specific predictive factors appear to be at play.

By developing a deep understanding of these dynamics within a population, strategies can be developed that are specifically tailored to the most critical dynamics influencing a particular group to help counter emerging threats.

And, if caught early enough, a population can potentially avoid becoming radicalized in the first place.

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1.2. Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization (Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko)¹

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We define political radicalization as changes in beliefs, feelings and behavior in the direction of increased support for a political conflict. Radicalization can involve the movement of individuals and groups to legal and nonviolent political action (*activism*) or to illegal and violent political action (*radicalism*). An extreme of radicalization is terrorism, in which a non-state group targets not only government forces but civilian citizens supporting the government.

Analysts often describe jihadist radicalization as either “top-down” or “bottom-up” (U.S. Department of State, 2006; National Intelligence Council, 2007). Top-down radicalization refers to cases in which a radical group seeks new members through an organized recruiting campaign (charismatic imams, mobilizing networks, education and outreach programs). By contrast, bottom-up radicalization refers to cases in which individuals or small group develop radical feelings and beliefs in relative isolation from any existing radical group and only then seek connection with an existing radical group or move to radical action on their own initiative.

Unfortunately, the top-down vs. bottom-up distinction is not easily applied to the current array of cases of jihadi radicalization. If friends engaged in a community service group move to radicalization after watching Al Jazeera, or after watching videos of Muslim victimization on a jihadi web site, or after talking in a radical chat room—is this top-down or bottom-up? It is bottom-up in the sense that the friends have not been contacted personally by members of an existing radical group. But it is top-down in the sense that jihadist groups provide footage for Al Jazeera, put inciting films on their web sites, and organize radical chat rooms. The news, films, and chat rooms of jihadist and radical groups ARE, in effect, their recruiting programs.

Rather than trying to reconcile the differences between top-down and bottom-up perspectives, a more promising approach is to identify mechanisms of political radicalization that operate across groups as varied as militant jihadis and U.S. domestic radical groups. These mechanisms occur at three levels: individual, group, and mass public (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). *Individuals* are moved to join existing radical groups by a range of personal motives and experiences. Activist and radical *groups* become more extreme through competition with government forces and with groups trying to represent the same cause. A *mass public* is radicalized in and through intra and inter-state conflicts. Here we focus on individual- and group-level mechanisms. It is important to note at the outset that none of these mechanisms enables a 100 percent prediction of radicalization; rather each is a contributor for movement toward radicalization. Usually, individuals radicalize due to a combination of mechanisms.

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Individual-level Mechanisms

Individual mechanisms are the most relevant for understanding how individuals join an already radicalized group. The next section, **group-level mechanisms**, focuses on how an existing group becomes more radical over time. In practice, the two levels of mechanisms tend to become mutually reinforcing.

1. Individual Radicalization through Personal Grievance. An individual can be radicalized as a result of the perception of unjustified harm to self or loved ones. Although often cited as an explanation for terrorism, this mechanism is difficult to quantify. We are not aware of any research that attempts to count the proportion of terrorist group members with a personal grievance against their target group.

However, several observations indicate that personal grievance is seldom sufficient for radicalization. Most individuals with a personal grievance do not know or cannot reach the individuals who victimized them; their target of radical action and terrorism is the larger group that the perpetrators are seen to represent—police, army, government officials, and citizens supporting the government. Terrorist groups may include individuals seeking revenge, but a terrorist group aims to represent a political cause that is more than a collection of vendettas. Indeed, personal motives of revenge can undermine the cohesion and united action that make an effective terrorist group. Thus, we argue that personal grievance seldom leads to radicalization unless it is interpreted (with help of group and mass-level rhetoric) as part of a larger political struggle (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

In areas where intergroup violence is high and long-standing, most individuals will have some direct experience of personal victimization or loss at the hands of the enemy. Thus, the Chechen Black Widows included many women who were widowed or brutalized by the Russian Army (Granville-Chapman, 2004; Parfitt, 2004). Personal grievances led some of these women to suicide terrorism (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006). There are similar accounts of personal victimization among Tamil Tiger and Palestinian suicide terrorists (Arnestadt, 2004).

In areas where intergroup violence is low, fewer individuals will have experience of personal victimization, and such victimization, when it occurs, is more likely to take the form of bias and discrimination than physical brutality and death. Muslims in Europe who turn to terrorism are less likely to be trying to revenge a personal grievance than Muslims in Iraq or Afghanistan.

2. Individual Radicalization through Political Grievance. An individual can be radicalized as a result of strong identification with a political group or cause that is highlighted in the mass media or Internet. It is rare that this mechanism of radicalization goes all the way to violent action without some group or organizational support; more commonly the growing radicalization of beliefs and feelings leads the individual to associate with similar others through group dynamics described below. But cases of “lone-wolf terrorism” do occur.

Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, became so invested in his personal crusade against technological progress that he began mailing bombs to those he saw responsible for such progress. Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, a young immigrant from Iran, drove a sport utility vehicle into a crowded area of the University of NC Chapel Hill, injuring nine people to “avenge the deaths of Muslims around the world.” Lone-wolf terrorism is often attributed to

psychopathology, but there may be many examples labeled as “hate crime” that do not involve any psychiatric disorder.

3. Individual Radicalization in Action—The Slippery Slope. Individuals may become radicalized as a result of experiences they have after joining an existing radical group. Except for suicide bombers, it is rare for a new terrorist recruit to be entrusted with carrying out a lethal attack. Instead, interviews with former group members indicate that progression toward the most radical behaviors is deliberately slow and gradual (McCauley & Segal, 1987). At first, a new recruit may be asked to carry insignificant pieces of information, or to serve as a lookout. Later, the recruit may be asked to deliver a weapon and later still asked to drive a senior member to a meeting. This progression continues until the now-tested recruit is ready to use a bomb or a gun.

The power of this progression is its gradual nature. The first step is easy with little risk to the recruit and little harm to anyone. Each new step in the progression is only minimally more radical. On this slippery slope, there is no transition marked “terrorist,” and an individual looking back on a terrorist career can find it difficult to answer questions about “When did you decide to become a terrorist?”

Recruiting for the Basque terrorist group, ETA, has been described as the development of a personal relationship between a terrorist and a potential recruit. The new man is mentored and brought along into ETA in a very gradual progression. A Red Brigade militant in Italy described his experience this way: “A choice [made] in cold blood, such as ‘now I will become a terrorist,’ [did] not exist. It was a step-by-step evolution, which passed through a kind of human relation that I had with Guido, and with the people I worked with” (della Porta, 1995, p. 168).

4. Individual Radicalization in Relationship—The Power of Love. In order to avoid penetration by government security forces, radicals and terrorists tend to recruit from within the trusted circle of friends and family of those already radicalized (della Porta, 1995, p. 167-168; Sageman, 2004). Similarly, individuals may join radical groups in order to be with or to protect a loved one who is already a member. The bond that brings people into the group is likely to become even stronger as they share common experiences of threat from the authorities or rival groups, as well as the experience of isolation, common to radical groups that tend to make group members more dependent on one another. Former members of radical groups recall that once a loved one is threatened or killed, any doubts about the group’s tactics or cause become irrelevant. In this mechanism, an individual may become highly radicalized in terms of actions without a parallel radicalization in political beliefs.

Sophia Perovskaya, one of the leaders of the nineteenth century Russian terrorist group “People’s Will,” initially objected to the idea of using violence to advance the organization’s cause. She nonetheless participated in the organization’s activities, including assassination attempts, because of her loyalty to her lover Anrdej Zhelyabov. Anrdej was one of the most radical of the group leaders and committed to violence (Radzinsky & Bouis, 2006).

A particular form of love that can move individuals to join a radical group is the “love-at-a-distance” that is sometimes referred to as charismatic leadership. A strong and confident personality combined with public speaking skills can provide an important attraction for new recruits. This is one of the keys to Osama bin Laden’s staying power.

5. Individual Radicalization in Status and Thrill Seeking. Terrorism offers a number of rewards to those who seek adventures and the admiration of others: access to a secret society with grandiose goals; the thrill of operations that involve guns and money; and status and fame unparalleled by the achievement of an ordinary life. Young men, in particular, are susceptible to the appeal of these rewards as they transition from adolescence into young adulthood, trying to position themselves relative to their peers (Wilson & Daly, 1985). A strong social structure will often provide outlets for the young and restless including firefighting and military and police service. But even when these legitimate outlets are available, a proportion of thrill and status seeking youths will be attracted to street gangs or criminal networks for a life of unpredictability and danger. For these individuals, the ideology of the group they join matters less than the anticipation of thrill and status (Goldstein, 1994; Kanasawa & Still, 2000).

Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is an example of this kind of radicalization. A petty criminal imprisoned for rape and drug possession, he ascended the ranks of a prison gang by severely beating his rivals and demanding complete servitude from other prisoners. Released from prison, he went to Afghanistan where he could indulge his inclination for violence and thrills in the war against Russians. There he met Osama bin Laden and adopted the fundamentalist militant jihadi ideology. But as leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi released videotapes of beheadings he personally carried out, despite requests from Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, to avoid alienating Muslims. For Zarqawi, the rewards of violence and status could be more important than forwarding the global caliphate.

6. Individual Opening to Radicalization: Unfreezing. For many individuals, the path to radicalization is blocked by prior commitments and responsibilities. Supporting a family, building a career, and attachments to friends and neighbors would all be jeopardized by joining an illegal and dangerous organization. But what if these commitments and attachments are lost? Perhaps parents or a spouse die suddenly. Or a civil war ravages the country, destroying homes, families, jobs, and social networks. Or an individual moves from home to a foreign country or remote city and has to begin again with no social ties and few resources. Thus disconnected, an individual is an easy prospect for any group that offers comradeship and connection. If group membership comes with an ideology, it may seem like a reasonable trade.

In his analysis of the 9/11 bombers, Sageman (2004) concluded that isolation and alienation opened the door to radicalization of young Muslims living in Europe. It is important to note that unfreezing can facilitate many different new identities, but for a Muslim living in a non-Muslim country, shared religion is a likely to be a high-salience source of similarity and support.

Group-level Mechanisms

There are a few individuals who translate their own personal grievance into political violence without participation in a radical group, but these lone-wolf radicals do not usually represent a large threat. Radical power comes from groups with enough cohesion and organization to plan and carry out collective action and, in the case of terrorism, collective violence. In this section, we emphasize the mechanisms that move a whole group toward political radicalization - key to understanding deradicalization or desistance from illegal political action. We return to this issue at the end of the section on **Implications and Research Issues**.

7. Extremity Shift in Likeminded Groups—Group Polarization. Group discussion among like-minded people tends to move average group opinion further towards the direction

favored initially by a majority of group members (Brown, 1986, p. 200-301). Discussion among people who favor the same political candidate, for instance, is likely to move average opinion toward even stronger approval of this candidate. This tendency is the result of two forces.

First, discussing an issue will bring out new arguments, not previously considered. In a like-minded group, most of the new arguments will be in the direction already favored. Group members are then persuaded by the new arguments they hear and become more confident and more extreme in the initially favored direction. Second, individuals who are more extreme in the group-favored direction are viewed as more admirable and influential. Less extreme members of the group then tend to gravitate toward the more extreme opinions in order to see themselves as more influential and admirable (Brown, 1986, p. 200-301).

These two forces are likely to affect groups of people who come together around some issue of political reform (saving redwoods, animal rights) or of resisting reform (integrated schools, gun control). A group drawn together by concern for the same political issue is likely to become more radical over time, especially if their efforts do not seem to be making enough difference. In the U.S., the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came to their first demonstrations in 1960 well dressed and clean-shaven with the Bible in one hand and the U.S. Constitution in the other. By 1966, SNCC's leader Stokely Carmichael was talking about "Black Power" and violent confrontation with whites. Similarly, despite the 1962 Port Huron statement, a manifesto focused on poverty and civil rights in which the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) called for democratic reform, the organization drifted toward increasingly radical politics and more confrontational tactics (Sale, 1973).

8. *Activist Radicalization in Competition with State Power--Condensation.* This mechanism of radicalization arises in conflict between a government and an activist group challenging the government. Initially, the members of the challenge group are not prepared to get involved in illegal or violent action. As activists, they may participate in non-violent protest or spread propaganda. When the state response is repressive and the costs of continuing political action are raised, the less committed members drop out. Those who remain are likely to turn to more radical rhetoric and action (Mechanism 7), typically leading to even harsher response from the state. Over time, only a tiny fraction of hardened radicals remains and may go underground as a terrorist group.

The group dynamics at the heart of this mechanism are a reliable consequence of facing outside threat or attack. Hostility toward the threatening group is the obvious result, but equally important is the impact of threat on the interactions among those feeling threatened. Perceived interdependence within the threatened group increases as group members see they will share the consequences of the outside threat. They see, as Dr. Johnson put it, that "we must hang together or assuredly we will hang separately." The result is increased group identification (increased cohesion), idealization of ingroup values, increased respect for ingroup leaders, and increased readiness to punish anyone dissenting from group norms. This mechanism is a powerful source of radicalizing beliefs, feelings, and behavior as a group facing threat moves toward the unity of thought, feeling, and action that prepares them to fight the threat (Grant & Brown, 1995; LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

In Italy in the 1970s, the terrorist Red Brigades condensed out of leftist protest movements, after years of escalating conflict between protestors and Italian police. Similarly, the Weather

Underground condensed out of the Students for a Democratic Society after escalating conflicts between protestors and U.S. police (Sale, 1973).

9. *Group Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support—Outbidding.* Groups rallying behind the same political cause can be in competition for the same base of sympathizers and supporters. This support can be crucial in providing cover, money, and new recruits. As competing groups try different tactics to advance their cause, the competition may escalate to gradually more radical acts if sympathizers favor these acts – a competition described by Mia Bloom (2005) as “outbidding.”

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist group that eschewed the rhetoric of jihad and did not organize martyrdom actions in the early years of the Second Intifada. Polls of Palestinians indicated that support for the PFLP was dwindling. The PFLP began talking about jihad and fielded its own suicide bombers and its poll numbers recovered (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

10. *Group Radicalization from Within-group Competition—Fissioning.* The intense pressure for conformity within a radical group can result in factions and internal conflict. The conflict may be about tactics, with one faction advocating more violence, or may be more to do with personalities and internal power struggles. Sometimes the conflict can escalate to violence but even if it does not, the factions may separate to form new groups. The ingroup dynamics resulting from external threat (Mechanism 6) again come into play, and at least some of the new groups are likely to be more radical than the group from which they separated.

The IRA provides an example of many competing factions—Official IRA, Provisional IRA, Real IRA, Continuity IRA, INLA—who sometimes targeted one another. In perhaps the most extreme case of within-group conflict, Japanese authorities in 1972 found a mountain hideout of the Japanese Red Army with the dismembered bodies of twelve terrorists who had lost out in an intragroup conflict that had spun out of control (McCauley & Segal, 1987).

11. *Social Reality Power of Isolated Groups—The Multiplier.* Some would say that science and engineering do not address the most important human questions. What is beautiful and what is ugly? What is fair and what is unjust? What is worth working for, or fighting for, or dying for? Am I a good person? What does it mean that I am going to die? In group dynamics theory, the only source of confidence in answering these questions is consensus: agreement with others (Festinger, 1954). Systems of meaning and values represented in religions and secular ideologies offer abstract answers to these questions, but the specifics for implementing these systems in relation to the current situation typically depend on group consensus.

When an individual belongs to many different groups with competing values, any one group has little power over the individual. But when a group is isolated from outside influences, its power over individual members becomes extremely strong. Isolated groups--terrorist groups, youth gangs, religious cults, soldiers in combat—have unchecked power to determine value and meaning. Consensus power in such groups can justify and even require extreme beliefs, feelings, and actions against anyone who threatens the group. The unchecked value-setting power of an isolated group is a multiplier, but it is not necessarily the propensity for illegal and violent action that is multiplied. In a monastery, isolation can serve to multiply religious fervor and prayer. In an underground terrorist cell, however, isolation is likely to multiply the intensity of violence and justify escalation of violent tactics. Group radicalization through condensation, outbidding, and fission mechanisms are all multiplied to the extent that the group members are cut off from all

but fellow-radical group members.

Just how far the social reality power of the group can go is suggested by the comments of Mark Rudd, a leader of the Weather Underground, looking back on the violence of his youth. “We were just stupid kids too in love with our ideas to realize they weren’t real. We believed they were real because we thought them. That’s the essence of the downside of idealism” (Rudd, 2008).

Implications and Research Questions

1. Pathways to Radicalization are Many and Variable. There is no one path, no “trajectory profile” to political radicalization. Rather there are many different paths. How many can be estimated by calculating how many different combinations can be made of the mechanisms already identified. Some of these paths do not include radical ideas or activism on the way to radical action, so the radicalization progression cannot be understood as an invariable set of steps or “stages” from sympathy to radicalism. Radicalization by the power of love for someone already radicalized, for instance, can occur for an individual with no previous political activity. Joining a violent group for thrill, money, or status similarly does not require any political ideas or ideology (della Porta, 1995).

2. There is No Conveyor Belt from Activism to Terrorism. Whether or when legal activists graduate to illegal political or violent action depends on culture, time, and place. Some activists have moved on to terrorism, and some with radical ideas have moved on to radical action. The question is, how common are these transitions?

After the 7/7 bombings in London, polling showed that five percent or 50,000 adult Muslims believe that these attacks were justified in defense of Islam (Pew, 2005). But the UK security services are focused on no more than 2000 individuals as jihadist threats, suggesting that only about four percent of those who justify terrorism are actually any kind of security threat (Gardham, 2009).

Similarly, it appears that few activists graduate to terrorism. Of the tens of thousands of U.S. college students involved in 1970s activist organization, Students for a Democratic Society, only a few hundred moved on to terrorism in the Weather Underground. Comparable ratios are seen for the 1970s student movements that produced the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany (Sale, 1973).

It appears, then, that the proportion moving from radical ideas to radical action is small, and the proportion moving from legal activism to radical action and terrorism may be even smaller. Certainly the proportions are too small to support the metaphor of a ‘conveyor belt’ (Baran, 2004) with its implication of an inevitable end for anyone who steps onto the belt.

What about the proportion of radicals or terrorists with a previous history of legal activism? This question is in need of study, but examples suggest that even here the proportion may be small. In the UK, none of the individuals involved in the 7/7 bombing was a regular member of an Islamic activist group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or al-Mahajiroun, though several of the bombers seem to have been peripherally involved in these groups. Obviously, no one considering illegal political activity is likely to risk the attention of police and security forces by joining an activist group, even if the activism is entirely within the law.

3. *When Does Activism Compete with Terrorism?* In some places and times, legal activism may serve as a safety valve for the expression of grievances that might otherwise lead to terrorism. Groups involved in legal activism may even compete with terrorist groups for potential recruits. A group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir may contribute to jihadi terrorism to the extent that it encourages the same beliefs and feelings encouraged by Al Qaeda--seeing the war on terrorism as a war on Islam, feeling humiliated by Western power--but may inhibit jihadi terrorism to the extent that it discourages Hizb members from translating these feelings and beliefs into violent action. Assessing the balance of these two tendencies is a difficult issue for researchers, security forces, and policy makers.

4. *How Important is Ideology in Moving Individuals and Groups to Terrorism?* As already noted, there are many paths to radicalization that do not involve ideology. Some join a radical group for thrill and status, some for love, some for connection and comradeship. Personal and group grievance can move individuals toward violence, with ideology serving only to rationalize the violence. Indeed videos of Muslims killed or maimed in “crusader” attacks are often cited as motivation for jihadi attacks. Hussain Osman, arrested in connection with the 7/21 attempted bombings in London, reportedly told his Italian interrogators that, “Religion had nothing to do with this. We watched films. We were shown videos with images of the war in Iraq. We were told we must do something big. That’s why we met” (Leppard & Follain, 2005).

Osama bin Laden’s speeches offer another clue. He emphasizes Muslim grievances against the U.S. – support for authoritarian Muslim leaders, support for Israel, U.S. troops in Muslim countries – but spends little time selling the global caliphate that he asserts is the answer to these grievances. As was the case with SNCC and the Weather Underground, ideology for jihadist groups may be more a product of contention than a cause of contention.

The idea that ideology may be relevant to only a fraction of a radical group is reflected in the latest *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (2009, p.6). “Modern insurgencies are often more complex matrices of irregular actors with widely differing goals. At least some of the principal actors will be motivated by a form of ideology (or at least will claim to be), but that ideology will not necessarily extend across the whole insurgent network.”

5. *What is the Role of Emotion in Radicalization?* The literature on radicalization tends to emphasize cost/benefit calculations, but many have noted the salience of emotions such as anger or outrage, shame, and humiliation in political conflict. Research on emotional aspects of radicalization is needed. For instance, it is not clear whether hate is an emotion or a powerful form of negative identification that can be the occasion of many emotions - both positive and negative - depending on what is happening to the target of hatred (Royzman, McCauley, & Rozin, 2005). Similarly, it is not clear whether humiliation is a distinct emotion or a synergism of more fundamental emotions such as anger and shame (Lindner, 2006).

6. *How Does Martyrdom Contribute to Political Radicalization?* Many have noted the power of martyrdom for political mobilization, and there is a significant literature that asks how individuals are encouraged or recruited to give their lives in suicide terrorism (Merari, 2004; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006). Still, research is needed to determine how a particular death is framed and accepted as martyrdom, and the mechanisms by which a perceived martyr moves others toward sacrifice for the martyr’s cause.

7. *Does Encouraging Individual Desistance from Terrorism Interfere with Group Desistance from Terrorism?* Crenshaw (1996) makes an important distinction between two

kinds of government accommodation with terrorists. In one case, a new alternative is offered to the group as a whole; in the other case the alternative is offered to individual members of a terrorist group. Both Venezuela and Colombia have offered amnesty to violent opposition groups and legalized their political participation on condition of their giving up violence. In contrast, the Italian government encouraged 'repentance' of Red Brigade individuals who could earn reduced prison sentences by informing on comrades. The opening for groups works best when the group has high cohesion and strong leadership so as to minimize the splitting off of factions that want to continue violence. But the opening for individuals works best when cohesion is low and leadership is weak, when at least some terrorists are disillusioned, bored, or remorseful (McCauley, in press).

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1.3. Psychological Factors, Individual Factors, and Triggers (Anthony Lemieux)

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The Challenge and the Utility of Individual Psychology in the Study of Terrorism

In this paper, several distinct areas within the broader field of psychology that have contributed to the study of terrorism will be briefly considered. It is worth noting however that this review can only encompass a very thin slice of the overall wealth of information that can be leveraged from the psychological domain. Furthermore, efforts to focus on the psychology of the individual as an attempt to elucidate a ‘terrorist profile’ or ‘terrorist personality’ have been widely regarded as unsuccessful in terms of their application across individuals, groups, social context, and over time (see Horgan, 2005; Post, 2007 for additional discussion of individual approaches to the study of terrorism, profiles, and pathologies). That said, there are certainly some aspects of individual level psychology that make significant contributions in this field – especially to the extent that they can be incorporated into a broader context that considers intra-group dynamics as well as intergroup relations (e.g., Forsyth, 2010). When considered within a broader context, psychological factors at the individual, group, and intergroup levels can be especially useful in addressing potential root causes of terrorism. In particular, we can draw upon a fundamental principle of social psychology that places a premium on examining the interaction between people (encompassing aspects of personality, experience, attitudes, social norms, etc.) and situations (encompassing group dynamics, social influence, leadership, and the broader socioeconomic and sociopolitical contexts, etc.). By assuming an interactionist perspective, the strengths and limitations of theory and research that has been developed or extended to unpack the complexity of terrorism can be considered.

Stage Models: Perspectives that Offer Promise to Understanding the Role of ‘Triggers’?

When applied to the question of ‘who becomes a terrorist,’ the interactionist perspective requires not only a consideration of personal attributes (i.e., personality and dispositional characteristics) but also a consideration of the situation, including social and cultural context (also see Moghaddam, 2004 for a detailed discussion of the cultural preconditions for terrorism). This perspective is evident in several exemplary models of terrorist development, identity, and ultimately, behavior. To understand motivations for terrorism rather than other forms of political action, or mobilization more generally, several psychological models detail stages or levels that individuals move through as they become increasingly radicalized toward terrorism. Two such models have been developed by Moghaddam (2005) and McCauley (2009). Moghaddam (2005) posits a ‘staircase model’ in which terrorism is viewed as sequential progression from lower floors to higher floors on an increasingly narrow staircase. Each floor is characterized by unique psychological processes and progressive restrictions in response options, such that the final outcome is “destruction of others, or oneself, or both” (Moghaddam 2005, p.161; also see Waller, 2002 for a discussion of the systematic progression toward intergroup violence).

In his conceptualization of the trajectory of radicalization toward the use or endorsement of terrorism, McCauley's (2009) 'pyramid' model positions terrorists as the apex of a pyramid composed of a general population, passive supporters, and active supporters. In this model, terrorists are but a very small fraction of the overall collective that the broader pyramid is meant to represent. Both of these models assume a multiplicity of reasons for how and why someone might be drawn to a particular group or cause that involves terrorism; however, the models can have a practical application in looking at the pathways to, and varying levels of involvement in, terrorism. At the very least, such models may provide a foundation for conceptual clarity and distinction between those who may passively or actively support terrorism and those who might take a more direct role. If, for example, we make a conceptual connection between the progression – as implied by Moghaddam's (2005) staircase model and consider some of the important implications that have been empirically established in the study of conformity (e.g., Asch, 1955), compliance (e.g., Cialdini, 2008), and obedience (Milgram, 1974) in which an authority figure gives clear directives to those who lack relative power, we can get a potential glimpse into the type of powerful situations in which terrorists may become increasingly immersed as they move closer toward taking violent action.

Individual and Group Level Factors: Experiences, Emotions, and the Challenge of Generalization

From a psychological perspective, it is important to note that there is little evidence to suggest that terrorists have abnormally high levels of mental illness or psychopathology (Reich, 1998; Horgan, 2005; McCauley, 2004). What does emerge, however, is the consistent finding that terrorists are rational actors with purpose, intent, high levels of commitment, and deeply held convictions (Crenshaw, 1998; Post, 1998). And while external factors such as global poverty, inequalities in health care, education, or even access to the basic requirements of food, water, and shelter have been implicated as necessary causal factors of terrorism, these are not sufficient (e.g., Marsella, 2004; Moghaddam, 2004). Rather, these may constitute background conditions in which recruiting, indoctrinating, and motivating individuals toward terrorism may become increasingly likely (Lemieux & Pratto, 2003; Staub, 2003). However, this is not necessarily true for all terrorists or even all types of terrorism. We must qualify precisely this kind of statement in the face of evidence such as the detailed descriptions that Sageman (2004) provides of the global militant jihad, its networks, and characteristics of its membership. Sageman found in his sample that factors such as the experience of poverty, low education levels, and the like were not linked in a causal manner to those who ultimately became involved in the global militant jihad. In fact, in his sample they appeared to be fairly well educated, and solidly middle to upper-middle socioeconomic status. Again, this particular example effectively demonstrates the importance of context, and also provides a counterfactual to the popular assumptions about terrorists, such as poverty or lack of education as core causal features, are often unsubstantiated by reliable data. Merari (2007) notes in his review of suicide terrorism that in fact, among Palestinian suicide terrorists, the socioeconomic profiles correspond to those of the general Palestinian population, and that at the time of their attacks, suicide terrorists even had slightly higher levels of education.

There is an intuitive appeal to linking traumatic experience with the development of terrorism (e.g., Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006). In fact, there are a number of biographies and narrative accounts of those who had been involved in terrorism (see Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003 for an account of interviews with interviews of incarcerated terrorists). While such

accounts are particularly interesting because of the depth of experience and involvement they convey, there is considerable difficulty when one takes those key findings from retrospective accounts and narratives and tries to leverage them to develop valid and reliable predictive models. That said, there are some very important and recurring themes that can inform our broader understanding of some individual level factors that can plausibly have a distinct impact on one's trajectory toward terrorism. For instance, the interviews that Post et al. (2003) analyze show that the vast majority of their sample recount traumatic experiences, coupled with their living in a community that was closely and deeply involved in conflict. Thus, to truly understand the motivations requires a careful examination of the context that interacts with individual level psychological factors in very significant and influential ways. By carefully examining the types of stories and statements that those who are (or have been) involved in terrorism can provide very useful information and can help to clarify which psychological principles may seem to be the most relevant or applicable – which may then lend itself to further empirical evaluation.

However, there is a long and rich history of empirical research on motivation that demonstrates that behavior is not always driven by consciously made decisions (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996). Here, the clear implication is that people are not always as aware of the key drivers of their own behavior. This may be further compounded by memory problems, especially where there is a pronounced tendency for individuals of all walks of life – likely including terrorists – to fill in details that are not based on accurate memories but rather are based on sequences of events that are logical and consistent with their attitudes and expectations (Taylor & Fiske, 1991; also see Neuberg, 1996, for a related discussion of expectancy confirmation). It is in this way that we can consider the strength of narrative richness in personal accounts, but also consider some of the potential difficulties posed by relying on interviews or other methodologies that are built on the words and recollections and stated goals and ideals of actors with appropriate caution. With these potential limitations in mind, we can learn some important lessons about the type of emotions and attributes that have been implicated as especially informative in the context of terrorism.

The emotional experience of humiliation has been widely cited as a potential catalyst for political violence in general and terrorism in particular (e.g., Marsella, 2004; McCauley, 2004). Among the wide range of emotions that have been examined as triggers for terrorism, humiliation is frequently positioned as a form of grievance that is necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) in the motivation of terrorism. Depending on cultural conditions, humiliation may in fact require that steps be taken to address it and rectify it. That may include the use of violence, and is an especially important consideration when discussing cultures where honor is paramount and the manner in which insult is both perceived and expressed, along with how such grievances need to be remedied.

Narcissism is another individual level factor that has been studied in this context (Post, 2007). This personality factor may be well-suited for a conceptual analysis of certain terrorist leaders including Ocalan of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Prabhakaran of the LTTE, and Guzman of the Shining Path to name but a few. However, in and of itself, narcissism does not provide a compelling predictive value of the advent of terrorism specifically, though it may be very useful in parsing intra-group relations with a particular emphasis on the dynamics between leaders and followers. Considering the dynamic between leaders and their followers may shed some light on individual level motivations (Deikman, 2006). The tendency to follow a leader is likely to have a significant relationship to one's tendency toward authoritarianism, which makes

them significantly more likely to support and follow established authorities, especially to the extent that the leader is setting an agenda that attempts to rectify current wrongs and that might usher in a more perfect time as had been present at some prior point in history (see Altemeyer, 1988, 1996, for a discussion of Right Wing Authoritarianism).

Another potentially applicable personality factor that clearly links the individual to a broader collective is altruism. In the context of terrorism in general, but suicide terrorism in particular, unpacking the psychological underpinnings of altruism may provide some conceptual insights. The research on the altruistic personality conducted by Oliner and Oliner (1988) suggests that when self-sacrifice is positioned as necessary and important for a greater good, it can lead to the adoption of attitudes and behaviors that are often at odds with one's own health, well-being, and possibly even one's survival. Thus, the concept of altruism and the empirical research that examines when this particular type of self-sacrifice is more likely might provide useful information in the context of terrorism and countering terrorism. There are some benefits to the actor (in terms of recognition, glory, and honor; see Richardson's 2007 discussion of 'renown'), but there are also very significant benefits to the suicide terrorist's family, their community, and their ethnic and religious community (e.g., Pedhazur, 2005; Moghadam 2008).

Thus, from a social psychological standpoint, many of the causes that are most frequently uncovered through close scrutiny and analysis of interviews, narratives, messages and propaganda of leaders (e.g., Kepel & Milelli, 2008) and participants in online discussion forums (e.g., Brachman, 2008), we get a glimpse of the kinds of ideas, attitudes, and considerations that are particularly influential. Building on this premise, we can briefly consider the role of influence and how the radicalization process has been both enhanced and increasingly enabled by advances in technology that create dynamic social networks in which ideas and information can be exchanged, in which social comparisons can be made, and in which participants may move toward increasingly extreme viewpoints. The understanding of how people interpret, process, select, and use information (which is widely available on the internet; Weimann, 2006) is a direct focal point of Al Qaeda (Brachman, 2008). One key potential contribution of psychology and communications is analyzing the way in which people process such messages and how they are framed. The extent to which individuals identify with people, causes, and organizational goals is both shaped and fueled through propaganda and its sequelae in terms of attitude and behavior change.

The study of motivation for terrorism very often focuses on questions of why, which provides myriad answers and can capture a wide range of responses – many of which appear to reflect idiosyncratic tendencies as much as (or perhaps more than) discernable patterns that can be harnessed in a manner that enables effective prediction of who will engage in terrorism. Rather, the line of inquiry about motivations can also be informed and complemented by an increased emphasis on how this happens (Horgan, 2005). By extending the question in this way, we are in a much better position to draw on empirically established principles of group dynamics (Forsyth, 2010) for instance. Again, it is the integration of the individual level psychology with that of small groups, social influence networks, and broader sociopolitical and economic contexts that starts to provide a more accurate and informative picture. It is certainly the case that no one of any of the aforementioned personality characteristics, group backgrounds, or other variables holds a monopoly on developing a complete understanding of the individual level catalysts of terrorism. However, combinations of these that take the context and environment into careful

consideration may provide some important insights that can continue to inform both the policy and research communities alike.

Terrorism as an Intergroup Phenomenon: Looking for Triggers in Intergroup Events and Relations

Terrorism is a particular form of asymmetric conflict in which actual or perceived threats to identity may play a particularly important role (Taylor & Louis, 2004). When social identity is perceived to be under challenge or threat, it can mark potentially serious problems that groups may respond to in a variety of manners. The perceived locus of the threat to that identity (in terms of the perpetrators) can have a bearing on the type of actions that the group members support, or would actually engage in, potentially including terrorism. Thus, the issue of identity (social, cultural, religious, political, etc.) may be at the heart of understanding motivations for terrorism. This point directly ties to the psychology of the individual because there is ample evidence to suggest that many important aspects of individual identity are largely derived from social affiliations and group memberships (Taylor & Louis, 2004).

Research in the formation and maintenance of social identities has consistently shown that when people belong to a group, they act in ways that favor their ingroup. Acting in ways that give advantage to the ingroup is characteristic of groups that are formed based on even the most trivial criteria (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As group identity becomes increasingly salient, intergroup competition has been shown to increase both stereotypes and harm of outgroups (Sherif, 1966). Generally, rigid, categorical thinking (i.e., ‘us versus them’) sets a necessary precondition for both intergroup violence and terrorism (Post, 1998; Staub, 2005). Whether it is used to justify acts of violence, to explain group differences, or, even in the context of policy decisions, social categorizations that privilege one group identity over another are a frequent correlate of intergroup violence and terrorism (Hewstone & Cairnes, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In fact, categorical thinking and the differentiation of ‘us versus them’ has been a central feature of many instances of extreme intergroup violence in addition to terrorism, including the genocides in Turkey, Germany, Cambodia, and Rwanda (Power, 2002; Staub, 1989). In the most extreme examples of intergroup violence, dehumanization of the outgroup plays a pivotal role. Not only is this other group not us, but they are also not human. By reducing the humanity of an outgroup, it places them squarely outside the realm of moral inclusion (Opatow, 2005). At this point, the moral imperative may actually shift toward requiring actions that are intended to limit or altogether eliminate members of that group (Bandura, 2004). Again, the process by which this happens has been fairly well established (Waller, 2002; Staub, 1989) in which the progression and importance of dehumanization leading toward intergroup violence has been clearly elaborated.

One critical aspect of intergroup relations that may provide an especially useful platform from which the impact of grievances can be considered is when people become aware of what others have in relation to themselves, in terms of both material resources and social status. To the extent that they perceive the differences to be both meaningful and potentially unjust, they feel deprived of something that is rightfully theirs. This feeling of relative deprivation (e.g., Gurr, 1968, 2000; Runciman, 1966) is characterized by resentment and frustration, and is especially poignant when it occurs as the fortune of one’s ingroup seems to be declining while the fortunes of others are improving. Thus, a heightened experience of relative deprivation is likely during economic downturns as a response to both military defeats and terrorist attacks and

may result in increases in prejudice and scapegoating (also see Staub, 1989, 2003; Waller, 2002). Labeling broad categories of people as appropriate targets may indeed serve as a catalyst for continued intergroup conflict.

The related concept of ‘hate’ has emerged as important based on its place in public dialogues about terrorism and also in its potential application to understanding intergroup violence and terrorism, albeit with limited empirical evidence (Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, 2005). The kind of hate that may be operating in the context of terrorism is neither blind nor disorganized. Rather, it is intense, focused, and often highly organized. This organization takes place by category, and to the extent that the hate is more categorical, rather than directed at a specific policy, action, or individual, it may be more intense (Opatow, 2005). Though this may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, it helps to provide a framework in which hate is directed at a broader collective of people based primarily (if not solely) on their group membership. If we consider terrorism an example of “killing by category” as McCauley (2009) has posited, then it is important to understand how those categories are formed, reified, and acted upon. In sum, triggers for terrorism that may appear to operate at the individual level must necessarily take into account the intergroup context, as terrorism is most often an intergroup phenomenon.

How Can our Understanding of ‘Triggers’ Be Refined and Applied?

The idea of specific triggers leading directly to terrorism is not directly supported by the evidence of the often relatively mundane manner in which potential terrorists move into and through organizations. Horgan (2005) gives a very interesting perspective on this phenomenon and pulls the thread into the study of the conditions under which people leave terrorism. In fact, one of the key findings thus far is that people who get involved may not have a real sense of what they are actually getting into. Rather than the fame or notoriety that is often considered a prime motivation, many of the tasks that newer members of the organization take on may be rather boring and unsatisfying. Thus, there may be a fundamental disconnect between the motivations and triggers that bring someone over the threshold of involvement in the first place and the subsequent reality of their involvement. In this way, another useful consideration might be to differentiate individual psychological characteristics that might have a pronounced influence on ‘success’ as measured by the ability to persevere and persist, which may lead to a focus on those who may be less impulsive, more able to delay gratification, and those with the requisite patience and the ability to adapt to meet the demands of a situation that may be inconsistent with their initial expectations. This particular course of inquiry might have prime applicability in understanding the selection process that occurs as people move further into the organization and is important to understand – not just with regard to the individual level factors, but also with relation to the pull, and the push, associated with the group dynamics that are inherent across group and organization types – including terrorists.

Taken together, a more in-depth analysis of exactly how and when such precursors motivate terrorism would better focus preventive efforts, and would require interdisciplinary collaboration as I have previously asserted (Lemieux, 2006). One example of an interdisciplinary collaboration is the experimental research reported by Asal, Lemieux, and Wilkenfeld (2008) that examines the relative impact of grievance, perceived risks of getting involved in political action including terrorism, and the impact of social-personality factors. As Moghaddam (2004) suggests, having a strong sense of the cultural preconditions that have both conceptual and practical links to some of the phenomena may increase the likelihood for

terrorism to emerge. However, to increase the utility, it is of the utmost importance to consider any particular focal point as part of a broader constellation of factors, some of which may involve understanding more about the individual level attributes, characteristics, and experiences, while others may focus on higher-order factors including group level attributes. In conclusion, this brief analysis suggests that a multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach (of which psychology is one area that offers some important conceptual and methodological approaches) is likely to be of the greatest benefit in understanding the roots of terrorism and of greatest utility to the policy community and others.

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1.4. Contextual and Motivational Factors in the Pathways to Radicalization: Why Location Matters (Anne Speckhard)

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In recent years, the processes by which people, young people in particular, within and outside of conflict zones become radicalized and transition from peaceful citizens to individuals enacting violent acts of terrorism have been studied intensively. There is a growing understanding that the radicalization trajectory can be understood to operate as a process that engages individuals on four levels, each operating with its own motivational forces and vulnerabilities (Hafez, 2006; Moghadam, 2003; Speckhard, 2005a). These four levels are:

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1. the group itself and its political reasons for existence and motivations for action;
2. the individual and his or her own vulnerabilities and motivations for involvement;
3. the ideology employed by the group, often to rationalize and justify political violence; and
4. the segment of society that supports all of the above.

As we increasingly begin to understand the processes of, and threats from, violent radicalization, governments in Western, as well as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian, societies have begun to understand that it is necessary to mount an equal and as comprehensive a fight against violent radicalization. This fight should include four main areas:

1. preventing radicalization, particularly among vulnerable populations;
2. immunizing society against violent ideologies;
3. identifying and disengaging (by arrest, amnesty programs, or simple intimidation); and
4. deradicalizing those who are on the brink of, or already have committed, violent acts on behalf of the militant groups.

Pathways to Militant Jihad

If we look at what we have learned from studies on suicide terrorism, terrorism in general, and radicalization processes in particular – especially those that are dealing with jihadist militant ideologies - we know that there are key vulnerable populations and venues to target for prevention, inoculation, and disengagement and deradicalization programs. This paper very briefly addresses these populations and describes how their location and particularly how contextual issues plays into their motivations for engaging in terrorism – motivations that must be addressed in order to successfully reduce terrorism. The first and largest group to consider in the development and implementation of programs to deal with militant jihadi terrorism includes existing Muslims as well as potential converts to (radical) Islam because these are the people who may be attracted into violent and extremist aberrations of the Muslim faith. This is particularly true of predisposed individuals if they fall under the influence of a charismatic militant jihadi leader or group that meets their individual needs – needs that may not have much to do with the actual goals of the terrorist group. These needs may range from protection, friendship, positive identity, a sense of mission, a guardian of sacred values, comfort against discrimination or marginalization, psychological first aid, or to find a means of enacting revenge or fight occupation (Speckhard, 2005a; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2005). The mechanisms by which these dynamics lead to radicalization may differ between environments that are inside, versus outside, conflict zones.

Inside Conflict Zones

In order to counter violent radicalization, one must understand how it occurs. The pathways are many and vary with the most dramatic variance occurring between violent extremism stemming from conflict and non-conflict zones (Speckhard, 2005a; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2005). When bombs are falling, homes are destroyed, loved ones are imprisoned, tortured, and killed; when individuals lose their ability to pursue education, to be employed, or become refugees, etc., as often occurs inside conflict zones, radicalization to violence/terrorism is accomplished quite easily. It occurs as a result of traumatization and the presence of one or more desires: for political freedom, to end occupation, to live in peace, to rescue loved ones, and revenge losses, etc. (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2005).

Within conflict zones, the individual motivations for engaging in terrorism include fighting perceived or real occupation, fighting gross human rights violations, and enacting revenge for very real losses. Individual motivations for terrorism are usually laced with trauma and the desire for revenge. Those individuals with the most traumatic losses are often at highest risk as they are in deep emotional pain and the militant jihadi ideology offers for them a legitimate and honorable exit from life as a “martyr” and a type of short lived psychological first aid (Speckhard, 2005a). Likewise, children and adolescents whose life views are in the process of forming and who are subjected to violent experiences often fall prey to world views offered to them by radical groups employing violent jihadist ideologies.

Extremist groups that support terrorist attacks against the civilian populations of the opposing force within an active conflict zone generally enjoy widespread support from the local populace. After all, when one’s own population is actively under attack or are the victims of widespread collateral damage, as is nearly always the minimum case inside conflict zones, attacking civilians of the opposing side with terrorist tactics can easily be rationalized as retaliation.

Inside Non-Conflict Zones

In non-conflict zones, radicalization occurs quite differently and varies according to the local context and local grievances. For instance, we know that vulnerabilities exist particularly within first- to third-generation Muslim immigrants living in Europe who are disengaged from society or are alienated and marginalized – particularly those that have been ghettoized or are self-isolated. These vulnerable individuals are often young people looking for adventure, a sense of positive identity, a group to belong to, meaningfulness, and protection – especially in areas where criminal gangs are active (Speckhard, 2007a, 2008a). In another non-conflict zone, Morocco, the author found that these sources of motivation were overshadowed by poverty, frustrated aspirations, and hopelessness (Speckhard, 2005b). In either case, when coupled with a charismatic recruiter who promises a mission, excitement, sense of meaning, and/or a heroic exit from a life of despair or ennui along with the rewards of martyrdom, the vulnerabilities of the individual may begin to mesh with the goals of the group.

Bringing the Conflict Zone into the Non-Conflict Zones

Lastly recruiters often find a way to foster conflict zone effects by bringing the conflict zone to non-conflict zones to vulnerable individuals via graphic pictures, videos, etc., which induces a secondary traumatization response and sense of outrage. When this is accomplished, it is not difficult to exploit emotional responses, vulnerabilities, and needs to influence consideration of the militant jihad as a means of righting injustice. Likewise, we must keep in mind that even in non-conflict zones, exposure to violence or direct traumatization can open the pathways to accept violence in exchange for the rewards of group membership, such as in violent homes, gangs, or exposure to other violent or traumatic events. Violent experiences in prisons among detainee populations can also provide a receptive audience for charismatic jihadist recruiters (Speckhard, 2008b). Thus, it is not entirely possible to make the dichotomy between conflict and non-conflict zones. Those who grow up in urban ghettos, within the influence of gangs, exposed to domestic violence essentially grow up in mini-conflict zones and may show all of the vulnerabilities to terrorism recruitment that an individual growing up in an active conflict zone features. Likewise, the ability today to bring graphic images, mainly via the Internet and television, into non-conflict zones blurs boundaries dramatically. A Belgian second generation

Moroccan immigrant may, for instance, experience secondarily the violence in Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere via satellite television and Internet and also be growing up amidst gangs, domestic violence, or both and as a result show the same motivational aspects as someone coming out of one of these active conflict zones.

Summary

It is important to consider motivational and contextual issues when attempting to address terrorism at its roots. Understanding that those who are heavily exposed to violence may have differing motivational factors than those who are responding to alienation, social disenfranchisement, hopelessness, frustrated aspirations, group dynamics, etc., is important in designing appropriate responses. Likewise, these motivational states are heavily influenced by location, particularly by whether the social milieu is embedded in violence.

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1.5. Muslim Diaspora Community Support for Terrorism is Associated with Perceived Discrimination and Employment Insecurity (Jeff Victoroff, Janice Adelman)

(Unpublished primary research, not for public citation)

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Abstract

A subset of those involved in the global Muslim fundamentalist movement will consistently select political violence as a strategy to accomplish their goals. However, the pool of supporters and potential recruits will balloon or shrink depending on potentially modifiable risk factors. Our analysis of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2006 and the Pew Muslim American Survey of 2007 supports our hypothesis that perceived discrimination and employment security are risk factors that influence the proportion of the general Muslim diaspora community who feel supportive of terrorism on behalf of Islam. In so far as perceived discrimination and rate of employment are modifiable by laws or social policies, so is community support for anti-Western terrorism.

Introduction

Political violence arises from grievance and from ambition for change. Evidence suggests that the emergence and development of terrorist groups is tied to the support they receive from a larger population group (Crenshaw 1995; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). So, for example, when a large population contains a certain proportion of individuals who feel politically aggrieved, some of those individuals may become radicalized, some of those who are radicalized may become activists, some activists may be willing to join extremist groups, and some members of extremist groups may commit acts of political violence—including terrorist attacks on civilians. The impetus for the winnowing process that leads to formation of activist, extremist, and terrorist cells tends to arise from psychologically collective behaviors of distressed and angry people, often with the provocation of charismatic leaders. Recruitment to violent groups depends on the proportion of those in the larger population who agree (cognitively) and feel sympathetic (emotionally) with the image, goals, and methods of terrorist groups.

It is self-evident that some intelligence/police/military actions will reduce the risk of extremist violence by co-opting, capturing, or killing terrorists. It is less obvious, but perhaps equally likely, that carefully designed social policies will help to prevent terrorism by addressing the underlying socio-economic, cognitive, and emotional risk factors of populations prone to contribute moral support, material support, or participants to the extremist enterprise.

An illustrative historical example is the emergence and dissolution of the violent black separatist movement in the U.S. in the early 1960s. Methodologically rigorous research is hard to

find, but it is intuitively plausible that the prejudice, discrimination, oppression, and economic and political exclusion of African Americans were causally related to the emergence of the Black Panthers. The slew of U.S. federal Civil Rights legislation beginning with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was temporally associated with a marked decline in the activity of the black separatist movement. It is not possible to quantify the degree to which the decline in the black separatist movement was attributable to the FBI's enforcement efforts as opposed to the impact of social policies that undermined the allure of membership by making some grievances moot. Yet U.S. national security seems to have been enhanced at least in part by policies that had short term impact on immediate grievances (such as improved perception of civic enfranchisement) and, perhaps more importantly, long term impact on inter-group relations via restorative justice stratagems such as affirmative action and forced busing in the interest of integrative social contact beginning in elementary school.

The social science of inter-group conflict clearly played a role in this transformation. Although these massive social policy initiatives were hardly intended as controlled studies, the small-scale efforts of pioneering scientists such as Williams, Sherif, and Allport drew attention to the problem and provided critical guidance toward the solutions even before the critical mass of public sentiment and political will absolutely compelled action. The job is far from finished (Massey & Denton, 1993). Yet the U.S. civil rights era stands as a historic model for the potential impact of applied social science to defuse a deadly and dangerous inter-group conflict.

A global Muslim fundamentalist movement has been gaining ground for several decades. Evidence suggests that, although there are relatively few active members of violent Salafist jihadi groups, support for anti-Western behavior is widespread throughout the Muslim populations of the Middle East and commonplace in the Muslim diaspora population of Europe. Multi-pronged intelligence/military/police initiatives have led to the killing or incarceration of a number of dangerous individuals, and some avenues of material support have been interdicted. Yet financial backing, moral support, and recruitment continue to flourish in many regions. It is worth examining whatever data are available to identify and quantify risk factors for such collective support. In so far as such risk factors are modifiable by social policy, one has a new tool for defusing conflict.

To that end, we examined the datasets of two large surveys recently conducted by Pew: the 2006 Global Attitudes Project 15-Nation Survey, which included Muslim participants in Europe, and the 2007 Muslim American Survey. Based upon long-established theories of social conflict, we hypothesized that:

1. The opinion that "violence against civilian targets is justifiable to defend Islam" would be associated with perceived discrimination; and
2. The opinion that violence against civilian targets is justifiable to defend Islam would be associated with unemployment.

Method

To test our hypotheses, we conducted secondary data analyses on two publicly available opinion surveys. The Pew Global Attitudes Project (<http://pewglobal.org>) conducts face-to-face interviews regarding public opinion on a regular basis. We downloaded the Spring 2006 15-

Nation Survey from the Pew website. The Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the interpretations presented or conclusions reached based on the reported analysis of the data.

Of the original 16,710 participants from 15 nations, we included only those representing European Muslims in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain. This yielded a total of 1,627 participants (879 males, 747 females). The mean age was 35 years ($SD = 12.48$; range = 18 to 97 and over).

We focused on responses that specifically related to support for suicide bombing and other violence against civilian targets, as well as those related to demographic factors, economic factors, perceived discrimination, and other aspects of inter-group relations. We used the Muslim weight variable, along with the European Muslim filter variable in the downloaded SPSS (advanced mathematic and statistical software) datafile.

A second dataset, called the 2007 Muslim American Survey, was provided by the Pew Research Center (<http://peoplepress.org/dataarchive/form.php?DocID=319>) under the auspices of The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (<http://people-press.org/>). The survey was conducted via phone interviews made from January through April, 2007. A total of 1,050 Muslim Americans completed the survey. The Pew researchers employed a complex sampling method, weighting the data from these 1,050 subjects to account for sampling errors that would limit generalizability to the larger U.S. Muslim population. We used the WesVar statistical software for complex samples to conduct all analyses, enabling our findings to better predict responses from the larger population.

Results

Our results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. As some of the effect sizes are not large on an absolute basis, additional research or validation may be advisable before developing strategies based on these correlations.

As shown in Table 1, among European Muslims, the opinion that terrorism is justifiable was inversely correlated with age and with favorability of opinions regarding the U.S., Americans, and Jews. The opinion that terrorism is justifiable was directly correlated with having had a bad personal experience of discrimination and with worry about unemployment.

Table 2 shows that, among American Muslims, the opinion that terrorism is justifiable was also negatively correlated with age and with employment status. The opinion that terrorism is justifiable was positively correlated with having experience that others were suspicious of the respondent, having been called offensive names (i.e., having experienced harassment and/or discrimination), and the opinion that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.

Table 1:

Correlations (Pearson's r) between queries in the 2006 Pew European Muslim Study and the Opinion that Terrorism is Justifiable

(0 = never justified, 1 – rarely justified, 2 = sometimes justified, 3 = often justified)

“Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?”

Query	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
Age	-.159	.001***
Sex	.003	.895
Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not at all worried about unemployment among (survey country) Muslims?	.072	.005**
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of The United States?	-.021	.431
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Americans?	-.097	.001***
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Jews?	-.076	.005**
In your opinion, how many Europeans do you think are hostile toward Muslims – would you say most, many, just some, or very few?	.063	.015*
Which of the following phrases comes closer to describing your view? I favor the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR, I oppose the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism.	-.008	.749
In the last two years, have you personally had a bad experience due to your race, ethnicity, or religion, or hasn't this happened to you?	.110***	.001***

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

*** = $p < .001$

Table 2:**Correlations (single predictor in the regression model) between queries in the 2007 Pew Muslim American Study and the Opinion that Terrorism is Justifiable**

(0 = never justified, 1 – rarely justified, 2 = sometimes justified, 3 = often justified)

“Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?”

Query	<i>Beta</i>	<i>p</i>
Age	- .165	.003**
Sex	.029	.571
Education	- .59	.178
Are you now employed full-time, part-time, or not employed?	- .123	.022*
In the past twelve months, have people acted as if they are suspicious of you because you are a Muslim, or not?	.114	.040*
In the past twelve months, have you been called offensive names because you are a Muslim, or not?	.113	.046*
In the past twelve months, have you been singled out by law enforcement Officers (other than airport security) because you are a Muslim, or not?	.027	.552
In the past twelve months, have you been physically threatened or attacked because you are a Muslim, or not?	.014	.711
And thinking more generally – NOT just about the past 12 months – have you ever been the victim of discrimination as a Muslim living in the United States?	.056	.245
Do you think that coverage of Islam and Muslims by American news organizations is generally fair or unfair?	- .036	.238
Do you think that the government’s anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims in the U.S. for increased surveillance and monitoring, or don’t you think so?	.016	.762
Do you think the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism or don’t you believe that?	.034	.418
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S., or hasn’t it changed very much?	.098	.040*

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

Discussion

As some other studies have found, younger Muslims are more likely to support extremist ideas and behaviors (Buonfino, 2007; Lieberman & Collins, 2008; and others). It was no surprise to find that age was inversely correlated with the opinion that terrorism is justified.

The findings in this study that are new and potentially useful to decision makers are those related to discrimination and to employment security. Hypothesis 1 was largely confirmed by this study; that is, the hypothesis that violence against civilians (terrorism) is justified to defend Islam is correlated with (but not necessarily caused by) perceived discrimination. Variables that appear highly relevant to perceived discrimination were correlated with the opinion that terrorism is justifiable, both among European and U.S. Muslims. Yet the pattern of responses was somewhat different: The direct experience of discrimination was highly correlated with support for terrorism among European Muslims, and the (more general) experience of discrimination (indirectly by having experienced being a subject of suspicion, or directly by having been called offensive names) was correlated with support for terrorism in the U.S. The more general question of ever having been a victim of discrimination in the U.S. was not correlated with support for bombing. Overall, the findings are consistent with the social science observation that perception of injustice universally tends to provoke an angry response (DiGuseppe & Defrate, 2006), although anger does not equate to support for or engaging in terrorism.

Hypothesis 2, that is the hypothesis that employment would be correlated with support for terrorism, was strongly confirmed by this study, although the variables in the two data sets relevant to employment were somewhat different. Among European Muslims, worry about unemployment was correlated with support for bombing; among U.S. Muslims, actual employment status (less than full-time employment) was correlated with such support. It is reasonable to conclude that employment security plays a role in determining the likelihood that a member of the Muslim diaspora community living in the West will support violent behavior. Our findings are consistent with the social science theory that, without a meaningful, purpose-driven adult identity—including a rewarding job—some individuals will turn toward anti-social behavior (Zimbardo, 1969).

Since Muslims in the West whose employment is insecure are more likely to opine that terrorism is justifiable, full employment would seem highly desirable. Since being called offensive names is associated with support for terrorism, initiatives to prevent hate speech would perhaps be worth pursuing. It would be more difficult to change other significant correlates of support for terrorism, such as community suspiciousness of Muslims, or the perception that it has become more difficult to be Muslim in the U.S. post-9/11.

To date, little empirical research has examined whether specific initiatives to alter these potentially modifiable risk factors actually do so. For example, targeted programs to ensure full employment of at-risk Muslim men could be assessed for their impact on the reservoir of community support for terrorism. Forced integration of Europe's segregated Asian/White school systems might yield longer-term benefits. Demonstration projects evaluated with rigor would seem to be essential. Yet, even before those data come in, policy makers may wish to consider whether cost-efficient mechanisms exist that, theoretically speaking, could address the factors shown to significantly correlate with support for terrorism among Muslims living in the West.

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1.6. The Role of Emotion in Escalating Violent Non-State Actors to Hostility (David Matsumoto)

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One crucial aspect of human behavior that is often overlooked by researchers, operators, and policy makers is that of human emotion. Although emotion is often viewed as too soft for serious consideration or research, an understanding of emotion is central to an understanding of any individual or group behavior. On the individual level, emotions are evolutionarily evolved information processing systems that aid in survival (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Darwin, 1872/1998). They are transient, fleeting reactions to events that have implications for our welfare, and require immediate response (Ekman, 2003; Lazarus, 1991). They prime behaviors by initiating unique physiological signatures and mental structures (Levenson, 1999, 2003). They aid in bonding memories and cognitions (Bower, 1981; Forgas & Bower, 1987). And most importantly, they are a major source of motivation (Tomkins, 1962, 1963).

Emotions also exist on the group level, and serve similar functions. Group emotions are *emotions shared by individual members of groups, often about their own groups or other groups*. Group emotions occur when a sufficient proportion of individual members of a group have similar emotions about their group or about other groups (although there is no definition or consensus in the field about what that proportion may be). Like individual-level emotions, groups have emotional reactions to events that have consequences to their perceived welfare and survival. Group level emotions serve as motivations for group behaviors. They provide guidelines and bases for making attributions about ingroups and outgroups. And they aid in regulating social behavior and preventing social chaos (Matsumoto et al., 2008). Thus, a

complete understanding of behavior starts with the recognition of the importance of emotion, because emotion is motivation (Tomkins, 1962, 1963). This is true on the level of individuals as well as groups. Importantly for this article, it is true for the understanding of the behavior of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA), especially acts of hostility.

Understanding Emotions as Discrete Constructs

There are many ways to understand and categorize emotions. A simple way, for instance, is to classify emotions simply by their valence (positive or negative) or intensity (strong v. weak). Indeed, this way of understanding emotions is very popular not only among laypersons but also in academic psychology (Feldman Barrett, 2004; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999), and its simplicity merits attention. But there is a large body of literature that demonstrates convincingly that not all emotions are the same, nor should they be reduced to simple dimensions such as valence or intensity (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2007). This framework is known as a *discrete emotions* perspective, and in this perspective, different categories of emotion are qualitatively and uniquely distinct from each other; that is, emotions are discrete entities.

Take the emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust, for example, all of which can be considered negative emotions in the simplistic valenced view above. There are important differences among these emotions that make it clear that they are not alike, and these have major practical implications. Anger, contempt, and disgust are very different emotions, with different physiological reactions, different mental state changes, and different nonverbal expressions (Ekman, 1999), all of which prepare us for different behaviors. When we are angry, for instance, our heart rate increases, and the blood flows differentially to our arms and hands, preparing us to fight (Levenson, 2003). The function of anger, therefore, is to remove obstacles. The function of disgust, however, is to eliminate or repulse contaminated objects, while a primary function of contempt is to make a statement about one's evaluations of another's actions vis-à-vis status and hierarchy. Anger, therefore, is an emotion about what someone or a group did. Contempt and disgust, however, are emotions about who the person or group is.

While laypersons often do not make such distinctions among emotions, those distinctions are important. In particular, there is a special place for disgust in understanding terrorism and violence, for several reasons. First, studies of emotions in interpersonal conflicts indicate that it is disgust (and contempt), not anger, that is associated with the breakdown of a relationship (which could be seen as a component of hostile acts between groups) (Gottman & Levenson, 2002; Gottman, Levenson, & Woodin, 2001). Second, as mentioned above, disgust is a basic, primary emotion, elicited by perceptions of agents of contamination or disease. It is universal, not only in its signal properties (Ekman, 1993), but also in terms of its elicitors (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Third, disgust is a moral emotion, and it is often used to sanction our moral beliefs and behaviors (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). Fourth, our anecdotal observations of the videos of terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden or the Virginia Tech University shooter Cho Seung Hyi, as well as the speeches and writing of world leaders who incited wars (e.g., Hitler, Milosevic, etc.) indicated an escalation of disgust (in facial expressions) leading up to violent acts. Disgust leads individuals to kill cockroaches, and it does not matter whether the cockroaches are male, female, or infants; they are cockroaches and must be eliminated. Likewise, terrorist acts do not differentiate between men, women, or children; they must be eliminated because they are vermin (or infidel dogs).

Thus, although much research on aggression has focused on anger, in today's context of terrorism as a global phenomenon, disgust must be considered a central emotion to study on the group level, as there it represents a shift toward making an assessment of the inherent characteristics of the other group, rather than a temporary judgment about an act committed by that group. Disgust transforms aggression, which sometimes can be constructive, into hostility, which is almost always not, and anger into hatred. The transformation of anger to contempt and then disgust is akin to a transformation of a situational attribution about an act to a dispositional attribution about the person. Consequently, if a person or group does something bad, anger is focused on the act, but the person or group may or may not be bad, and in fact may be rehabilitated in some way in the future. Evaluations resulting in contempt and disgust, however, mean that the person or group is inherently bad and there is no chance for rehabilitation; thus, the logical recourse is to eliminate them. Elimination can occur in various manners: from the extreme form of violently eliminating them, to shunning, to avoidance, to simply dissociating them from one's consciousness.

Intergroup Emotions

Although the scientific study of emotion has traditionally focused on the individual, in recent years, group level emotions have increasingly become an object of scientific research. Most studies have examined the types of emotions felt by members of groups toward outgroups. Studies of intergroup anxiety, for instance, suggest that anxiety toward outgroups may occur because of fear of embarrassment about not knowing what to do with the outgroup, fear of negative behavioral consequence, fear of negative evaluations, a history of negative intergroup relations and minimal previous contact with the outgroup, large status differences between the ingroup and outgroup, or higher ratios of outgroup members compared to ingroup (i.e., more of "them" than "us") (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Studies on the *Stereotype Content Model* suggest that group members have different emotions toward outgroups based on the dimensions of perceived warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). *Intergroup Emotions Theory* suggests that group members feel anger toward outgroups when the ingroup is in conflict with the outgroup and the ingroup view is the majority; this anger will lead groups to confront, oppose, or attack the outgroup (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000).

Some studies have also examined the emotions that are attributed to ingroup and outgroup members. *Infrahumanization Theory*, for instance, suggests that ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation leads to the attribution of more human characteristics, including emotions, toward ingroup members compared to outgroups (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodrigues, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2004; Rodriguez Torres et al., 2005). Thus, ingroups are more likely to attribute the more "human" emotions of compassion, shame, serenity, bitterness, or contempt to ingroups. At the same times, ingroups attribute more "basic" or "primary" emotions such as surprise, anger, pleasure, fear, attraction, or disgust to outgroups. Interestingly, these emotions are those considered to be shared between humans and non-human primates (LeDoux & Phelps, 2008).

Thus, the dehumanization of outgroups involves emotional attributions about those outgroups associated with animals, not humans, and intergroup emotions are the glue that keep such attitudes about outgroups connected. Without their emotional bases, these attitudes would have little meaning or practical consequence. But intergroup relations are complex and

potentially deadly, especially among VNSAs, precisely because outgroup cognitions are associated with strong emotions.

A Framework for Understanding the Role of Emotions in Escalating VNSA to Violence

Not only are emotions important to the creation and maintenance of intergroup attitudes and relations, but *changes* in those emotions across time may be associated with different intergroup behaviors (because the primary function of emotion is to motivate behavior, on both the individual and group levels). In my view, violence and hostility are the direct result of the planned inculcation and careful, methodical nurturing of hatred in VNSAs. As mentioned above, this theoretical framework is based on a view of discrete emotions (Ekman, 1999), most notably those having to do with morality (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Although emotions such as shame and guilt have received considerable attention as moral emotions in the past (Shweder & Haidt, 2000; Tangney & Fischer, 1995), more recent work has focused on anger, contempt, and disgust and their relationship to autonomy, community, and divinity (Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999). More specifically, Rozin and colleagues (1999) proposed that anger, contempt, and disgust are often elicited in response to violations of autonomy, community, and divinity, respectively, known as the CAD (community, autonomy, divinity) Triad hypothesis.

Sternberg (2003) has proposed a triarchic theory of hatred that is based on these three emotions, and fear. He proposes that hatred is based on a negation of intimacy (based on disgust), passion (based on anger and fear) and decision-commitment based on devaluation and diminution of others (based on contempt). According to his model, different kinds of hatred can exist based on different combinations of these three components. Because there are three components, they can yield seven different combinations of hatred: cold, cool, hot, simmering, boiling, seething, and burning hatred.

An interesting aspect of Sternberg's (2003) theory is that hatred is propagated via stories. Stories serve an important and interesting purpose, by bringing to life the various components of hatred in a concise, easy-to-understand and easy-to-communicate method. It provides group leaders with a platform by which group emotions can be developed, fostered, maintained, or extinguished, and for those same emotions to be propagated within groups by its members who communicate the stories to others. According to Sternberg (2003), there are many different types of hate stories that achieve this purpose:

- the stranger
- impure other (v. pure ingroup)
- controller (v. controlled)
- faceless foe (v. individuated ingroup)
- enemy of God (v. servant of God)
- morally bankrupt (v. morally sound)
- death (v. life)
- barbarian (v. civilized ingroup)
- greedy enemy (v. financially responsible ingroup)
- criminal (v. innocent party)

- torturer (v. victim)
- murderer (v. victim)
- seducer-rapist (v. victim)
- animal pest (v. human)
- power crazed (v. mentally balanced)
- subtle infiltrator (v. infiltrated)
- comic character (v. sensible ingroup)
- thwarter-destroyer of destiny (v. seeker of destiny)

Stories also serve the important function of providing members with a way to communicate attitudes, values, beliefs, and opinions across generations, a central component of culture, which refers to a shared meaning and information system transmitted across generations (Matsumoto & Juang, 2007). VNSA organizations, like many groups, are uniquely characterized by their own cultures. Collectively, this system provides guidelines for normative behavior, the basis for the nature and function of attributions, communication systems, and intergroup relations. VNSAs, especially terrorist organizations, are characterized by sacred values and beliefs (Atran & Axelrod, 2007; Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007), but then again so are many ideologically-based organizations (e.g., pro- or anti-abortion groups, gun groups, death penalty groups, etc.). Research on terrorists and other ideologically-based groups suggests that they are comparable to each other in their social psychological dynamics (Stahelski, 2005). Hatred and disdain of others is facilitated by a culture of hatred and disdain that is permeated throughout the group, and future generations are similarly enculturated.

Work on the CAD Triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999) is important because it highlights the importance of specific, discrete emotions in moral systems. Sternberg's (2003) work is important because it uses the CAD Triad hypothesis as a basis to understand the various components of hatred. Building on this previous work, I propose that these emotions are transformed over time, often via stories, to inculcate cultures of hatred and violence. Specifically, I suggest three phases in this emotion transformation:

Phase 1 – Outrage based on Anger. Phase 1 involves the group identifying events that obstruct goals or are based on perceptions of injustice. Phase 1 may also involve the group identifying threats to well-being, physical safety, or ways of life. These interpretations and attributions lead to, or are fueled by, feelings of anger toward the outgroup.

Phase 2 – Moral Superiority based on Contempt. In Phase 2, groups begin to reinterpret anger-eliciting situations and events identified in Phase 1, and take the high road; that is, they reappraise the events from a position of moral superiority, identify links between similar behaviors or events, no matter how tenuous, thus making the attribution that the outgroup is morally inferior. These reappraisals and attributions lead to, or are fueled by, the emotion of contempt.

Phase 3 – Elimination based on Disgust. In Phase 3, there is a further reappraisal of events and situations that lead to the conclusion that distance needs to be placed between the ingroup and outgroup (the mild form of elimination), or that the outgroup needs to be eliminated (the extreme form). These ideas are promulgated by the emotion of disgust.

This perspective allows us to understand how groups can hate, but not all hatred leads to violence or hostility. Hatred based primarily on anger and/or contempt will *not* be associated with violence or hostility, but hatred that involves disgust does, because disgust is the emotion of repulsion and elimination. Groups can be angry or contemptuous, but when they are also disgusted, they may become dangerous. Further, it is interesting to note that many definitions of hatred involve concepts of intense aversion, which is related to the emotion of disgust, or intense animosity, which has its roots in animals (and therefore not human), also related to disgust.

How do these appraisals and reappraisals occur, and group emotions get created or transformed? Powerful leaders set the tone for groups to interpret or reinterpret events in certain ways that then lead to group emotions. Leaders do this by creating stories based on their appraisals or reappraisals of critical events and situations, and by communicating the emotions associated with their reappraised stories to their followers and subordinates. The communication occurs through the specific types of emotion-laden and emotion-related words, metaphors, images, and analogies used, as well as nonverbally through their faces, voices, gestures, and body language. That is, it is not the case that emotions are communicated directly to groups (e.g., we perceived an obstacle, so we must be angry); instead, emotions are communicated indirectly via the associations made to groups with emotion-laden words, metaphors, analogies, and nonverbal behavior. Through the careful use of language and nonverbal behaviors, leaders are in a position to motivate, escalate, or defuse situations, and incite action or not, through emotion.

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1.7. The Neurology of Crime and Violence (Thomas O'Connor)

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The aim of this piece is to inform the reader about what scientific evidence exists, to date, regarding the neurological basis for feelings of unfairness and sensations of grievance, particularly those feelings and sensations that may lead to violent behavior such as terrorism. It should be noted that a number of intervening mechanisms and pathways exist between a basic neurological event and complex behavioral action. Other than epileptic seizures where accidental physical harm can result, few neurological conditions are the direct cause of violent behavior. They can be causes, however, in the antecedent sense, but numerous pathways exist depending upon psychological, social, and cultural factors. This author is a criminologist with a special expertise on stress-induced crime and how perceptions of unfairness can lead to violence (O'Connor, 1993). The approach adopted here comes from the field of biosocial criminology, where biological forces are seen as operating on, as well as influenced by, environmental stimuli. Biology, psychology, and sociology are integrated.

Criminology is an appropriate discipline to draw upon because of its strengths in specifying the dependent variables (outcomes or results). Other social science disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, have strengths in elaborating the independent variables (inputs or

causes). In recent years, criminologists have demonstrated a willingness to consider research findings from other sciences that study criminal behavior. Integration of biological and social knowledge has increased awareness, understanding, and the possibility of effective treatment modalities. However, conceptualization issues remain problematic. For present purposes, the dependent variable of crime is defined as “any socially harmful act or analogous social injury which is prohibited by the State and against which the State may react by punishment” (Sutherland, 1949, p. 31). This is a broad enough definition to cover the many types of terrorism, for which the requisite mental state is premeditated or purposive use of violence, according to State and Defense Department definitions (Office of Coordinator, 1997; U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990).

Unfairness is conceptually different from grievance but a common sense distinction should be made. To use an example, every society has a nudity taboo, and a woman may experience a sense of unfairness to learn that a nude photograph of her has been taken surreptitiously, but a sense of grievance only ensues if she learns her photograph has been published somewhere. Ultimately, the concepts are a matter of judicial determination, but they also exist subjectively and depend upon the social setting. Subjective perceptions are difficult to measure, and study is further complicated by the field's reliance upon two interminable concepts: the reference group and relative deprivation. Both terms were initially developed by Merton (1968) as an alternative to the older frustration-aggression hypothesis, which relied mostly upon a Freudian interpretation of natural impulses being thwarted. It is standard sociological practice to assume a reference group (whom a person chooses to compare their own or group's condition with) may be real or imagined, and the effects of relative deprivation (sense of injustice) are real in their consequences. Along these lines, the field of social psychology includes a wealth of research on "deprivational forms of inequity" (Singer 1981: 88), the history of which can be summarized as largely focused first on exchange theories, then equity theories, subsequently on the sociology of emotions, and finally on general strain theory (Agnew 1992). General strain theory is the only model in contemporary criminology that emphasizes feelings of unfairness and sensations of grievance. In its present form, it is decidedly sociological but not incapable of integration with the insights of other disciplines.

Biosocial criminology first emerged in the mid-1970s, but was largely ignored until the late 1980s. Wilson (1980) was one of the pioneers who argued on behalf of using biology to explain presumably social traits like selfishness and spite. C. Ray Jeffery's (1977) use of biology for criminological purposes was overshadowed by the simultaneous rise in the popularity of models for situational crime prevention or CPTED (crime prevention through environmental design). During the 1990s, biosocial criminology had plenty of false starts and dead ends such as the compulsive masculinity thesis (O'Connor, 1994). However, by the start of the 21st century, biosocial criminology continued to draw upon "hard science" psychiatry, psychology, and medicine and now is believed to have moderate to strong empirical veracity (Rowe, 2001; Walsh & Beaver, 2009). For example, brain neuroscience (Blair, 2008), childhood development (Lahey et al., 2008), hormones and neurotransmitters (Hubbard, 1983), and studies in molecular and behavioral genetics (Wright et. al., 2008; Walsh & Beaver, 2009) have all been usefully imported. The following bodies of literature are now customary aids to understanding criminal behavior:

- **Brain Functioning:** Imaging studies show that amygdala dysfunction is strongly related to the conditioning of emotional reactions, particularly fear, and when combined with executive deficits (dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, and medial cortices of the frontal lobes) produce emotional states and cognitive biases that motivate criminal behavior.
- **Childhood Development:** Callous-unemotional traits such as lack of empathy are traceable to the interaction of early childhood temperament with parenting factors, and are strongly predictive of subsequent antisocial and violent behavior.
- **Hormones and Neurotransmitters:** Abnormal levels of norepinephrine, acetylcholine, and endorphins produce a fight or flight reaction characterized by a need for arousal at fairly regular intervals, usually via violence.
- **Phenotypes and Genotypes:** A phenotype results from the expression of an organism's genes as well as the influence of environmental factors while a genotype reflects the inherited instructions of genetic code, with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) being the gene-environment interaction with the most relevance to chronic misbehavior.

Biosocial criminology, compared to other approaches in criminology, tends to explain at least as much variance (10-20%) as general stress or strain models (O'Connor, 1993). This means that among general population samples, research on various models or an assemblage of variables will explain about 10-20% of all possible causes for violent behavior. Even the best sociological theories in criminology will typically produce research findings in the 20-30% range (Agnew, 1992). Clearly, the right combination of sociological and biological factors has yet to be found. Research is compounded not only by the aforementioned conceptualization problems, but by the fact that proxy biological variables often have to be used since brain scans, blood tests, hair samples, and various other ideal data collection measures rarely pass human subjects review. Some (e.g., Rowe, 2001) have argued that biological factors alone (without adding sociological variables) may produce better research results, for example, in the 40-60% range, but again, ethical problems exist which would likely prohibit the carrying out of such research. Yet, only by moving forward with such research can the full potential of biosocial criminology be realized.

It may be that the most appropriate uses of biosocial criminology, for now, involve the development of screening mechanisms for adequate diet, nutritional intake, and organ functioning. With such a control purpose, the explanatory power of biosocial theories could be increased by verifying the ability to predict non-violent behavior. After all, one of the promises of biosocial criminology is to resolve a recurrent explanatory problem in social science about how to account for individually different reactions to similar environmental stimuli. In other words, biosocial theories may be best tested by predicting who does not become a violent criminal or terrorist. On the other hand, the question remains about what to do when screening mechanisms reveal neurological defects. It is clearly inappropriate to say all persons with such deficits are destined to become criminals or terrorists, but some intervention may be warranted, particularly when sociological factors are facilitative of such pathways. Biological defects alone do not govern one's destiny. It is possible for a small number of people to cope with their

handicaps by psychologically “insulating” from such influences. It is also possible that strong personality variables like hardiness, self-reliance, and work ethic can insulate a person from influence. To better zero in on the people with the most risk, biosocial criminology has borrowed heavily from the field of endocrinology (Fishbein, 1990) and explored most broadly the concept of psychopathology (Raine, 1993).

It is important to look for biological influences that may be disguised as sociological factors. Endocrinology provides just such a look. The key concept of endocrinology is central motive state. In psychology, the equivalent concept is desire. Some examples are thirst, hunger, and sex. Various hormonal pathways or "circuits" exist for other states of excitation or arousal (Fishbein, 1990), and it is important to note that hormonal reactions do not occur in a vacuum. Desires have an appetitive (searching) phase and a consummatory (fulfilling) phase. Individuals can generate the appetitive phase of a hormonal reaction by themselves, but they need the hormonal reactions of others (pheromones) or additional environmental stimuli to generate the consummatory phase. It is possible that some criminal, violent, or terrorist behavior is generated by hormonal reactions.

Testosterone, and other androgens, have been the most-studied hormones in criminology (Walsh & Beaver, 2009). Testosterone has been related to aggressive criminal behavior in a number of studies, and many criminologists believe that high levels of testosterone reduce a person's social integration, making them more of a loner, and, by decreasing their inhibitions, increasing their likelihood of deviating from society's norms (Brain, 1993). Hormones exert a strong influence, primarily by inducing brain events that prompt people to behave in certain ways to environmental stimuli not only reactively, but anticipatorily in the form of what might be called unconscious behavior (by making a person think they want something before they see it). Hormonal disorders are easily treatable - not only by medicine, but also by geographic relocation since often a different set of weather conditions or seasonal patterns will provide a cure.

Neurotransmitter problems in the brain are more difficult to diagnose and treat. The strongest evidence in criminology exists for the statement that antisocial personalities have significantly lower levels of serotonin than ordinary people (Fishbein, 1990). Most people with such problems complicate their situation by “self-medicating” with alcohol or drugs. Despite the genetic basis for a person's production of neurotransmitter levels, it is quite easy to manipulate them with drugs, with diet, with counseling, and even with altitude. Also, neurotransmitter balances are constantly changing as stored memories create new neural pathways. It may be that brain imaging will one day tell us that certain stored grievance memories follow a particular pathway, but right now, the science as well as treatment is seriously underfunded. People in our society seem willing to accept that antisocial personality disorders are largely untreatable.

Vitamin deficiencies as well as vitamin dependencies may play a role in perceptions of unfairness. Certain vitamin B deficiencies are correlated with criminal as well as mentally ill behavior (Rafter, 2008), the mental illness-crime connection being suggestive of cognitive distortion and bias. Vitamin deficiencies also cause low IQ, mental impairments, and weak immune systems. A vitamin dependency is different, requiring a genetic predisposition, and is most often diagnosed as a food allergy. Criminologists hesitate to generalize about the effects and most often only allow for the possibility of "transient states" of criminality (Fishbein, 1990).

It should be apparent that most biosocial models need psychological and/or sociological factors to be added as intervening or mediating variables. For these purposes, the concept of

inequity from general strain theory (Agnew, 1992) is an excellent choice. It deals with distributive justice expectations in a relatively straightforward way, positing that people evaluate reward and punishment allocations on the basis of comparison levels. Comparison levels were first examined by Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and defined as what it takes, at a minimum, for someone to seek out new friends for respect, appreciation, or acceptability. The concept bears a remarkable affinity to Cooper's "doctrine of necessity" (Cooper, 1977), which holds that a person becomes a terrorist when they come to believe that continuance of the status quo is worse than any consequence of the act of terrorism. In other words, utter hatred of the status quo helps overcome any feelings of guilt about killing innocent people. Clearly, inequity is a sociological trigger for biosocial factors that drive the terrorist mindset.

Inequity as a sense of unfairness is characterized by a desire for retaliation or revenge, which follows from a perceived injury or deprivation. Misattribution to imagined injuries are common, and although it might not be possible to ameliorate the neurological foundations of such distortions, it is entirely possible to alleviate "equity distress" as Walster et al. (1978) put it. Doing so would require calm, rational discussion (or public information) of the benefits and costs of contemplated terrorist action. In accordance with Schoeck (1966) who stated the emotion of envy was a critical source of relative deprivation, what might be helpful would be a national dialogue on the inherent danger of a society of equals. Inequality cannot be conquered, but inequity can. We need only imagine ways to provide achievable status enhancements instead of stigma for the more unfortunate and embittered.

To summarize, biosocial criminology has a good deal of potential not only for an increased understanding of violence and terrorism, but for the prevention of both. Further research in this field may enhance, as well as inspire, counterterrorism solutions. To the extent that factors such as unfairness, grievance, injustice, inequity, envy, and spite are related to the causes of terrorism, there is at least moderate proof that these causes have biological connections to what are often mistaken to be solely environmental influences. No cases are likely to be driven completely by biological factors, but some terrorism problems may be driven by a combination of biological and sociological factors. Some hypotheses along these lines might explore such factors as diet and exercise combined with parental upbringing as well as peer group behavior that aggravates hormonal or neurotransmitter problems. Biosocial approaches offer an alternative to purely sociological approaches. They also move interdisciplinary work forward. Finally, they put the causal order of variables back on track for the development of truly general theories, which can explain antecedent as well as intervening and triggering factors.

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1.8. Instigators and Perpetrators of Collective Violence (David Mandel)

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Psychological theory geared towards understanding collective violence, whether by violent state or non-state actors, has tended to focus on three groups: victims, perpetrators, and bystanders (e.g., Baumeister, 1997; Miller, 1999; Staub, 1989). In this paper, I propose that the category “perpetrators” needs to be refined or, rather, divided (also see Victoroff, 2005). Specifically, those who instigate collective violence need to be distinguished from those who subsequently carry it out. We may call the former *instigators* and the latter *perpetrators*.

The main point is that instigators play a critical role in the *origination* of collective violence, whereas perpetrators play a critical role in its *execution*, and the latter tend to operate in

the service of instigators. Of course, in some instances, the two sets overlap. The lone-wolf terrorist epitomizes the case of strong, if not perfect, overlap, but also illustrates its limits. As the complexity of terrorist operations and the size of a terrorist organizations increase, the likelihood of instigators and perpetrators being one and the same steeply diminishes. As organizations grow, they also tend to grow more complex and, accordingly, the functions of their various members tend to become more differentiated. This is no different for organizations of violence. Hence, we should not be surprised to see a division of labor there too.

Instigators: Why Study Them? Why Don't We Study Them?

Given that it is the goals, plans, and acts of instigators that set in motion a complex, causal chain of events leading to collective violence, the importance of understanding the "psychology of instigation" should be evident. The significance of examining instigators, however, has often been downplayed in favor of understanding how presumably ordinary members of society can be led into becoming perpetrators of collective violence. For example, as Staub (1989) stated in reference to the Holocaust, "there will always be wild ideas and extreme ideologies. For us the question is how the German people came to follow a leader and a party with such ideas, and how they came to participate in their fulfillment" (p. 98). The implication here is that Hitler was possessed by these crazy ideas, and what is really important is not why he became possessed but rather why he was able to influence other "normal" people.

One reason for this focus is social psychology's aim of formulating accounts that generalize to the mass of ordinary people. Instigators of collective violence, with their "wild ideas" do not seem to fit this mold. These theorists do not deny the importance of instigators, but view them as largely inexplicable in terms of the psychological processes used to describe "ordinary individuals." Consider Milgram (1974): "The psychological adjustments of a Wehrmacht General to Adolf Hitler parallel those of the lowest infantryman to his superior, and so forth, throughout the system. *Only the psychology of the ultimate leader demands a different set of explanatory principles*" (p. 130, my italics).

Another reason for the reluctance to focus on instigators may be the concern that people will misconstrue explanations of their behavior as exculpatory statements. Indeed, this concern may be well founded as Miller, Gordon, and Buddie (1999) found that explaining a perpetrator's behavior increased the likelihood of their participants condoning that behavior. Other possible reasons include the fact that perpetrators greatly outnumber instigators, and perpetrators tend to carry out the actual killings; thus, they may seem more important to understand. I would argue, however, that it is precisely because instigators can lead so many others to participate in acts of collective violence, or stand idly by while it unfolds, that we need to try to understand them as well as their followers and bystanders.

Characteristics of Instigators

Non-interchangeability

A defining feature of instigators, which serves to distinguish them from perpetrators, is the non-interchangeable role that they serve in the development of collective violence. Kershaw noted this when he wrote, "whatever the external circumstances and impersonal determinants, Hitler was not interchangeable" (1998, p. xxvii). Accordingly, most perpetrators will pass a counterfactual test of "undo-ability," whereas most instigators will fail the test. The same could not be said even for top-ranking Nazi perpetrators of the Final Solution, such as Himmler or

Heydrich. In rerunning history with Hitler, one can imagine substitutions for the others that would still leave the core features of the historical episode intact. Perhaps a substitution of Heydrich would have slowed the Final Solution and saved many lives that were lost, but it would not have prevented the Holocaust—at least, that is not easy to imagine *but for* Heydrich. In a similar vein, we can easily imagine substitutions of individual 9/11 terrorist hijackers and, yet, still imagine that the attacks would have taken place in essentially the same manner with different perpetrators. The same cannot be said for bin Laden. That is, it is much easier to imagine: “No bin Laden, no 9/11.”

I am not aware of any study that has formally tested the non-interchangeability of instigators hypothesis. Nevertheless, I suspect that if one were to elicit the views of terrorism and political violence scholars or counter-terrorism practitioners about the non-interchangeability of instigators and perpetrators, a reliable and large difference would be found. This hypothesis could quite easily be tested in future research.

Catalysts of Violence

Instigators often achieve their non-interchangeable position by appealing to a mass audience. They may offer hope to their followers, usually in times of social crisis in which many are searching for meaning and a sense of belonging in their lives. This hope is energizing and provides a common vision, but it is often a vision that rests on hatred, distrust, and justification of violence. Hitler capitalized on Germany's high propensity for violence during a period of dramatic social unrest and consolidated immense power in the process. In exchange, he imparted a new form of coherence to an unstable social system, albeit one that culminated in incalculable misery and destruction and that proved to also be unstable. In so doing, his role was figural against a background of other enabling conditions and transformed those conditions. As Yehuda Bauer put it, Hitler was "the radicalizing factor" (1994, p. 308). Bauer's statement is indicative of an important point about instigators. It is characteristic of instigators, but not perpetrators, that they serve a *catalytic* role in the development of collective violence. The characteristic fits bin Laden as well: his key role as Al Qaeda's first in command, quite arguably, has been to incite and sustain widespread hatred toward the West and Israel. That is why the periodic releases of his tapes calling for renewed *jihad* are damaging even if they are short on specifics. They inspire the idea, “Be creative. Find your own way of carrying out *jihad*. That is *your* duty to God.”

The catalytic function served by instigators does not mean, however, that they are “initial causes” of collective violence. Rather, instigators increase the *propensity* for collective violence and intentionally act to *accelerate* its pace and *direct* its focus once it has started. For example, the racial anti-Semitism propagated by the Nazis under Hitler had as one of its own proximal causes the many anti-Semitic German writings and speeches of the late 1800s. If Hitler had not been exposed to these ideas as a young adult, it is unlikely that he would have turned out to be “Hitler” (Mandel, 2002b). Few instigators of collective violence construct their justifications for violence without influence from a mix of ideas that have already permeated the instigator's culture to some extent. In this sense, instigators can be seen as the conduit between the cultural background and the expression of violence that they help bring to the foreground.

Cross-spectrum Power Holders

In his analysis of power in contemporary societies, Alvin Toffler (1990) defined three forms: *low-grade* power relies on physical force or the threat of violence, *medium-grade* power relies on control of capital wealth, and *high-grade* power relies on access to, and control of,

information and knowledge. A critical factor that distinguishes instigators from other perpetrators is the acquisition of power across this power spectrum. Instigators are likely to achieve higher positions of authority than perpetrators (including dictatorial or even quasi-messianic status). The roles that even high-ranking perpetrators take on tend to be shaped and sanctioned by these ultimate leaders (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Unlike most perpetrators, instigators may attain the power to mobilize armies, paramilitary forces, and the police. Although the ability to achieve control over state apparatus may be limited for non-state instigators, their power in this regard will still tend to be greater than that of the perpetrators they lead.

Instigators are likely to have greater powers than perpetrators in many other respects as well. They tend to have better control over sources of financing and use of organizational resources. If they rise to power as state leaders they will have greater powers to change laws, while as non-state actors they will have greater powers to challenge the validity of existing laws that do not serve their interests. Unlike perpetrators, a key task of instigators is to influence the attitudes of the masses in ways intended to serve their strategic intent. In short, instigators not only have the power to authorize individuals to participate directly in collective violence, they also have greater powers than perpetrators to shape bystanders' reactions to these events and establish the social parameters for depersonalization and stigma (Goffman, 1990) and dehumanization and moral exclusion (Bandura, 1999).

Propagators of Nationalism

As LeBon (1896) emphasized over a century ago, the effective instigator energizes his followers by agitating their emotions and by appealing to the sentiments that guide their reason. In modern history, *nationalism* has been one of the most effective political strategies for accomplishing this goal (Hobsbawn, 1992; Smith, 1986), and its success is fundamentally due to its psychological power. On the one hand, nationalism creates an egotistic sense of in-group cohesion by emphasizing the shared greatness of a people. On the other hand, it exacerbates feelings of threat by pointing to the nation's precariousness, feelings of hatred by pointing to those deemed responsible for its hardships and failures, and feelings of insult due to the belief that one's nation has not received the respect it deserves. As Isaiah Berlin noted long ago in an essay entitled, *The bent twig: On the rise of nationalism* (reprinted in Berlin, 1991), nationalism is often motivated by some form of collective humiliation. The same message was articulated decades later in Staub's (1989) book, *The Roots of Evil*, and later still in Stern's (2003) *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. It is interesting to note that when bin Laden in his August 23, 1996, *Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques* issued a call for *jihad*, the call was for "a guerilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it" (Federation of American Scientists, 2001). That is, bin Laden appealed not to Arab or Muslim states, but to the "Moslem nation."

Chiot (1994) has documented that, in case after case, twentieth-century tyrannies have been characterized by a combination of perceived national superiority coupled with perceived national threat and/or a collective sense of insult from the outside world. The Nazi image of a German master race threatened by an international Jewish plague that mocked Germany and her people illustrates the point. Similarly, bin Laden points to the "humiliation and disgrace" hurled on the Islamic world by the West "for more than eighty years" (Lewis, 2003). The reference to "eighty years" may not be evident to most Westerners of our generation, but it would not fail to have significance for Muslims likely to recall that in 1918 the Ottoman sultanate, the last great

Muslim empire, was defeated, occupied, and later partitioned by the British and French empires into Iraq, Palestine, and Syria (and later Lebanon). As Bernard Lewis (2003) points out, these insults must be understood in historical context, both in terms of the geopolitical reality that since the birth of Islam, Muslim empires ruled most of the civilized world for the next millennium and were exporters of civilization to the emerging West, and also in terms of the religious tradition of *jihad*, with its dual connotations of militant struggle and duty to God.

According to bin Laden, “hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God” (PBS Frontline, 2001). The reframing of calls for violence as “duties” or “moral obligations” is a popular technique of instigators to legitimize collective violence. By linking the perpetration of terrorism to a religious duty, bin Laden uses God as the ultimate authority. In effect, bin Laden has claimed that if you fail to try to kill Americans, you have failed in your duty to God. Such messages can instill powerful feelings of moral obligation to an ideal or cause. Hannah Arendt (1965) noted in her famous report of the Adolf Eichmann trial how a strong sense of obedience to Hitler and his ideals served as an important source of Eichmann’s diligence in overseeing the transport of Jews to death camps during the Holocaust—so much so that Eichmann was willing to violate orders by his superior, Heinrich Himmler, toward the end of the Holocaust to stop transporting Jews to the death camps in order to follow what he believed was Hitler’s wish.

Nationalism and religious fundamentalism play upon a key aspect of human social cognition—the tendency to categorize individuals into groups. As we know from Tajfel’s (1981) classic work using the minimal group paradigm, people will discriminate in favor of ingroup members and against outgroup members even when the basis of social categorization is trivial (such as when an experimenter tells participants that their test scores reveal a preference for paintings by either Klee or Klimt). Nationalism is particularly effective at creating this sense of *us* versus *them* because nations (unlike states) tend to be defined in terms of features that are of high personal and social importance, such as ethnicity, race, religion, ideology, and language (Azzi, 1998). Consequently, the nation is likely to be seen not merely as an aggregate but as a cohesive *entity* (Campbell, 1958). For example, German *völkisch* nationalists conceived of their nation as an organic whole whose members were united by blood bonds that went back to the beginning of human history (Stackelberg, 1999). Religious fundamentalism goes even further: not only are there blood ties, there are also duties to God that serve to unite the *ummah* or nation of Muslim believers.

What Motivates Them? Concluding on an Unanswered Question

For those of us who share very different political views, social perspectives, and cultural ideals from the instigators and their movements we wish to better understand, it may be tempting to think that instigators are savvy manipulators of the public that use nationalism merely as a means of political expediency and power grabbing. To be sure, successful instigators will use the sentiments of the masses to gain power and will do so strategically. But, it would be shortsighted to think that instigators were merely being Machiavellian, but that, privately, they were unconvinced of their own arguments. Rather, it appears that in many cases the motivation to instigate comes from a genuine sense of the same sentiments that instigators propagate or incense in their supporters.

Surely, there are numerous psychological factors that play a role in each case history. As I have argued elsewhere (Mandel, 2002b), Hitler’s rage seems to have been provoked in no small

measure by an extreme form of *threatened egotism*, which as Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) define, refers "both to favorable appraisals of self and to the motivated preference for such favorable appraisals, regardless of whether they are valid or inflated" (p. 6). These authors have reviewed considerable literature indicating that violence is more likely to be carried out by people with high but unstable self esteem than by people with either high and stable self esteem or low self esteem. There is of course an interesting parallel between this person-level characterization of the threatened egotist and the group-level characterization of the threatened nation. Both share the elements of positive self-regard and a need for such positive appraisals, coupled with a sense of frustration that their deserved standing has been marred. But, it is unclear how well threatened egotism serves as an important psychological factor if we look across the spectrum of instigators. For instance, whereas Hitler met with much personal failure and was on the brink of destitution by the start of WWI (Kershaw, 1998), bin Laden came from one of the wealthiest Saudi families and there is little evidence, at present, that his doctrine of threatened Muslim nationalism is driven by a parallel threatened sense of self.

Perhaps a more likely generalizable candidate for the indication of figures who may turn out to be instigators of collective violence is totalistic thinking, by which I refer to a constellation of factors including intolerance of ambiguity, an undifferentiated view of key issues, and an overriding confidence in the veracity and moral soundness of one's own belief and the falsity and moral corruptness or "evilness" of those who adopt alternative views (Mandel, 2002a). Totalistic thinking has been central to many examples of armed conflict and collective violence. For Hitler, Germany was locked in a mortal struggle with two possible outcomes: utopia or perdition, with the Jew as the mortal enemy of the German (*Mein Kampf* means "my struggle"). For bin Laden, the struggle is between the true Moslem believers and the rest of the world (one connotation of the term *jihad* is "struggle"). We see in these statements two key factors. First, there is a reduction of perspectives to two sides that are seen as diametrically opposed and, thus, not in a position for negotiation. Second, the stakes of the conflict are ultimate, thus conveying the clear message: *If the ends were ever to justify the means, the time is now*. These aspects of the totalistic mindset may prove to be important preconditions for "radicalization" (Mandel, in press), that imprecise term often used these days to convey what goes on before the terrorists' bombs go off.

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2. Dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors

2.1. Small Group Dynamics (Marc Sageman)

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The U.S. administration change in 2009 provides an ideal opportunity to re-assess the transnational Islamist terrorist threat confronting the West, its evolution over time, and the implications for an effective counter-terrorism strategy. This must be based on solid empirical grounds and not on anecdotal evidence or ‘conventional wisdom.’

The goal of any campaign to fight terrorists is homeland security: protection of the population. A strategy to reach this goal must rest on an empirical understanding of the enemy’s behavior. To gain such understanding, a comprehensive, quantitative review of all operations in the West, either linked to or in the name of “al Qaeda,” over the past two decades was conducted for the NYPD using open source information, field visits and research, trial transcripts, and lengthy consultations with law enforcement agencies and intelligences services in the West.

The results are outlined here. The study revealed that out of 61 different attempts, only two operations in the West, with any degree of success defined in terms of any casualties, could be attributed to al Qaeda itself – the 9 September 2001 attacks upon the United States and the 7 July 2005 London underground attacks. There were 12 other successful operations conducted in the West, but nine conducted in France in the mid-1990s were attributed to the Algerian GIA terrorist group. The other three, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Madrid bombings in 2004, and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, were carried out by independent informal groups that did not have any formal links to other terrorist groups. The number of attempts in the West peaked in 2004 with 10 attempts and has been in sharp decline since. Most of the plots were carried out by autonomous local groups acting on behalf of al Qaeda. Most of the finances were raised locally by the perpetrators themselves; as in the last five years, there was little financial support from al Qaeda. In terms of training, al Qaeda’s role has decreased dramatically in the past five years, and other terrorist groups (Lashkar e-Toyba, Jaish e-Mohammed, Islamic Jihad Union...) have taken over. In the data analyzed, the vast majority of the plots ended in failure (Sageman & Silber, in press).

The enemy (al Qaeda [AQ], AQ affiliates, and AQ copycats/wannabes) is a relatively small group of mostly young people, who aspire to belong to a social movement that uses violence against civilians for political ends in the name of their version of Islam. An overwhelming majority of traditional Muslim scholars has condemned this version as deviant, but the politics of sensationalistic journalism have selectively given voice to a minuscule number of mostly self-appointed imams who support this use of violence. A majority of Muslims

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understand the difference between Islam and the claims of the terrorists and point to the biased Western reporting as just another instance of this alleged “war against Islam.” This bias effectively increases the pool of young Muslims susceptible to the messages of the terrorists, especially those expressing that they are the only ones who can defend Muslim interest and honor against Western cultural and physical aggression.

The terrorists in the incidents studied are simply young people seeking thrills and a sense of significance and belonging in their lives, like other terrorists have worldwide in the past hundred and thirty years. This sense of significance comes from their belief that they are special, part of a small vanguard trying to build a better world in the name of a cause. These terrorists want to build a utopia modeled on the community fostered by the Prophet because they believe that it was the only time in world history when a just and fair community existed. They are willing to sacrifice themselves for this cause in the name of God. Contrary to popular belief, radicalization to the point of conducting terrorist acts is not primarily due to poverty, brainwashing of youth, ignorance or lack of education, lack of jobs, lack of social responsibility, criminality or mental illness. Their mobilization into this violent social movement is based predominantly on friendship and kinship. The vast majority of recently arrested terrorists in the West – Europe, North America and Australia – are part of the Muslim Diaspora, expatriates, and the second or third generation of immigrants. They are radicalized in the West, not in the Middle East.

The strategy to fight these terrorists must be based on understanding the radicalization process, which breeds new participants in this terrorist wave against the West. The logical answer is to decrease the number of newcomers into the violent social movement and increase the number of those leaving it, either through internal factors, arrests, or deaths. If the number of those leaving greatly exceeds those entering, this terrorist movement will fade away. The speed of its demise will depend on the size of the flow in and out of the social movement. By radicalization, I mean the process of transformation of ordinary people into fanatics who use violence for political means. The word itself is a source of confusion, as some people use it to describe extremist views. Here, we should stick to violent behavior rather than ideas, because it is the violence that is the real concern and not what people think. This process of radicalization consists of four prongs: a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks. These four factors are not stages in a process, nor do they occur sequentially. They are simply four recurrent phases in this process. As mentioned earlier, this process is driven by young Muslims chasing dreams of glory by fighting for their version of justice and fairness. They are enthusiastic volunteers, trying to impress their friends with their heroism and sacrifice. Suicide bombers, or *shahids* as they call themselves, have become the rock stars of young Muslim militants.

One of the major themes expressed by Islamist radicals conveys a sense of moral outrage, a reaction to perceived major moral violations like killings, rapes, or unfair local police actions. Before 2003, the major source of such outrage was the killings of Muslims in Afghanistan in the 1980s; Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and Kashmir in the 1990s; and the second Palestinian intifada at the turn of the century. Since 2003, the sense of outrage has stemmed from events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Somalia. Although the war in Iraq did not cause this social movement - after all, 9/11 occurred before the invasion of Iraq - it has become the focal point for global moral outrage for Muslims all over the world. In all my talks with Muslims, Iraq, along with the humiliations of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, monopolizes the theme of any conversation about

Islam and the West. On a more local level, Muslims are concerned about the actions of the local representatives of their respective governments, especially local law enforcement agencies. If these activities appear anti-Muslim, they perceive that they are victims of a larger conspiracy, bridging local violations with perceived global moral violations.

To fuel radicalization, this sense of moral outrage must be interpreted in a certain way: these global and local moral violations are part of a unified Western global strategy, namely a “War against Islam.” Having said this, it is important to realize that this worldview is deliberately vague and that there has been far too much focus on ideology in trying to understand radicalization. The new terrorists are not Islamic scholars. The defendants at terrorist trials in the West were far from being Islamic scholars or even intellectuals who decide what to do after careful deliberation. The explanation for their behavior is not found in how they think, but rather in how they feel. They dream about becoming heroes in this “War against Islam,” modeling themselves on the seventh century Muslim warriors that conquered half the world and the Mujahedin who defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Many hope to emulate these predecessors by fighting in Iraq against coalition forces. Their interpretation, that the West is involved in a “War against Islam”, is just a sound bite and has little depth to it. People bombing Western cities and volunteering for Iraq are not interested in theological debates but in living out their heroic fantasies.

The “War against Islam” interpretation is embedded within cultural traditions that differ from country to country. Their respective consistency across cultures of this interpretation explains one of the major differences between Europe and the United States in motivations for radicalization leading to terrorism. In Europe, national myths are based on an eternal essence common to all citizens of a country, such as Frenchness, Englishness, or Germanness. In the United States, and other countries built on waves of immigration, the national myth is that of a “melting pot.” The point is that the myth of a national essence excludes non-European Muslim immigrants, while that of a melting pot facilitates their inclusion into the host society. The notion of the “American Dream”, the land of opportunity, partially protects the United States. Whether it is true or not, the important point is that people believe it. A recent poll found that 71 percent of Muslim Americans believe in the American Dream (Pew Research Center, 2007). This is not the case in Europe, where Muslims complain about discrimination in the labor market. In the United States, belief in a “War against Islam” is not consistent with the inclusiveness of the melting pot and the equal opportunity of the American Dream. This makes homegrown terrorism within the United States less likely than in Europe.

The “War against Islam” interpretation “sticks” more to Muslim Europeans than Americans because it resonates with their everyday personal experience. This notion of resonance encompasses the social, economic, political, and religious factors that constitute their everyday life experiences. This set of factors is what is traditionally referred to as the “root causes” of terrorism. First, from a historical perspective, we are dealing with very different communities. The United States was able to “cherry pick” immigrants and allowed Muslim engineers, physicians, university professors, and businessmen to immigrate. The result is that the Muslim American community is solidly middle class, with a higher average family income than the rest of the population². This is not true of Europe, which imported unskilled labor to

² Although this is the demographics of the individuals forming the first ripples of a terrorist wave, these leaders justify their actions in the name of their less well off brethren. I have called this contributing

reconstruct the continent that had been devastated by World War II. So, on a socio-economic scale, we are dealing with very different populations: mostly middle class in the United States and an unskilled labor pool in Europe. In terms of the labor market, Muslim Americans believe that they are facing equal opportunity. Muslim Europeans know that this is not the case, as the unemployment rate for male Muslims is much higher than its host counterpart. Muslim Europeans strongly believe they are facing discrimination because they are Muslim. Welfare policy also distinguishes Europe from the United States, as Europe tolerates a higher unemployment rate. Many unemployed Muslim Europeans are on the welfare payroll. Some do not feel any sense of urgency to get a job and some spend their idle moments talking about jihad. Ironically, European states, through welfare payments, contribute to the funding of inexpensive terrorist operations. Probably the most devastating effect of the lack of meaningful employment is boredom from idleness. Here, the thrill of participating in clandestine operations may prove almost irresistible to some.

The factors described above influence some young Muslims to become angry, and vent their frustration. What transforms a very small number of them to become terrorists is mobilization through networks. Until a few years ago, these networks were based on face-to-face interactions. They were local gangs of young immigrants, members of student associations, and study groups at some radical mosques. These cliques of friends became radicalized together. The group acted as an echo chamber, which amplified their grievances, intensified the members' bonds, bred values rejecting those of their host society and facilitating a gradual separation from it. These natural group dynamics resulted in a spiral of mutual encouragement and escalation, transforming a small number of young Muslims into dedicated terrorists willing to follow the model of their heroes and sacrifice themselves for comrades and the cause. Their turn to violence and the terrorist movement was a collective decision, rather than an individual one. In the past two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being replaced by online radicalization. It is the interactivity of the group that changes people's beliefs, and such interaction is found in Islamist extremist forums on the Internet. The same support and validation that young people used to derive from their peer groups through direct contact are now found in these forums, which promote the image of terrorist heroes, link them to the virtual social movement, give them guidance, and instruct them in tactics. These forums, virtual marketplaces for extremist ideas, have become the virtual "invisible hand" organizing terrorist activities worldwide. The leader of this violent social movement is in effect the collective discourse on roughly half a dozen influential forums. These forums are transforming the terrorist movement, attracting ever younger members, and now more prominently women, who can participate in the discussions.

The Atlantic Divide in cultural, social, and economic factors explains the greater likelihood of formation of homegrown terrorist networks in Europe than the United States. The main reason for the absence of a second 9/11 type of attack in the United States is the relative absence of homegrown networks there. The main threat to the U.S. homeland still comes from Europe. In quantitative terms, the threat of a homegrown attack in Europe is about seven and a half times greater in terms of per capita Muslim than in the U.S..

The nature of the terrorist threat has evolved over time. The first wave of Muslims who joined this terrorist social movement consisted largely of some "Afghan Arabs," companions at

factor to terrorism "vicarious poverty." See Marc Sageman, 2008, *Leaderless Jihad*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 48-50 for further details.

arms of Osama bin Laden, who had come to Pakistan to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. They were, in general, well educated, from a solid middle class background and joined al Qaeda around the age of 30. They still form the al Qaeda Central leadership, but there are at most a few dozen left, hiding in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The second wave consisted of elite expatriates from the Middle East, who came to the West to pursue their education, became radicalized in the West, and traveled to Afghanistan around the age of 25 for training in the 1990s. They were incorporated into al Qaeda Central, and there are at most about a hundred left, again in the FATA. The third wave is completely different from its predecessors. It consists mostly of terrorist “wannabes,” who, angered by the allied invasion of Iraq, aspire to join the social movement, but cannot link up to al Qaeda Central, which had to go into hiding after the allied invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11. These newcomers are generally poorly educated, homegrown, and join the movement around the age of 20 (Sageman, in press). They form fluid informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. Very few succeed in connecting with al Qaeda Central or remnants of Lashkar e-Toyba or Jaish e-Mohammed. Those that succeed do so either through family connections (mostly British Pakistani Muslims) or through chance (mostly Northern Europeans). Others seek out the glory of fighting in Iraq and connect with fluid networks of smugglers linked to al Qaeda in Iraq. But these constitute a small minority of this violent social movement. The threat to the West has evolved in a Darwinian way in response to the post 9/11 habitat. The ongoing process of radicalization now takes place in a very hostile, physical but tolerant, virtual environment and results in a scattered, decentralized social structure – a “leaderless jihad” (Sageman, 2008). It lacks formal command and control but the Internet gives it a semblance of unity and guidance.

This dynamic suggests that the threat to the West, far from being an inevitable “clash of civilizations” or a “long war,” is actually self-limiting. At present, al Qaeda Central cannot impose discipline on the third wave wannabes, mostly because it does not know who they are. Without this command and control, each disconnected network acts according to its own understanding and capability, but the collective actions do not amount to any unified long-term goal or strategy. These separate groups cannot coalesce into a physical political party, which would become a vulnerable target for Western military or law enforcement power. Without the possibility of a physical presence or ability to negotiate with its enemies, which might encourage it to show a semblance of unity, the social movement is condemned to stay a leaderless jihad, an aspiration, but not a lasting physical reality. Al Qaeda has not been able to rally any state to provide protection against Western pursuit. Without a viable and effective sanctuary, it cannot fully regroup and consolidate into a physical power able to capture some territory in order to establish its utopia.

There has been talk of al Qaeda resurgence, but the truth is that the al Qaeda hard core members of the first and second waves are dwindling in numbers and are not being replaced. The campaign with numerous Predator strikes that started in the second half of the 2008 has dealt enormous blows to al Qaeda leaders and cadres, from which they may not be able to recover. The few members of the third wave who succeed in making contact with al Qaeda Central in the FATA have been turned around to conduct operations in their respective countries and are not incorporated into al Qaeda Central. The survival of this social movement relies on a continuous inflow of new members, which, in turn, depends on the reasons young Muslims might be attracted to this violent social movement. Here, again, the appeal of the al Qaeda social movement is limited. Its appeal thrives only at the abstract fantasy level. The few times its

aspirations have been translated into reality – the Taliban in Afghanistan, part of Algeria during the civil war, and more recently in Anbar Province of Iraq – resulted in governments, actions and events that were particularly repulsive to most Muslims and alienated its former supporters. A Taliban like government, whose only role is to ensure that its subjects follow its interpretations of the law, is not an attractive reality to many. Furthermore, as each generation tries to define itself in contrast to its predecessor, what appeals to the present generation of young Muslims might not appeal to their successors. A major source of this appeal is the empowerment of fighting to right the source of moral outrage caused by the allied invasion of Iraq. As the Western footprint there fades, so will its appeal. And finally, new hotheads in the movement will always push the envelope to make a name for themselves and cause ever escalating atrocities. The magnitude of these horrors will turn off potential supporters.

More than seven years after September 11, 2001, the United States strategy to counter this terrorist threat continues to be frozen by an inability to get past the horrors of that tragedy and relies more on wishful thinking than on a deep understanding of the enemy. The pursuit of “high value targets” who were directly involved in the operation was an appropriate first step to bring the perpetrators to justice. While it succeeded in degrading the capability of al Qaeda Central, this strategy is not viable against this third wave leaderless jihad, which has become the present threat to the West. On the ideological front, the strategy promotes a political vision of democracy and freedom as an antidote to terrorism. This resonates with American audiences but is seen as an exercise in cynicism for Muslim populations, who know all about their respective governments’ rigged elections and denial of freedom, often with implicit United States complicity. However, the dramatic downturn in the economy chased terrorism from the headlines of the recent presidential campaign. This electoral neglect of the issue was a great improvement over the previous campaign, where each side was trying to convince the electorate that it was tougher on terrorism than its political opponent, degenerating into a frenzy of sound bites, fought on national news channels fueled by photogenic commentators worried about their share of the viewing audience. This mindless simplification of “you are with us, or you are against us,” essentially echoes the arguments of the enemies engaged by the United States in the “War against Islam,” uniting the Muslim world in opposition to U.S. international policy. Ironically, the best propaganda tool for the enemy was the American media, where sensationalism trumps substance. The election of President Obama has greatly undermined the appeal of the jihadist ideology that the U.S. is unfair and would never elect an outsider who is an obvious representative of a minority³. Even jihadi chat rooms are still debating this event and are trying to reconcile this result with their claim that the U.S. represents the epitome of injustice. Young Muslims in Europe now are no longer turning to al Qaeda, but are asking questions about the inability of their respective political systems to generate their own Obama.

If national security is the true aim of this fight and the threat is self-limiting, then the logical strategy is one of containment while waiting for the threat to disappear due to internal reasons. The key is to accelerate, not slow down or stop, this process of internal decay. Nothing should be done that will make the threat grow to include virtually all Muslims; such an escalation might then, indeed, become an existential threat to West. Containment must neutralize the main

³ The U.S. President Barak Obama’s Cairo Speech in early June 2009 is a good illustration of this point. Osama bin Laden had released an audio recording about six hours prior to the speech. Yet, what was debated on the Jihadi websites that I monitored was President Obama’s speech and not Osama’s tape, which was almost completely ignored.

drivers of the radicalization process: fantasy, fashion, and thrills – “jihadi cool”. Terrorist acts must be stripped of their heroic nature and reduced to common criminality. There is nothing more heroic than to go against uniformed members of the only remaining superpower. The fight against these terrorists must be demilitarized and turned over to collaborative law enforcement. It is also important not to give too much attention to the terrorists who are arrested or killed. The temptation to hold press conferences to publicize another “major victory” in the war on terror must be resisted for they elevate the status of these criminals to that of heroes. Low-key arrests and prosecution should serve to degrade the status of the terrorists. The military role should be limited to sanctuary denial, either directly or through allied forces, because sanctuaries have the potential to transform local terrorist activities into transnational coordinated plots.

Containment is not a passive strategy. It relies on the U.S. technical capability to detect terrorist activities worldwide and construct strong international alliances against these specific terrorists to disrupt and eliminate international plots. It must interrupt the radicalization process and prevent potential members from joining this movement.

In terms of confronting the sense of moral outrage on a global level, the non-Muslim foreign footprint in Iraq must be reduced as soon as possible. There has been a lot of confusion about al Qaeda and Iraq. The two issues are separate. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan because al Qaeda was there, but al Qaeda came to Iraq after the allied invasion because non-Muslim invaders were there. The argument that the “terrorists will follow us home” has so far been unfounded. In contrast to Afghanistan, where wannabe terrorists learned their trade and returned home, the foreign volunteers come to Iraq to die. The “bleed out” from Iraq will be a problem for adjacent Muslim countries, but probably not for distant Western countries. On a more local level, law enforcement authorities must be viewed as protective rather than hostile to the Muslim community. In a sense, this is what happened in many European countries, where white policemen patrol immigrant neighborhoods. To be seen as part of the community, the makeup of police forces must change to reflect that of the community by recruiting young Muslims, who could cultivate an ongoing everyday relationship with young people in the community. It is not enough to hold regular meetings with community leaders, whom the younger generation does not respect. To regain the trust of the Muslim community, local police actions must be explained. This has become a problem in Britain because of the legal ban on reporting on criminal cases in litigation. However, the opposite – making exaggerated claims of threat for short-term political benefits – will also alienate the Muslim community. So far, Muslim Americans have shown themselves to be very patriotic, but this has not been well recognized either by the press or by our government. It is important to trust them to continue to be patriotic and not to alienate them.

In terms of countering the terrorist interpretation, the West needs to convince Muslims that its counterterrorism efforts are not part of a “War on Islam.” Hostile statements to Islam made by Western leaders and the use of a belligerent vocabulary (e.g., the use of “crusade”) have not helped. The “war” metaphor needlessly elevates the status of the terrorists to that of a “worthy” opponent and may inspire glory seeking young people to join the fight. Without a clear definition of who the enemy is, a segment of the population might feel targeted. Many Muslims around the world suspect that the American use of the term “terrorist” is a code word for Muslim and believe the “war on terror” is really a “War against Islam.” The widely disseminated rants of Islamophobic bigots reinforce their fears. Most Muslim Americans do not even believe that the U.S. led “global war on terrorism” is a sincere effort to reduce terrorism since “actions speak louder than words.” To regain the confidence of the Muslim community, state officials should

carefully define who the terrorists are and actively challenge those who question the loyalty of Western Muslims. Since most Muslims in the West are part of the Diaspora, Western governments should educate their constituencies about the benefits of immigration to foster greater acceptance. Publicized stories of successful immigrants could celebrate an international version of the American Dream and provide role models for young Muslims, who may come to view Western success as “cool.” The “war of ideas” or the search for a “counter-narrative” as presently conceived by the U.S. government is generally misguided: terrorists are not intellectuals. They do what they do because of fantasies and fashion, not out of well thought out positions derived from any scripture. The “war of ideas” should be replaced by the inspiration of new dreams and hopes for young Muslims. We should learn our lessons from our own experience with the Civil Rights movement, when Reverend Martin Luther King inspired a generation with his speech “I Have a Dream!”

In terms of resonance with people’s daily experiences, the United States is doing much better than Europe and can show its Western allies ways of mitigating soft social and economic discrimination of local immigrant communities. Discrimination against Muslims at airports and with law enforcement should be eliminated. More Muslims should also be encouraged to enter into the realm of politics and show that they can peacefully influence their environment. Domestic policies to even the social, economic, and political playing field differ from country to country and tactical recommendations must be country specific.

In terms of mobilization through networks, it is imperative to disrupt and, when possible, destroy existing terrorist networks. Terrorists must be eliminated or brought to justice. This is a police rather than a military mission, which must rely on properly trained international allies, aided by U.S. technical means and sharing of electronic intercepts. Terrorists’ prosecution must be conducted with complete transparency and fairness. This is very much a battle for young Muslims’ hearts and minds: any appearance of persecution and discrimination for short-term tactical gains will be a strategic defeat in this battlefield. The point is to regain the international moral high ground, which served the U.S. so well during the Cold War. This international alliance with local police must be carefully monitored because local tyrants would like to eliminate any internal opposition in the name of the “war on terror.” The U.S. must be very careful in its choice of alliances, so as not to be inadvertently dragged in local persecution of legitimate dissent against tyranny. With the advent of the Internet, there has been a gradual shift from offline to online networks, centered on Internet forums, where young Muslims share their dreams, hopes, and grievances. This is an internal Muslim discussion. However, the U.S. might encourage more participation of voices that reject violence and challenge the emerging calls to violence. The focus must shift from celebration of terrorist actions to a focus on the victims of these horrors and reflection on the devastation they bring. Young people must learn that terrorism is about death and destruction, not about virtual self-glorification. It is necessary to reframe this whole debate about terrorism, from imagined glory to the very real horror. The voices of the victims and their relatives must be heard over the cacophony of bragging and pretending that occur in chat rooms.

Western Muslim communities are relatively young, having mostly immigrated in the last half century. Their younger generations are searching for their identity and trying to define their role within Western society. It is important for the West to welcome them, help them integrate better within its fabric, continue to promote its core universal values of justice and fairness, and

fight its internal elements that try to single out and antagonize what has now become an integral part of the West.

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2.2. Good-Bye To All That: The End of the Leader-Less Jihad v. Leader-Led Jihad Debate (Bruce Hoffman)

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Among the fatalities of the tragic November 2008 attacks in Mumbai was the so-called “bunch of guys” theory. Like the scores of dead and hundreds of wounded, it too was the victim of a terrorist operation that was planned and premeditated; executed by trained commando-like teams deployed as part of an evident command and control apparatus that orchestrated their deployment and coordinated their assaults. Schooled in the use of automatic weapons and apparently well versed in close quarters combat tactics, the gunmen were able to stand their ground against furious security force responses and counter-assaults. The operation also showed detailed surveillance, directed intelligence gathering, and meticulous logistical preparation. In sum, the fingerprints of an existing, identifiable terrorist organization, complete with the training camps needed to prepare the attackers, the operational headquarters to plan and direct the operation, and the knowledge of surveillance tradecraft to successfully affect them, are literally all over the operation.

In contrast, the “bunch of guys” theory of leaderless jihad claimed that terrorism in the 21st Century had drifted from the provenance of top-down direction and implementation provided by established, existing organizations to an entirely bottom-up, loosely networked phenomenon of radicalized individuals gravitating towards one another with a shared penchant for violence. These collections of individuals were defined as the new threat we all had to prepare for: self-selected, self-radicalized, and mostly self-trained wannabes with a limited capacity for violence that were allegedly multiplying and spreading to challenge both the more traditional conceptions of terrorism and the attendant countermeasures and security force responses based upon this anachronistically organized style of terrorism. Indeed, with the rise of the leaderless jihad, it was argued, organizations had become as immaterial as they were superfluous. The main terrorist threat had now become decidedly low-level - easily addressed by

local police forces with modest resources rather than by standing militaries and the vast array of kinetic instruments at their disposal.

A debate of sorts over the organizational vice leaderless nature of contemporary terrorism had arisen over the past year or so. At congressional hearings and conferences, in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Times*, among the variety of informed and distinctly uninformed blog and web sites arrayed across the Internet, as well in the corridors of power in the globe's national capitals, the issue was discussed and contested. On 26 November 2008, however, it was resolved in Mumbai by the terrorists themselves. In a blaze of automatic weapons' gunfire and hurled hand grenades, they settled the matter - and drove home their point over the course the next 48 hours, ceasing only when Indian security forces had shot dead the last gunmen holed up in a waterfront, luxury hotel.

Mumbai saw the eclipse of leaderless jihad as the salient terrorist threat today as disciplined teams of well-armed, well-trained terrorists simultaneously spread throughout the city to execute their mission at least ten different targets. In each case, they stood their ground and inflicted the carnage and bloodshed they were trained to accomplish. And, at the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower and Oberoi hotels, the terrorists not only effectively resisted counterattack by Indian security forces, but impeded and inflicted serious losses on those same forces - including the deaths of the city's top police counterterrorist commanders. The leader of an Indian Marine commando unit marveled as the fighting finally wound down how the terrorists were "very, very familiar with the hotel layout. . . . They were a very, very determined lot. They were moving from one place to the other. . . . Not everybody can fire AK-47 weapons like that. They were trained somewhere" (Wax & Lakshmi, 2008). Thus the delusional theories about the diminishing role of organizations in orchestrating terrorist violence were blown away too.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that a continuing risk from home-grown extremists clearly still exists and cannot be dismissed or ignored. The 2007 plot by six self-identified Islamic militants to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey is a case in point. Another is the half-baked plot to attack two synagogues in the Bronx, New York that was foiled in May 2009 by the FBI after an informant penetrated the motley cell. But while authorities must continue to worry about attacks by "amateur" or wannabe terrorists like these, their focus - preparations and response capabilities - will inevitably have to be geared to the more "professional," trained, disciplined and deployed terrorists as it is doubtful that home-grown terrorists could amass the numbers and have the requisite skill-set required to hit multiple target sites with the ferocity that the Mumbai attackers exhibited. Indeed, whether in Britain or in Germany, in recent years the more competent and ambitious indigenous terrorists have repeatedly found it necessary to take advantage of the training opportunities that only actual, existing terrorist organizations can provide in real-life, and not Internet-enabled, so-called virtual training camps.

An Emergent Consensus

One has to wonder, in fact, if there is any professional intelligence agency or senior official who still believes that the most consequential terrorist threat emanates from bunches of guys and not from established terrorist organizations like al Qaeda? In one of his last major public addresses before stepping down as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) in November 2008, Michael V. Hayden variously explained how "al-Qa'ida [sic], operating from its safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas, remains the most clear and present danger to the United States today;" that, "If there is a major strike on this country, it will bear the fingerprints of al-

Qa'ida;" and that, "Today, virtually every major terrorist threat my Agency is aware of has threads back to the tribal areas" (Hayden, 2008). Revealingly, Hayden did not mention once the threat from "bunches of guys" or self-radicalized, self-selected individuals belonging to a social network rather than a bona fide terrorist organization. His words are all the more important, not only for their timing - coming just two weeks before the Mumbai attacks - but also because when the DCIA talks he is not speaking only for himself but is inevitably expressing the collective wisdom of the world's most powerful intelligence service.

Nor were these conclusions exclusively the domain of allegedly "blinkered" American intelligence chiefs and their agencies who, critics often claim, "see al-Qaeda everywhere and in every plot and attack." The Netherlands' General Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst*, or AIVD), for example, is among the most professional and prescient of the world's intelligence and security agencies. Though far smaller than many of its Western counterparts,¹ it is an elite and perspicacious service that is as impressive for its early identification and incisive analysis of emerging trends as it appears genuinely able to "think out of the box."

The radicalization phenomenon, for instance - involving homegrown, domestic threats by organizationally unaffiliated militants - that is now so ingrained in our thinking and assessments of contemporary jihadi threats, was first publicly highlighted by the AIVD *seven* years ago in its *Annual Report 2002*. Thus, as far back as 2001, AIVD agents and analysts had detected increased terrorist recruitment efforts among Muslim youth living in the Netherlands whom it was previously assumed had been assimilated into Dutch society and culture (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2002). This assessment was proven tragically correct in November 2003 when a product precisely of this trend that the AIVD had correctly identified, a 17 year-old Dutch-Moroccan youth named Mohammad Bouyeri, brutally murdered the controversial film maker, Theo van Gogh, as he rode his bicycle along an Amsterdam street.² Accordingly, any assessment of current jihadi trends by the AIVD is to be taken very seriously, indeed.

The 2007 AIVD *Annual Report 2007* highlighted five principal international developments in jihadi terrorism that are of enormous consequence to the security of the West and the U.S. as well as the Netherlands. The sober AIVD analysts took particular note of the following disquieting trends:

1. "There has been a shift in the source and nature of the threat," the report argues. "Whereas it used to come principally from autonomous local networks, internationally-oriented local networks now also present a danger to the West."
2. "From the known threats in neighbouring [sic] countries, the AIVD can discern a shift in the international orientation of these networks. In the past, they were concerned mainly with supporting and sometimes recruiting for the violent jihad in traditional conflict zones. Now, though, they also seem to be focusing upon traveling abroad for

¹ The AIVD reportedly employs some 1,100 people. See Dutch News LG accessed at: <http://www.dutchnews.nl/dictionary/2006/11/aivd.php>.

² See the excellent book by Ian Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and the Limits of Tolerance* (London & New York, Penguin, 2007), for an especially perceptive analysis of both the van Gogh assassination, Dutch society, and the Muslim milieu from which Bouyeri emerged.

- training before returning to pursue their struggle in the West. This appears to have added a new dimension to the jihadist threat.”
3. “The degree of influence on European jihadist networks and individuals from Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is increasing.”
 4. “The AIVD has discerned signs that core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan is recovering, and that its influence as one of the primary sources of inspiration for jihadists around the world has further increased” [my emphasis] (p. 29).

The AIVD’s assessment is particularly noteworthy in that it dovetailed very closely with the publicly released key judgments of the seminal July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) (National Intelligence Council (NIC), 2007). This capstone document, representing the collective wisdom of the American intelligence community, had similarly concluded that the threat posed by al-Qaeda to the U.S. homeland and elsewhere had increased as a result of the movement having re-grouped and re-organized along the lawless frontier spanning both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 2007 NIE had forcefully argued that:

- “Al-Qa’ida [sic] is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.”
- “[Al-Qa’ida] has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership” (NIC, 2007).

And, the 2008 AIVD Annual Report both confirmed and reiterated these key trends. “An analysis conducted in 2008 by the AIVD and verified by fellow services,” it states,

“indicates that core Al-Qaeda’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks has increased in recent years. . . . One development of particular concern is the growing evidence that people from Europe are undergoing military training at camps in the border region. As a result, the ability of (core) Al-Qaeda and its allies to commit or direct attacks in Europe could increase. Not only might the trainees themselves carry out such actions upon their return to Europe, but they could also guide or support others” (General Intelligence, 2007)

A Future of More of the Same

There is not much likelihood of the organizational salience in terrorism changing in the future - at least not for the next 16 years. According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s authoritative assessment of global trends to the year 2025, “Terrorist and insurgent groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups - that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks” Admittedly, while the report also mentions the continuing threat posed by “newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,” its emphasis clearly is on the continued predominance of, and the more serious threat posed by, organized terrorism and the operational entities that orchestrate it rather than by “bunches of guys” (NIC, 2008).

In this respect, the dramatically and tragically successful Mumbai attacks contrasted to the amateurish, botched Bronx synagogues plot is a timely and powerful reminder that in terrorism, organizations most certainly still matter.

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2.3. Terrorism as Social Movement Tactic Theory, Mobilization (Maya Beasley)

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Terrorism can best be seen as a social movement tactic rather than a political aberration or act of insanity. Individuals who participate in terrorism are not brainwashed into accepting their missions; rather, they are generally well integrated into society and sign on in the interest of fighting their enemy. Along these lines, social movement organizations (SMOs) which utilize terrorism are generally integral parts of society, and individual members typically go to great lengths to deepen their social ties (Pape, 2005). Using a basic definition of terrorism: “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence [against civilians] in pursuit of political change” (Hoffman, 1998), it is clear that terrorism is not only committed by insurgent groups. Many nation states, including Apartheid South Africa, Guatemala, Britain, and Turkey have employ(ed) terrorist tactics on a regular basis. However, when applied to non-state actors, we can view terrorism as a form of collective action, and therefore have access to a variety of theories to predict its incidence.

Theoretical Approaches to Social Movements and Collective Action

A common perception pertaining to social movement activity is that it arises out of the sense of strain felt by insurgent groups. Strain or deprivation theories generally predict a positive relationship between the level of deprivation experienced by a group and collective action. Specifically, psychological responses to changes (especially increases) in strain, most frequently measured in terms of financial deprivation, generate rising discontent, which, in turn, increase participation in insurgencies (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977).

These theories have been applied with mixed success over the past forty years. As Turner and Killian point out, “there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group” (Turner & Killian, 1972). Effectively, while some sort of perceived strain is necessary, it is not sufficient to explain the emergence and persistence of social movements.

This paper addresses the three primary approaches to social movements: political process, resource mobilization, and framing, all of which are intricately linked to one another. I will provide a brief overview of each of these approaches and examples, as well as describing their relation to one another, and their application to terrorism.

Political Process

The political process approach to social movements contends that there are three key factors (aside from strain) which produce a successful social movement. As shown in Figure 1, these include political opportunity, the strength of social movement organizations, and the subjective meanings potential participants attach to their situations.

Political Opportunity

The basic premise of political opportunity theory is that collective action is facilitated or constrained by external environmental factors. Political opportunities for social movements emerge when (a) social movement actors are given increased occasion to participate in institutional/state systems; (b) evidence of political instability appear; (c) splits within elites emerge; (d) insurgents gain influential allies and (e) the capacity of state or opposition groups to repress dissent decline and/or opportunities to advance movement claims appear (Tarrow, 1998).¹

Each dimension of political opportunity is determined, in part, by the degree of openness of the state systems within which insurgent groups exist. Hence, within non-democratic systems, ones characterized by minimal institutional access, new openings in the political system should encourage open dissension which was previously politically repressed (Tarrow, 1998). Similarly, within non-democratic systems, the absence of consistent avenues for political competition means that indications of political instability signal an opportunity to openly mobilize as the potential for repression is minimized by the volatility of the system itself. For example, the collapse of Mussolini’s Fascist regime after WWII, coupled with changing political alignments within Italy provided openings for peasants to openly mobilize for land-rights. While

¹ This dimension is not addressed in the white paper.

their claims were not new, the opportunity to act against the Fascist regime had previously been non-existent (Tarrow, 1998).




Figure 1. Political Process Model, adapted from McAdam, 1982

Insurgents are also more likely to act when they have powerful allies that can advocate on their behalf within systems to which they generally have limited access. Thus, peasant movements within Central America during the 1980s benefited from alliances with political party activists, guerilla groups, and union organizers who were already key players in the political mix. Along these lines, divisions within elite actors are likely to increase insurgency. These splits provide occasions for social movements to take greater risks and may also incite elite group members to realign with insurgent groups in order to seize additional power (Tarrow, 1998).

Unlike many forms of collective action employed by social movements, terrorism is an extreme and violent measure. Many social movements and related social movement organizations use terrorist tactics, as well as both non-violent and other forms of violent insurgency. While social movement theory generally indicates that insurgents are more likely to employ violent tactics when faced with violent repression (Araj, 2008), we have not, as of yet, tested whether the same holds true for violent tactics which target civilians such as terrorism. While the aforementioned dimensions of political opportunity can aid in predicting when movements that employ terrorism will mobilize in some capacity, their ability to predict the use of terrorism must come with caution/caveats.

In particular, responses to the opening of systems - whether stimulated by democratization, political instability, splits among elites, new alliances, or changes in the degree of direct forms of repression against insurgency - may vary depending on specific social

movement organizations and their full agenda. The opening of systems through democratization, for example, may be received as a sign of good will and be met by non-violent, constrictive forms of mobilization. However, democratization may also be perceived as a form of governance imposed upon groups, which see the transition itself as a weakness of the system to be exploited through a variety of tactics including terrorism.

Along a similar vein, political openings based on influential alliances with other terrorist organizations, divisions among elites, or lowered state capacity to repress, may incite the use of terrorist tactics. For example, conflicts based on a foreign occupation may attract the attention of more established social movement elites within or outside of the region willing to provide an emergent insurgent movement with resources and encouragement to pursue their rebellion via terrorist acts if elite(s) perceive a common threat. Repression may constitute less of a threat to the use of terrorism since martyrdom frequently aides movements by gaining sympathy and support.

Indigenous Organizational Strength

Another principal component of the political process approach is the strength of social movement organizations (SMOs). While openings in the political sphere provide opportunities for effective mobilization, the ability to exploit those opportunities is, in part, dependent on the resources of insurgent groups (McAdam, 1982). Of significant importance to organizational strength are membership, incentives for participation, networks, and leadership. Because many of the issues related to indigenous organizational strength are subsumed by resource mobilization and framing approaches, particularly as they pertain to participation, I will address these issues in their respective sections.

Framing and resource mobilization approaches tend to emphasize the role of financing indirectly by focusing on network building. However, a key aspect of organizational strength is the direct effect of financial backing which can assist movements with providing spaces to organize, staffing, technology to communicate, and political influence. For example, McAdam asserts that the Civil Rights Movement was enabled in part by financing from the black middle class, which had emerged to support segregated black communities. Although relative to its white counterpart, the black middle class was small, the financial support it provided was critical to social movement organizations. Internal funding is especially important to movement emergence since external financiers are unlikely to provide support without clear indication of a movement's initial efficacy. Many terrorist groups have, however, received substantial external funding and continued to receive it contingent on their success in carrying out terrorist attacks.

Cognitive Liberation

While political opportunities and increased SMO capacity are imperative to the emergence and sustenance of a social movement, the subjective meanings potential participants ascribe to shifts in opportunities determine whether they will act. The perception of opportunities by insurgents, not simply the objective existence of such opportunities, is therefore critical to political process theory. As a collective, people must define the source of their frustrations as unjust and capable of change through mobilization. According to the political process approach, changes in political opportunities serve as cues for cognitive liberation and social movement organizations provide prospective participants environments in which they are likely to recognize those signals and provide a sense of political efficacy.

Resource Mobilization

As with any form of collective action, the timing and impetus to mobilize depends, in part, on the availability of resources to act. Resource mobilization theory asserts that the translation of grievances into action requires the availability and use of a variety of organizational resources including membership, communication, and external support, most of which are reliant on social networks (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). As such, my review of this approach focuses primarily on the mobilization of social networks related to social movements.

Micro Level Processes

Social movement scholars have long held that the psychological or attitudinal fit between participants and social movements are inadequate to explain movement participation. Instead, the preponderance of movement research indicates that social networks are the primary source of movement recruitment and participation, a key resource of social movements. Micro-structural accounts concentrate on two components of recruitment: interpersonal ties and membership in SMOs or related organizations. Accordingly, strong interpersonal networks with individuals already tied to a social movement serve as conduits of information for prospective participants and reinforce the salience of the identity relevant to participation. As prior research has shown, the stronger a given tie is, the stronger the influence applied to a potential recruit (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993). In contrast, the presence of network ties who actively oppose movement related identities or understandings weaken the influence of networks associated with a movement. Similarly, membership in organizations relevant to a social movement serves to reinforce interpersonal ties between prospective movement participants and those already active while increasing members' sense of self-efficacy. For example, Snow et al demonstrated that a sample of students participating in political movements at a Texas university in the late 1970s were pulled into movement activities through pre-existing interpersonal ties (Snow et al., 1980).

A key distinction made by social network researchers is between network degree (number of direct ties to a movement) and network range (total number of different groups to which an individual is connected) (Burt, 1980). Network degree helps determine the frequency of interactions, which is indicative of recruitment efforts, information dissemination, and social influence. On the other hand, network range denotes the diversity of information received by an individual (Tindall, 2004). Movements that employ terrorism, as with any movement, rely upon social networks to build membership, reinforce relevant identities, and counter contradictory efforts or ideologies. Consider, for example, the impact that urbanization had on building the Civil Rights Movement. As blacks moved to Northern and Southern urban centers throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century, their ability to recruit and sustain momentum increased dramatically.

Meso Level Processes

Although frequently overlooked, meso-level networks are important to movement emergence, persistence, and efficacy. Unlike micro-level networks between individual grassroots participants, meso-level networks are those between movement leadership and organizations. In this case, leaders serve as brokers who share information between geographic locations and social movement organizations (Hedstrom et al., 2000). Thus social movement organizations can act in collaboration to further movement goals, share tactics and strategies, and act in tandem at two or more distant locations. The existence of meso-level networks among

terrorism-related movements helps to explain the increasing existence of transnational movements and increased diffusion of terrorist activity.

Framing

The framing approach to collective action addresses the production and maintenance of meanings for participants and targets of social movements. It is closely related to the concept of “Cognitive Liberation” introduced by the political process approach; the significance of framing is its capacity to recruit and build solidarity among movement participants through the construction of rationales for mobilization and by increasing participants’ belief in their group efficacy. It provides a tie between an objective political opportunity and the social resources imperative for movement efficacy by identifying a rationale for individuals to mobilize collectively. There are three key types of framing, each of which serves a different purpose: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Prognostic frames seek to prove to participants that change is possible, and motivational frames convince social movement members that their participation is necessary for such change to occur (Gamson, 1992).

Diagnostic frames highlight specific societal problems and identify the parties guilty of creating them. By naming those at fault, framers also construct boundaries (Gamson, 1992). Consider, for example, the way in which white supremacist movements frequently use religious tenets to distinguish racial minorities and Jews as subhuman “others” responsible for the destruction of white rights (Dobratz, 2001). In this case, the others include minorities and Jews and the diagnosed problem is the abrogation of white rights. In similar fashion, Al-Qaeda faults the U.S. and Zionist sympathizers for the suffering of Muslims in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden’s 1998 edict asserts that,

“For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.”

“Despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.”

In this case, the United States, Israel, and their allies are the “other”, while the problem is the violence and destruction perpetrated against Muslims.

A critical aspect of framing which has particular significance to both regional and transnational movements that employ terrorism is the importance of framers’ knowledge of target communities. That is, close familiarity with the values and concerns of specific communities are frequently integrated into movement frames as an incentive for participation. Hence, the problems cited by social movements must be consistent with what potential

participants perceive as their problems. In transnational movements, this may require that diagnostic frames simultaneously engage local and global issues.

In the early 1920s, for example, Ku Klux Klan leaders in Indiana not only framed the issue as one concerning race, religion, and national origin, but also exploited local concerns including problems related to surplus agricultural production such as corn (McVeigh et al., 2004). In particular, the Klan opposed tariffs enacted in 1921 and 1922, which overwhelmingly impacted the ability of corn farmers, also suffering from the Depression, to sell to foreign markets. The Klan capitalized on this issue by incorporating Indiana's local problems into its framing. As the Grand Dragon of Indiana's Klan explained in November 1923 (McVeigh, Myers, & Sikkink, 2004):

“The manipulators of our national government have seen fit to erect high walls of tariff to protect our industrial interest, which were not justified, and while they have permitted the Federal Reserve Bank to become a tool in the hands of selfish and sordid men, the great agricultural districts of America have been sorely neglected to a point where they have suffered almost beyond hope of repair.”

In this case, the Klan extended its framing to include economic policies that affected corn prices.

Unlike diagnostic frames, prognostic framing provides specific solutions and tactics for dealing with the diagnosed problems. Consider, for example, the remainder of bin Laden's 1998 edict:

“All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims.On that basis, and in compliance with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:”

“.....We -- with Allah's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”

Not only does bin Laden reaffirm the United States as the principal “other”, but he clearly identifies that the solution is for Muslims to kill American troops and their allies in addition to raiding American financial markets.

With the problem diagnosed and its solution at hand, the principal purpose of motivational framing is to rally people into action. It requires allaying fears of potential reprisal and reaffirming the benefits of their action. Bin Laden, for example, appealed to Muslim's religious duty in his 1998 edict:

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it....”

He goes on to cite various passages from the Qur'an and points to unanimous agreement among Islamic scholars that jihad is an individual duty if enemies destroy Muslim countries. Bin Laden's edict is a straightforward example of the way in which social movement leaders and

social movement organizations are able to provide a problem, a solution, and a reason for individuals to participate.

Summary

Although there is no precise way to relate the three main approaches to social movements to one another, all have significant complementary insights into mobilization processes that can be applied to movements which employ terrorist tactics. While the political process model emphasizes the structural conditions, which must be in place for mobilization to occur, it also points to the importance of the role of social movement organizations and individual perceptions of those opportunities. In contrast, resource mobilization focuses on the ways in which movements and related organizations build and act upon those opportunities. It neglects, however, the messages and understandings, which potential and current participants require to act. The strength of framing is its stress on the representation of problems, solutions, and motivations, which move participants to mobilize. If we view terrorism as a tactic rather than a phenomenon, we can apply these approaches with relative ease.

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2.4. Organizational and Ideological Dynamics of Islamic Terrorist Groups in the Fourth Wave of Terrorism (Arie Perliger, Ami Pedahzur, Steve Kornguth)

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Introduction

Our goal in this paper is three-fold: 1) to utilize several datasets that include information on both international and domestic terrorist events as well as comprehensive data on the universe of terrorist groups that have operated over the past four decades, and parse the terrorist entities by major ideological concepts underlying the groups organization; 2) to identify the change in organizational structure of these groups over the past four decades, and then 3) to focus on specific characteristics of the contemporary wave of terrorism (1980 to the present) that will enable development of countermeasures to this threat.

A helpful resource describing the changes in the nature of terrorism over the last 130 years is David Rapoport's 'The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism' (See – Rapoport, 2001, 2006). The first wave lasted from the last two decades of the 19th century until the First World War and was characterized by anarchist groups that reacted to undesired political and economic reforms undertaken by political leaders in eastern and central Europe. The second wave spanned from the 1920s to 1960s and was catalyzed by the end of the Second World War with the move toward self-determination and decolonization. The third wave was precipitated by the success of the guerilla groups during the Vietnam War, and spread all over the world as left wing groups in Latin America and Western Europe used controlled tactics—such as hostage taking—to advance their revolutionary ambitions. The success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan marked the end of this wave and ushered in the current fourth, or 'religious wave.'

Maximizing the number of victims was one of the operational characteristics of the fourth wave groups; the mechanism utilized a de-centralized (horizontal network) structure (Dolnik, 2003; Steven & Benjamin, 2000; Tucker, 2000; Hoffman, 1999, 2002, 2003).¹ The initial manifestations of religious Islamic terrorism around the early 1980s involved organizations characterized by hierarchical structures. These organizations included Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), and the Harakat Ul-Mujahidin (HUM). They operated mostly on the

¹ For example: the March 1995 attack by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, which released a deadly gas into a crowded Tokyo subway station, injuring some 5,000 commuters and causing the death of twelve; the September 11 attacks; the March 2004 attacks in Madrid; and the London bombings in July 2005.

domestic level, aiming their attacks at occupying foreign forces (Pape, 2005). In the early 1980's, these groups did not perpetrate attacks on Western soil and tended to blur their religious ideology by emphasizing nationalist and separatist-ethnic goals.

Datasets Used in this Report

Two databases were utilized for our analysis. The first is the terrorist group database that contains detailed information from three sources on terrorist groups established between 1900 and 2007. The three sources include: (1) Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Schmidt, Jungman, & Stohl, 1988); (2) the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (MIPT); and the (3) U.S. Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Project (U.S. Department of State). These sources provided information about the characteristics of 2242 violent political groups.² Since not all of the groups included in the above three compilations warranted the label 'terrorist,' groups that did not meet the following four criteria were omitted: (1) the group's activities included violent acts, which (2) were perpetrated in some type of political context, (3) involved a symbolic or psychological effect aiming to influence a wider audience and not just harm the immediate victims, and (4) were aimed at non-combatants or civilians (Schmidt et al., 2006). The second dataset is an adapted³ version of the original 'Global Terrorism Database' (GTD) of the START project (see START). The adapted dataset included 68,791 incidents of international and domestic terrorism that occurred between 1970-2004. For every incident, the dataset provides the following information (a) the *date* of the attack, (b) the *tactic* used, and if it was (c) a *suicide attack* or not, (d) the specific *location* of the attack, (e) the type of *targets*, and (f) the identity of the *group* responsible for the attack.

Analysis

In the first stage of our analysis, we focused on two variables: (a) *guiding ideology* of the terror group, and (b) *groups organizational structure* to test if indeed there is an increase in the level of religious terrorism from the early 1980s to the present and if indeed most of these groups adopted decentralized structure. As for the ideology variable, the categories are as follows: nationalist, religious, right or left political wing, and Islamic or non-Islamic. Since some groups have multiple ideological agendas, we analyzed their rhetoric and formal teachings so as to identify their long-term goals and, from these, the leading ideology of each group. For example, Palestinians Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad can both be regarded as religious Moslem groups because while they strive for national liberation, the long-term goal of both is to transform Palestine into a part of a large Moslem entity spanning the entire Middle East. The second variable, group structure (network or hierarchical), intended to verify if the fourth wave groups adhere to a decentralized structure.⁴ To distinguish between network and hierarchical

² Since the paper focus on changes in the characteristics of groups exercise political violence, we did not included non-violent groups which hold the same or some of the characteristics as the violent groups.

³ The GTD consist originally from two separate datasets: one for the years 1970-1997 and the other for the years 1998-2004. The latter dataset include more variables and some of its operational variables include more details then the first. We merged the two dataset into one dataset running from 1970 to 2004 and modified the differences in the variables in order to construct one unified coherent dataset, in which all its variables will have the same categorization.

⁴ It should be noted that in different operational situations, groups can transform their organizational structure in order to adapt to new conditions and improve the ability of the group to survive. See for

groups we used Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (2001) typology of networks. Groups are defined as having a network structure when they consist of scattered, independently operating cells with limited operational and logistic links either to one another or to headquarters. They are defined as having a hierarchical structure when there is a clear line of authority from a central command to the operational forces carrying out the attacks (Mayntz, 2004) and when they have clearly identified leaders who serve in their leadership position for an extended period of time and directly supervise and organize the group's violent campaigns.

Ideology and Group Structure

Of the 103 religious groups in the dataset, 92 (89.3%) were founded after 1970 and 82 (79.6%) were founded after 1980. Religious groups accounted for only 45.8% of the groups founded after 1980. The others were mainly left wing (29.3%) and nationalist (18.1%) groups. Among the religious groups themselves, we noted that 27.3% also had a nationalist ideological affinity. Since the 1990s, 67.1% of the groups were religious or held religion as some part of their ideological platform. We conclude that during the last two decades there has been a marked increase in terrorist groups having a religious ideological basis.

Table 1. Logistic Regression Models Based on the Groups' Dataset (Time = Independent)¹

Dependent variable	B (S.E.)	Wald	Constant	Nagelkerke R²
<i>Religious</i>	.94(.12)	63.840***	64.605	.274
<i>Islamic</i>	.97(.12)	63.248***	64.049	.280
<i>Left wing</i>	-.17(.007)	6.519*	6.372	.021
<i>Right wing</i>	-.17(.007)	5.393*	4.956	.020
<i>Nationalist</i>	-.14(.007)	3.954*	3.681	.013
<i>Structure</i>	.26(.009)	29.103**	9.335	.140

¹ In all models, the time is the only explanatory variable, while the dependent variable is a binary one.
*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001

The series of logistic regression models (Table 1) in which the ideology served as the dependent variable and time (represented by year of foundation) was the independent variable further supports the finding that religious Islamic terrorism increased over this time period. They also clarify that there was no meaningful increase in the appearance of other ideological groups during the same time period.

example the Palestinian Hamas after and before 2002. After Israel initiated operation 'Defensive Shield' in the West Bank, the organization abandoned many of its hierarchical characteristics and operated by independent networks scattered all over the West Bank. In the current paper we looked at the basic structure of the group after it was established.

Table 2. Logistic Regression Models Based on Incidents' Dataset (Time = Independent)*

Dependent variable	B (S.E.)	Wald	Constant	Nagelkerke R ²
<i>Religious</i>	.067(.003)	553.702***	573.460	.037
<i>Islamic</i>	.141(.007)	405.432***	401.693	.243
<i>Left wing</i>	-.050(.002)	1026.734***	1028.847	.040
<i>Right wing</i>	-.033(.003)	152.562***	142.028	0.10
<i>Nationalist</i>	-.061(.001)	2223.011***	2189.454	.051
<i>Structure</i>	.011(.002)	28.512***	25.381	.001

¹ In all models, the time is the only explanatory variable, while the dependent variable is a binary one.

*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001

Using the incident dataset from Table 2, we found that 94.4% of the attacks by religious groups occurred after 1980, and 63% after 1990 (the former includes the attacks of the 1990s and 2000s as well). Table 2 indicates that only the rise in Islamic terrorism yielded a significant model with meaningful explanatory power. This reveals that while there is a significant rise in the attacks perpetrated by Islamic groups over time, there is a less significant increase in attacks by other religious groups.

Only 44.6% of the groups established since 1980 had decentralized structures compared with 62.8% of those established since 1990. Over the last three decades, the number of attacks initiated by decentralized groups never exceeded 30% of the attacks (per year) and in most years was lower. The results of the two logistic regression models illustrates that while there is indeed a significant increase in the number of groups with decentralized structure over time, this change is less dominant than the ideological one (refer to Tables 4 and 5). In other words, the shift to religious Islamic ideology in the last two decades is more pronounced than the shift to decentralized structure, as some of the prominent religious groups (Hezbollah, MILF and others) actually adhere to semi-military hierarchical structure.

Tactics and Lethality




Figure 12. Share of Attacks in Which Suicide Tactics Were Used




Figure 2. No. of Attacks in Which WMD Were Used

The findings regarding suicide attacks (see Figure 1) indicate a gradual and consistent growth in the use of this tactic over the last three decades. In the 1980s, the average number of suicide attacks per year was 4.9, in the 1990s it jumped to 10.2 and between 2000 and 2004, it escalated to 76.4 per year. Figure 2 presents the measure (p-value) of suicide attacks out of total attacks per year. The increase in suicide attacks is not a result of the growth in the general number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, suicide attacks still comprise less than one percent of the total number of terrorist attacks. As for WMD, the incident dataset indicates 129 cases of the use of chemical and biological substances during attacks. WMD attacks during the period from 1980 to 2004 do not appear to have increased linearly as a function of time.




Figure 3. Yearly Average Number of Fatalities and Injured per Terrorist Attack

In Figure 3, we present the gradual increase in the average number of fatalities and injured in terrorist attacks every year. The data on victims was modeled by converting the yearly average number of fatalities and injured persons per terrorist attack to a log scale and fitted a quadratic regression (i.e., a degree 2 polynomial). The models for victims and fatalities were highly significant (Injured: $F=30.08^{***}$, $R^2=.48$; Fatalities: $F=40.54^{***}$, $R^2=.55$). They confirm that there is a clear rise in the number of victims over the years; terrorism is indeed becoming more and more lethal. Thus, the assumption that the fourth wave groups are more inclined to maximize the number of victims from their attacks is substantiated by our analysis.

Explaining the Fourth Wave

From 1993, a new configuration of Islamic violence started to gain momentum. Small cells of Muslims perpetrated attacks in Western countries or against Western targets on neutral ground. The shift in the geographical site of terrorist attack, from a local to global target, raised the question whether a “leaderless Jihad” had emerged. The ‘leaderless Jihad’ thesis of Marc Sageman (2008) and others (Bourk, 2004) views the global Salafi Jihad as a diffused phenomenon of isolated homegrown cells that no longer follow the dictates of a core group of leaders (i.e., Al-Qaeda central). While these groups are inspired by the ideology, acts and propaganda of the Islamic veteran groups, Sageman postulates that they evolve spontaneously and act independently in terms of training, target selection, timing of the attacks and the choice of tactics. The networks are composed primarily of Muslim immigrants and their descendants who have found it difficult to assimilate in their new countries and have therefore developed a strong sense of alienation.

The alternative approach, offered by Hoffman (2008), concurs with the argument that the global Jihad is less centralized and coordinated than it used to be as a result of the killing of senior and mid-level Al-Qaeda activists in Afghanistan. Hoffman, though, argues that Al-Qaeda is a key actor in the global Salafi Jihad. According to his contention, the group was able to find replacements for those who were killed or apprehended and utilizes skilled operators in “sleeper

cells” to rebuild its operational capabilities. Hoffman concludes that sleeper cells rather than homegrown independent networks should be the prominent security concern of the West.

Development




Figure 4. Number of Groups Founded by Decade and Configurations of Islamic Terrorism

The data indicates three phases of the evolution of Islamic fourth wave groups (see Figure 4). The first stage consists of the paramilitary groups, 31.1% of which were established during the 1980s and another 26.6% during the 1990s. Moreover, in the 1980s they comprised 97% of the Islamic groups. A significant portion of these groups were established before the "formal beginning" of the fourth wave (20% in the 1970s and 17% before then). The second stage started with the formation of Al-Qaeda in 1988 and the consolidation of its affiliated groups during the mid to late 1990s and again in the early 2000s. The third stage was marked by the appearance of sleeper cells and homegrown networks. The majority of these groups (70.8%) became active during the last decade and none of them can be traced to the period prior to 1993. Use of the statistical Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique with the year of attack as the variable under examination indicated significant differences between the paramilitary groups and Al-Qaeda groups (the small number of attacks of the two other configurations led to their disincorporation in this specific analysis) ($F=18.429^{***}$). These findings substantiate that indeed paramilitary groups in general preceded the appearance of the Al-Qaeda groups.




Figure 5. No. of groups founded by Geographical area and configurations of Islamic terrorism

Significant differences were found with regard to the number of attacks of the different configurations. While the majority of networks (both sleeper cells and homegrown) perpetrated a single attack and then disappeared, the two other configurations generated continuous campaigns of terrorism. This is reflected in the data extracted from the incident dataset. The paramilitary groups were responsible for 94% of the total volume of Islamic terrorism. Almost five percent of the attacks were perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates while, as indicated above, a negligible percentage can be associated with the different networks. Geography also seems to have a significant effect. Only 2 out of 45 paramilitary groups (4.4%) were active on Western soil (see also Figure 5). All the others were located in developing countries, most notably in the Middle East, North Africa and South East Asia. This finding is also relevant for the Al-Qaeda central network that operates in these areas. Networks in general present a more diverse geographical scope. Sleeper cells serve as bridges between paramilitary groups and homegrown networks. While the majority of these cells operated in developing countries, (7, 63.6%) some were observed in different parts of the world (4, 36.4%) such as in Argentina and Australia. The majority of the homegrown networks operated in the West (10, 71.4%) and the four other groups in moderate Muslim countries whose regimes were allied with the West (Morocco, Turkey). This implies a division of labor within the global Jihad. While the sleeper cells operates in countries with weak counterterrorism mechanisms in the third world and therefore can operate undercover for years, the homegrown networks evolved and operate in western countries with advanced counterterrorism mechanisms. In those latter countries, it is more difficult to instill sleeper cells, hence the spiritual leaders of the global Jihad foster the emergence of networks of local activists, providing them the ideological justification for their attacks and helping them in forging ties with Islamic organizations that can provide them logistic and operational assistance.

Terrorism as a function of ideology and Organizational Structure




Figure 6. Internal Division by Ideology (Percentage) within the Different Ideologies

Figure 6 illustrates that greater than 80% of the Al-Qaeda, sleeper cells and homegrown network cohorts currently extant in the fourth wave of terrorism have a religious base ideologically. In contrast, the paramilitary groups share a nationalist religious ideological framework.




Figure 7. Internal division by Organizational Structure (Percentage) within the Different Ideologies

The different configurations of the groups are reflected in their organizational structure and operational characteristics. The group data indicates that the paramilitaries were more structurally diverse than the other groups. More than half of the paramilitary groups (65.6%) had

a clear hierarchical structure while only 16.7% of the Al-Qaeda groups and 9.1% of the sleeper cells (and no homegrown network) had a hierarchical structure (See Figure 7). The current paramilitary units have characteristics similar to such groups that existed in the first three waves of terrorism; they utilize a military infrastructure (such as training camps). In the case of Al-Qaeda, the reliance on known structures dropped to 31.6% and in the case of the sleeper cells and the homegrown networks, to 8.3%. We can conclude that while in the early stages of the fourth wave most religious groups strived to imitate the structure of military units; during the later years, more and more groups acknowledged the advantages of creating less stationary, more mobile, dynamic and decentralized organizational frameworks.

Table 3. Sleepers Cells and Homegrown Networks

	Average No. of members	Average No. of hubs	Affiliation to other groups	Military Training	Recruitment	Tactics
<i>Sleepers cells (N=11)</i>	18.0	1.85	Groups was dispatched by sponsor group (Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda)	70.4%	Pre-Planned, based on operational needs	Adherence to suicide attacks
<i>Home grown groups (N=14)</i>	24.36	3.55	Limited connection (After group was established)	42.7%	Primordial ties	Adherence to suicide attacks

Table 3 presents the main structural and operational characteristics of the sleeper cells and the homegrown networks. In nominal terms, the homegrown networks are 25% larger on average than the sleeper cells. This could be explained by their different recruiting mechanisms. The homegrown networks are typically established on the basis of existing social ties of kinship and friendship. Hence, there is a form of grassroots evolution of the network rather than top down development. In the case of the sleeper cells, members tend to be preselected, and recruitment is supervised by a central group of operatives.

These findings are further supported by the number of hubs in the networks. Hubs are locations where the players centrality⁵ is twice as high as that of the regular members. The hubs are responsible for coordination of network activities. The less centralized and supervised homegrown networks have on average a higher number of hubs (3.3) than sleeper cells (1.85). The homegrown networks are based on ties between family members, neighbors and colleagues; hence, we can expect to find a relatively high number of actors who are familiar with the

⁵ Measure of network analysis which essentially reflect, for specific network member, the fraction of number of existing ties from all the potential ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 178-180).

majority of the networks, while in the case of the sleeper cells the emphasis on division of function is more strict.

As for ties to other groups, sleeper operatives are usually dispatched by the group to a designated country in order to form an infrastructure for future attacks. The homegrown networks are not supervised by a sponsor group but the link, if it is created, comes at an advanced stage when the group is ready to operate and requires financial or logistical support. This is reflected in the fact that in sleeper cells, 70.4% of the members have had military training prior to joining the cell, while in the case of the homegrown network, the number is much lower (42.7%). Further, most of the activists in such cells have had minimal training, mainly to familiarize themselves with the explosive devices they intended to use.

Countermeasure Development

Several characteristics of the Homegrown and the Sleeper cell configurations of the Islamic Terrorist organization have social network recruitment patterns that bring to mind the dissemination of biological infectious agents (naturally emergent or intentional) or metastases of cancer cells. The homegrown networks are populated by recruitment through existing social ties of kinship and friendship. The seeding of participation of a new recruit to a terrorist group is through direct contact from proximate cells (family, friends) in the same manner as viruses, bacteria or tumor cells spread from proximate infected regions of the body or neighbors. In the case of the sleeper cells, members are recruited through supervision by a central group of operatives. The seeding in this case is also achieved through social networks (analogous to viral or bacterial dissemination through intimate contact). From this biological disease model, several strategies emerge for diminishing the likelihood that terrorist group(s) will thrive in a particular societal setting. From the perspective of the virulent agent, terrorists - or threat agents - become more robust or infectious as the identification of society members with the terrorists increases (binding analogy with bacteria or viruses), as the access of terrorists to mass communication and media through the web, posters, television increases (altered metabolism analogy), and can become more agile and dangerous, like the ability of a discredited terror group to morph into a new shape or deliver a new message. The Freikorps experience in Germany following WWI and the Werewolf experience following WWII are illustrative in this regard. There was a profound difference in two experiences that were associated with host susceptibility factors (the response/attitude of the conquered population to the occupation).

The countermeasures needed to transform an accepted terror group into a dysfunctional unacceptable entity may have similarity to biological systems that recruit the immune system to destroy invading infectious agents or cancerous cells. The expertise needed to accomplish transforming an accepted terrorist entity into a foreign set includes social scientists, linguistics, computer science, cognitive and neural science experts, as well as cooperation between intelligence, military and academic centers in the affected nation state. At a minimum, the approach most likely to succeed requires extensive knowledge of the culture, language, ethos of the specific region affected and access to leading edge data mining, statistical modeling, political organization, communications research. In the same manner that metastases of tumors from a primary location to new sites is affected by the concept of "seed and soil," where the cancer seed or infectious agent seeks out favorable soils for spread, so the terrorist seeks out favorable environments in which to thrive. The cancer spread is blocked by precluding growth of blood vessels to the newly implanted tumor. The ability of the terrorist entity to become implanted in a

region or state may be impeded by blocking its nutrient requirements (e.g., access to public information networks, supply of weapons and personnel, and transfer of funds that support the threat and infrastructure).

The international responses to the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, the London railway bombings, and the Madrid railway bombings have been in large part successful because they led to actions that caused the Al-Qaeda unified network to realign into smaller cells that have been less effective on an international scale. The positive countermeasures have included increased surveillance of potential terrorist cells, their communications networks and financial transactions.

Conclusions

The major observations reported here are that: 1) over the last three decades there has been a clear proliferation of Islamic terrorism compared with violent groups that adhere to other ideologies; 2) that Al-Qaeda based terrorist groups have shifted from hierarchical to network structures involving home grown and “sleeper cells” while most other terrorist groups show less of a structural change; 3) there has been an increasing lethality of terrorism worldwide.

In our analysis of Islamic based groups and attacks of the fourth wave, the data indicate that there are four main configurations: paramilitary, Al-Qaeda, sleeper cells and homegrown networks. Each configuration emerged under different conditions. In general, these four configurations may not share a common ideology; they vary in structure and recruitment mechanism and the profile of their members is different. While we see a clear decline in the emergence of homegrown Islamic terrorist networks in the West since 2005, Al-Qaeda central and its affiliates seem as active as ever in central Asia and the Middle East. This continued presence may serve as a component to seed the global re-emergence of a centralized terror organization.

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2.4.A. References

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2.5. Terrorism: Organizational and Group Level Factors (Victor Asal)

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Identifying the causes of terrorism is both an extremely important and challenging problem. The effort to do so is important because of the human, political and economic cost and challenging because of the diverse possible causes and the lack of empirical data available and how politicized the discussion can often become.¹ I borrow from Crenshaw by defining the causes of terrorism as "... root causes (or preconditions) are those factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, whereas trigger causes (or precipitants) are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981)."

This overview narrows the field by focusing primarily on those factors that impact the decision by groups and organizations to turn to terrorism leaving aside important factors related to the individual psychological level or the larger institutional or societal level. Examining causes at the organizational and group level are important because:

"What we must explain in order to explain terrorism is not simply why some people are aggrieved and how they are organized, nor even why they resort to violence, but why they employ violence against civilians or noncombatants in particular (Goodwin, 2004, p. 259-260)."

¹ For an excellent overview of the psychological review of the literature see (Borum, 2004) For broader overviews of the general terrorism literature see (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Lia & Skjølberg, 2004; Silke, 2004).

Given the importance of the issue, I should note at the outset that there has been very limited amount of quantitative research on terrorism (Lum et al., 2006; Kennedy and Lum, 2003). The data and analysis that has been done mostly focuses on counterterrorism efforts and looks at the international level of terrorism rather than the domestic level of terrorism (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Mickolus et al., 1989; Mickolus et al., 2004; Mickolus, 1982).²

In addition, most of the data that has existed up until recently is event data but not focused on organizational or group factors. Event data (data that simply says an attack happened on x date at y location potentially with information on who did the attack), by itself, cannot address why organizations might have resorted to terrorism (Silke, 2004; Pynchon & Borum, 1999; Borum, 2004). Event level data, though, has been used to advance our understanding of what factors might be related to terrorism at the country and regional level as opposed to the organizational level (see for example Borum, 2004; Li & Schaub, 2004; Li, 2005; Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Hewitt, 2000) but that is not the primary focus of this paper. Even the work that has collected data on organizational factors has focused on terrorist organizations – which can tell us about why terrorist organizations behave in certain ways but cannot tell us why they chose to be terrorist organizations in the first place (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming).

On the other hand, there has been important qualitative work and a few quantitative pieces that have advanced our understanding of why organizations might turn to terrorism (Oberschall, 2004; Bloom, 2005; Hofnung, 1994; Crenshaw, 1981, 1990; Hafez, 2003; Hafez, 2006; Pedahzur, 2001, 2005; Weinberg et al., 2003). The reasons advanced in this work include a need to transform the world based on ideological motives, desperation in the face of intractable political and economic circumstances, use of terrorism as a psychologically potent strategic weapon, and socialization processes that encourage terrorist behavior as both justified and normal. In this paper we will review different factors that might lead to an organization to choosing terrorism. I will then review some new findings based on a new data set of ethnic organizations in the Middle East that includes organizations that both use terrorism and those that do not.

Ideology

Crenshaw argues that “terrorist ideology, no matter how unrealistic, must be taken seriously as a guide to intentions. Coupled with analysis of capabilities it provides a basis for expectations (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 15).” Indeed, Wilkinson asserts that the most important factor explaining why organizations choose to use terrorism is their ideological motivations (Wilkinson, 2000). The argument for seeing ideology as a key cause for the deployment of terrorism by an organization is that ideology “... sets out the moral framework within which [organizations] operate (Drake, 1998, p. 53).” Ideology- particularly religious ideology- has been argued to be the reason why terrorism has become more lethal in the last decade (Laqueur,

² A new data base, the Global Terrorism Database now allows for an analysis of domestic terrorism (about 90% of all terrorism events), but it is still too new to have generated a great deal of research and, like the existing data bases, it still focuses on events rather than organizational features (Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2007).

1998, 2004, 1999; Hoffman, 1998; Lesser et al., 1999; Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Simon & Benjamin, 2000, 2001; Juergensmeyer, 2003).³

Ideology can be used as a basis to define other humans, including civilians, as the “other” and dehumanized (Gressang IV., 2001) (Crenshaw, 1988; Tilly, 2003, p. 21). Drawing on Gressang and Juergensmeyer and others, Asal and Rethemeyer posit that ideology can lead to organizations focusing on either supernatural audiences or human audiences as well as lead to a strong or weak othering of potential targets, where “othering”⁴ is defined based on various on-line sources as “securing one’s own positive identity through the stigmatization of an other” on the basis of racial, geographic, ethnic, economic or ideological social differentiation. The hypothesis is that the combination of strong othering and a supernatural audience can be particularly dangerous (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008b).

³Part of this increase has been tied to the use by religious organizations of suicide terrorism that had been proven to be particularly lethal.

⁴See Melanie Ulrich’s webpage at //www.cwrl.utexas.edu

Table 1. Audience and Othering (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008b)

	Strong Othering	Weak Othering
Supernatural audience	Religions – especially those correlated with ethnicity	Religions without clear ethnic affiliations
Human audience	Ethnonationalism	Leftist Rightist Environmentalism Communism Anarchism

Much of the literature on terrorism supports the argument that a nationalist ideology will be a strong evidence for causation of terrorism by organizations (Zimmermann, 1987) (Lia & Skjolberg, 2004; Engene, 2004; Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383, Ross, 1993). “If national or cultural autonomy is denied or endangered, the likelihood of violence increases (Zimmermann, 1987, p. 349).” As noted above, the same argument has been made about religious ideology. As Hoffman argues, speaking of the intensity of terrorism:

“... religious terrorism tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because of the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world views that directly affect the “holy terrorists” motivation. For the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine

duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture. (Hoffman 1999, VII)..” see also (Hoffman 1995)

It is important to note that ideology can also act as a **constraint** against targeting civilians. Norms can be both negative (Gressang IV., 2001) and positive (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In the same way that democratic institutions can make democracies less likely to go to war with each other (Deudney, 2004; Oneal et al., 1996), organizations with a democratic ideology may be less likely to use terrorism as a tool. Democratic norms encourage nonviolent conflict resolution (Huth & Allee, 2003) and political inclusion (Ramirez & Soysal, 1997; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore, 1996). Both of these features may encourage groups not to use violence and if they do use violence to chose to not be indiscriminate in their targeting thus moving them away from terrorist behavior. Religious norms can also promote or act as a constraint to targeting civilians depending upon the interpretation of the religion.

Capabilities and Resources

Ideology can serve as a cause of terrorism by providing organizations a motivation for their behavior. Motivation alone though is insufficient because terrorist attacks require certain levels of capability and resources. Many researchers argue that capabilities and resources are the key factors in determining how organizations behave (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; McCammon et al., 2001; Alimi, 2003, p. 117). Different capabilities may lead to different choices about whether to use terrorism or what types of terrorist tactics are used (Pape, 2003; Merari, 1993).

In the existing literature there is a strong disagreement about how the level of popular support an organization has will impact the choice of terrorism. Some argue that fringe groups are more likely to choose terrorism because they cannot compete with other stronger organizations and are too weak to target military personnel (Blomberg et al., 2004; Engene, 2004; Zimmermann, 1987; Carr, 1997). “... [T]errorism is the strategy of a minority that by its own judgment lacks other means. When the group perceives its options as limited, terrorism is attractive because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential reward is high (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 387).” Terrorism is thus seen as a “poor man’s air force (Hoffman, 1998, p. 34).”

On the other hand, it is possible that popular organizations have more resources to pursue various strategies, including terrorism, and that given certain types of conflicts, terrorism will be an option that is popular with the target audience of a terrorist organization (Boyns & Ballard, 2004). Cronin, for example, argues that ethnonationalist terrorist organizations like Hamas are long lived precisely because of their popularity (Cronin 2003, p. 40).

Another key resource that an organization might possess is external support. External support by states can provide organizations with a great deal of resources they otherwise would not be able to obtain like “... firepower, funding, training and intelligence... safe havens and bases ... (Wilkinson 2000, p. 64, Byman, 2005b, 2005a; Quillen, 2002; Hoffman, 1999, p. 15).”

Zimmermann goes so far as to argue that this support can approach having a root cause type of impact for political violence when he says that:

“Outside economic, military and ideological support might also lead an opposition movement in protracted political violence. The contras in Nicaragua or Savimbi’s rebels

in Angola provide two recent examples. Such outside support may provide opportunities to adopt violence as an opposition strategy or to intensify the level of violence (Zimmermann 1987, 349).”

State Behavior towards the Organization

Political organizations are often created in order to change the policies of states and thus state behavior towards the organization is likely to be a strong factor in determining if and when an organization might turn to indiscriminate targeting of civilians (Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). When states repress indiscriminately they may be inviting the same behavior in return (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383; Byman, 1998; Feldmann & Perala, 2004). Juergensmeyer argues that, in addition to ideology, oppression by a state encourages groups to dehumanize the enemy and use terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Waldman says that violence by the government leads to a desire for revenge based on governmental behavior (Waldman, 2001).

On the other hand, states can also behave in conciliatory ways towards organizations. Sederberg suggests that concessions to organizations can promote peaceful behavior by organizations (Sederberg, 1995, p. 295). Other researchers, though, suggest that concessions may make the government seem weak and encourage organizations to use terrorism to get more out of governments (Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c;). An example would be the recent expansion of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Testing Hypotheses about Organizational Causes

The problem, though, with much of the theorizing cited above is that it is based primarily on single case studies or small case study efforts that are limited in their ability to control for other possible explanations or to support broad generalizations. Recent work using a new data set that tracks yearly the behavior of over 100 ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East for the years 1980-2004 allows for some empirical testing of some of these arguments about the organizational correlates (and evidence for causation) of terrorism (Asal, 2008). The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset builds on the existing Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) (Minorities at Risk (MAR); Gurr, 2000, 2005). The MAROB project codes every organization in existence for at least three years that claims to represent the interests of one or more ethnic groups or that contains members from a specific ethnic minority. It is important to caveat that the testing of these arguments is limited because the analysis looks only at risk ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East and does not have variables that capture all of the factors posited as causes of terrorism. This analysis found that organizations that rhetorically justify attacks against civilians, that are advocating for a separate state, that are getting foreign support and being strongly repressed by the host state are more likely to use terrorism, while organizations that profess a democratic ideology are less likely to use terrorism.

Bearing this caveat in mind, the data set does allow for comparative testing of various explanations and the findings are interesting. When controlling for other factors, no one causal factor by itself is deterministic. Rather, different factors incrementally make terrorism more likely and when combined together have a large impact on an organization's choice of terrorism. Ideology, particularly nationalist ideology, makes the use of terrorism more likely. Organizations that have foreign support are also more likely to use terrorism as the resulting resources and backing is less likely to be impacted by retaliation from the government. State repression and state refusal to make any concessions also increase the likelihood that an

organization will embrace the use of terrorist tactics, whereas organizations that embrace a democratic ideology are less likely to do so.

An analysis using the same (MAR) data which focused on identifying the factors, which make it more likely that an organization will specifically target the military, found similar but **not the same** factors as those that make it more likely that an organization will target civilians (MAR). For example, organizations that are patriarchal and control territory are much more likely to target soldiers but these organizational features have no impact whatsoever on the likelihood of whether organizations will target civilians.

Ways Ahead

Currently, a great deal of excellent work has been done theoretically about the organizational causes of terrorism and there is an important body of qualitative literature on the subject. This effort along with limited quantitative analysis identifies several key factors leading organizations towards the choice of terrorism. Organizations that embrace ideologies that dehumanize the “other” and organizations that are marginal or have foreign state support are more likely to choose terrorism. Governments that use harsh repression are more likely to move organizations towards terrorism. All of these findings though have to be seriously caveated. Like the study of terrorism, at both the individual level and the societal level, there is a desperate need to collect more and more comprehensive data on terrorist behavior and the possible factors that explain terrorist behavior. The collection of data only on terrorist incidents or only on terrorist organizations does not allow us to compare those organizations that use terrorism and those that do not – and thus does not allow us to analyze with any rigor those factors that make it more or less likely for an organization to move from one of these groups to the other.

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2.6. Organizational Profiling (James David Ballard)

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Some experts suggest that terrorism will continue to evolve into more violent forms (Stern, 1999; Hoffman, 1999). This paper would propose that terrorist tactics will evolve toward Weapons of Mass Victimization (WMV), typically referred to in the literature as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Magid, 2003; Ballard & Mullendore, 2003; Zimmer, 2002; Levi & Kelly, 2002; Ballard, 2000; Schwartau, 2000). Given historical trends toward greater violence, the question should be posed: Under what circumstances would a group or terrorist organization seek to employ a WMV? As an example, this paper will discuss what organizational characteristics are necessary for a group to feel ready, capable, and willing to use radiological materials as a terrorism tactic?

IKMASS

One technique for the assessment of this risk profile is codified by the acronym IKMASS:

- Ideology,
- Knowledge,
- Management,
- Audience,
- Social distance, and
- Symbolic value.

After reviewing the literature, this project identified six factors as the analysis frame for the various types of groups who are involved in, or could become involved in, WMV terrorism. Use of this schema may offer a chance to predict who will use certain weapons, proactively address the threat they pose, and ultimately offer nation states an opportunity to more effectively target resources towards the most relevant threats. Individually these six factors do not represent an exhaustive or mutually exclusive delineation of the characteristics that could be assigned to a terrorist organization, but they do represent a collective thought process on how such organizations need to be distinguished from the larger mass of groups that use political violence to gain some type of social goal. The discussion below is loosely focused on one form of WMV, the radiological dispersal device (RDD), merely to show how this schema would work on a particular form of weapon.

Ideology

Generally, the term “ideology” refers to the set of beliefs, values, folkways, norms, and attitudes that underlie the existing social order, or an alternative to that order (Apter, 1964; Mannheim, 1952). Social movements, even violent ones, that are in opposition to the dominant culture, for example a reform movement or a resistance movement, are defined as a sustainable collective movement that seeks some degree of social change within the dominate culture (Turner & Killian, 1987). These movements embody an ideology, as does the culture they reside within.

Ideology in the context of terrorist organizational analysis refers to the intellectual or theoretical structure of the violent political and/or terrorist organization. As is typical of social movements, this philosophy is used to gain or maintain a variety of goals. For example, the

terrorist organization could expose a violent rhetoric as a means to gain new members from the disenfranchised among their target recruitment population. Organizations have a working set of assumptions, their working philosophy if you will, and it has a usefulness that transcends its rhetorical value for that organization. These could be non-violent movements (Ackermann & Duvall, 2000) or more sinister groups with a propensity to violence (Bainbridge, 1997; Saliba, 1995). These oppositional groups, what Gramsci (1971) called “counter hegemonic” social groups, will in very visible ways embody the arguments the organization has against the governing social order. In the case of terrorist organization potential, the key may well be to identify the splintering of the terrorist organization along differential philosophical beliefs. Such ideological fracture lines are critical to assess since they may be the first indicators of increased violence potential.¹

Knowledge

Knowledge is generally understood in sociology to be what humans perceive to be real and true in the social world (Mannheim, 1936; Mannheim, 1952; Schutz, 1972). It is a socially created construct and humans depend on it for their sense of self, sense of placement in the universe, and most importantly they depend on it for a sense of reality. Knowledge allows humans to participate in social interactions, even those that are socially unacceptable or deviant, like terrorism.² It may include ideology (discussed above) but most important for this assessment technique is operational knowledge, which is critical to assess for a terrorist organization including the tactical, technical, and strategic information held within the group. More specifically, it is essential to try and understand if the organization can gather and comprehend the necessary information on the deployability of WMV.

Regarding radiological weapons, the first major area of concern may well be the worldwide diffusion of weapon and nuclear fuel cycle knowledge (Slavin, 2003; Cordesman, 2000). The problems posed by such widespread use of nuclear technology, be it for weapons or power generation, is that the minimal skill set necessary for the construction of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) can be augmented by expert knowledge of the types of radioisotopes that are available, which materials have the most harmful effects on humans, and many other areas of very technical expertise, which could make the difference between an organization

¹ WMV, like all terrorist and oppositional tactics, could be addressed with the idea of a spectrum of effects that they can produce, if only as an organization device. The use of a thermonuclear device can be seen on the highest end of the spectrum, an RDD somewhere towards that end of the spectrum, and lesser tactics like mass protests on the lower end of the spectrum. Chemical and biological weapons would likewise be able to be situated on such a spectrum as are more mundane terrorist tactics like bombing, kidnapping, etc. The problem with such simplifications is that they fail to address the very real differentials in the consequences of such weapons and the varying degrees that they may be effective. See Bremer-Maerli (2003) for more details on each type of weapons and their effects.

² Knowledge can also be viewed in many different ways. Some consider the acquisition of knowledge a primary focus of debate. They would ask questions like: Is human knowledge constructed or realized in daily interactions? Knowledge can also be categorized as technical, propositional, situational, internal, external, foundational, coherent, and many other ideas discussed in the debates on epistemology. Cognitive and perceptual psychological scholarship also abound. Even a partial enumeration of them is beyond the scope of this article. The transition to a discussion on specific knowledge in the next paragraph is designed to focus the reader on certain types of knowledge that groups possess and that are relevant to this RDD discussion.

merely capable of deploying a RDD and an organization that can effectively use an RDD for mass victimization. For example, “orphan” sources may prove to be more critical than actualized weapons subject to much more stringent controls, at least with respect to RDD (Ferguson, Kazi & Perera, 2003).³ Lastly, an understanding by someone within the terrorist organization of sources like spent nuclear fuel (SNF) may offer an additional source for potential RDD raw materials.⁴ Such insider knowledge could allow the organization to plan an attack on fixed sites (for example a nuclear power plant and corresponding spent fuel storage pools) or mobile transported materials (for example shipments to a reprocessing plant or geologic repository).

Assessment of this knowledge entails knowing information on the backgrounds of the members of the terrorist organization. Intelligence on the types of experts familiar with radiological issues that the terrorists have contacted, how and if they have shared relevant knowledge, the presence of such information in terrorist training manuals, and other indicators would be the primary focus of such an examination. A social network analysis of the organization can reveal this critical assessment.

Management

The management of large scale terrorist organizations has been examined and seems to follow what Weber (1958) suggests are identifiable bureaucratic structures (Paz, 2000; Brackett, 1996). The groups have rules, follow procedures, and embody the idea of a division of labor within their structures. Some of the specific characteristics of terrorist organizations noted in the literature include the limited longevity of the group, the variations in the size of the group and its level of effectiveness, and its ability to gain and/or maintain funding (Stohl, 1988; Pisano, 1987; Adams, 1986). Research on the management of terrorist organizations also shows the importance of focusing in on the inspirational or charismatic leader of certain groups (Burke, 2001; Stern, 2000; Brackett, 1996).

Operational success for the group rests on the ability to solicit financial support as well as the related organizational ability to provide logistic support for operations. In order to assess this aspect of the management factor, the key is what can be termed the “operations” manager. The operations manager is critical to identify and analyze because this person is one of the linchpins of the organization and physically represents its ability to be effective on tasks, as an operational entity, and ultimately as an organization. For example, managers like Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri or Muhammad Atef from the *al-Qaeda* organization illustrate how effective non-charismatic

³ Commercial sources have been studied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (Gonzales, 2002, 41-42) and include medical sources (Cobalt 60 and Cesium 137 used in treatment) and industrial sources (Cobalt 60, Iridium 192 and maybe the most concerning radioisotope, Cesium Chloride in powder form).

⁴ Many discussions on RDD assume that the adversary would need to divert the radioactive source from its safeguarded environment and only then could it be used as fuel for a device. Typically the means designed to thwart the use of such materials revolve around denial of the opportunity to transport the materials. Some scholarship has developed that asserts that the use of the materials in place, for example a direct attack on transported radioactive materials, does not require the terrorist to physically acquire the materials, rather they could initiate an attack on the materials where they are located, especially in an urban center, and create widespread panic and social disruption (Halstead & Ballard, 1997; Ballard, 2002).

leaders can control the overall operations of a group and affect perpetration of the organization even after an all out military campaign designed to obliterate the organizational leaders.⁵

Audience

The audience for the terrorist act is another factor that should be considered when assessing a terrorist organization's propensity to commit a WMV attack. It is important to ask and answer the question: What message is the organization communicating by planning and/or by committing such an attack? Likewise, it is critical to understand the organization's audience, where they are located, and for what purposes the attack is being perpetrated. Purposes could include recruitment of members, solicitation of funding, and/or encompass a variety of organizational motives, potentially each with different risk or threat profile.

Organizations, just like everyday humans, exhibit behavior that they wish others to observe and/or engage in behavior that would be less than desirable if made public. Goffman (1959) refers to this role bifurcation as frontstage and backstage behavior, and this idea specifically addresses what roles a social actor plays and their relationship to various audiences. In Goffman's dramaturgical terms, keeping the audiences ignorant of the totality of the roles you could adopt is audience segregation. These same dynamics apply to organizations. For example, commentators note how a terrorist group is "talking" to a sub-population within a nation state, sometimes trying to incite violence against a government, possibly with the intent to overthrow that government. What is emerging is the recognition that extra organizational audiences (not defined necessarily by geographic boundaries or political entities like a state) can be the focus.⁶ For example, these audiences could be in another country or culture or half way around the world. The point is that terrorists have a message and it is directed towards an audience, territorially defined in some cases, extra-territorial in others, and even intra-organizationally defined in some cases.

Social Distance

Social distance is the degree to which humans seek to associate or disassociate themselves from other groups (Bogardus, 1959). Analytically, it is similar to the process of social segregation, where conditions of inequality and power imbalances are perpetrated by one group and opposed by the other (Massey & Denton, 1993; Bogardus, 1928). Such social distancing can be based on physical distance from where the "other" lives in a different physical location, emotional distance where the separation is more internal than external (for example between sub-cultural groups), and/or based on perceptions of differences that allow for the dehumanization of one group by another.

⁵ The most contemporary example is the war on the Taliban and Afghanistan. Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States government launched a massive military strike against the Taliban for harboring terrorists suspected of committing the attacks. In the weeks that followed, the United States and coalition forces were able to attack the infrastructure of one terrorist organization in Afghanistan and still others in various places around the world. Never-the-less, the remnants of the organization remain as of the writing of this essay and are of concern for counterterrorist specialists.

⁶ Morton Bremer Maerli has written extensively on the subject, but the most salient work is in Norwegian. The author's knowledge of these arguments is based on personal interactions with this researcher over the last several years and similar interests in this area of terrorist scholarship.

Perpetrators of WMV events must come to a place where in their social distance from their target population is increased. They act in such a way that the victim's humanity is negated. The measurement of social distance is a much researched area within the social sciences. In an effort to understand the effects of this distancing, researchers have looked at social distance and associated various social factors: age (Eisenstadt, 1956), nationality (Grace & Neuhaus, 1952), social classes (Halbwachs, 1958; Kahl, 1957), and race (Westie, 1953).

The assessment of social distance and terrorist organizations includes four specific areas: potential social distance based on perceived religious differences; social distance based on perceived racial and/or ethnic differences; social distance based on perceived differences in cultures; and social distance based on perceived socio economic differentials. These four dimensions offer an opportunity to analyze the degree to which an organization vilifies the other and represent one dimension viable in the assessment of a group and its propensity to commit mass victimization.

Symbolic Value

The Interactionist paradigm in sociology is a theoretical perspective that seeks to understand how humans use and interpret symbols in the process of communication, as well as in creating and maintaining impressions. Integrationist theory informs, in part, how humans use symbols to forge a sense of identity and experience everyday life within a social system (Blumer, 1969; Cooley, 1964; Kuhn, 1964; Mead, 1934; Simmel, 1950). This process applies to organizations who seek to use symbolic targets to convey a message of anger, dissociation, dehumanization, or any other justifications the terrorist organization could use for violence. It can apply to the victims of the organizations violence, the target site itself, or even the tactic used for the attack.

The choice of an RDD attack may have symbolic value in and of itself, as suggested by an attack on nuclear waste shipments.⁷ The perpetrators of such an attack could be targeting these shipments in opposition to nuclear power; or perceived arrogance on the part of the government in promoting this program; and/or because it would offer an opportunity to create an environmental disaster with radioactive materials, a potentially symbolic gesture in and of itself. For other adversaries, such hypothesized attacks could be used as a warning, or as a means to demonstrate power to the opposition, in the case of the United States the last remaining "super" power in the global community.

Conclusion

This argument has emphasized that intelligence agencies and terrorism scholars should engage in direct analysis of the threats organizations pose in an integrated global community, with particular attention paid to radiological dispersal devices. The approach is a simple approach for applying organizational resources to gather the necessary information. The IKMASS process suggested herein can be illustrated by the diagram that follows.

⁷ The protests in Germany regarding the transportation of nuclear waste are helpful in illustrating this discussion. The groups who opposed transporting nuclear materials by rail used large scale protests and various methods of violent and non-violent confrontation to halt the shipments, even during a time when this particular country was attempting to phase out nuclear power.




Figure 1. IKMASS Schematic




Figure 2. Frequency Analysis

The actual assessment of the six factors or dimensions will vary depending on the group under consideration, the weapon or tactic they may be contemplating using, and/or the level of intelligence that is available on the group. Each of the six factors or dimensions should be normalized on a grading scale (i.e., 100 point scale) so that changes in each dimension can be compared. One specific suggestion is that the terrorist organization be charted over time (longitudinally) and on each of these factors (see charts above for a sample of how such an analysis would look). In this way, a quasi time series analysis design, changes in the six risk factors can be tracked and by the imposition of a trend line representing the summation of these changes, the risk potential for this particular organization could be assessed, updated, or downsized as appropriate. The analysis could also focus on single indicators, but this may not be the best strategy since it is generally understood that multiple measures are a more robust analytical choice. For example, spikes in any one indicator could be indicative of new intelligence on the group, could be the result of a temporary change in the organization, and/or could be the first indicators of a higher risk of an attack. The bottom line is that the combination of the six factors noted herein offers a more robust profile of the organization and its potential to conduct an attack using WMV.

The process suggested in this essay would necessitate the use of non-publicly available knowledge of the terrorist organization.⁸ Some of the material for this analysis would be from public or open sources, but the expectation is that such a process would best be served by the inclusion of secure data. This suggested analytical approach is offered as a “straw man” analysis mechanism for academic study and debate since it is not currently possible to verify the validity or reliability of such a methodology.

At the same time it is easy to envision that if such a process, in modified form, were to be applied to actual public and secure data, it could represent a resource allocation mechanism for antiterrorism and counterterrorism agencies and their activities. Such a method may also act as a prediction or risk assessment tool when considering threat remediation efforts, initiatives designed to counteract such threats, and counterterrorism related policies. Using a form of organizational analysis, would enable the prioritization of threats that need the most immediate attention and this approach could provide some semblance of order to the process of counterterrorism analysis. Likewise, adjustment of the dimensions noted above could allow for a similar assessment process relative to nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. As noted earlier, these tactics are distinctly different from RDD and must be analyzed accordingly. If the IKMASS protocol, or variants thereof, is shown to be a viable option in assessment of the risk of RDD terrorism, such an extension of the protocol to other tactics would be prudent.

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⁸ Information of this sort would be expected to be highly classified and maybe even fractured between sources (agencies and government). Systematizing the sharing, collection, analysis, and storage of this information is a formidable task. The results would likewise be sensitive and potentially unusable by the academic community, at least for the foreseeable future.

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2.7. Network Analyses of Violent Non-State Actors (Bob Duval, Kyle Christensen)

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The advent of methods and tools for network analysis has brought about a paradigm shift in the way we examine data concerning terrorists, terrorist organizations and violent non-state actors in general. Relational data such as individual contacts, group membership, financial transactions, telephone calls, and web site links all provide information about social structure for the study of political extremism, violence, transnational crime, and terrorism. And indeed, the examination of terrorist networks has emerged as a prominent field of study in recent years (Sageman, 2004, 2008).

Recent work in Social Network Analysis (SNA) has shown that it provides the analyst with the means to describe and visualize the social structures of violent actors as networks. We can use SNA to infer both properties of the network as a whole, as well as internal characteristics

that would not be apparent simply by examining the data with tallies, spreadsheets, or statistical programs. A number of notable relationships and structures among the actors that have been studied have emerged from the complex ways in which they are linked. Most importantly, network analysis has produced significant knowledge while examining a limited class of data that simply identifies some form of contact, relationship or linkage between the subjects of interest.

Network analysis has emerged to prominence for several reasons. First, the increasing reliance on computer science for large scale data collection, processing, and mining leads readily to the adoption of the network model. The same terminology and methods that ascertain where bottlenecks exist in a local area computer network serve to identify and describe the central actors and vulnerabilities in terrorist networks. Social network analysis, while originally finding occasional use in sociology, increasingly appears in a broader range of academic disciplines as a state-of-the-art methodology. The power of new visualization methods, data collection strategies, and innovative means to conjoin further data with the relational structures in the networks leads us to a powerful tool set for research and, ultimately, tactical and policy decisions.

But perhaps network analysis has arrived primarily because of recent successes. Network analysis, or in its investigatory guise, link analysis, played a significant role in the capture of Saddam Hussein (Reed, 2006) and the prosecution of the “Virginia Jihad” (Surface, 2007). Network analysis was instrumental in focusing the hunt for Saddam Hussein by tracing the linkages of his ties to family members, Sunni tribal loyalists, and former protégés in Iraq. And in a notable direct success, the “Virginia Jihad Network” was investigated and prosecuted by link analysis based on the network of relationships among the 11 defendants. Ali al-Timimi’s central role was revealed by the analysis of communications traffic. Recent congressional testimony highlighting the link between the “Virginia Jihad Network” and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba training camps in Pakistan, where the Mumbai terrorists were believed to have trained, provides further indication of its current importance in counterterrorism (Van Duyn, 2009).

One of the most widely discussed examples of network analysis of terrorist activity is Krebs’ now classic analysis of the 9/11 hijackers (2002). Through the use of public sources that identified contacts between an initial pair of the hijackers known to the FBI in 2000, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, a picture of the network emerges that indicates the prominence of Mohammad Atta as the local leader and broker in communications within the group. In the process of expansion of the network from all contacts within one step of the initial pair, it is with the inclusion of secondary steps or contacts that Atta emerges as having maximum closeness and betweenness for the network. Atta’s closeness score indicates that he had the greatest access to others in his network, and his betweenness score indicates that he had the greatest ability to influence the flow of information in the network. In addition, all 19 hijackers are within two steps of the initial known pair. Krebs’ work is *post hoc* analysis, yet it has pointed the way since it not only identifies the social structure of the hijacker’s network, it also reveals the channels of communication flows, prototyping our understanding of terrorist network behavior.

While it is by no means certain that network analysis and monitoring of this particular pair would have revealed the plot in time to disrupt it, the findings are suggestive that network analysis as a research tool provides promise as a monitoring and detection tool as well. As noted, the use of networks to examine the personal relationship structures in Sunni tribes played

a significant role in the capture of Saddam Hussein and is being implemented in tracking the development of the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq (McFate, 2005). And in an earlier post-hoc analysis of the transnational activities of Aum Shinrikyo, Picarelli (1998) suggests that network analysis could have revealed the increasing WMD threat that the cult eventually realized.

This chapter briefly describes the state-of-the-art in social network analysis of VNSAs with a discussion of what we are learning about these organizations. This is followed by an overview of the key elements for characterization and visualization of social networks and how they provide us new knowledge about VNSAs. A description of the limitations and constraints of existing techniques will be provided. Lastly, a discussion of several significant innovations and discoveries that shows where SNA research on VNSAs is headed along with discussion of desired developments is used to summarize our examination.

What We Have Learned from Network Analysis

Social networks provide a mechanism for the analysis and display of structural variables, as measured by contacts or connections between two or more actors, and composition variables, which are based on actor specific traits (Wasserman & Faust 1994, 29; Scott, 2000, 2-3). These variables comprise the actors, their attributes, and ties between the actors, which make up the social network. These are also referred to as nodes and edges in mathematical graph theory.

The primary application of SNA to the study of violent actors or groups is to identify their social structure, ascertaining which actors are central, and who belongs to what “cliques” or subgroups (Reed, 2007). These data are then be used to generate a variety of actor and graph specific statistics. Similarly, these data may also be used identify and examine sub-group characteristics as well. An analyst may choose to represent multiple aspects of social structure quickly and effectively using tools such as multi-dimensional scaling or clustering techniques to classify groups of actors, potentially identifying cells and less compliant groups within larger networks or movements (Sageman, 2004). This affords the analyst a powerful means for visualization and discovery of new information. Such information is at the heart of battlefield tactical intelligence and Reed (2007) makes a strong case that the incorporation of network analysis into the Intelligence Preparation for Battle is a crucial step for modern warfare.

As we are concerned with VNSAs, it is useful to note that there are many types (Williams, 2008), and that network analysis has been used to reveal significant findings about a number of them: terrorist organizations (Sageman, 2004), militias (Zhou et al., 2005), warlords and cartels (Milward & Raab, 2006), insurgencies (Reed, 2006), gangs (Xu & Chen, 2003), and organized crime (Ferrara et al., 2008). And these actors relate to each other through contacts, meetings, activities, training, financial transactions, authority relationships, and many other structural relationships. All represent social systems that have close kinship, tribal or regional proximity affiliations that foster the growth of network structures. In addition, their violent nature means that they are usually clandestine, and thus must trade organizational effectiveness for operational security (Clark, 2005). This results in the reliance on pre-existing social networks, and constrains both operational detection on the part of state actors, and recruitment on the part of the VNSA.

Central to current analysis on VNSAs is the ability to ascertain organizational structure and identify avenues of recruitment. Sageman’s (2004) seminal work provided one of the first glimpses into the organizational structure of Al Qaeda identifying several substructures, or

organizational cliques: the Central Staff, the Southeast Asians, the Maghreb Arabs, and the Core Arabs. Also from his limited network analysis, we came to understand recruitment to Al Qaeda as a more complex, and less demographically determined process. The realization that many members were middle class and married flew in the face of Western presuppositions. As we increase our ethnographic base for analyses such as these, our understanding of the components of recruitment and organizational structure will grow as well (Renzi, 2006; Conway & McInerney, 2008).

One of the more visible groups studying network analysis and a range of violent actors is the Dark Web Portal at the University of Arizona (Chen et al., 2004). This large-scale open source project has produced a large body of work on the use of the Internet by extremist groups and terrorist organizations, both domestic and international. The Dark Web project points to the utility of network analysis in ascertaining community structures or groupings. Analysis of linkages between sites has produced network clustering that matches substantive expertise with substantial understanding of the topic. When the organization structure of movements can be modeled on data that can be updated readily and frequently, we can move beyond from our previous sole reliance on post hoc analysis and move to real time monitoring. The Dark Web project has done extensive examination of extremists on the Web, with network analyses focusing on network extraction, group identification and clustering, subgroup detection and the discovery of network interaction patterns (Chen et al., 2003).

Network analysis of violent actors has been conducted over many diverse types of networks. Reed's analysis of trust networks involved immediate and extended family ties as well as friendships and bodyguards, while strategy and goals mapping utilized financial transactions and insurgency operations (Reed, 2006). These mappings led to the inference that members of the Iraqi insurgency built upon their trust ties, leading ultimately to U.S. operations that resulted in Saddam's capture.

Networks are also of interest because of their novel methods for engaging calls for action. Recent attention has been focused on swarming behavior, where networks of resisters or protesters are mobilized on very short time scales via mobile phones and other electronic communications devices. The "Battle in Seattle" protest at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999 was a precursor to swarming as a tactic in social protests (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001). Such swarming behaviors and the rise of the mini-blogs such as Twitter make this an important area of SNA that needs to expand and be monitored for extremist and terrorist utilization.

Increasingly, network analysis suggests that network reach is a key factor. The "Small World" or "Six Degrees of Separation" descriptions of the networked society may be too large to be of utility for network detection. Initial research suggests that two to three steps is all that is required to uncover the essential network structure (Surface, 2007).

Recent Developments in Network Analysis

SNA provides a useful medium for exploring the behavior of actors in a variety of environments. Current research concerning the study of violent non-state actors and their use of the Internet has been focused on two key areas of study. The first major area of literature is rooted in sociology and has been particularly focused on content analysis and ethnographic research (for example, Blee, 2007; Bertlet, 2004; Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Gerstenfeld et al.

2003). These studies typically provide excellent analyses of segments of the domestic extremist groups, but are limited by the inability to link these groups effectively.

There has also been considerable work in the computer science literature devoted to the taxonomic study of Internet extremist groups based on content analysis. Qin et al. (2007) provide an excellent example of this strategy via the use of software tools and an analyst to locate, collect, and rate the technical sophistication of Middle Eastern extremist websites.

There are several applications of social network analysis that study violent non-state actors engaging in activities on the Internet. First, social network analysis has been used effectively to assist in assigning roles for individuals engaged in online discussion forums (Welser et al., 2008). Similarly, social network analysis was used to detect and monitor activities of individuals who commented on jihadist videos placed on YouTube (Conway & McInerney, 2008). These two studies provide clear examples of network analysis being used to classify and link behavior of individuals within a defined space on the Internet showing how individuals or groups spread extremist messages and which individuals may be receptive to potential inducements.

Another excellent example of social network analysis being used to study extremist behavior on the Internet was conducted by Zhou, Chen, and colleagues at the University of Arizona (2005). This group focused their work on a semi-automated collection of web sites in which collection software, referred to as a spider, traced linkage data. These sites were then coded and classified using the clustering techniques of SNA. This study shows the unique applications of both automated and human interactions to analyze data to produce complex but easily understandable sets of visualizations and clusters.

Violent non-state actors' use of the Internet is increasingly important to study because of its use as a medium for communication, recruitment, and resource mobilization. Social network analysis provides a key tool that provides analysts the ability to quickly visualize networked structures and identify clusters based on characteristics or ties among suspect persons or groups. In addition to the ability to define and classify group boundaries, the ability to further analyze individual activity using Web 2.0 features such as social networking or media sites may provide critical support in combating online propaganda and recruitment activities. Additionally, this will help analysts isolate and monitor key individuals who may become sympathetic to these activities.

Visualization is an exceedingly important aspect of SNA. And with large numbers of actors and their linkages, information can quickly overwhelm the analyst, even with graphic display of the link structure. The incorporation of self-organizing, or Kohonen, maps is one approach to reducing visual noise and displaying multidimensional data in two dimensional representations facilitating network visualization. These have been utilized to cluster groups for network displays of extremist and terrorist groups by the Dark Web portal (Chen et al., 2004). Bayesian Belief Networks can also be used to produce graphical knowledge representations (Ferrara et al., 2008).

Among the enhancements in SNA of significance is increased attention to weighted graphs. The community structures uncovered by unweighted directed graphs are being refined by incorporating weights for the edges or relations between network actors. Weights can come from a variety of sources, with text, commentary, or description providing valuable sources of contextual information to refine community or organizational structure. In an analysis with clear

ramifications for open source monitoring efforts, Newman (2004) reports the power of weighted graphs in extracting community structure in news reports. The separation of community structure in media content on the Anthrax attacks in Washington and New York shows the relevance for topics of concerning reports about violent actors in media reports. And in one of the clearer expositions of SNA on real data, Koschade (2006) is able to effectively parse interactions among the Jemaah Islamiyah participants in the 2002 Bali bombing into two distinct clusters or cells that closely match investigatory reports.

The ability to examine network structure and ascertain the characteristics of the nodes leads to tactical considerations. If we know what nodes are most central, we may be able to disrupt network operations through removal or interdiction of the node. Likewise, when we see nodes that are closer to many other nodes, they represent targets for influence or misinformation approach. Quite simply, knowledge of network characteristics gives us information about tactical options.

Networks, as diffuse structures, grow unpredictably and heal after damage (Cunningham, 2003). Alternate communication routes are established through existing sets of actors, and new actors are recruited to provide additional pathways, not merely as replacements for nodes that have been removed. Networks are resilient due to the differentiation, which emerges from confrontation and the need to adapt to operational conditions (Raab & Milward 2003). The robustness of network structures lies in the interconnectedness of the nodes. Rigidly hierarchical structures are vulnerable; diffuse networks are robust. Hierarchical structures have specialized paths that represent the only communications channels between the nodes, providing a formalized chain of command. In networks, additional connections provide redundancy through alternate paths, control is diffuse, and information channels are robust. The result is that VNSAs have evolved networks rather than organized military organizations because their flexible command structures make them hardier than conventional force structures. These networks are organizationally resilient and adapt both organizational structure and operational tactics based upon their environment (Milward & Raab 2006).

As a result, SNA identifies who is important and where network vulnerabilities lie. Selected properties of networks become of great interest when we assemble the structures from the available relational data. We are interested in properties such as centrality, with particular interest in “closeness” and “betweenness.” Nodes with greater “closeness” are connected to more individuals. They are rapid disseminators of information and other communications. Nodes with greater “betweenness” are the linkages between subgroups that otherwise may have little contact with each other. They are essential to communicate with different areas of the network and act as boundary spanners bringing ideas and innovation to both subgroups to whom they connect. Often these two assessments result in different tactics and different targeting strategies. In fact, research on disrupting networks suggests that while removal of emerging leaders is a desirable second-best strategy, random node removal is the best strategy for network destabilization (Carley et al., 2001).

Interest in destabilizing networks has spurred interest in the analytic community. Memon and Larson (2006) have developed a Dependence Centrality score that facilitates designation of the key player(s) in an organization. By accounting for frequency of communication between and through nodes, Dependence Centrality gives us a refined view of network vulnerabilities and appropriate chokepoints for destabilization.

Counterterrorism efforts are clearly aided by the ability to look for vulnerabilities on the organizational structure of violent groups and their members. And in a complementary fashion, network analysis is providing valuable support for counterterrorism by identifying vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure. Network analysis of target vulnerability of gas pipelines, electricity grids and water supplies provides useful complementary information that while not describing the behavior of VNSAs, may well provide insight into VNSA targets, given an understanding of motivations and past behaviors (Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005).

Limitations of Social Network Analysis

Social network analysis suffers from a number of limitations that must be kept in mind by any analyst using this methodology. These critiques stem from the data and techniques used in network analysis generally and from the social sciences more broadly. They deal with central issues of validity, data, and visualization as key areas for discussion.

One of the first things we must note is that on occasion, the data can be overwhelming. The reported collection of telephone records by the NSA represents a staggering assemblage of network relations. And yet such data is always potentially incomplete. Too much data confounds our ability to discern patterns, and too little keeps the pattern from emerging at all. And the fact that we do not always know all of our targets of interest means that we must attempt to achieve a balance between the two. The ability to account for the effects of missing, incomplete, or uncertain data is a much needed area of research.

One fundamental limitation of social network analysis is our difficulty in critiquing the underlying methodology presented in the analysis. Existing studies including (Zhou et al., 2005) note that their analysis of domestic extremist organizations used semi-automated collections of Internet based materials. This method develops a clear and coherent method for developing social network structures based on web linkage data. However, a key concern regarding the development of the model and subsequent analysis is the inability to question the basis on which it is developed. Essentially, it can be very difficult to explain the complex procedures that are used to process or develop the data in the social network. Similarly, once the data are visualized, it is even less transparent. It is extremely important to note that social network analysis is most effective in the hands of a well-trained analyst. Failure to utilize well-trained human expertise may result in imprecise or flawed conclusions.

Social network analysis indeed provides a series of powerful analytic tools. The data sources needed for both actor and structural variables in many examples require some form of machine coded content analysis to detect either the relationships themselves or additional contextual information to weight the relationship ties. This can pose serious challenges for research projects if computer assisted methods are used for these techniques simply due to the costs associated with human coding. This problem is further exacerbated in an online environment based upon the constantly changing nature of social interaction on the Internet and the current lack of a coherent system that links content analysis to dynamic social network analysis. Data collection and analysis with this type of research must be carefully managed to ensure that the scope of the project remains feasible for the analyst.

Similar concerns regarding the validity of representation are also present when discussing the nature and construction of network diagrams. First, the use of any spatial or cartographic visualization produces a sense of permanence about the structure that must be given particular attention by the analyst. The underlying assumptions of these models suggest a degree of

permanency in the structures that may not be present, particularly given assumptions about underlying data. Second, the use of visualization to provide exploration of data is a valuable tool for any analyst (Brandes et al., 2006). The ability to do this is, however, premised on the underlying assumptions of the information being incorporated into the model. Pictures drawn on incomplete data may appear much different than those produced with relatively little additional data.

As we expand our data collection to multi-modal and multiplex sources, where we have data from more than one type of actor or transaction, analysis becomes more complex as well. The collection of attribute data to weight the edges or ties is a potentially significant enhancement, but one that is subject to the concerns already stated.

Conclusion: The Promise of SNA

The expansion of the network analysis tool set is imperative for future research. A number of developments will greatly enhance its use in the analytic community.

We must ultimately extend Operations Research concepts to SNA to move from description to actionable analysis (Clark, 2005). As we examine networks, we come to understand the linkages. By turning our structures into systems models and analyze the inputs, outputs, and communication flows, we can take steps to influence their behavior. The network tells us the structure and the important nodes and channels. Then operations research can ground that structure in actions based on known or assumed metrics concerning the structural variables calibrating the process. Social network analysis gives us the fundamental map of the process.

The growth in data collection efforts is leading to new conceptualizations of network analysis. For instance, while the *Novel Intelligence from Massive Data* program initiated in 2002 has not resulted in publicly visible developments, the subject of massive data analysis remains an area of future growth. There are a considerable number of large databases of interest for monitoring and network analysis: the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II), The Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX), the Able Danger Program, the Automated Targeting System, and the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) program (Surface, 2007). The establishment of patterns of behavior across a broad class of interactions required massive amounts of data to establish adequate baseline probabilities, and programs at the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Security Agency (NSA) are frequently mentioned in the media as being under development. Our ability to process massive quantities of relational data and search for subgraph isomorphisms, or specific interaction patterns will be central to this endeavor (Coffman et al., 2004). The need to process massive information flows is critical need for future development and one which likewise gives rise to significant discussion of privacy issues.

Network structures evolve. Relatively small changes in staff or personnel can radically alter the structure of the network. Our current low level of ability to track changes in network structure produces a significant limitation, as we know that organizations evolve, especially as a result of both success and failure.

Almost all network analysis is static. Yet people are not. The evolution of the behavior of violent groups is all too apparent in the post 9/11 world. Thus network analysis that captures the dynamics of actor linkages is one direction that promises to inform us (Breiger & Carley, 2003). Initial work on the topic indicates this promise. In a segmented analysis of Al Qaeda

communications in annual snapshots from 1988 to 2004, McCulloh and Carley (2008) find that 1997 is a critical year in which the network structure changed. This coincides with public statements about the reuniting of Bin Laden and Zawahiri, and is followed by increasing activity against the U.S. six months later with the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Stepping back from direct network analyses of VNSAs, we can also see that the growth of networked data and applications indicates future needs at a meta-level of network analysis. As network studies increase, analytic tools are refined, and data collection methods expanded, the integration of network analyses will be facilitated by the evolution of the Semantic Web (Golbeck et al., 2005). The publication of data and tools that allow for the ready discovery, collection, and integration will greatly improve the analysis of these organizations. The concern for secure data integration across intelligence organizations parallels this need for an integrated approach to network studies on the organizational level.

In addition, current analytic methods are largely static models of a single network. The development of layered network analysis, where properties in one network can be linked or tied to properties in a related network at a different layer of abstraction will become important. Such mixed-mode developments will give increasing capability to both explanation and description, but increasingly suggest means for providing tools for network disruption. Ultimately, SNA is a tool to guide in the implementation of policy, for it is through our understanding of these networks of violent actors that we may understand who they are, how they operate, what they are doing, and what we may do about them.

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2.8. The Path of Global Spread of Radical Ideologies (Dipak Gupta)

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One of Professor David Rapoport's contributions to the academic inquiries into terrorism is his theory of waves of international terrorism. Rapoport argues that there have been four waves in the history of modern terrorism where an idea has spurred violence across the world. Although his idea has become mainstream, there is no research on how ideas actually spread. This article attempts to bridge this important gap by combining recent advances in the fields of business, advertisement, and mass communication with research on terrorism. In this process, I stress the importance of the political entrepreneurs. I argue that understanding the process by which these ideas spread across the world can provide us with the tool to manage future waves of international terrorism.

Introduction

The world is susceptible to the flooding of ideas. New ideas of fads, fashion, culture, and even political aspirations and philosophy periodically inundate the world. The process is perhaps

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similar to the spread of infectious diseases. For instance, there are many types of bugs that ail us and are then transmitted from one host to another by various means. Some of these, such as the Ebola virus, are not only extremely infectious but also are absolutely lethal. Yet, only a few of these bugs actually spread among a sizeable population and, even among them, a handful, such as the influenza epidemic of 1918 and the current AIDS epidemic, turn out to become pandemics. In the area of violent political dissent, we see a similar pattern. In this article, I would like to explore how some ideas become paramount and influence the course of history. Toward this goal, I will explain the “wave theory” of international terrorism in the following section. Section three will ask the question, “What is it about human nature that makes the global flooding of a single idea possible?”. The fourth section will present a case for the process by which the “waves” are formed, which ultimately inundate the entire world. The final section looks into the future and seeks appropriate policies to deal with the new waves that may threaten the world.

Waves of Ideas and Modern Terrorism

By carefully studying the history of terrorism, UCLA political scientist David Rapoport asserts (2006) that since the 1880s, the world has experienced four distinct waves of terrorism. Rapoport (2006, p. 10) defines waves with three characteristics: a) a cycle of activities characterized by expansion and contraction phases, b) covering multiple nations, and c) “driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.” Rapoport identifies four distinct waves fueled by common ideological fervor emanating from anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism respectively since 1880. The first three waves lasted roughly 40 years each. Rapoport argues that we are currently in the fourth wave of global terrorism inspired by religious fundamentalism, which started in the early 1990s.

Although the “wave” theory has gained a firm footing in the extant literature on terrorism (Sageman, 2008a), not much effort has gone into the examination of the causes of and the process by which mega ideas saturate nearly every corner of the earth. By drawing upon some of the current research in the areas of business, advertisement, and marketing, we can discern some patterns that can shed important light onto why certain ideas seem to “infect” a large number of people across history, culture, and geography. However, before we delve into the question of *how*, let me address the question of *why* people follow these mega-trends of ideas.

The Why of the Mega-trends

If the global spread of political ideas seems surprising, we should note how other ideas freely flow and inundate our societies. From fashions to toys -- bellbottom pants to cabbage patch dolls -- trends suddenly appear from nowhere. In the Western cultural ethos, the idea of individualism is pervasive. In our daily affairs, the assumption of self-utility maximizing individuals as islands of rational calculation, independent of community, culture, or creed, becomes self-evident truth. Despite this conscious and unconscious acceptance of basic human nature, current advancements in the fields of experimental psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Haidt, 2006), evolutionary biology (de Waal, 2006), and cognitive sciences (Damasio, 1994; Pinker, 2002) clearly demonstrate the importance of group behavior in our decision-making processes. Even economists, the primary proponents of the assumption of self-utility maximization, who typically are disdainful of those who might contaminate the concept of human rationality with history, culture, or psychology (Becker, 1996; Lerner, 2007), are

becoming cognizant of the importance of group psychology and interdependent utility functions (Frank, 1998). This diverse body of research clearly demonstrates that as social beings, we all crave to belong to groups and, when we do, we derive great satisfaction by adhering to their explicit rules and implicit norms. In fact, in the Maslovian (Maslow, 1968) hierarchy of needs, the need to belong is second only to the physical needs of keeping our bodies and soul together.

Furthermore, people follow cultural dictates not only because they generate personal utility, but also because through their “doing” they “become” somebody (Schuessler, 2000). Therefore, Hoffman (1998, p. 43) is correct in asserting that when people join dissident organizations and take part in collective violence, which we now commonly define as “terrorism,” they act not so much upon their private motivations, but out of a broad community concern. In other words, in their own minds, all political terrorists are altruists. This fundamental difference in motivation distinguishes terrorists from ordinary criminals who are motivated only by their personal gratification (Gupta, 2008). Those who join street gangs do indeed work for the group, but they typically define the group’s boundary extremely narrowly, which includes only the immediate members.² Our natural proclivity to form groups and work for their collective welfare is biologically imprinted in us, which accounts for the human need to join global trends of all sorts, including waves of international terrorism.

How Do Ideas Spread?

Journalist Malcolm Gladwell, in his bestselling book (2002) asks an important question: How do ideas spread? How do we arrive at the tipping point, after which, a new idea, a fad, a fashion, or an ideology floods the world? Gladwell studied the success of businesses like the popular footwear, Hush Puppies, and children’s shows like *Sesame Street*. When we examine the process by which a wave of international terrorism spreads throughout the globe, we find that this is the same process by which ideas spread, some ending up being global, others remaining localized, some making great impacts, most others disappearing within a very short time. Gladwell’s analysis of the processes by which little things can make a big difference discerns the workings of three broad forces: i) the messenger(s), ii) the message, and iii) the context.

The messenger(s):

The social theories of terrorism and political violence argue that gross imbalances within the social structure, such as poverty, income inequality, and asymmetry in power lead to violence (Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1963; Tilly, 1978). However, when these factors are put to empirical tests they, despite the age-old assertion of their salience, produce only ambiguous results or weak correlations (Hibbs, 1973; Gupta 1990; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Keefer & Loyaza, 2008). The reason for these puzzling results rests with the fact that the factors of deprivation – absolute or relative – only serve as the necessary conditions for social unrest. For the sufficient reason, we must look into the role that “political entrepreneurs” play to translate the grievances into concrete actions by framing the issues in a way that clearly identifies the boundaries of the aggrieved community and its offending group (Gupta, 2008). The clear identification of the “us” and “them” creates conditions to overcome the natural bias toward free-riding and overcome the collective action problem (Olson, 1968).

² In economic terms, this is not an example of a *public good* that motivates a terrorist, but a *quasi-public good* or a *club good*. For an extensive discussion, see Gupta (2008, 146-60).

Gladwell, for instance, makes a finer distinction within the category of “political entrepreneurs” whom he calls the *connectors*, the *mavens*, and the *salesmen*. The connectors are the primary nodes of a communication network. These are the people who know a lot of people and are known by a lot of people by dint of who they are (position, power, money, etc.). The *maven* is a Yiddish word meaning the “accumulator of knowledge.” The mavens are the so-called “theoreticians” of a movement, the pundits and gurus, who can provide a cogent explanation of the current crisis based on their knowledge and observations. The *salesmen* are those, who through their power of persuasion can attract groups of followers. Although there are no specific boundaries separating these three groups of key individuals, any analysis of a global movement will clearly identify people with characteristics of all three.

In this article, I am going to concentrate on only one movement within the fourth wave, al-Qaeda. However, a careful look at all the other previous waves will clearly indicate the same pattern.

The grievances of the Muslim community (*ummah*) have been acute for at least a century since the days when the last Islamic Empire in Istanbul slipped into the pages of history books. After an impressive run that lasted over a thousand years and saw the conquest of almost the two thirds of the “known world,” beginning with the expulsion of the Moors in 1492 by the Spanish monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Islamic Empires started to experience defeat for the first time. The following half millennium saw a steady decline of the Islamic Empire, which was completed after WWI with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Yet this widespread realization did not immediately create violent rebellion along the lines of religious fundamentalism. The collective frustration and anger felt in the Muslim world found its expression mostly through nationalistic yearnings, primarily as a result of the second wave (anti-colonialism) of international terrorism. The so-called “jihadi” movement took shape slowly through the writings of the mavens, such as Hasaan al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb.³ Although they failed to make much political impact outside of Egypt during their lifetimes, their writings inspired the scion of one of the wealthiest Arab families, Osama bin Laden. If we examine bin Laden’s life, we can clearly see why he would be the Great Connector. As a student in the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, young bin Laden was greatly influenced by his teachers, Abdallah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of the fiery Islamist. His vast wealth and his connections to the Saudi royal family gave bin Laden a ready platform, which an ordinary person would not have had. As a result, when the Afghan war started, with his influence and familiarity with the rich and the powerful, he could establish *al-Qaeda*, “the base,” which served as the bridge between the Arab mujahideens fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan and their families in the Arab countries. Furthermore, he quickly established linkages with the Pakistani military intelligence service, the Inter service Intelligence Agency (ISI), which served as the conduit for the CIA to deliver money and weapons to the Afghan fighters. Apart from his personal wealth, bin Laden was also able to tap into the vast amount of charity money (*zakat*) generated within the Arab world, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations. Through his immense connections and seemingly inexhaustible funds, bin Laden was able to attract a large number of

³ The word *jihad* has a specific religious connotation. Not all Muslims accept the way the radicals have used the term. By accepting the term to label radical Islam, we may actually give it more legitimacy than it deserves. However, since all other alternatives to the expression, such as “Salafis,” “fundamentalists,” “extremists,” or “literalists” carry their own limitations, I will use the term “jihadi” in this article being mindful of its political and religious limitations.

Most, including the likes of Ayman al-Zawahiri and many others who served as the salesmen of his jihadi ideology. Together, the mavens, the connectors, and the salesmen began the foundation of the fourth wave of international terrorism.

The message:

The information age literally bombards us with innumerable pieces of information every single day of our lives. As we see, listen, and/or read them, very few get our conscious attention. You may, for example, see a billboard while driving, a commercial while watching television, or listen to a lecture, yet may recall absolutely nothing about the specific message they contain only a minute later. On the other hand, you may recall something you have heard, seen, or read many years ago. The question is, what causes some messages to stick? The secrets of stickiness have been the focus of research done by psychologists, communications specialists, and scholars from diverse disciplines. Heath and Heath (2002), for instance, identify six factors that cause messages to stick. They argue that a memorable message must be *simple, concrete, credible*, and have contents that are *unexpected*, they must appeal to our *emotions*, and should contain a compelling *storyline*.

Simplicity is one of the foremost requirements of a “sticky” message. In the area of political communication, where a leader attempts to inspire a large number of people, sticky messages depend on the simplicity of thought. When we look at the messages of bin Laden, we can clearly understand that in his vision Islam is under threat from the infidel West, the Jews, and their collaborators in the Muslim world. Most of his communications, long and short, contain this message (Lawrence, 2005).

These messages are not simply a litany of grievances, but are concrete in their action plan: It is the religious duty of every Muslim to join the jihad against those who are putting the followers of the Prophet in peril.

The “unexpected” part of a memorable message comes when, to the listeners, the leader “connects the dots” and explains clearly the confusing world in which they live. To many in the Arab/Muslim world, the message must come as a revelation where they begin to see how the unbelievers have been undermining their rightful place in history. Through extreme cunning, the infidels not only sapped the energy of the Islamic Empire, but also are plotting to destroy it militarily, politically, financially, and even spiritually. This sudden realization often lies at the core of recruiting of new believers to the cause.

Coming from the son of one of the wealthiest families, living an ascetic life, waging war against injustice, bin Laden cuts a God-like image in the minds of many in the Arab/Muslim world. These images, often carefully chosen by al-Qaeda, give his messages an immense and immediate credibility.

As human beings, we remember messages that evoke emotions, particularly those that paint the portrait of an impending threat. Fear is most often the primary motivator for collective action. Evolutionary biologists bolster the findings of Prospect Theory offered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory simply states that in the process of evaluating benefits and costs of an action, human beings often place a far greater weight on the fear of a loss than the prospect of a gain (Heidt, 2007; McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov, 2008). Therefore, fear moves us in a profound way. Hence, it should come as little surprise that the messages of bin Laden

would be strewn with dire predictions of a destroyed Islamic world, which are sure to pass when the believers fail to act (Olsson, 2008).

Finally, memorable messages come with stories. Experimental studies (Heath & Heath, 2007) show that when two similar messages are presented to an audience, one with supporting statistics and the other with a suitable story, the latter inevitably sticks more than the former. Similar to all other political communicators, bin Laden's speeches are chalk full of analogies of stories from Islamic history. Thus, when he calls the Westerners, "the Crusaders," or George W. Bush, "Hulagu Khan," their implications leave little doubt in the minds of his intended audience.

Thus, throughout history, the mavens have concocted coherent stories by borrowing from religion, history, and mythology with complete set of heroes and villains, good and evil, allies and enemies that have resonance with the masses. The connectors have spread it far and wide, and the salesmen have recruited eager volunteers.

The Context:

There may be great messengers, but the stickiness of their message depends on their sociopolitical, historical, and cultural context. Rapoport (2006) himself points out three historical and cultural factors for the spread of at least one form of religious wave: Islamic fundamentalism. He argues that the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the beginning of a new Islamic century, and the Afghan War paved the way for it. The success of the Ayatollah Khomeini is bringing about a fundamental change in Iran by driving out the Shah, the closest U.S. ally in the Islamic World, which gave a tremendous impetus to many Muslim radicals to choose the path of violent revolution to drive out the infidels and the apostates. Second, millenarian beliefs in the arrival of a redeemer were seemingly realized with the Iranian Revolution, giving the fundamentalists one more sign of a propitious time to rise up in the name of Allah. Finally, the Afghan War saw a victory for the Mujahideen against the mighty Soviet military. In their victory, the religiously inspired totally disregarded the role that the covert U.S. and Pakistani aid played. They simply took it as yet another sign of their inevitable victory.

In contrast to Rapoport's emphasis on historical and cultural factors, social science analyses of social movements in general, and terrorism in particular, concentrate on the macro level social, economic, and political variables (Keefer & Loayza, 2008). The presence of a large number of factors related to structural imbalances, such as poverty, unemployment, income inequality, and lack of opportunities for political expression provided the youth in the Islamic world and those living in the Western nations the context within which the messages of bin laden could be retained.

Finally, terrorism does not happen in a vacuum. The evolution of a violent movement is the outcome of a dynamic interaction between the target government and the dissident group. Being guided by the same process of over emphasizing the actual threat (Mueller, 2006), time and again governments fall into the trap of overreaction, which only reinforces the movement.

Inspiration and Opportunity: Looking at the Future

While ideas spread and many get inspired, only a few individuals actually join radical groups. Literature (Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2008b) shows that regardless how inspired they are, few people who join violent dissident groups as a result of epiphany; most join slowly over time through friendship and kinship. When people get deeply affected by the sights of suffering of their own people and/or listening to inspiring speeches etc., they seek common friends or

relatives through whom they get involved in political activism. O'Duffy (2008) narrates the process of radicalization of Muslim youths in the UK. Yet, one curious phenomenon has generally escaped the notice of most researchers: there is a significant difference in the rates of actual activism among the various national groups. Thus, while many young men and women from Pakistani background join these movements, few from Bangladeshi or Indian communities do so. On the other hand, young men and women from the Magreb community, similar to the Pakistanis, find ways to become active in such movements. This differential rate may be the outcome of opportunity.

Pakistan was created with a deep scar in its collective memory. Apart from the trauma of horrific mass killings that preceded a partition, it also inherited the persistent problem of Kashmir. The inherent logic of the partition based on religion might have dictated that the former princely state would join Pakistan, history did not go that way. As a result, the Pakistani leaders from the beginning framed the issue of "liberation" of Kashmir as an integral part of its national identity. Facing a much stronger enemy, Pakistan turned to the jihadis and, in effect, privatized its war of attrition (Swami, 2007). Since these terrorist training camps were established and administered with the full support of the Pakistani government and its intelligence service, the ISI (Stern, 2003), they operated in the open; those who wanted to join them had full knowledge of their location. Similar training camps, built around extreme versions of Islam, flourished in the North West Frontier provinces with blessings and resources from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States. During the Afghan War against the Soviet military, these camps became the ready destination of all the "wannabe" jihadis. These camps provided unprecedented opportunities for the inspired all over the world. Apart from the jihadi training camps, radicalism blossomed in Islamic schools, the madrassahs, which were financially supported by Saudi Arabia as a part of their war of religious hegemony (Fair, 2008). By providing opportunity to the inspired, Pakistan quickly became known as the "most dangerous place on earth."

Sageman (2008b, p. 85) finds, from his dataset of terrorist profiles, that most of the violent activists not only are of Pakistani background, but also a disproportionate percentage come from Mirpur district, a small area in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. These findings are consistent with his earlier (2004) "bunch of guys" hypothesis, where a group of (mostly) men, by heeding the call of an inspirational leader, create a cell. In their devotion to the cause, they create their own set of norms, which at times may even require them to sacrifice their own lives.

These sorts of groupings are common in all social settings. However, if these radicalized members find a way to act upon their conviction, a terror cell is born. As groups are formed, leaders emerge. In the network process, they act as the nodes by making contact with other groups or the central core of a movement. As ideas spread, inspiration meets opportunity to produce terrorist attacks. This is why the establishment of a strong Taliban-dominated region in Pakistan poses a great security threat to the rest of the world (Hoffman, 2008; McConnel, 2008).

The conclusion that we can draw from this discussion is that the intelligence community needs to pay particular attention as to where groups can form such as mosques, discussion groups, student unions, etc. Unfortunately, in a rapidly changing world, this task is likely to get harder, which will enable future waves to develop and spread far more quickly and, in turn, be more difficult to manage because of the pervasive nature of electronic communication. Today, ideas can spread instantly and networks amongst like-minded people are rapidly developing

around the world (Weimann, 2006). As Robb (2007) points out, the nodes of communication networks not only become sources of information exchange, they, in effect, become “small worlds” of virtual communities on the web. Through their interactions, they develop social capital, provide ideological and emotional support to their members, raise money, disseminate dangerous information regarding explosives, and keep the fire of hatred burning. Nearly three decades ago, when bin Laden began his jihad, his power to connect was limited by his physical ability to meet with influential people in the disaffected parts of the Arab/Muslim world. The next generation of connectors will increase this capacity infinitely through the rapid advance of communication technologies. More importantly, these new connectors may not even need the large sums of money and family connections that helped bin Laden to establish al-Qaeda. Currently, there is a debate among terrorism experts on how significant al-Qaeda as an organization actually is (Sageman, 2008; McConnel, 2008; Hoffman, 2008). Regardless where the truth lies, however, experts of all stripes clearly warn us that when the next wave comes, or as this wave continues, the “jihadis”, whether completely leaderless or part of a hierarchical organization, will continue to pose an unprecedented threat to the global security. The essence of human nature will continue to cause us to form groups and fight against others. In the open savanna, humanity survived by banding together. Our future survival will depend on how well we can manage the destructive power of groups.

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2.9. The Effects of Counterterrorism: Empirical Political Dynamics (Stephen Shellman, Victor Asal)

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One of the key changes in human interaction since the end of the cold war is the rise of non-state actor political violence. Of particular and growing concern is the use of political violence against civilians by smaller non-state groups. The number of fatalities from such attacks has risen steeply in the last few decades. As a result, states today spend billions of dollars to protect themselves against acts of terrorism. While many studies have analyzed how terrorist behavior develops and how it responds to government efforts, most of this work is qualitative in nature (Abrahms, 2006; Adams, 1986; Addison & Murshed 2005; Alexander, 2005; Bartley, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Carter, 2001; Crenshaw, 1987; Crenshaw, 1990; Desker, 2003; Eland, 1998; Harb & Leenders, 2005; Harmon, 2001; Hoffman, 1998; Kilcullen, 2005; McCulloch & Pickering, 2005; Merari, 1993). While some work has focused on international terrorism¹ (Barros & Proenca, 2005; Enders & Sandler 2000; Enders & Sandler 1993; Eubank & Weinberg, 2001), there is still a lack of work focused on domestic terror and or *all* terror. Quantitative transnational terrorism research has increased our understanding of the systematic trends and effects of terrorism and counterterrorism (CT), but we lack an understanding of such phenomena in the domestic arena.




Figure 1. International & Domestic Events 1998-2006 (MIPT 2007)

¹ Terrorism is transnational in nature when, according to Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, and Fleming (1989) and the international terrorism database (ITERATE), the nationality of its perpetrators, location, institutions, human victims, mechanics of resolution, or ramifications transcend national boundaries. On the other hand, “domestic terrorism is homegrown and has consequences for just the host country its institutions, citizens, property, and policies...the perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host country” (Enders & Sandler, 2006b, 6).

Based on a few years of recent data, Figure 1 demonstrates that domestic terrorist events are far more frequent than international terrorist events. Moreover, it seems that domestic terrorism is on the rise. According to the limited domestic terrorism data available from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) from 1998 to 2006, 123 countries experienced 4,442 domestic terrorist events yielding more than 31,000 deaths and almost 60,000 injuries. In contrast, during the same period international terrorism plagued 108 countries, where only 2,035 events caused almost 7,000 deaths and 17,000 injuries. Only about 9% of all the terrorist events in this period are transnational in nature, of which, yield only about 18% of the total deaths caused by both kinds of terrorism (MIPT, 2007). Not only is domestic terrorism more frequent, it is also more lethal.

Crenshaw, Dugan and La Free (2006, p. 5) argue that:

if there is a continuum between local and international levels of terrorism, then understanding international terrorism requires knowledge of “domestic” as well as “international” incidents. However, most analyses of terrorism ... consider it in the exclusive context of actions defined as international—occurring outside the boundaries of the country where the organization is primarily located or attacking foreign targets in the home country. Thus ... the picture they give is ... incomplete.

While international terrorism garners quite a bit of attention in various literatures, domestic terrorism has largely been ignored. As a result, our understanding of the causes of terrorism and the interaction of terrorism and counterterrorism is clearly myopic and potentially flawed by our sole focus on transnational terrorism. In short, much more work must be done in the realm of domestic terror as well as the linkages between domestic and international terror. For the purposes of this section of the paper, we review the empirical work completed on both international and domestic terrorism, point out the strengths of such work and what we know, and highlight the lacunae we need to fill – what we do not know!

The Social Science Literature on This Topic:

Two major schools of thought – structure/systems and behavioral/process – dominate the literature on political conflict. Most of the empirical work in political science, sociology, and economics focuses on the correlates of conflict in a given country in a given year. While such studies can aid in explaining spatial patterns at the country level, they fail to explain the timing and dynamics of conflict. Variables like mountains, ethnic fractionalization, and GDP stand out as key variables (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003). More recently, Li and Schaub (2004) show the dampening indirect effects that economic globalization has on transnational terror. Other work by Li (2005) reveals that democracy has mixed effects on international terror. Specifically, his study illustrates that democratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a country, while government constraints increase the number of those incidents. Yet such structural variables do not change much over time if at all with “globalization” perhaps being an exception. More recently, Walsh & Piazza (2010) show in a cross-national study that that abuse of physical integrity rights promotes terrorism. Structural and environmental variables can explain why there is more violent conflict in India than Japan, but they cannot explain why there is more terror and political violence in Punjab in 1990’s than in the 2000’s. That is “the factors analyzed in country level analyses are the same for a given country during war and peace, and are therefore incapable of predicting shifts from one period to the other” (Butler et al., 2005).

Very little in terms of geography and economy have changed much across that time period. Moore and Shellman (2008) write:

While studying the political, economic, and social attributes of countries is a useful approach for understanding and highlighting general patterns of conflict, it is ill-suited to address conflict processes because such approaches “are essentially static ‘input-output’ or ‘stimulus-response’ type models, not dynamic models of interaction” (Moore, 1995). Charles Tilly argues that because “collective action is dynamic... its outcomes depend very strongly on the course of interaction” (Tilly, 1985).

A second approach focuses on the behavioral dynamics, processes, and linked decisions associated with political violence, armed conflict, terrorism and even criminal activities. Essentially, actors’ decisions are based on the decisions of their opponents and this strategic inter-dependence can more effectively explain conflict processes. This work focuses on competition between governments and various dissident groups over policy, control of the state, and - especially - the support of the population (see Shellman, 2004a, 2004b, 2006a, 2006b). Moore and Shellman (2008) write:

This shift is critically important because it means that theory becomes much more useful to policy makers: the emphasis on parties to the conflict leads this research to develop hypotheses about the conflictual behavior of dissidents in response to government behavior and vice versa. By moving away from thinking about the impact of democratic v. autocratic institutions, the size of GNP/capita, and the ethnic composition of society these scholars have begun to ask the following sorts of questions:

- When does repression work? When does it backfire?
- Why are some dissident groups so much more violent than others?
- What explains varying levels of discrimination in targeting across time and space?
- What event sequences lead to conflict escalation?
- What are the effects of government countermeasures on the tactical choices of dissidents?

Information about political institutions, economic output, and ethnic composition are of limited usefulness for answering these questions because they don’t change much over time.

Criminal justice, sociology, and political science literatures generate testable hypotheses concerning the frequency and severity of various event types such as crimes, violent political clashes, and terrorist attacks based on how authorities, governments, and/or international players act. A similar empirical puzzle emerges throughout most of these studies. For example, some criminology literature shows that aggressive policing to increase arrest rates yields lower crime rates as potential criminals are deterred from the increased probability of being arrested (Wilson & Boland 1978, 1981; Sherman 1986; Cook 1980). Other studies show that such policies fail to deter criminals from committing crimes (Jacob and Rich 1981; Chilton 1982; Decker and Kohfield 1985) in that crime levels do not change as a function of such policies.

Political science and sociology studies of repression and dissent yield their own conflicting results. Some argue that hostile government behavior discourages hostile dissident behavior and encourages dissident cooperation (Snyder & Tilly, 1972; Moore, 1998; Francisco, 1995; 1996; Lichbach, 1987), while others contend that hostile government behavior encourages dissident hostility (Gurr, 1970; Hibbs, 1973; Francisco, 1995; 1996). Still others posit that government cooperation encourages dissident hostility (e.g., Rasler, 1996), while in contrast, still others counter that government cooperation encourages dissident cooperation (e.g., Krain, 2000; Carey, 2004). The major critique of the work above in criminology, political science, and sociology is the level of aggregation scholars work at in their models. Most of this work aggregates all actions by governments and all actions by dissidents together or all actions by criminals and all actions by police together into simple two-actor models of police-criminal and government-dissident dynamics. Yet, the world is not so simple. It is often the case multiple actors and groups of actors are competing for resources. A forthcoming study by Shellman et. al. (2010) shows that aggregation of actions into gross single actor conglomerates can yield serious threats to inference.

The same deterrence debate permeates the terrorism literature but with much less frequency and with systematic empirical inquiry. To begin, Ginges (1997) argues that the Israeli hard-line approach is less effective at combating terrorism than the more conciliatory Italian approach utilized during the 1980's. He argues that harsh government policies breed more activity and lead to cycles of violence, while conciliatory policies lead to negotiations, settlements, and fewer terrorist events. On the other hand, Miller (2004) argues that governments develop reputations based on how they deal with terrorists and different reputations yield different effects on terrorism. If governments are harsh on terrorism, they develop reputations for being tough on terror, which deters future attacks. Likewise, if governments are more conciliatory towards terrorists, they develop reputations for being soft on terrorism, which invites future attacks. Yet, as stated before, much of this work in the CT arena is lacking rigorous empirical testing.

The seminal empirical work in the counter-terrorism (CT) area is by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (Enders & Sandler, 1993; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Enders & Sandler 2000; Enders & Sandler 2002; Enders & Sandler 2004a; Enders & Sandler 2004b; Enders & Sandler 2006a; Enders & Sandler 2006b). The major theoretical and empirical contributions of their work hinge on the ideas of substitutes and compliments. Essentially, they argue that terrorists are rational actors attempting to maximize a shared goal, subject to a resource constraint that "limits the terrorist group's expenditures not to exceed its resources" (Enders & Sandler, 1993, 830 and 833). This shared goal is produced from a number of commodities such as media coverage, political instability, the generation of fear, etc. Terrorists employ various terrorist (e.g., bombings) and non-terrorist tactics (e.g., compete in elections) to produce the same basic commodities. As governments impose restrictions (i.e., CT actions, and policies) on terrorists, terrorists will substitute or compliment their previous actions. For example, in their work on airline skyjackings, they show that metal detectors have a suppressant effect on skyjackings, but other types of terror attacks increase. That is, metal detectors do not decrease terror attacks across the board, but rather yield an unintended consequence. While the overall number of attacks more or less remains constant over time, other attack modes like kidnappings increase, while skyjackings decrease.

The basic logic of Enders and Sandler's should transfer well into other domains of inquiry. For example, theorists and modelers should be able to apply the logic to other types of CT domains in order to think about and empirically study how CT policies and actions yield intended and unintended consequences. Asal & Shellman (2006, 2007) applied this logic to terror and CT in India and Shellman has applied the model to the Philippines and Russia. For example, Asal & Shellman (2006) show that Indian CT policies such as the Disruptive Areas Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act increase bombings while decreasing armed attacks. The increased powers of police and military as well as their increased presence in the streets decreases more overt acts and increases covert actions. Their other work on regional terror in India (Asal, Shellman, & Stewart 2007) shows that while structural variables may increase the probability of terror in a given region, behavioral process variables and state CT actions tends to explain and predict *when* we will observe terror in a given region. Piazza's (2008) qualitative work on India supports Asal and Shellman's finding in that Piazza argues that terror in India is not the product of poor economic conditions, but is manifested in the government's poor management of ethnic conflict and protracted political problems.

Current Work on Political Dynamics of Terror & Political Violence

One of the primary pitfalls of previous work on repression-dissent and terror-CT dynamics was a lack of the necessary data to examine the intended and unintended consequences of government policies and actions.

We argue that to complete research on the intended and unintended consequences of CT actions, one needs chronological data on the acts of violence as well as on the actions of governments, NGOs, and IGOs take on a daily basis. Such data are difficult to obtain, but strides in automated entity extraction have made the generation of such data less daunting. The first ingredient necessary to produce such data is text containing such events, actions, and outcomes. Naturally, one is drawn to electronic news reports. Previous work in the area concentrated on analyzing one source, yet research by Schrodtt et. al. (2001) and Shellman et. al. (2007) reveals that there is a bias in different media outlets and that collecting data from a single source can lead to bias in statistical findings. Shellman et. al. showed empirically that combining a sample of representative sources helps to average out the bias and allows one to draw more valid and reliable inferences from statistical models. Recently, Shellman collected political events data for 10 South East Asian countries and with the help of Schrodtt expanded the coverage to 29 countries in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility (PACOM AOR).² The data contain information from 6-million news reports from 75 distinct local, national, and international sources. The effort is two orders of magnitude greater than any other event data collection effort in history. The data were recently expanded by Shellman and Lockheed Martin to cover U.S. Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) actions in the region. Such data can and will be used to explain, model, and forecast political dynamics among various state and nonstate actors between and across countries. The data are hierarchically coded and can be disaggregated by actor (group, individual, state, etc.), target (actor, place name, and/or physical entity such as bus, railway, café, etc.), and event (bombing, negotiation, agreement, armed attack, giving of aid, cooperative actions, etc.). It is also possible to spatially disaggregate

² Shellman's original data collection was funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), while the data expansion effort with Schrodtt was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency (DARPA).

some of the data by region. Some research projects were carried out spatially disaggregating events in Cambodia, India, and Russia in particular. For example, Figure 2 shows the model fitted values overlaid on the actual terrorist attacks by Chechen Rebels in Chechnya, while Figure 26 shows regional terror attacks in Russia. Note how darkly shaded the Chechen region is in the South-Western part of the country.




Figure 2. In-sample Forecasts of Terrorism in Chechnya




Figure 3. Frequency of Russia Terrorist Attacks by Region, 1995-2005 (light/low to dark/high)

In both analyses, government repression proved to be an important explanatory variable for terror attacks. We found evidence that low and high levels of repression have weaker effects on terror than moderate levels of repression. Moreover, criminal activities were also important predictors of terrorist attacks.

Most of the previous literature treats terrorism separately from other violent political tactics and considers it as a distinct area of inquiry. More recently, other scholars have even gone further, treating “suicide terror” separately from other terrorist and non-terrorist tactics (e.g., Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005). Yet, terrorist tactics are often utilized within an array of other violent, non-violent, and cooperative means. The study of terrorism should not be segregated from the

larger study of political conflict and instead we argue that studies focused on explanations of terror should be discussed within the broader field of contentious politics. By adopting a particularistic conceptualization of conflict behavior (e.g., terror) we limit our ability to understand the full repertoire and behavior of state and nonstate actors. If a group uses multiple strategies and tactics to achieve their objectives (e.g., Hamas competes in elections, provides social services to the public, and engages in violent activities), yet we concentrate on attempting to model and explain one of them (terror activities) while ignoring the rest, our inferences will be biased and our results rather useless. While the work of Enders and Sandler lead us down the right path, the models are incomplete ignoring other activities on both sides of the conflict.

A recent study by Shellman et al. (2008) categorized various actions on separate Diplomatic (D), Information (I), Military (M), and Economic (E) continuums and used such data to evaluate how such actions affected the ebb and flow of nonviolent, violent, and terrorist actions by dissident groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Figure 4 shows a plot of DIME, terror attacks, violent dissent, and nonviolent dissent from 1991-2005 in the Philippines. The findings from that study showed that economic and diplomatic tactics did not quell violent dissident actions while they did give rise to nonviolent actions. Moreover, the analyses illustrated that government military strategies and tactics exacerbated violent dissident tactics and strategies. Such a study while still having its pitfalls, moves us closer to understanding a more complete picture containing the various groups involved and their tactical choices sets and how such tactical choices are dependent on one another.




Figure 4. Frequency of DIME, Terror, Nonviolent, and Violent Activities in the Philippines, 1991-2005

Future Questions We Need to Address

We must build on these literatures by systematically empirically modeling and testing competing hypotheses with new data containing information on a variety of CT policies and terrorist and non-terrorist strategies and tactics. We should begin to design studies that evaluate when and why violent, non-violent, terrorist, and non-terrorist strategies are interchanged during

a conflict. We propose studies that model the substitution of terrorist, non-terrorist, violent, non-violent and cooperative tactics and strategies as well as different government counter-efforts (e.g., DIME). Asal and Shellman are moving in this direction and have begun to collect information on governments and their tactics and strategies more uniformly in addition to collecting the chronological information on dissident tactics and strategies. Asal is also leading the charge on collecting group attribute data, which will inform how organizational and group characteristics affect choices (See the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) data effort).³

In terms of our CT data collection efforts, our future research seeks to explore how both a government's policies and tactics affect dissidents' tactical choices. We define CT *policies* as plans of action for tackling terrorism-related issues. It sets in motion a process (e.g., aggressive sentencing of convicted terrorists by increasing the powers of courts) for dealing with the threat and its consequences. In contrast, government *tactics* refer to actual actions (e.g., adjudicating a case) taken by actors (e.g., judges, etc.) responsible for carrying out the policy. CT policies and tactics fall into several subcategories including but not limited to using force, defending targets against attack, granting political concessions, improving socio-economic-political conditions and winning hearts and minds, and/or doing nothing. Such policies and actions can also be classified into DIME actions and policies. To our knowledge, no quantitative empirical studies examine the consequences of each of these different kinds of policies. Aside from alternative policies affecting resource pools and yielding substitution effects, each group may be affected differently given their diverse characteristics and motivations. For example, the threat of being killed may not deter a religious terrorist from carrying out attacks since they are willing to die for the cause. Similarly, some conciliatory policies may decrease the frequency of terrorist activities if the concession moves the group closer to its pre-determined policy objectives. As such, future studies should control for group motivations and norms⁴ when analyzing the effects of various CT policies on different terrorist attack modes and tactics.

Conclusion

Harry Eckstein (1980) wrote over 25 years ago that we can distinguish between “contingency” and “inherency” approaches to the study of violent conflict. The first perspective assumes that conflict is contingent on unusual or irregular conditions that cause disruptions in conventional politics. The contingent approach leads one to study the political, economic and social attributes of countries to explain variation in their conflict experiences. The inherent perspective assumes that violent political conflict emerges out of low-level contentious interactions among a set of political players. This approach leads researchers to focus on the conditional behavior of parties to conflict and how that behavior changes over time. While Eckstein laid out these two approaches in 1980 until recently, few scholars have taken the latter path. Currently, the literature is moving past the structural-systems oriented approaches and towards the more behavioral-process oriented approaches to studying political violence. Such a shift has enabled us to examine and learn the consequences of behavioral interactions. We are now connecting the behavioral approaches to the study of terrorism. For example, we have begun to be able to answer questions like: how do different levels of repression affect levels of terror?

³ See www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ for more information on the MAROB project

⁴ Wintrobe (2002) argues that suicidal terrorists engage in such acts to obtain the group benefit of solidarity.

What government actions and policies decrease levels of terrorism or cause shifts in terror tactics? We have found so far that certain policies can have unintended consequences such as increasing one type of terror tactic (e.g., bombings) while decreasing another type (e.g., armed attacks). Moreover, by combining the structural and behavioral process approaches, we have found that structure can set the stage for terror, but the timing of terror is often best understood as a function of joint tactical decisions and behavioral interactions among a set of actors party to the conflict. Additionally, we have been able to disaggregate and isolate the effects that different foreign policies and actions (e.g., DIME) have on levels of nonviolence, violence short of terror, and terror. Finally, through our recent analyses, we found empirical links between terror and criminal activities that should be explored in future analyses.

We think that there is enormous potential value in leveraging the new political process school's insights to inform policy makers on the utility of strategies and tactics to quell terror. We are on the cusp of being able to say very interesting things about the violent behavior of dissidents and governments as the outcome of dynamic processes that vary over time and space across the countries in which such conflicts take place. In sum, the future of this work can aid the policy and operational community better understand the ebb and flow of political violence and terrorism and how best to combat it.

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2.10. Financing Terrorism: Entrepreneurship, Business Strategies, and Moral Issues (Frédéric Lemieux)

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Introduction

According to Schmid, Jongman and Horowitz (1988), the various definitions of terrorism that have been articulated in contemporary times usually refer to the politically motivated use or threat of violence against civilians, fear and induced terror, intentional and planned action, asymmetric warfare, psychological effects and social reactions, coercion, and immorality. The concept of terrorism remains a social-political construct and its definition continues to be widely accepted by numerous researchers, governments, and interest groups (European Union, 2002; Jenkins, 2006; Laqueur, 2001; United Nations, 2004). This conventional approach considers the funding of terrorism as leverage to support logistical and operational expenditures. Terrorist financing activities can be categorized at two different levels of analysis: (1) operational and (2) strategic (Ehrenfeld, 2003). Short term funding sources are usually exploited for operational purposes and represent a flexible “means-end financing” (low profile activities, undetectable to police and banking systems, limited competence). First, operational financing is largely task oriented and does not require sophisticated funding sources to support disorganized local entities or decentralized structures such as sleeping cells.¹ Expenditures related to terrorist attacks generally require modest investment and most of them have been funded through legal and illegal “soft financing activities.” Second, strategic financing aims to support the long term activities of more structured organizations including the recruitment, training, propaganda, sustainment of their constituency, and maintenance of their facilities such as terrorist training camp and also community infrastructures (schools, hospitals, associations, and cult institutions).

¹ According to governmental officials, expenses related to bombings like those which happened in Dar Es Salam (1998), Nairobi (1998), Aden (2000), Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Glasgow (2007) are estimated at less than \$80,000. Moreover, some estimation pointed out kamikaze operations, which happened frequently in Israel, cost less than \$200 per attack, including the preparation, crude material, and the execution. All of those cost-efficient operations were attributed to religious-extremist movements and were accomplished by terrorist cells composed of locals who participated in financing deadly operations (Warde, 2008).

However, conventional wisdom lends little consideration to concepts such as economic development, capital investment, and entrepreneurship - all possible components of the goal of terrorism. According to Napoleoni (2005), the funding sources of terrorists have evolved in three main phases throughout the 20th century: 1) state sponsors during the Cold War period; 2) privatization of funding by exploiting valuable resources in failed states wedged in a war economy in the early 1990s (terrorists for hire); and 3) utilization of global financial and trade markets after the establishment of free trade zones and the globalized economy in the past decade. However, this framework does not necessarily capture the significant shifts that suggest that financial resources can be also understood a potential sources of power. Radical and violent movements need sustainable economic projects to keep their political/religious causes viable. In fact, economic analysis has shown that terrorists are rational actors who maximize their payoffs from target selection and possible reactions of governments (Landes, 1978). In addition, terrorist organizations profit from political destabilization by taking control of national and international supply chains as well as maximizing financial gains from a shortage of basic commodities (Enders & Sandler, 1993).

This paper aims to revisit the existing literature and apply some of the findings to further our understanding of how terrorist movements can generate profits and create wealth by taking advantage of local, national, and global economical structures. I explore how terrorist groups can adopt financial strategies that reflect economic and political choices made to maximize benefits associated with their political/religious goals. Conceptualizing terrorism financing merely as a means to wage terror campaigns and achieve political ends comes shorts in helping us understand the critical importance of the funding of terrorism. Further, this approach fails to capture a reality in which the legitimacy and political message of terrorists can only be effective when they fill a gap left by government weakness. Our current perception of the financing of terrorism underestimates the fact that terrorist fundraising capabilities far exceed their operational costs and that they heavily invest in economic development to maintain the allegiance of the community.

Strategic Funding and Social Entrepreneurship

The size and organizational structure of a terrorist organization can influence the way these actors raise money to sustain themselves. Smaller and ephemeral terrorist organizations like cells or unstructured groups rely on less sophisticated licit and illicit sources of revenue to face operational expenditures (Rapoport, 1992). Alternatively, structured terrorism organizations spend considerable time and money to support diverse essential activities such as recruitment, training camps, housing and food, forging identities, intelligence gathering, and communications. The structural complexity (coordination), sophisticated management (communication), and the scope activity (specialization) of a terrorist organization inevitably shape the financial needs and affect the viability of a group and its capacity to carry out violent actions.²

² The case of the London and the Madrid bombings illustrates that strategic funding is a prerequisite to deploy effective terror campaigns carried out by local cells. In both cases, operational costs and logistical expenditures required a modest investment, an estimated \$15,000 each (Warde, 2008). Interestingly, British authorities found that one of the suicide bombers resided in a \$240,000 apartment in London where he had prepared explosives. He worked as a part-time employee in a restaurant and the police found no evidence explaining the origin of the money that had been used to pay for this residence (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006). In the case of the Madrid bombing, Spanish authorities

According to Hoffman (2006), the endurance of terrorist groups is connected to the level of sustenance and financial support they receive from an existing constituency (for example, ethnic community, faithful religious members, etc.). The author suggests that some organizations have a better chance to survive longer than others do. Indeed, religious movements and ethno-separatists groups enjoy the devotion of faithful members and the loyalty of community members. Moreover, recent studies have proposed a different theoretical framework based on the “club model” rejecting ideological and theological explanations. This framework emphasizes the function of voluntary organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the face of government failure to do so (Berman & Laitin, 2008). These “violent clubs” are prosperous enough to enable them to be well suited to solve the financial problems that their constituents face. They are powerful political actors that rely on a large membership and support network from their community.

Acting as clubs, well-established terrorism organizations like *Basque Fatherland and Liberty* (ETA), Hamas, Hezbollah, and *Irish Republican Army* (IRA) have access to financial assistance programs or economical privileges, which support most of their active constituents and combatants’ families. In fact, the conception of terrorist clubs structure should not only consider the number of operatives but must also include peripheral members who comprise radical constituents and influence the leadership. For example, the structure of an established terrorist organization can be divided into three clusters: 1) extended network of movement radicals, who share goals; 2) sympathizers, who provide essential support and act as facilitators (bank accounts and estate); 3) and the terrorists, who are engaged in violent operations (Lake, 2002). One of the best-known sources of financing of the violent clubs is through the collection of funds via donations from an extended network and sympathizers.³ Other commercial activities were managed by terrorist organizations to support communities facing difficult economic conditions and in some cases severe deprivation of basic commodities and public services.⁴ These elements represent the foundation of the social entrepreneurship approach that is raised throughout this section.

indicated that the terrorists were a part of an international drug trafficking ring possessing more than two million dollars in hashish and other drugs (Whitlock, 2008).

³ In a recent trial, members of Holy Land, an international Muslim charity, were convicted of giving more than twelve million dollars to support the non-violent activities of Hamas. The Texas-based charity financed schools, hospitals, and social welfare programs controlled by Hamas in areas ravaged by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to prosecutors, Holy Land’s benefactors were terrorist recruiting pools and the charity spread violent ideology and generated support among Palestinians. Hamas as well as Hezbollah are also associated with reselling stolen infant formula and illegally redeeming grocery coupons in their respective countries.

⁴ The IRA had a monopoly on transportation companies in the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland. During the 1970s and 1980s, the IRA was the owner of 350 taxis employing more than 800 catholic drivers in a region where this population was struggling financially. The IRA has owned also co-ops, supermarkets, and commodities shops supporting the catholic community in large cities of Northern Ireland. As Gerry Adams, a former Irish Republican Army volunteer, stated in 1976: “[...] *I take a course of action as a means to bringing about a situation in which I believe the people of my country will prosper [...]*” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 233).

Globalized Funding Strategies and Business Entrepreneurship

Despite the importance of understanding and responding to economical needs of their constituents, terrorist groups are required to develop financial stratagems and acquire entrepreneur skills and values to maintain their financing capacity. The funding strategies of terrorists have transitioned over the past decades, capitalizing on business opportunities from emerging markets, the trend of globalization, and structural transformations of financing networks. The globalized economy can facilitate the trade of legal and illegal goods and services into several markets without discriminating between the actors involved and regardless of the nature of what is traded. Recently, western counter-terrorism agencies have linked terrorist legal and illegal international trades, like currency and commodities smuggling (gems, drugs, tobacco, food, luxury goods, etc.), as they represent an underestimated strategic source of revenues. Those sources of financing are highly integrated into western economies and rely on existing economic interdependencies between national financial systems and illegal supply routes, global markets and extra-national economies, and legal entities and criminal organizations (Napoleoni, 2005; Nordstrom, 2007). In such conceptual framework, illicit and licit lose their sense and only economic survival or development prevails.

The adoption of new finance strategies have changed the values and the structure of terrorist groups by requiring leaders to acquire more sophisticated managerial and entrepreneurial skills in order to innovate in a globalized environment rather than focus on violence (Napoleoni, 2005). Alexander (2004) suggests that terrorists have the capacity to exploit economic systems by acquiring and operating companies and nonprofit organizations around the world. Opportunities are available in the global economy to facilitate the market for licit and illicit commodities or services in unauthorized and underground extra-national economies (international trade systems).

Religious movements and ethno-separatists groups have now reached financial emancipation from state sponsors by exploiting diverse financing strategies. One strategy is the appropriation of existing business activities to replicate operational and tactical funding methods. For example, several terrorist groups are involved in cigarette smuggling as a means of financing, funneling profits from a multimillion-dollar cigarette-smuggling operation to Hezbollah.⁵ This particular example illustrates how a terrorist organization based in Lebanon was able to take advantage of fiscal breaches within U.S. legal market structure. Also, according to Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007), well-structured terrorist groups have developed in-house fundraising capacity and their own business strategies to respond to the specific needs of the organization.

In some particular groups, like the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE), specialized sub-groups are working within the organization on particular forms of financing and adapting their strategies to regional characteristics where they have infiltrated. Terrorist organizations can also be successful in licit business sectors. According to Alexander (2004), Hamas owned textile

⁵ In North America, the most famous case involved a North Carolina-based Hezbollah cell which used cigarette smuggling to raise money for a terrorist organization in Lebanon (Melzer & Shelley, 2006). A ring of eighteen smugglers related to Hezbollah made noticeable profits from the disparity between state taxation of tobacco products along with the discounted prices to certain populations such as Native Americans.

businesses and cattle ranches to fund their organization. The *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* has proved to be in possession of metal works in Lebanon, and the ETA group owned furniture stores in France. Finally, and more recently, Al Qaeda's leader was reputed to own several companies involved in various economic sectors doing business around the world such construction, manufacturing, currency trading, import-export, and agricultural enterprises (Hoffman, 2006). Usually conventional wisdom considers these businesses as front companies, although this example highlight the fact terrorist organizations generate work for local communities and can supply regional or national markets.

Another terrorist strategy is developing cooperative relationships with legal and illegal groups to increase gains or exploit new fundraising sources. According to Makarenko (2002, 2004), criminal groups and terrorists are frequently engaged in strategic alliances in order to secure access to particular goods and services, which cannot be reached by legal trade channels without being detected by official authorities. These alliances are momentarily "tolerated" and take the form of illegal trade involving drugs, weapons and diamonds. These three products can be exchanged as informal currency for any services or goods without trace in the formal banking systems (Mili, 2006).⁶ Consequently, weapons, narcotics, and precious gems form a triangular informal currency system that terrorists exploit to substitute official currencies and hide their transactions from enforcement agencies.

A third approach is organizational hybridization between a terrorist group and for-profit entity (usually criminal groups). The strong penetration of illegal markets during post conflict reconstruction in the aftermath of Bosnia war while under NATO surveillance is a pertinent example (Andreas, 2004). During this period, collaboration between ethno-separatist groups and local mafias resulted in a merge of radical political goals and the necessity of financial gains to reconstruct the new country. In this particular case, interdependencies between terrorists and illegal actors led to the creation of economic structures that ensured domestic and international trade (Mincheva & Gurr, 2007). As a result, pervasive influences from illegal markets during the reconstruction of the country contributed directly to the reinsertion of "criminal combatants" and separatists into the new national economy. The underground economy and its loose financial structure became formal, and illegitimate revenues were absorbed by the national financial system introducing extra national trades into the GDP (Napoleoni, 2005).

Finally, we find the configuration of a "nexus" in which economic exchanges are established between legal and illegal entities have economic significance for terrorists. Terrorist separatists, rebels and extremist groups interested in acquiring money and valuable assets are more willing to do business with established illegal actors than open a new battle front within markets where trade shares are already set up and controlled by powerful individuals (Schmid, 1996). A similar argument can be made for smuggling other valuable commodities like drugs, diamonds, and oil in which organized crime and the military have developed a high level of expertise allotting little place for terrorists to become serious competitors (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). This is particularly true if members of local mafias or armed forces are a part of constituents for which terrorist groups are fighting.

⁶ By introducing "cocaine-for-weapons" trade with rebels groups, Hezbollah is able to exchange what they have in large quantities (weapons) for goods easily resold (drugs) in countries where Hezbollah is not able to make formal transactions or resell Iranian weapons to gain access to illegal or legal goods and services.

Weak States and Financing Opportunities

Countries affected by intensive domestic terrorism are also engaged in an “economic fight” in which governments compete with terrorist organizations for the control of regional resources and profitable markets (Naylor, 2002). In other words, taking over the control of natural resources and penetrating international trade and supply chains represent key aspects for several structured terrorist groups as they establish a solid financial base (e.g., Angola, Columbia, Peru, and Sri Lanka). The access and control of lootable (i.e., drugs and gems) and unlootable (i.e., natural gas and oil) resources considerably affect the capacity of a terrorist group to survive and combat intensity. According to Ross (2003), there are several findings showing that diamonds, drugs, and oil are strongly associated with civil wars and domestic terrorism over the two past decades. Moreover, the author demonstrates that lootable resources are linked to rebellion conflicts and unlootable resources tend to ignite separatist conflicts, which are both considerably difficult to resolve. Also, lootable resources, like drugs and gems, will create discipline problems inside police and army apparatus of a given producer country, increasing opportunities for corruption and transnational trafficking. Finally, the author pointed out that lootable, illegal, and unobstructable resources will more likely to benefit terrorist groups than unlootable, legal, and obstructable resources which will tend to benefit the government (Ross, 2003).

Moreover, Mace (2007) suggests that illicit markets and illegal commodities supply chain support and strengthen terrorist organizations. Weak states and transition countries apparently offer loopholes, ineffective law enforcement, lack of border control, and absence of follow up on shipment routes. Even under the pressure of western countries, weak or failed states choose illegal markets due to the lack of viable, long term, legal economic opportunities to trade their products and services with industrialized countries. The work of Goredema (2005) provides an interesting framework that formalizes the impact of terrorism on failed states and highlights three major stages, presenting a pathway in which terrorist groups can take over a national economy. The first stage is characterised by the ability of a terrorist group to extend its influence and discredit the political apparatus as well as its members having an influence on the economic system.⁷

In the second stage, terrorist groups are able to expand on the territory and establish a parallel financial system. Terrorists have the capacity to infiltrate several economic sectors and provoke destabilization in order to block foreign investment, which will affect inflation and unemployment rates. In Africa, the existence of numerous “failed states” has engendered regional political instability, providing a wide range of intertwined collaborations between 1) private and illegal actors responsible for transnational smuggling (including drugs, foods, and commodities) and 2) separatists/rebels groups controlling territories where smuggled goods are transiting (Goredema, 2005). Diamonds, as a natural resource, offer numerous advantages as currency: high and stable value on international markets; anonymity in business relations; easy to smuggle; and provide a good refuge value to consolidate illegal funds.⁸ Hezbollah is an example

⁷ The former Taliban regime and the marble extraction industry in Pakistan show how insurgent and affiliated terrorists groups can control local resources and profit from the international marble market (Shah & Perlez, 2008).

⁸ Since 1993, terrorist groups have implemented illegal diamond drilling companies in Tanzania and Kenya. In Sierra Leone, *Revolutionary United Front*'s chiefs are responsible of diamond transportation to

of a group who relied on Lebanese merchant's network in the Congo to provide millions of dollars in diamonds for buying weapons and other critical commodities (Peduzzi, 2006).

In Columbia, for example, criminal organizations are in charge of the growing and distributing of cocaine. Indeed, they pay share revenues generated by drug trafficking to the FARC in exchange for services or materials. In Europe, business relations between ETA and the Neapolitan mafia are well known. Cocaine is traded in exchange for heavy weaponry, bombs, and explosives coming from Pakistan and Uzbekistan transiting through the Czech Republic, where military officials acted as facilitators (Curtis & Karacan, 2002).

Finally, in the third stage, the government has lost power in many socio-economic spheres, the underground economy is rampant, and the state has no choice than to trade with terrorists and/or local mafias to stabilize the fragile new financial system. Terrorist groups become a powerful political and financial actor at the national level. A study conducted by Nordstrom (2007) revealed collaborative business relations between military and ethno-separatist group in Africa.⁹ Actually, trade in regions affected by conflicts are apt to be conquered and territorialised by criminal organizations and terrorists groups under the protection of temporary government structures (Curtis, 2002). In these regions, terrorists, criminal groups, and local politicians work together to reach their own objectives, to respectively support the fight, make money, and save the country from ruin. To do so, they rely on underground economic channels, informal banking systems, and private suppliers using humanitarian air bridges in which private cargo airliners are looking to increase their profit margins.

Business as Usual?

Economics, Ethics, and Terrorism

According to several authors, violent terrorism attacks could slow down the volume of international trade and provoke panic in global capital markets (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004). In this regard, the globalization of the economy and free trade has also been linked to terrorism by providing motivation and causing grievances against states profiting from world economy success, globalization offers opportunity for terrorists to penetrate porous borders, thus providing economical structures to wage terror campaigns (Barbieri & Pathak, 2007).

The economical impacts of terror will vary in regards to the intensity of terrorism. In North America and Western Europe, where the intensity of terrorism is low, capital markets are more resilient and recover sooner compared to other capital markets in the world because banking systems and financial sectors provide sufficient liquidity to sustain market stability and

Monrovia's transit zone, Liberia's capital. From there, transactions occurred under the surveillance and protection of the Liberian government in exchange for generous pay offs. Usually, diamonds are traded for money, weapons, and critical commodities like food and medicine (Goredema, 2005; Peduzzi, 2006; Global Witness, 2003).

⁹ According to the author's interviews with European government officials in Angola, despite the existence of an embargo on fuel to the rebels, military tanker convoys stop many times on their way to transact with rebels, trading fuel for valuable currency. In this way, militaries are able to establish a lucrative fuel business which compensates for their poor salary. In addition, rebels can continue to fight against the government.

neutralize panic movements (Chen & Siems, 2004). Alternatively, for countries that face higher levels of terrorist risks (e.g., domestic terrorism: rebellion or separatism), the impact on the economy is more important as foreign investment is more limited and can cause large movements of international capital across other countries' borders to diversify risks (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008). Finally, there is also evidence that countries facing constant aggression from international terrorism demonstrate less of an effect on growth, stock and foreign exchange market (Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides 2004; Eldor & Melnick, 2004). This distinction is very interesting but not surprising if we agree that the impact of terrorism on the economy differs according to the "battle ground" and the motivation of terrorists. The previous results suggest that countries facing constant aggression from international terrorism, but showing a relatively strong socio-political cohesion, are more likely able to diversify domestic economy and enable international investments in financial key sectors (Larocque, Lincourt, & Normandin, 2008).

Furthermore, separatist and religious terrorist organizations play an active role in several legitimate and illicit business sectors. They are also gatekeepers in commodity supply chains passing through failed and/or in-transition countries experiencing insurrection. As economic actors, violent groups are trading with a wide range of business partners such as military, local politicians, transportation brokers, national and international nongovernmental organizations, and criminal groups. The extensive ring of constituents and supporters provides terrorists a vast social capital in which they can work out financial alliances (government officials, local/regional criminal groups), develop or maintain trade relations in lucrative businesses (diamonds, drugs, marble, oil, silk textile), and exploit loose economical structures by utilizing the experience and expertise of well connected businessmen supporting the cause. Even extremist terrorist or religious groups like Hezbollah have resolved the religious dilemma of been involved in drug trafficking by convincing their constituents that drug smuggling through western countries is a part of the whole strategy to "intoxicate" infidels (Chevalerias, 2008). In Lebanon the production of opiates, heroin for instance, was acquired through a business partnership among Syria, Hezbollah, and the Druze community.¹⁰

Indeed, doing business with terrorists, at least directly, seems morally inconceivable from the point of view of western companies and governmental institutions. However, the main concern about not trading with "evil" is that most profit-driven actors do not necessarily know how to identify terrorists since they are not dealing directly with "kamikazes" (i.e., reckless people) but with men and women sharing similar concerns about profit margins, payoffs, and on-time delivery of legal/illegal goods. These services are provided or exploited by unsuspected supporters of a violent political cause. The relocation of corporations in developing countries, outsourcing contracts with foreign entities, and extraction and exploitation of natural resources in complex environments like failed states represent a few examples of day-to-day business operations in which terrorist sympathizers can be involved without any possibility of early detection.

¹⁰ According to Clutterback (1994), Syria has stimulated considerably opiate production in Lebanon during the 1980s; increasing from 100 tons in 1975 to 2,000 tons in 1985 (the production of opiate fell down to 1000 tons in 1989). Hezbollah received subsidies from Syria to cultivate opiates in the Bekaa Valley. The opiate proceeded through the transformation into industrial complexes controlled by the Druze community. Druze is religious group believing in Islam mostly present in Lebanon and Syria (Albani, 2001).

Common sense suggests that western countries have several security and surveillance processes in place to make sure that they do not trade with terrorists and their supporters. At some point, common sense is incorrect on this issue; businesses do not rely on morality or loyalty to setup trade agendas. As mentioned earlier, markets do not discriminate; business decisions rest only on the nature and scope of opportunities, demand, and offer. Moreover, this is not about security breaches in economic systems or market surveillance; this is about the nature of conflicts and the vital role of trade for all opponents.

This paradox can lead to unexpected economic exchanges between enemies. Indeed, governments do not disclose information relating to trading with the enemy since these exchanges are, most of the time, illegal and prohibited by the state itself. However, during the so-called “*War on Terror*” and a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control disclosed information on ninety U.S. companies doing business with enemy nations (terrorism supporters) that were in violation of the *Trading With the Enemy Act - 12 U.S.C. § 95a* enacted in 1917 (Alexander, 2004). This inconvenient truth emanates from ethical flaws in economical values system. The asymmetric morality between political discourse and economical pragmatism reveals how delicate securing and monitoring international trade activities can be, largely because business morality does not necessarily follow political agendas and can be flexible in regards to the ever-shifting legitimacy of economic actors. This is particularly true at the international level where the definition of terrorism, enemy of the state, criminal combatants or any other appellation is so volatile according to specific national political timing and also to the nature of market’s demand within a specific country. At this level, formal and informal rules, legal and illegal actors, recorded and underground financial activities are difficult to differentiate. Also, legitimate companies do not necessarily know with whom they are doing business especially in failed and in-transition states where official authorities have sometimes no choice other than to deal with terrorist organizations or tolerate their business in the underground economies.

Conclusion

Western countries engaged in the war on terror face the challenge of conceptualizing terrorists as violent political actors, possessing more than the mere aptitude to destroy, and having the capacity to develop and exploit economic structures. First, picturing terrorists with entrepreneurial and business characteristics does not match the western conception of the funding capacity of terrorist organizations, which is more limited and negative, describing it as illegal, parasitic, predatory, and unsophisticated. Second, the current misconception about “funding evil” has led to the implementation of inappropriate enforcement measures that target suspicious money transfers, which are difficult to detect among all the transactions in the whole banking system. Tracking systems deployed to monitor financial transactions from potential terrorist groups are only partially effective in most western countries. In some cases, they are so inappropriate that even government agencies do not use them because the investigative process is too unwieldy and previous investigations along the same lines have produced no or little results (Whitlock, 2008). Even international prohibition and bans on blood diamonds or narcotics are not really effective and they continue to be used as a source of financing. However, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries seem to have more success in tracking money, disrupting financial montages of terrorist organizations, and prohibiting fundraising in mosques (Blanchard & Prados, 2007).

Nonetheless, these security measures are questionable regarding the infringement of civil rights and have ignited more hostility or resentment from targeted communities. Focusing on the financing of terrorist organizations by conceptualizing this activity as a “means-end” is certainly falling short without any sustainable policy. In fact, there is a lack of strategic articulation between political, financial, and non-profit actors in addressing the root causes of several terrorism movements around the world. Sustainable economic development policies in failed or in-transition states would certainly eliminate or delay the conversion of antagonistic social movements into violent political groups. These types of initiatives can reduce or even prevent the adhesion and the support by fragile communities of the cause of terrorist organizations by providing economic and social alternatives.¹¹ Such alternatives can be implemented by credible and respected regional actors who can design adapted, integrative solutions to counter the exclusive and dogmatic causes of terrorists. Indeed, the implementation of these initiatives will require a strong leadership from the international community, which seems more inclined to enforce and to use coercive means since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

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¹¹ Alternatives include: development of cooperatives, investments in local trading and transportation of commodity, re-establishment of national and international supply chains, renovation of schools and hospitals, promoting collective association and all other economical and social measures which can contribute to a community's wealth.

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2.11. Relations between Violent Non-State Actors and Ordinary Crime (Sam Mullins, Adam Dolnik)¹

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Overview

Despite the fact that terrorism and more ordinary forms of crime are usually investigated separately, there is a great deal of overlap in the worlds of violent non-state actors (VSNAs) and criminals. The greater our understanding of this overlap, the better equipped we will be for devising effective law-enforcement strategies to counter both threats.

In studying terrorism, the emphasis tends very much to be upon the role of ideology and the perpetration of acts of violence and destruction. But ideology is not necessarily the central

¹ This article has been adapted from Mullins (2009).

driving force for individual terrorists, and bombings and other forms of attack represent only the tip of the iceberg of day to day activities of terrorist organizations.

Terrorists are frequently charged under ‘ordinary’ criminal law (LaFree & Dugan, 2004) and in reality there are often very close relationships between terrorism and everyday crime. There are numerous instances of cooperation between terrorists and criminals at different levels, and the pathways into both kinds of activity exhibit many similarities. There are similar systems of social influence and organisation and a convergence in terms of methods, motives, and profiles. These issues are described in greater detail, focusing in particular on contemporary Islamist terrorism in the West, and implications for law-enforcement and counter-terrorism (CT) approaches are discussed.

Violent Non-State Actors & Organised Crime

Organised crime groups and terrorists have been known to collaborate since at least the 1970’s and 80’s. For example, Makarenko (2002) notes that drug ‘cartels’ in South America would regularly employ members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and M19 to guard cocaine plantations. Such opportunistic, mutually beneficial arrangements foster inter-organisational learning and are thought to have become more common as a result of increasing globalisation. Collaboration between organised terrorists and criminals is occurring in a range of activities, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and people, as well as money laundering and credit card fraud (Curtis & Karacan, 2002).

Many terrorist organisations –including the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Basque Fatherland & Liberty (ETA), the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Hamas, Hizballah, the FARC, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and others- are now directly involved in organised crime, effectively cutting out the middleman (Ibid; Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007). In some cases, criminal activities for profit may eventually eclipse the group’s original ideological aspirations. An example of this might be the Abu Sayyaf group of the Philippines, which is known for extortion rackets and kidnappings (Contreras, 2005).

The current consensus appears to be that the type of relationships that emerge between criminal and terrorist organisations are flexible and idiosyncratic depending on the particular groups involved and their circumstances. Relationships so far have been characterised as opportunistic or even ‘parasitic’, and are not seen as enduring alliances (Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007; Oehme, 2008). It is also crucial that terrorists’ criminal activities generally remain geared towards furthering their political objectives (Ibid). Organisations are, however, dynamic, and some authors have suggested that greater contact between mid- to low-level criminal and terrorist leaders (facilitated by informal, ‘decentralised’ network structures) may lead to longer-term strategic alliances (Dishman, 2005).

Violent Non-State Actors & Petty Crime

Terrorists are also involved in low-level criminal activity. For example, Shelley (2002) notes that al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the FARC, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and others are involved in street-level drug distribution as well as cultivation and trafficking. Over the years Islamist terrorists in the West have frequently been involved in various forms of relatively petty crime including various forms of fraud, thievery, small-scale drug-dealing and other offences. For instance, in the 1990’s Fateh Kamel’s network of radicals in Montreal was heavily involved in theft and passport forgery (Bernton, Carter, Heath, & Neff, 2002). The 2004 Madrid train

bombers financed the operation by way of drug-dealing and robberies, and even acquired explosives in exchange for drugs thereby avoiding using cash that could be tracked back to them (Jordan, Mañas, & Horsburgh, 2008). Eleven of 22 jihadi networks in Spain detected between 2004 and 2007 have been involved in “common organised delinquency” (Jordan, 2007).

Many Islamist militants have had backgrounds of petty criminality and drug abuse, and prisons are a fertile recruiting ground. Sageman (2008) found evidence of many Islamist recruits with criminal records which may be evidence of increasing numbers involved in criminality, although those with records may also be those most apparent in open source materials. The most recent wave of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorists also appears on average to be younger and less well off than previous generations (Ibid). This may be indicative of increasing similarity in the average terrorist and criminal profile, and of shared pathways into both types of activity (Mullins, 2009). Accordingly, Roy (2008) asserts that while there is a strong link in the West between militant Islamism and common delinquency, there is no such common involvement in ‘high end’ crime. It is even possible that “[w]hen second-generation migrants join organised crime, they are less tempted by political radicalisation” (p.18).

This does not necessarily contradict the fact that various Islamist and other terrorist groups are involved in organised crime. While involvement in high-end crime might generally preclude radicalisation, becoming radicalised does not appear to rule out organised criminal activity. Also, large-scale criminal operations might only be possible for those terrorists who have the necessary connections or organisational affiliations. The general consensus at present is that the majority of Islamist militants in the West are largely autonomous- as a result, they may have to support themselves through crime but are less likely to be able to expand beyond relatively small-scale, local operations.

Involvement in petty crime has several implications. Firstly, it means that terrorists must learn the requisite skills to perform these roles. It is also likely to put terrorists in contact with ordinary criminals, necessary for obtaining various resources or achieving particular goals. As part of a broader criminal network, the chances of intermittent or even sustained contact with other types of offenders and with the criminal justice system (CJS) are greatly increased (hence terrorists may frequently appear on the law-enforcement radar as seemingly insignificant fraudsters, thieves, or drug-dealers). The heavy overlap in activities of terrorists and criminals thus suggests shared knowledge, skills and social contacts. They may be useful to one another financially (avoiding traceable transactions), and may often share other short-term goals.

Methods

Terrorists are involved in large and small-scale crime, varying in levels of sophistication. In carrying out these activities they employ similar methods to organised crime groups. Shelley (2002) notes that both terrorists and criminals raise funds through legitimate or semi-legitimate means in addition to fraud, money-laundering, counterfeiting, and smuggling. In addition, they are often organised in similar networked structures that sometimes intersect, they communicate in similar ways utilising modern technology and sometimes use tactics of corruption to achieve goals (Shelley, 2002). Makarenko (2002) adds that both terrorists and criminal networks are often transnational in nature and utilise diaspora communities; they use sophisticated intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques and similar target-deployment in the form of small teams or cells. Hence terrorists and criminals do the same things, sometimes know the same people, and are organised in similar ways. Kenney (2003) thus uses his knowledge of Colombian drug

networks to inform counter-terrorism strategies, and warns that targeting leaders alone may prove ineffectual since mid- to low-level organisational elements are able to reorganise and continue to function.

Motives

In the short term, terrorists and criminals commit the same crimes for the same reasons, i.e., to profit financially. However, for criminals, this is generally an end in itself, while for terrorists it is a means to achieve political/ ideological goals. Broadly speaking, these represent two fundamentally different strategies: violence-for-profit versus profit-for-violence. As a result, criminal motivations may fluctuate according to market-opportunities while terrorist motivations are likely to be affected by other factors, such as political or world events (Kenney, 2003). Having described motivational differences at the organisational level it is important to note that at the individual and group level, motivations for initial and continued involvement in both criminal and terrorist activity are complex. Both are special cases of co-offending - relying on networks of people to achieve goals. As such there are very powerful social rewards for involvement (Weerman, 2003), which for individuals may be at least as important as overall organisational aims. Hence at the level of the group, terrorist and criminal motivations have more in common than is commonly assumed.

Profiles

Silke (2008) points out that generally speaking, young males are responsible for the majority of crime and terrorism. However, there are also important differences in their profiles. Silke (2008) concludes that terrorists are distinct from criminals based upon the fact that factors which are thought to 'protect' against involvement in crime (such as higher educational achievement, better occupation or social standing, and successful marriage) do not seem to prevent against becoming a terrorist. However, the statistics on criminal backgrounds may reflect biases in the criminal justice system (McNeill & Chapman, 2005). They also tend to be generalised and undifferentiated by type of crime, and there appears to be more diversity in the criminal population than is implied. Hate crime, for instance, shares a number of 'unique' features with terrorism. It is a largely group-activity where targets are chosen symbolically, with intended psychological repercussions (Craig, 2002). What is more, in contrast to the typical view, these offenders are not generally impoverished or unemployed (Ibid).

Terrorist populations are perhaps even more diverse as no typical profile of much use exists. Even within specific terrorist organisations or types there is a wide range of people involved. In conflict zones especially, there may be a significant number of operatives who are driven by trauma and revenge (Speckhard, 2007), however, terrorists on the whole appear to be psychologically 'normal' (Horgan, 2005). Nevertheless, certain trends according to geographic region and time can be identified. In the case of Islamist terrorists in the West, on average there appears to have been a gradual decrease in age and in socioeconomic status, as well as an increase in backgrounds of common criminality (Sageman, 2008). As mentioned above this may reflect growing financial independence from any 'parent' organisation (Sageman, 2008), but may be more indicative of increasingly blurred lines between criminal and terrorist activity. Examples of this kind of phenomenon are becoming more apparent. For instance, gangs such as the 'Muslim Boys' of London utilise aspects of the Islamist identity whilst being heavily involved in serious criminal offences (Malik, 2005). They have given rise to the concept of 'criminal jihad', leading to the question of whether they are more criminal or more terrorist (Malik, 2005).

Becoming Involved in Crime & Terrorism

Social affiliations are a vitally important route into various criminal and terrorist activities (e.g., Henry, Tolan, & Gorman-Smith, 2001; Horgan, 2005). Family members as well as peer groups often facilitate involvement in both, and this effect can be seen as recruitment by routine association. Friends select one another based on similarities, and over time, come to share attitudes and beliefs as they engage in the same behaviours together. As per Weerman's (2003) model of co-offending, as social exchange, they provide mutual acceptance and appreciation, which secures participation in the group. Hence, initial involvement in crime and terrorism can be a matter of circumstance and is not necessarily driven by a pre-existing desire to commit crime or to pursue radical change or destruction. Accordingly, Nesser (2006) describes the majority of Islamist terrorists based in Europe as 'drifters' who join the jihad almost unconsciously via circumstantial acquaintanceships. And in support of this it is being realised that, like crime, becoming involved in terrorism is not all about ideology. Instead, behavioural participation in the group may often precede ideological commitment (Horgan, 2005, p.138; Sageman, 2008, p.75).

Within criminal/ radical social milieus, status is also extremely important. More experienced individuals are generally more influential, and greater 'premium' is attached to roles of heightened commitment (Matsueda et al, 1992; Horgan, 2005). Traditionally, status differentials within terrorism have been seen as evidence of brainwashing and manipulation. These days, bottom-up processes of self-radicalisation and self-recruitment are increasingly emphasised (e.g., Sageman, 2008). Nevertheless there may still be active recruiters who encourage others to join them (Nesser, 2006). Likewise there are criminal mentors who guide and encourage their less experienced counterparts (Morselli, Tremblay, & McCarthy, 2006). Thus criminal and terrorist involvement and development both appear to progress through a combination of routine association, bottom-up desire of new recruits, and top-down guidance.

Criminal & Terrorist Identities

A sense of shared identity is often important for initial and continuing involvement in various group crimes (e.g., gang activity) and terrorism. A major difference however, is that criminals do not look beyond their immediate group, whilst terrorists come to identify very strongly with a much larger collective (e.g. 'Irish', 'Muslims' or 'Tamils'). Such identification enhances, and is fueled by, feelings of empathy. Hence, many Islamists report getting involved after becoming outraged from watching videos of atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya and elsewhere. In turn, this affects altruistic motivations, which does not seem to be the case with criminals (LaFree & Dugan, 2004). It is this perceived 'nobility' of the terrorists' cause which helps create an all-important identity, whereby almost no sacrifice is too great in the pursuit of their goals.

Social Organisation

As mentioned already, criminals and terrorists show similar systems of social influence and organisation. Both organised crime and terrorism have been seen as traditionally hierarchically organised, and although this may depend very much on the particular organisation and context, today they are often described as fluid and informal networks characterised by local autonomy, flexibility and resistance to law-enforcement (Kenney, 2007). In the case of Islamist terrorism, this arrangement is seen as the consequence of the crippling of al-Qaeda as a central,

coordinating organisation after 9/11. For criminals, it appears to be taken for granted that this represents a 'natural' informal system of organisation.

A major difference is that criminal groups –both youth and adult- are generally thought to be highly transient, with a great deal of desistance and turnover (Reiss, 1988; Warr, 1996). Terrorist groups, on the other hand, are said to involve intense interactions and “exceptional degrees of internal pressure” (Horgan, 2005, p.133), which are only possible through sustained membership and stability. Group stability thus appears to be the mechanism by which terrorist identities are able to consume individuals.

Yet as a network, Islamist terrorism is still described as fluid and amorphous, seeming to imply that individuals can move around and participate according to individual ability, constraints and desire. This implies that levels of stability are likely to vary, perhaps according to tasks performed or 'network location.' Stability may be highest during periods of initial radicalisation (at least for those who stay the course), and during operational planning when there is a high need for secrecy. Varying terrorist support groups –including those involved in regular commission of crime- might be more akin to ordinary criminal groups in terms of turnover and permeability.

Desistance, Disengagement, & Deradicalisation

The majority of all crime is committed by a small, persistent minority, and desistance from criminal activity is common (e.g., Petersilia, 1980; Shover & Thompson, 1992). Comparatively little is known about desistance or disengagement (D&D) from terrorism (see Horgan, 2005; Bjørge & Horgan, 2009a). Nevertheless, comparable ideas are being explored and similar issues have so far been identified.

Bjørge & Horgan (2009b) usefully distinguish between 'push' factors (negative consequences of continued participation) and 'pull' factors (attractive alternatives). These are relevant both to the decision to desist from crime as well as decisions to disengage from terrorism. Disengagement research has highlighted common themes in salient factors including stress caused by the pressure of involvement or the risk of punishment, reduced time spent associating with radical/delinquent peers, increased time spent in legitimate social interaction (law-abiding family, friends, and work), a combination of disillusionment with current activities and increased acceptance of existing social and legal institutions, and reduced physical opportunities (Bjørge & Horgan, 2009b; LaFree & Miller, 2009).

It is vital to note that some factors affecting desistance/disengagement are structural, and some are more psychological. As a reflection of this, it is crucial to distinguish between actual behaviour and individual propensity. In the study of terrorism, this is expressed as the difference between disengagement (behavioural) and deradicalisation (psychological). This in turn has quite profound implications for programs aimed at facilitating sustained disengagement and de-radicalisation. Given the amount of common ground shared by criminals and terrorists, in particular the importance of social bonds and behavioural participation, it seems that a vital part of counter-terrorism and disengagement and de-radicalisation programs must be to address social, non-ideological elements of involvement. Indeed, a number of current approaches in different parts of the world (most notably Saudi Arabia and Singapore) are holistic in nature, addressing a variety of social and educational needs in addition to trying to dissuade individuals from their religiously-framed ideology (see Barrett & Bokhari, 2009).

Summary & Implications for Counter-Terrorism

VSNA sometimes collaborate with organised criminals, and are also routinely involved in the commission of large- and also small-scale crime. As such terrorists and ordinary criminals often do the same things, know the same people, and are organised in similar ways. Indeed terrorism has “a great deal in common with more conventional types of crime” (LaFree & Miller, 2009, p.17). This applies to methods, social motives, short-term goals, and to some extent, profiles. There are similar pathways into crime and terrorism via routine association, and social bonds appear to be a highly significant source of motivation. The role of terrorist ideology is sometimes over-emphasised and, as in crime, there is a strong behavioural component to initial involvement as newcomers become absorbed in subcultural status systems. Finally, similar factors, both structural and psychological, seem to affect decisions to withdraw from criminal or terrorist activities. Perhaps the most significant differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals are in their specific senses of identity and their (ostensible) ultimate goals.

There are a number of implications for law-enforcement efforts in the fight against terrorism. Firstly, since terrorists may frequently come into contact with the criminal justice system as common criminals and since radicalisation can also occur in prisons, there is a need to try to identify radical individuals at the point of arrest or when they come under suspicion of criminal activity. This might be possible, for example, via known associates or geographical profiling according to radical locales. Where terrorists are apprehended for petty crimes there is an opportunity to gather intelligence as well as potentially affect their future behaviour and exposure to other radicals in detention. Along similar lines it seems prudent to sufficiently educate ‘ordinary’ police officers about terrorists’ criminal activities and to maintain lines of communication between ‘beat cops’, criminal investigations departments, counter-terrorism units and security services. Equally, this may apply for enlisting the help of members of the public.

Recognition of parallels between crime and terrorism also urges greater use of criminological research to inform our understanding of similar processes in terrorism. As well as enhancing our comprehension of how people become involved in the first place, this will improve our understanding of how and why people disengage and deradicalise. In particular, systematic study of criminal desistance and rehabilitation programs may be used to inform D&D programs. Early implications are that to focus solely on trying to change (religious) ideological beliefs would be a misuse of time and energy. Likewise, Roy (2008) asserts that the battle for the hearts and minds of populations targeted by Islamists (male youth, particularly Muslims) should not be about ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ Islam because the fundamental issue at hand is not religion. Delegitimizing and stifling terrorism may therefore be even more complex than is sometimes assumed, especially so given increasingly blurred boundaries with common crime. Hence counter-terrorism must be flexible and adapt as does its adversary.

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3. The Role of Ideology in VNSA

3.1. VNSA Strategic Communications: Messaging and Media (Cori Dauber)

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VNSA Use of Communication

Terrorist and insurgent groups use three forms of communication: a) discursive—in other words, language, expressed through a variety of mediums from the most simple (e.g., letters nailed to doors) to the most technologically sophisticated (e.g., Internet websites and chat rooms); b) visual—in other words images, also presented across a wide variety and range of mediums; and c) symbolic acts, including the use of violence itself as a communicative act, structured and designed to send a message.

Discursive Communication

Like others who use words in an effort to persuade, terrorists and insurgents (in whatever language they are using) make use of rhetoric and argument, as well as the choice of particular narrative frames. Scholars evaluating the use of persuasive appeals made by terrorist and insurgent groups need to understand the language in which the appeal is being made and the cultural referents that ground the appeal (Doran, 2001). Also, these scholars increasingly need a working knowledge of the forms of communication enabled by the newest technologies (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007; Paz, n.d.).

The analysis of discursive communication of VNSA groups is available in a growing scholarly literature. For example, one of the most important Islamist works, a 1500-page book frequently cited in debates in chat rooms and other Internet sources (Lacey, 2008), is explored in detail in a biography of its author (Lia, 2008). The narratives presented in “martyr videos,” the videos filmed by suicide bombers the day before their detonation, are analyzed in a book-length study on the topic of suicide bombers (Hafez, 2007). But due to the dynamic nature of this field, with new texts being produced so quickly and in such volume (and, for the most part, on the Internet), some of the most important sources of scholarly communication analysis are available on the Internet. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center makes captured and translated primary documents widely available (CTC’s Harmony Document Database, n.d.), as well as simultaneously posting a series of reports analyzing the documents found in the database (CTC’s Harmony Reports, n.d.). Reuven Paz, an Israeli expert in Islamist use of the Internet, posts frequent short reports on his group’s website (Project for the Research of Islamist Movements, n.d.), while a group of mostly Norwegian scholars posts frequent updates on their research into the chatrooms and other uses of the web at jihadica.com.

The Visual Image

The power of the visual. In a war against an enemy choosing to employ terrorist attacks as a tactic, the strategic objective of the terrorist organization may be for the host government to fail, and consequently their operational objective may be to have the counterinsurgent pull out

(Naji, 2005). This outcome would require actions designed to shift domestic public opinion in the counterinsurgent's home country. Terrorists, therefore, often attempt to change their enemy's will (something they cannot accomplish through achievements on the battlefield) through indirect means, by changing public opinion. They battle to shape the perceptions and attitudes of the public—whether the indigenous public terrorists seek to intimidate or the domestic American public they seek to influence—so as to force counterinsurgents to withdraw from the battlefield prematurely.

Thus, the emphasis is on operations which, while they will not alter the direct balance of power on the battlefield, will alter the enemy population's commitment--its will to fight. Certainly, this has been the case in Iraq, where those groups fighting the United States understood they had no hope of defeating American forces on the battlefield. The global counterinsurgency is fought, therefore, not over territory, population, or material resources, but over popular will—theirs, ours, or both. Terrorist attacks are staged with an audience in mind, one beyond those directly involved in the attack. The point is to achieve a psychological effect of a specific kind (i.e., terror) and it is impossible to have a psychological effect on the dead, while, no matter how profound the effect on the survivors, their numbers relative to the rest of society will always be negligible. The bottom line is that those injured or killed in an attack function, from the point of view of those planning and executing the attack, as stage props (Weimann & Winn, 1994). The ultimate target will always be the larger audience, for whom the attack functions as a message of one kind or another. This is, of necessity, a battle to shape media coverage. In a modern world, an event staged for a larger audience inevitably will be an event staged for the media, since it is through the mass media that one is able to reach a mass audience.

Saying an attack, like any other event, is designed for an audience, or for the media, means two distinct things. First, it means the attackers intend it to be *heard about* by others (i.e., read about or “heard about” through their contact with the print press). In other words, people learn of the event through language—words and discourse. Second, attackers intend for the events to *be seen* (although most will “see it” only in a mediated sense, through media coverage.)

Between the two ways of finding out about an attack, hearing (or reading—i.e., becoming informed through language) or seeing, the visual medium is by far the more powerful, for several reasons. First, unlike words, we absorb visual images all at once, in a non-linear fashion. Thus, visual information is much harder to unpack, to explicate and critique as we are being exposed to it, and that its impact is much more visceral and powerfully emotional (although this is obviously a generalization) (Goldberg, 1993).

The second reason that visual images are often more powerful than words, at least in the context of news coverage, is that we approach news images in a different way than we approach images in other contexts (e.g., advertisements), as if these images show us an objective truth. We treat them as if what they provide is indisputable *evidence*, “because a photographer's interpretation of events relies on a mechanical instrument, photographs have been considered to be more accurate than their verbal counterparts ... as the closest one can come to an unimpeachable witness to war” (Moeller, 1989). We behave almost as if the camera serves as a kind of magic eye, through which the photojournalist is able to show us what we would have been able to see if we had been there, standing right in the spot he or she had been standing, no more and no less (Liebes & First, 2003).

There has been a great deal of discussion of the need for a “counternarrative” in fighting counterinsurgent warfare. Undoubtedly, this is a useful and important concept, but it may only get us so far without counter-images. Images will trump words almost every time, and the most effective response to an image, even a doctored or staged one, is often another image (Dauber, 2009).

Visual images in the news. In the context of news stories in a moving image format, images are accompanied by a verbal narration, the reporter’s “voice over.” These news stories traditionally were equated with “broadcast news,” but now include cable television, unaired stories prepared for television networks’ websites, print outlets in a streaming video format, stories prepared for download onto viewers and iPods, and stories prepared and uploaded to the web by independent or “amateur” news producers, such as bloggers. In television news (where the standard format was created), the news story is produced for a medium that is overwhelmingly visual. In that format, every idea mentioned by the reporter must also be represented visually, if only for a few seconds. Watch a news story closely—unless it is live coverage of an ongoing event, the specific event being reported will represent only one of many visual images composing the entire story. The other images come from the “B-roll,” or file footage, flowing one after the other as the reporter’s words move from one idea to the next. In short, the visual elements of the news story are built from a visual language that parallels, but differs from, the verbal language the reporter speaks. Thus, the phrase, “the war in Afghanistan” might be represented by an American soldier walking down a street near a woman in a burka, while the phrase “the collapse on Wall Street” might be illustrated by a scene of traders on the floor, or by a street in a typical American town with a row of “For Sale” signs in front of several consecutive homes.

We all “read” this visual language, or the stories would not work; they would not make sense to us. But in another sense, we are not trained to properly interpret this language. We are not trained to be critical readers of it, unpacking the assumptions that drive the choices being made and the way particular images are linked to particular phrases, ideas, or concepts. In other words, the image is fleeting; it is gone as soon as you see it, so you either critique it in real time or, most likely, not at all.

Many terrorists understand the conventions of Western press coverage, and in particular the visual conventions. They understand them well enough to game the system to attempt to maximize the amount of coverage they receive. They can design attacks in such a way as to draw cameras, and within limits, to ensure that the visual coverage is the way they want it. Nonetheless, terrorists do not in any sense control the press or the coverage they will receive. All they can do is exploit the conventions determining what is likely to be considered a newsworthy event, what will be considered a “good visual,” and so forth, and like a staged event during a presidential campaign, hope for the coverage to be as close to what they desire as possible (Dauber, 2009).

Terrorists are able to exert this influence with some degree of precision today, of course, because the Internet has provided new ways for the conventions of American journalism to *be* studied from thousands of miles away. The fact that television news stories are available via streaming video and newspapers are available in online format means that they are available to anyone who is anywhere with an Internet connection.

There is little doubt, on the part of American military officers interviewed for this research, that terrorists and insurgents in Iraq closely follow the American media. This is an advantage the Internet offers to international terrorists that is surely as important as any other. Terrorists now can review the way their attacks are covered virtually in real-time, and adjust their attacks accordingly, especially as Internet access grows rapidly around the world (Wheeler, 2006). Of course, the ability to study the visual aspect of coverage also transcends any language barrier. Prior to most media outlets going onto the web, terrorist groups based in another country, and targeting American interests in that country, would at best have been able to “jury rig” a method for examining the way their handy work was being covered in the United States.

The Symbolic Act

Terrorist attacks are, themselves, often “symbolic acts.” The act itself, in other words, is intended to be interpreted or “read,” in the same manner as one would normally read or interpret any other symbolic text. Analysts previously have discussed terrorism’s nature as theater (Weimann & Winn, 1994), but the current assessment goes beyond that discussion. Along a variety of registers, attacks are complex actions designed by sophisticated messengers using the act as a way to send messages, often to multiple audiences simultaneously.

The images that result from attacks are the consequence, in other words, of conscious thought and planning. Evidence, never intended for the public, to that effect has been discovered material that clearly was not intended for propaganda purposes. It is, by now, well known that Osama bin Laden wrote to Mullah Omar that, “it is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles” (bin Laden, trans. 2002). In a document found on a laptop titled, “The Bali Project,” and intended as an internal playbook, ‘Why Bali?’, the planner of the second Bali nightclub bombing wrote, “Because it will have a ‘global impact,’ ... Bali is known around the world, better than Indonesia itself, ... An attack in Bali will be covered by the international media” (Bonner, 2006).

To be sure, aspects of the time and place of any terrorist attack are purely pragmatic. Terrorists attack in urban areas – like Baghdad – because the press congregates there, which means the cameras are clustered there (an element of terrorist strategy that can be traced back to the Algerians fighting the French in the 1950s) (Hoffman, 1998). Terrorists learned from the attack during the Munich Olympics that there is a tremendous benefit to attacking at the same time as major international events. Such timing means that ready-made audiences can be “hijacked,” and (perhaps equally importantly) the originally scheduled event may be largely ignored, its audience deflected as the press corps turns its attention to what seems a larger story. Consider the impact on the G-8 summit of the 2005 subway attacks in London, with the result being the summit was largely forgotten when the attention of the Western media was diverted entirely to London (Frey & Rohner, 2006).

It is also the case that the date and location of an attack can be of symbolic value. The American embassies in East Africa were bombed on August 9th, the anniversary of the date the first American troops stepped foot on Saudi Arabian soil after Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait in 1990. The Bali nightclub bombing, the largest attack after September 11th to that date, took place on October 12th, the anniversary of the bombing of the USS Cole. This is not only true for Islamists, either. The Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed on the anniversary of the disastrous federal attempt to detain the Branch Davidians in Waco, a date of great importance to a segment of anti-government extremists in the United States.

While those dates are primarily of importance to the attackers, it is well known that it has been part of al Qaeda doctrine from the beginning that targets should be selected, in part, based on their symbolic value to the victims. This emphasis has been a common feature of militant Islamist terrorism. In December 1994, for example, Algerian terrorists had planned to fly a plane they had hijacked into the Eiffel Tower, thus causing massive destruction over the heart of Paris, but also destroying a symbol as important to the French as the Statue of Liberty or the Washington Monument is to Americans (Gunaratna, 2003).

Often it is symbols of government power that are attacked, as with the Pentagon, the ultimate symbol of American military might. In Iraq, this has translated directly into attacks on army and police recruits, training facilities, and wherever possible, personnel. This has sent the obvious message that those who “collaborate” with the government or with coalition forces will be targeted, including those who work as translators or secretaries. It also communicates (as it certainly does when symbols of American power are targeted) that, if the government cannot protect itself, it cannot protect the average citizen. For this reason, this tactic has been an approach of terrorists around the world. For example, as Nacos notes, when MI-6 headquarters was attacked in London in 2000, it:

... was as costly in terms of its effects on the psyche of the British people, who were horrified by the spectacle of someone hurling a rocket from a handheld launcher and [sic] a distance of only a few hundred yards onto Britain’s foreign intelligence center (Nacos, 2002).

Tactics can be powerfully symbolic and therefore communicative as well. As Mia Bloom explains, virtually every society has some sort of taboo against self-destruction (Bloom, 2005). There is, therefore, a visceral horror at the image of the terrorist willing to take his (and recently, also her) own life in order to kill others. And, by definition, the suicide bomber conveys to the targeted society that the organization the terrorist represents is willing to use any means by which to achieve its ends, and has operatives willing to go to any lengths. Since these terrorists are already willing, perhaps even eager, to die, they also are sending the clear message that it will be almost impossible to deter them. The anthrax attacks in the United States immediately after September 11th clearly demonstrated that a delivery mechanism for an attack could serve to send a powerful message, one that makes the attack itself far more successful as a *terrorist* operation than it would otherwise have been. The lone terrorist targeted important politicians and major media figures – prominent individuals, and thus logical targets of this kind of violence. Had the terrorist used a high-powered sniper rifle and attempted to assassinate the same people, it probably would have attracted as much attention, but would not have had the same emotional resonance. Had the terrorist used the exact same weapon – anthrax –via a different delivery mechanism, placing the anthrax in the targets’ cars or directly in their offices, their actions likely would have been more frightening, but still would not have had as much emotional impact.

What made the attacks so profoundly frightening to so many people was the delivery mechanism. The terrorist sent the anthrax through the mail. People could understand the rationale of targeting prominent individuals, but they also knew that they themselves were not as prominent, and therefore believed that they were not at risk. *But everyone gets mail*. Therefore, the attacks, by virtue of their use of the quotidian, made everyone feel as if they also were at risk. This is the likely cause behind 44% of Americans reporting at the time that they had begun to

exercise caution while opening their mail, with another 17% considering doing so (ABC News Poll, 2001). This attack killed five people and made 22 sick in total, but those numbers cannot account for the impact this event had on the country—with 47% percent of the public reporting that they were following news reports regarding the attacks closely (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2006). The visuals used to represent this attack – business envelopes and government agents in bio-hazard suits going through Post Offices no different from the ones you and I use every day – served only to underscore and emphasize precisely what was so frightening about the attack.

Purposes Communication Serves

Communication serves a variety of purposes for these groups. Whether discursive, visual, or symbolic, they communicate in order to recruit, fundraise, and “rally the troops.” This is particularly important after an event that will be seen as impacting the group negatively. After a key leader has been “martyred” so publicly that denials will not work, the leadership needs to make sure that the rank and file believe the group can survive and even continue more strongly than before. Whether directly or in “mediated” forms (i.e., experienced through the filter of some form of technological media), communication also can be used to demoralize or intimidate – or perhaps persuade – the so called “swing vote” into passive or soft support. Of course, the communicators also hope to demoralize the population of the enemy state.

Use of New Media

Throughout history, terrorists (and insurgents) have gravitated toward the newest and most sophisticated communication technologies available. They have often seen the potential in such technologies very quickly, and have proven adept at rapidly developing new, flexible, and creative applications to capitalize on them. In particular, they have used communication technologies to sidestep the traditional media, which has made it possible for such groups to get their message out to their followers in a direct, unfiltered fashion.

In Iran, the Shah might have controlled the media, and the Ayatollah Khomeini might have been exiled to Paris, but personal cassette tapes had been developed and become widely available for personal use by the late 1970s. They were perfect for the Ayatollah’s supporters, at the time an anti-government insurgency. After a sermon had been recorded by him, copies could be made with little difficulty, for little cost, at which point each copy was easily portable, easily hidden on the person of a supporter, and easily passed from one supporter to the next after it had been heard. In this fashion, the exiled Ayatollah’s message was spread, despite his lack of access to traditional media within the country, which was a smart use of pre-Internet technology (Tehrani, 1995). Today, al Qaeda and its affiliated groups use online video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Liveleak, as well as Google Earth to provide precise targeting and mapping for operations. They also continue to aggressively explore the potential of such new applications as Twitter (304th MI Bn OSINT Team, 2008) – even discussing the possibilities for an “invasion” of the social networking site Facebook.

What is new today is that a confluence of new technologies has all come to relative maturity relatively simultaneously. An information or communication technology becomes “mature” when it meets several criteria. First, it must be available “off-the-shelf,” that is to say; it must be commercially available to the general public. Second, it must be relatively affordable, something within reach of a decent percentage of the population. Third and critically, it must be

small enough to be easily portable. Fourth, it must be available in most of the world, not just in developed countries.

In the last few years, several key technologies have met these criteria. Cameras of increasing quality (even high-definition) continue to become cheaper and smaller, even in countries without dependable electricity. Similarly, laptop computers are available worldwide, at increasingly lower prices and higher quality. Software that permits images to be edited and manipulated also is available worldwide and requires no training beyond the instructions that come with the software itself. In fact, while software such as Moviemaker 3 is easily available around the world, and easily mastered without special training, it is not really necessary to purchase software with even that relatively low level of sophistication. Someone with even a low level of computer savvy (which likely characterizes a good number of the world's young people) can download free "shareware" at zero cost. Or those with a great deal of computer savvy can hack something for free. Alternatively, they can acquire what they need from the hacker or criminal communities (304th MI Bn OSINT Team, 2008). The Internet alone is a powerful, even revolutionary, tool the Internet in combination with these other technologies can be an even more powerful weapon.

The twist added by the groups active in Iraq, evident fairly early in that conflict, was the tactic of filming individual attacks as short video segments, perhaps lasting only as long as a few seconds. For example, many attacks on American convoys have been filmed by terrorists hiding in what amount to duck blinds. The terrorists then upload these segments *individually* to the web, rather than waiting until they have assembled a large collection. This practice likely started in Iraq as a result of the conjunction of technology, (i.e., easily available portable digital cameras and laptops) with opportunity (i.e., a combat theater where attacks on American soldiers were taking place regularly). Once uploaded, these videos become available to anyone who cares to download them. This maximizes the videos' impact since, once they are on the web, they can become the building blocks for much longer videos. These new videos may have higher production values and be made by individuals outside the combat zone with more sophisticated computer skills and access to better computers and software (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007).

There is a clear and notable evolution in the technology being used in the generation of propaganda, based on what has been being captured in the Iraqi battlespace:

Over time technology has gone bigger and bigger. We have seen more hard drives, as time goes on, hard drives coming off the battlefield have become more advanced, bigger hard drives, [with] more capability. Earlier in the fight [there were] 20 gig hard drives, now 40, some are 80, even 120. So we have seen an advancement as technology across the world has increased (LTC A. Jenkins, Director of Operations for the Combined Media Processing Center, Qatar, personal communication, December 3, 2007).

The size of drives (particularly portable drives) is critical, given the enormous size of even the most primitive video files.

In fairness, it remains the case that most of the equipment recovered typically has been three to five years old (A. Jenkins, personal communication, December 3, 2007). There could be any number of reasons for this finding, starting with the fact that, given the difficulty of gaining access to computers in the country during Saddam's time, the technology baseline was probably far behind the standard in developed countries, even compared to the rest of the region.

Despite the fact that the technology itself is not advanced but instead several generations behind, it is being used to access cutting edge techniques, and to constantly push the envelope in terms of creative applications of what technology allows. For example, the British have complained that insurgents have been using Google Earth in order to plan their attacks more precisely on British compounds in Iraq (Harding, 2007). The terrorists attacking Mumbai used Google Earth in a similar way, albeit they had access to Blackberries, a far more advanced platform and one that permitted them to follow the press coverage as the attack unfolded. This is an advanced, creative application of technology that requires Internet access, but not necessarily the most advanced platform on the market. The change in sophistication was expressed succinctly, "...al Qaeda [in Iraq] and other terrorist organizations used to articulate their battle plan with rocks and stones and sticks, now we see them using power points with laptops and projectors on a wall. So overall their [use of] technology has improved" (A. Jenkins, personal communication, December 3, 2007). Media labs are decentralized, apparently intentionally, even as media strategies seem to be centralized, and the labs themselves are *never connected* to the Internet. Rather, any editing, production, and video compression is done in the labs. Once complete, videos are downloaded to thumb drives or, more likely, given the size of video files, portable hard drives, and then taken elsewhere to be uploaded to the web (COL. D. Bacon, Chief of Plans for Special Operations and Intelligence working Public Affairs Matters in the Strategic Communication Department of Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I), personal communication, 10 November 2007). This set-up is known in the vernacular as "sneaker net."

So many attacks have been filmed, whether IED attacks on convoys, the detonation of suicide bombers, the execution of hostages, or sniper attacks on soldiers, that it has been suggested that attacks are staged in order to provide material that can be filmed, rather than the filming being an afterthought, incidental to the point of the attack and added after the planning is complete. As Army Lieutenant Colonel Terry Guild explained, "It is part of their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures" (personal communication, MacDill AFB, August 15, 2006).

How important was this approach to the efforts of the insurgency in Iraq? Between June and roughly November of 2007 (in other words, roughly the period corresponding to the surge of additional forces to Baghdad), American forces captured and destroyed eight media labs belonging to al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eight labs, they found a total of 23 *terabytes* of material that had not yet been uploaded to the web. Although in some cases the labs were discovered in the course of other operations, coalition forces:

made going after these media labs or propaganda labs a priority because we know how important these things are to al Qaeda operations, we know that they use these videos and put them on the web to recruit and to get funding, so to attack its livelihood we have to go after these things, so we have targeted them [specifically] (D. Bacon, personal communication, November 10, 2007).

The loss of these eight labs, according to MNF-I, resulted in more than an eighty percent degradation of al Qaeda in Iraq's capacity to get new material on the web, as of September 2007.

That said, while visual material (and specific claims that accompany it) can provide these groups with a new and powerful means of attacking their target population's will to continue fighting, the groups still need to find some way for the material to reach the traditional media for the visual product to be fully effective. It is highly unlikely that sufficient numbers of people in the West will find this material simply by surfing the web for it to have enough of an impact to

meet a terrorist group's needs, or for the material's full potential to be unleashed. While some terrorist group material indeed does find its way to the increasingly popular YouTube and similar sites, YouTube offers only so much potential coverage.

But the irony here is that traditional ("legacy") American media outlets now depend on the terrorists and insurgents for content so that, by uploading this material to the Internet and making it available to anyone who finds it, these groups ensure that it will find its way onto a American television network news shows as well. Because it has been impossible for the networks to consistently acquire visually compelling combat footage of either the fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan, for any variety of reasons, all six news networks and news divisions – ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, MSNBC (the cable partner of NBC), and Fox News – have made it a regular practice to download footage from terrorist and insurgent web sites. These outlets then integrate these visual products into their broadcasts, almost never with any indication that could be used by the audience to determine the actual provenance of the footage. This is the case despite the fact that, if the networks truly believe they have no choice but to continue using this footage, there are several options available to them that would clearly and unmistakably distinguish this footage from that taken by professional photojournalists or by "amateurs" (the new category used by all the networks now that the probability is high that witnesses to an event will have a camera of some sort on their person) (Dauber, 2009).

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3.2. Audience-Centered VNSA Strategic Communications (William Harlow)

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Executive Summary

There are potentially multiple audiences for any act of strategic communication by a Violent Non State Actor (VNSA). Before deciphering the importance of any given message or series of messages from a VNSA, the first analytical task is to determine the intended audience. Most messages purport to address a specific individual or group (e.g., videos addressed to both external groups such as "the American people" or to internal groups such as the call to jihad in

a January 2009 video tape purportedly released by bin Laden). However, those statements are not always reliable indicators of the true intended audience. This paper discusses the importance of determining the audience of a communicative act at the beginning of the analytic process. Audiences might include foreign publics, foreign policymakers, domestic audiences, existing group members, and potential recruits. Many VNSA messages are likely intended for internal consumption regardless of who the stated audience is. The decentralized nature of typical VNSAs and a complicated decision-making model leave these groups little choice other than to communicate through public messages.

The failure of U.S. strategic communication programs has been widely noted with the recent study by Paul (2009) highlighting some of the problems. As Goodall, Trethewey, and McDonald (2006) note, this failure may be due at least in part to a one-way model of communication, which assumes that we send messages, which are received exactly as intended. Unfortunately, this “hypodermic” model of communication—one that assumes that senders can simply inject receivers with messages—can be problematic in reverse when analysts assume that any message they happen to view was intended for them. This tendency presents a particular analytic problem for the U.S.: inadequate study of the strategic messages of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) may cause western analysts to assume that we are the intended audience for messages that may be, at least in part, internal communications.

Campbell and Huxman (2009, p. 192-193) draw a useful distinction between the “empirical audience” and the “target audience.” The empirical audience is any person or group of people who happen to hear a message. The target audience, on the other hand, is that person or group of people at whom a rhetorical act is directed. The phrase “rhetorical act” is not meant here in any derogatory way—Campbell and Huxman (2009, p. 7) take it to mean “an intentional, created, polished attempt to overcome the challenges in a given situation with a specific audience on a given issue to achieve a particular end.” This paper is concerned with the target audiences at whom rhetorical acts are directed. Analysts viewing a message will always be part of the empirical audience, but it is a mistake to assume the analyst’s country or some element of government (e.g., the United States) is the target audience in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary. While it is true that today’s empirical audience may become tomorrow’s target audience, or simply tomorrow’s target, that distinction is not useful to the immediate analytic challenge of determining the intent or value of a message.

Unfortunately, there is a tendency for a listener to assume that they are part of the target audience even when they are not. Any audience is first going to be concerned with their own needs (Lucas, 2009) and that applies regardless of whether they are the target, empirical, or other type of audience. If the analyst assumes that a message is directed towards him or herself, the meaning of the message might be lost entirely. That point is crucial; that is, if someone does not know who the audience was intended to be, they cannot reasonably interpret the message. Not knowing the target audience is akin to tapping a phone line without knowing either the recipient of the call or their response to the message—what is received will be badly out of context, difficult to interpret, and almost impossible to act on.

In discussing audiences, it is important to remember that there might be more than one intended audience for the same message. Determining the audience is particularly complex when the sender originates a message in a language that allows for or encourages multiple simultaneous interpretations. The sender is potentially aware that others can intercept and view

the message. Indeed, there may be some (strategic) benefit to having a message seen by someone other than the intended audience. That said, the important thing for determining the strategic intent of the speaker is knowing to whom he or she intended to send their message. There are at least five such possible audiences:

- 1) Foreign publics
- 2) Foreign policymakers
- 3) Domestic audiences
- 4) Existing members of the VNSA
- 5) Potential recruits to the VNSA

Some messages are directed to foreign publics. For example, Al Jazeera (2007) reported that Osama bin Laden issued a video in early September 2007 with the banner “A message from Sheikh Osama bin Laden to the American people,” and that message instructed Americans who were not Muslim to embrace Islam in order to end the war in Iraq by removing popular support (including financial support). It is likely that bin Laden was trying to communicate with Americans or other westerners in a general sense.

In that video, however, the person purporting to be bin Laden refers to (then) President Bush. The ostensible audience was the public at large, but the most significant policy maker of a foreign power was also addressed. Presuming that the audiences addressed were really the intended targets, the same message potentially reached at least two groups.

Strategic communicative acts by a VNSA can also be directed at a domestic audience. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC in Spanish) claim that their acts of violence are conducted on behalf of the Columbian people. In a July 2008 statement issued after a string of defeats by Government of Columbia (GOC) forces, FARC leader Alfonso Cano claimed that his group would continue fighting to build a “new Columbia.” This message promised a series of social benefits for Columbian citizens and said they would continue fighting despite the setbacks. Messages such as the one issued by FARC could be designed for any number of domestic purposes, from gaining tacit support of the populace to ensuring the overt compliance of or lack of interference from local authorities.

Included in those domestic audiences could be existing members of the VNSA sending the message. The January 2009 bin Laden video referenced earlier appears to be directed to group members or others supporting the same cause, possibly the true (intended) target audience. The (typically) decentralized organizational structure and illegal nature of terrorist groups means they (due to risk of capture, etc.) are unlikely to exchange messages in large public meetings (e.g., by holding annual conferences). Thus, video or other acts of public communication can be an effective way to pass needed messages, sometimes through codes or by simply delivering more general themes.

Finally, potential recruits to the cause may be included in those domestic audiences. The dangerous nature of VNSA operations requires a constant stream of new “talent” willing to undertake missions ranging from difficult to suicidal as well as serve other important functions. Since security forces are often surveilling or actively looking for known leaders of a VNSA, strategic communication via acts of public communication serve as a potential means of outreach to new recruits. Disaffected individuals may respond to these messages based on identification with a cause.

While it certainly happens that a VNSA directly or indirectly targets some part of a country or government (e.g., the United States or the United States Government) in a rhetorical act, two interesting phenomena happen in small groups, which suggest that these last two audiences—the existing and potential members of the VNSA delivering the message—are often the true target audience. First, the “bona fide groups” perspective suggests that groups have fuzzy edges that are best negotiated by public communication. Second, the multiple sequence model describing group decision making suggests that the occasional large-scale message broadcast to all group members may be the most efficient way to handle some communication needs.

While it does not specifically address VNSAs, the bona fide groups perspective offered by Putnam and Stohl (1990) helps explain why public messages may be the most effective means of communication for a VNSA. Putnam and Stohl (1996, p. 148) explain that the “bona fide group approach is a theoretical perspective that treats a group as a social system linked to its context, shaped by fluid boundaries, and altering its environment.” A group both changes in membership and constantly interacts with its environment. Stohl and Putnam (1994) suggested that their perspective should be applied to naturally emerging groups (those outside the laboratory), and VNSAs, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), fit this description. Putnam and Stohl (1996, p. 150) identified four ways in which groups constantly negotiate their borders:

- 1) Multiple group membership and conflicting role identities,
- 2) Representative roles,
- 3) Fluctuations in membership, and
- 4) Group identity formation.

MEND, a VNSA operating in the oil-rich Niger Delta of southeastern Nigeria, illustrates this concept. MEND carries out attacks on Western oil interests and Government of Nigeria (GON) facilities and sometimes claims credit for attacks with a statement saying they did so to secure a larger share of locally extracted oil wealth for ethnic groups from the area. MEND members, however, also have *multiple group memberships and conflicting role identities*—they participate in other organizations such as religious or community groups at the same time. Membership in the VNSA does not suddenly make them quit participating in the other organizations or in the other roles they serve in their communities. Thus, the organization has to find a way to communicate with people who are sometimes engaged in other activities. The *representative roles* played by each member of MEND means that they are expected to continue representing the organization to their communities and vice versa. There are also *fluctuations in membership* as some members die, others leave to begin another occupation, and new members join. Like other VNSAs, MEND also has a problem with *group identity formation*. Statements issued in May 2009, in response to a conflict with GON forces, indicated MEND trying to define why they were engaged in conflict and what the putative benefit would be for the local population. A VNSA such as MEND is a bona fide group because it clearly exists while having boundaries that cannot easily be defined, and that makes large-scale public messages a convenient way to communicate with the largest number of group members.

This problem is further complicated by the convoluted decision making process that many VNSAs may be compelled to use due to their decentralized natures. While various scholars in Communication, Business, and other fields have proposed models of the phases that groups go through when making decisions, it is a mistake to assume that any given model accurately describes the process for all groups. This is all the more true with a decentralized group such as

a typical VNSA. As Poole (1981) explains, groups have to be responsive to their environments in making decisions, and different groups will follow different decision-making models at different times. This makes it crucial to find a way to effectively communicate with group members.

Poole (1983) offers a better way to think of the decision making process that groups use. His multisequence model of decision development holds that, rather than following a straightforward or “unitary” process, groups go through three types of activities in reaching any decision. They can go through these activities in any order and may return to each activity many times before a final decision is made. Both the time involved in reaching a decision this way, as well as the decentralized nature of the process, make it all the more important to find an effective tool for strategic internal communication, and large scale public messages can be an important part of that process.

In Poole’s multisequence model, the first type of activity a group undertakes are task processes. These are any activities that help the group get work done. VNSA discussion of training regimes, finances, or potential targets would all be examples of task processes. The second group activity type is relational activities. These are any activities that build or reinforce the relationships between group members. If a VNSA group leader needs to assert his authority or convince people that he is alive, a large-scale public broadcast released on Al Jazeera or a known website would suffice. Large-scale public broadcasts can also build relationships with VNSA recruits by showing them that the group is active and pursuing a shared goal. Since most members of a large VNSA will never meet their senior leadership, broadcasts are the only way to maintain those relationships on a large scale. Finally, the third activity type typical of groups trying to make a decision is topical focus activities. These activities focus on the general themes or major issues facing a group, and large broadcasts are ideally suited to maximize the number of group members involved. In the aforementioned video from 2007, someone claiming to be bin Laden said he wanted the U.S. out of Iraq. The Iraq war would have been a significant theme for group members, and this broadcast was an efficient way to discuss it and demonstrate to group members that the senior leadership was engaged in the task at hand. The three groups of activities proposed by Poole represent one method of making decisions when constrained by the inability to operate freely. While this does not have to mean that broadcasts from terrorist leaders are always internal communications, it does reinforce that those broadcasts are an incredibly efficient way of conducting normal group activities.

In summary, an understanding of the multiple intended audiences and the nature of VNSA groups informs the development of strategies for dealing with them. Determining the true target audience will help in understanding the actual intent, necessary for designing disruptive actions. It is likely that internal audiences are frequently the target audience for VNSA public messages. Even if there is a nominal head of the group, the decentralized nature of many VNSA operations makes public messaging an attractive choice for internal communication, and some of the literature from the field of communication studies explains why this may be true. First, VNSA’s have fuzzy boundaries. As Putnam and Stohl explained in their bona fide groups perspective, groups struggle to negotiate their identity due to membership in competing groups, the roles taken by group members, and changes in group membership. Thus, public broadcasts are a logical choice for strategic internal communication. Second, Poole’s multisequence model of group decision development posits that groups frequently do not follow orderly decision-making

processes. Public messages enable VNSA's to conduct necessary task, relational, and process activities.

One final thought about the nature of VNSAs as bona fide groups – because their boundaries are so fluid and the decision making process so decentralized, their strategic communications will be incredibly hard to disrupt. Even if disruption is impossible, it is important to attempt to properly understand the messages and that requires knowledge of the target audience(s). The literature on group communication helps explain who those audiences might be.

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3.3. VNSA Strategic Communications: Reading Their Lips: The Credibility of Militant Jihadi Web Sites as ‘Soft Power’ in the War of the Minds (Reuven Paz)

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Introduction

In recent years, the term ‘soft power’ has been widely used in relation to the war of minds within the global war against global [militant jihadi] terrorism. Soft power is the ability to achieve your goals by attracting and persuading others to adopt them (Wikipedia, soft power). It differs from ‘hard power’ -- the ability to use economic and military steps and might to impose your will. Both hard and soft power is important in the war against terrorism, but attraction is much cheaper than coercion and is an asset that needs to be nurtured and exercised. Attraction, by both sides, depends on credibility. However, contrary to the use of soft power in the context of the war against the militant jihadis, few scholars deal with the other side – the goals and credibility of the soft power of the jihadi militants. Most security services, intelligence communities, and most other experts tend to occupy themselves with the militant jihadi hard power – terrorism.

The credibility of information obtained from open sources has always been an issue for intelligence and security communities. Intelligence communities—some of which served totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Soviet Union—were often known as ‘masters of disinformation.’ Western intelligence communities and security services have not always granted much more credibility to open sources than the KGB and its former Eastern bloc sister services. Not only were Western agencies well aware of the complicated relations between intelligence and the media, but they frequently utilized the media for psychological warfare. Hence, they too were suspicious of the credibility of open sources, as well as of the tricky process of distinguishing between information and disinformation.

Militant Jihadi Soft Power

The culture of militant global jihad is a young phenomenon in the Islamic world, which thus far is advocated only by a small minority of Muslim groups, movements, scholars, and individual sympathizers. However, various factors have widened the rank and file of supporters and sympathizers of this culture. These include the extensive use of terrorist tactics, primarily suicide-martyrdom operations; the insurgency in Iraq; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; growing anti-American and anti-Western sentiment; social and economic frustrations among Muslims; and growing multinational integration between Muslim communities in the West or in regions of conflict in the Muslim world. Global militant jihad is deeply rooted in interpretations of the earliest sources of Islam and Islamic history and adheres to the strictest doctrines of Salafist scholars; it is primarily a doctrinal development that requires legitimacy on the part of clerics and scholars in the form of interpretations, rulings, and preaching. It embodies the Islamists’ struggle to revive the Islamic civilization through global united solidarity and brotherhood on the

one hand and the demonization of whoever the current version of the “eternal enemy” is on the other. Most importantly, however, this process takes place publicly. Since we deal with movements and groups that are persecuted everywhere, and since they have no access to formal media, the Internet is their only alternative, and they use it in the most efficient way they can.

In the past decade, the “global war on terrorism” and the exceedingly easy access to Islamic and Islamist media through the Internet have produced a synergy that has affected the attitude towards open sources of information. The highly intensive and efficient use of the Internet by Islamic movements and groups in general, and the wide scope of Islamist terrorist groups in particular, provide us with an extremely wide range of information - information that also affects intelligence communities. In addition, the Western media relies on information from the militant jihadi web sites as well and, thus, provides them with an enormous exposure. Yet it seems that Western intelligence and security services have still a long way to go before they can fully rely on the information available in militant jihadi web sites. Two main obstacles stand in their way of exploiting the information available on these web sites:

First, the global militant jihadi phenomenon is relatively new and unfamiliar to many Western analysts. The number of Western analysts who can fully understand this phenomenon is still quite small, even though there are many so-called “experts” on terrorism. Furthermore, it is a very dynamic phenomenon and controversial even among the various militant jihadi groups themselves. It is admittedly very difficult to understand the differences, disputes, argumentations, and mindset of the militant jihadis in all their complexities. The modern militant jihad movement is more an “ideological umbrella” than a homogeneous movement, which makes swimming in this deep ocean a challenging task. The dynamic nature of the militant jihadi phenomenon is also a function of the militant jihadists’ “relationship” with the “enemy”—whose definition is flexible—and a response to its “aggressive nature,” especially since 2001. In the eyes of most of the militant jihadis, theirs is a struggle within an **asymmetric war of self-defense**.

Secondly, despite its global nature and aspirations, the militant jihadi phenomenon developed within the Arab world and is being exported to the larger Muslim world. The militant jihad is, therefore, almost entirely conducted in Arabic and its content is intimately tied to the socio-political context of the Arab world. The American and Western occupation of Iraq and the militant jihadi insurgency that followed increased the importance of the Arab element in this phenomenon. Likewise, most of the supporters of global militant jihad groups involved in various forms of terrorism among Muslim communities in the West are Arabs or of Arab origin. Most Western intelligence and security analysts are still unable to read the information in the original Arabic language and lack the knowledge, insights, and tools required to analyze Islamist radical groups and their mindset.

Militant Jihadi Use of the Internet: The Open University for Militant Jihadi Studies

There are several main reasons why militant jihadi movements, groups, clerics, and scholars turned the Internet into their main, and sometimes only, soft power vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching of their messages. Besides the known advantages of this medium of communication, several additional factors should be noted:

Most Arab and Muslim countries face jihadist extremist opposition groups that are oppressed and persecuted, rendering the Internet their only alternative to spread their messages. Most extremist citizens or groups are prevented from freely publishing books and newspapers or

from giving open lectures. Moreover, in most Arab and Muslim countries, these elements have no access to the traditional means of Islamic religious indoctrination such as mosques, Friday sermons, religious universities and colleges, or religious ceremonies.

The nature of militant jihadist ideology and doctrines, as well as a core militant jihadi mission, is to create a transnational global solidarity and brotherhood within the entire Muslim nation (*Ummah*). To that end, the Internet is currently the best means to promote this goal cheaply and rapidly while reaching the broadest possible audience. The Internet is the best means available to these groups to create and consolidate a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and a multitude of new groups, but also to create an image of a large volume of activity. In addition, the Internet is intensively surfed and read by the global media. Every militant jihadi event or message is instantly exposed to the world, circulated by news agencies, and cited in Muslim countries whose populations may not read Arabic.

The past decade has witnessed a rise in the significance and weight given to this medium in the eyes of militant jihadis due to a number of highly important events including the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “global war on terrorism,” the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and militant jihadi terrorist operations all over the globe. These events reinforce the image of a global clash of religions and civilizations; the sense among large segments of the Muslim public that they face “a war against Islam” disguised under the cover of fighting global terrorism; and the rise of militant jihadi terrorism as a global strategic factor in the West. The dynamic of the mutual relationship between the militant jihadi groups that use the Internet and the global media is growing.

The first strategic priority of global militant jihadi doctrines is to target the Arab and Muslim youth—the largest, most educated and, in terms of the Internet, most connected segment of Muslim societies. Besides, the use of the Internet for various goals, and the access to it in many Arab and Muslim countries, are growing rapidly, alongside growing developments in education for many of these audiences including females.

These groups are, above all, targeting their own societies, not Western regimes, and their citizens. The Internet may be used to intimidate the Western public, given their wide exposure to the global media and the huge effect that exposure has upon the sense of security in the West. Militant jihadis know that the widely circulated video clips of beheaded and executed foreigners and Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan terrorize Western audiences. Even so, the main reason why militant jihadis circulate these clips, photos, audio material, books, articles, or military manuals is to **indoctrinate** their own Arab and Muslim audiences; plant feelings of pride, a sense of belonging, and a new identity in their minds; and recruit their support. The Internet provides, by far, the best means to achieve the desired goal of virtual **nation-building** of the Muslim nation—*Ummah*—an aspiration anchored in the doctrines of the militant jihadi-Salafi currents. In other words, the Internet is the global Open University for Militant Jihad Studies.

One of the documents of indoctrination published in 2003, and recently re-circulated by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF),¹ talks about the nature of the university of global

¹ An organ of Al-Qaeda and global Jihad with a growing intensive virtual activity in the past two years.

militant jihad.² The author, using the pseudonym Ahmad al-Wathiq bi-Allah, then deputy director of GIMF, presents Al-Qaeda as an “organization, state, and university”:

“Since the operation of USS Cole [November 2000] and the glorious events of Manhattan [September 2001] until the present events of this blessed month, [Ramadan 2005] hundreds of Muslims from all over the world join this global militant jihadi university, in which they study all the studies of the militant jihad, its rules and disciplines... This is a non-central university, with no geographic borders, which has its presence everywhere and each person zealous for his religion and nation can join it... This university has its own presidency, whose role is to incite, guide, indoctrinate, and encourage the awareness of the Mujahidin. Its presidency is the leadership of the Mujahidin headed by Osama bin Laden... The university includes several faculties, among them electronic militant jihad, martyrdom, and the technology of side bombs and car bombs.”

The article bears propagandist overtones, but it clearly summarizes the indoctrinative nature of global militant jihad, and thus, the center of gravity of this phenomenon i.e., the Muslim audience. If this is the main audience, then there is almost no room for disinformation. An intensive reading of these web sites, and especially of the most radical 15-25 militant jihadi forums,³ and dozens of message groups reveals a highly serious approach and attitude of their participants, i.e., those who are targeted by this global indoctrination. In some Muslim communities in the West, but especially in the Arab world, we can assess the growing role of this indoctrination in the increasing willingness to support, justify, and volunteer to join militant jihadi terrorist groups. Since 2001, these militant jihadi web sites have gradually replaced the institution of the Madrassa as a tool for the recruitment of the first generation of militant jihadis in the 1980-90s. The Internet, in fact, has become **one global madrassa**.

Another example of a publication by GIMF—an analysis of the global strategy of Al-Qaeda—is even more lucid. Under the title, “Al-Qaeda’s War is Economic not Military,” the author, a Saudi scholar and supporter of global militant jihad (al-Najdi, 2005), analyzes the significant role that indoctrination plays in the global movement:

“We should direct some of these efforts to other targets that could serve another goal, namely to promote the glory of the Muslims, especially among the youth, who are swimming in the oceans of pleasures and lust. Those youth are in fact unused petrol, while many efforts are dedicated to confront those clerics who are selling their minds to the dictatorships, and who are useless too. These moral attacks would have a tremendous impact on the souls of the defeated youth.

Many idle youth were motivated to join the [militant] jihad by photos or videos such as of the USS Cole, or Badr al-Riyadh, or by watching the crash of the planes into the high buildings of Manhattan. Those youth, even though they were not fully aware of the impact of the attacks upon them, turned their minds and bodies towards the [militant] jihad. Here comes the role of indoctrination and developing the thinking of these people.

² The article was published in most of the Jihadi forums. See on-line in: <http://www.al-farouq.com/vb/showthread.php?t=2682>

³ The number varies since these forums are often closed by security services, Western hosting companies, or as a result of technical problems and reappear in other addresses or names.

It is a mistake to leave these youth with their superficial understanding of the nature of the war.

Whoever listens to the calls of Osama bin Laden senses in his words his care for the indoctrination of the supporters of the [militant] jihadi current, like for example in the Gulf States, in order to target the oil fields. Bin Laden could direct the Mujahidin through personal secret messages. However, he wanted the indoctrination to be public, in order that the crowds of people, who wait for his speeches through the TV channels or the Internet, would internalize his targets and follow them. If these messages would be clandestine and then the oil fields would be attacked, the masses of sympathizers might not approve it and might even turn to the opposite side and withdraw their support. Public statements by the Sheikh or the many videos of the Mujahidin can avoid such a negative impact of such an attack.”

The huge number of new interpretations, doctrines, and debates with other Islamic Sunni groups or scholars - Salafis, Brotherhood, Wahhabi reformists, and others - innovations in the terrorist *modi operandi*, and their widespread public presence on the Internet, brought about two contradictory developments. The first was a tendency for militant jihadis—scholars or laymen supporters—to view the swell of opinions and intellectual dialogue as a current, or movement, in the process of consolidation with the unifying goal, doctrines, and means of Tawhid.⁴ The other represented the emergence of a growing number of internal debates emerging either against a background of intensive, controversial terrorist/jihadi activity or, as the result of external pressures by Islamic establishments and institutions, governments or parts of Muslim societies.

Since September 11, 2001, this contradiction has been present in the public opinion of many a Muslim public, and even government. On the one hand, there was a growing anti-American sentiment, which emerged as a result of events in Iraq. It led to the support of many Islamic scholars, Arab officials, and a majority of the Muslim public for the jihad in Iraq. This was in addition to negative sentiment related to Israel and Palestine, which was a traditional axiom. On the other hand, many innocent elements of Arab and Muslim populations suffered from indiscriminate terrorism on the part of some militant jihadis, which received total legitimacy from most of the militant jihadi-Salafi scholars.

The emergence of the Internet as “the open university for militant jihad studies” with dozens of thousands of students, inflamed two significant processes:

- The emergence of a militant jihadi community with growing signs of solidarity and brotherhood. This community was extensively encouraged to take part in the debates, as the “virtual jihad” became a legitimate branch of the “militant jihadi war for minds.”
- The emergence of a set of militant jihadi “Internet scholars” whose main target was to indoctrinate the militant jihadi-Salafis, direct them, and consolidate the militant jihadi current.

⁴ Tawhid in general refers to the Muslim belief in the oneness of God, expressed in the central statement of “There is no God but Allah” and implies a strict moral and social structure based on the Quran as God’s final word. In the Wahhabi terminology, it is the unique reference to monotheism as the primary element of Islam.

Both groups of scholars and “students” developed a strong belief in an apocalyptic future, which effectively “hotwires” the militant jihadi-Salafi arena. This continuously stokes expectations of the defeat of the United States in Iraq; the fall of the U.S. as an empire in the same fashion as the Afghan defeat of the Soviet Union and contribution to its subsequent fall; support for new spectacular terrorist attacks on American soil; terrorist attacks in Europe against countries that take part in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, support Israel, or are supposedly “oppressing” the Muslim communities in Europe by imposing new laws (the veil, immigration, limiting civil rights in the name of the “war against terrorism,” outlawing Muslim charities, or by publishing anti-Muslim cartoons); the use of WMD; the collapse of Arab and Muslim apostate governments; the establishment of Shari’ah-ruled Islamic states; and so on and so forth. Through this hotwiring of the sense of an apocalypse, and the growth in the number of militant jihadi groups, scholars, supporters and sympathizers, self-radicalized youth and laymen whose knowledge of Islam is poor, the arena is broadened and inflamed with debates, competitions, and an appeal to basic desires.

In past years, the development of a growing number of topics under public debate within the militant jihadi-Salafi current has been prominent. During 2007, one of the most significant controversial topics among jihadi-Salafi scholars and groups has been the existence of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the state declared in the al-Anbar area controlled by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Another ongoing debate is over the killing of Muslims in general and innocent ones in particular. The phenomenon of debates over “sacred and untouchable topics” including serious militant jihadi-Salafi scholars started about two years ago. The latter likely exploited the fact that the killing of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 created a new situation in Iraq, which is still the most significant model of militant jihadi struggle. Zarqawi became a model-myth that paved the way to the establishment of the ISI. However, the absence of his authoritarian personality from the scene opened the door to increasing criticism over some of his violent doctrines and further inner debates.

Of note here, is the diversity of the origins of the militant jihadi-Salafi current, the flexibility of its development, and the transition from a very marginal Islamic trend to the frontline of the face of Islam, primarily in the Western societies. Many in the West now view Islam as a religion whose ideology is supposed to be moderate and peaceful, but which in fact is moving towards the most extremist and violent end of the spectrum, making a clash inevitable.

The Doctrinal Sources of Militant Jihadi-Salafism

The doctrinal sources require a separate presentation. Nevertheless, their diversity is part of the issue at stake. They include three different branches whose connection to classical, pure, political, or reformist Salafism can be scrutinized:

Egypt, through the more extremist parts of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—mainly Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Qader bin Abd al-Aziz (aka Dr. Fadl), Egyptian exiles in Saudi Arabia—and the self radicalized fathers of the Egyptian Jihad and Gama`at Islamiyyah—the Palestinian Saleh Sariyyah, the Engineers Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj and Shukri Ibrahim, and in a later period the physician Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Saudi Arabia, through its modern Wahhabi Tawhid led by the prominent Sheykh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and a huge class of his disciples created, among other issues, the “Movement of Awakening” (*Harakat al-Sahwah*), led by the two “twin” Sheykh Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali. During the 1990s, they were legitimized by two other classes of Neo-Wahhabi

scholars. Some were older clerics, such as Muhammad bin `Uthaymin, Abd al-Aziz bin Jarbou`, or Saleh al-Fawzan; and younger ones, who in part participated in the Jihad in Afghanistan, such as Ahmad al-Khaledi, Naser al-Fahd, Yousef al-Uyeri, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Jandal al-Azdi, and many others.

Palestine, led by the “Palestinian Trio” of Abdallah Azzam, Omar Abu Omar ‘Abu Qutadah’ and, above all, Issam al-Burqawi ‘Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’. The latter is the spiritual father of the fusion between the Wahhabi Tawhid and the violent Takfiri Jihad. This branch consists primarily of Jordanian-Palestinians, such as Abu Omar Seyf or Abu Anas al-Shami, whose role has been significant in both Chechnya and Iraq. They were an inspiration to a new generation of militant jihadi clerics who graduated from Saudi Islamic universities.

The most important element of this militant jihadi “texture” of principles and doctrines is that they lost any sign or traces of the original reformist Salafism. They turned the militant jihad into a dynamic that claims to purify the Muslim society through the actions of a small elitist fighting group and by claiming to attempt to follow the exact steps of the Prophet and his companions—the “Pious Generation” (*Al-Salaf al-Saleh*). Being a militant jihadi-Salafi means, above all, creating the “best” approximation of the first ideal generation of Muslims, primarily in the militant dimension. However, this created another greenhouse of militant jihadi doctrines – the principle of *takfir* (ex-communication) of every infidel whatsoever, but also of every Muslim who does not follow the militant jihadi-Salafi doctrines. There is a kind of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary touch to it all, with the signs of the destruction of the “old society”, while building the new type of Muslims and Muslim society. It very much has the flavor of “New Soviet Society” and “Soviet Man”. Such a society is bound to remain in a permanent state of war with a diverse group of enemies. These enemies are an ever growing list of “others,” all of whom do not approve of the present-day militant jihadi doctrines. This takfiri element comes primarily from the teachings of Abdallah Azzam, but also from the original Wahhabi zealotry, which dominates the Saudi sources of militant jihadi-Salafism and many of the militant jihadi scholars and terrorists.

The apostasy of the rest of the Muslim society, in militant jihadi eyes, created a situation in which, in the short time between 1995 and 2005, the definition of the “enemy” of Islam and the “true believers” was widened to include even the vast majority of the Muslim society. Doctrines used to develop some of the ideas of militant jihadi-Salafism, such as the social justice of Sayyid Qutb, were neglected in favor of the “magic touch” of violent jihad. The takfiri element of the militant jihadi-Salafis is the primary source of diversity and controversy between those who support the search for unity/Tawhid and those who support the purification of society from apostate elements even by killing innocent Muslims, or Shi’is, Sufis, Yazidis, or Sunni Muslims whose sole sin is being employed by companies that provide services to Americans in Iraq or the Iraqi and Afghan governments.

During 2005-2006, there were several instances of harsh criticism of Zarqawi himself, his anti-Shi`ah policy, and his violent and extremist *takfir*. Some of this criticism came from leading scholars of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Basir al-Tartousi in London, and Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, Zarqawi’s mentor in Jordan. In the case of the latter (currently imprisoned) individual, the criticism was made in public. However, Zarqawi and his followers in Iraq enjoyed such prestige and popularity as to receive full support in militant jihadi forums based on the principle that “the Mujahidin in the field know best how

they should act.” It was almost like the Islamic principle of “*Allahu A`lam*”—Allah knows best—and in this case – “the Mujahidin know best.” The so-called, but respected, “Saloon scholars,” were asked politely to keep silent and respect the wishes and strategy of the fighters in the field. The killing of Zarqawi in June 2006 did not change the strategy of Al-Qaeda in Iraq substantially, especially in terms of anti-Shi`ah actions, the terrible violence against civilians, and the continued espousing of the principle of *takfir*.

However, despite the success of Zarqawi’s violent anti-Shi`ah policy and operations and its ongoing application by his successors, there appears to be a decline in the religious position, prestige, and legitimacy of this policy. The shift from “Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers” to the “Islamic State in Iraq” in October 2006 increased the anonymity of the present leadership of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda on the one hand and the independence of other militant jihadi insurgent groups on the other. Zarqawi’s successor “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir” is in fact totally anonymous, the same as the “Imam” of the ISI, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. His prestige, if at all, comes from his so-called Qurayshi-Hashemite origin. The other prominent “Amir al-Mu`minin”—Mulla Omar in Afghanistan—is not regarded as a serious religious cleric or scholar, despite his success or that of his commanders since early 2006 in leading the Taliban and supporters of Al-Qaeda into a growing insurgency in Afghanistan using the same *modus operandi* as the Iraqi Al-Qaeda. For the vast majority of supporters of global militant jihad on the net, Mullah Omar is more a symbol of the sense of the militant jihadi apocalypse, similar to Osama bin Laden, who still owes his loyalty to Omar.

In the absence of dominant personalities such as Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, and due to the anonymity of his successors who refrain from any public appearances, some of the other militant jihadi or Islamic groups of the Sunni insurgency allowed criticism of Al-Qaeda or even entered into clashes with its members, which were followed by retaliatory violent attacks by Al-Qaeda. The position of Al-Qaeda as the leading force of the militant jihadi insurgency has been challenged and the attempt to impose the ISI upon all Iraqi Sunni militant jihadis, has, thus far, failed.

The absence of dominant scholars such as the late Saudi Yousef al-Uyeyri, the Jordanian Abu Omar Seyf, or the Saudi Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who are all dead, and the Saudi Abu Jandal al-Azdi, the Jordanian/Palestinian Abu Qutada, and the Jordanian/ Palestinian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, who are or were for a long time imprisoned, created a big vacuum. This vacuum opens the door for increasing public criticism and debates within the militant jihadi-Salafists on the one hand as well as making them more vulnerable to outside criticism and attacks by Saudi Salafists and affiliated scholars on the other.

Towards Militant Jihadi-Salafi Pluralism?

These debates and criticism find fertile ground in the virtual jihad on the net. It should be noted that supervisors of the various militant jihadi forums do nothing to block or hide them, allowing the development of a sense of greater pluralism among the community of the E-Jihad and a kind of “**virtual democracy**” within this growing community. This sense of **pluralism** also enables the emergence of “semi-parties” of pro- and anti- positions on very significant issues crucial for the militant jihadi global arena: the ISI, Sunni-Shi`ah conflict, Iran, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, suicide bombings outside of Iraq or against civilian Muslims, Saudi Arabia, extremist *takfir*, other trends of Salafism, and the authority of Islamist scholars, including militant jihadi-Salafi ones.

It is hard to say if there is a direct hand behind this “pluralism” -- is it a result of the growing use of the Internet, or of the “competition” between different militant jihadi forums, which want to serve as greenhouses for broad platforms for militant jihadi ideas? In some cases, it might also be the result of confusion and a lack of a clear position on the part of the web supervisors themselves. From a few cases of supervisors and webmasters who were arrested—such as the Moroccan Younis al-Tsouli in London (Irhabi 007), or the Tunisian Mohamed Ben El Hadi Messahel (Tunisian Admirer of the two Shaykhs – *Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi*, who was sentenced in March 2007 in Morocco to 12 years in prison for a terrorist plot) —we can see that their religious knowledge was poor. They were mainly devoted to the cause, self-radicalized, and proud to be militant jihadis, but had a poor understanding of militant jihadi doctrines. However, Saudi webmasters such as the late Yousef al-Uyeri or the one referred to as “*Al-Muhtasib*,” who was recently released from a two-year prison term in Saudi Arabia, were serious Islamic scholars, even though they had no formal Islamic education. It is difficult to say if this phenomenon is harmful for the Mujahidin in the long run or not.

Furthermore, from reading between the lines of some posts in militant jihadi forums, we can come to the conclusion that many of these supervisors know each other, if not in person, at least through email links. We can view personal comments or greetings that demonstrate a level of familiarity, beyond mere affiliation, brotherhood or solidarity. Hence, it appears there could be a guiding hand behind the policy of pluralism. It is obvious that, at least in the field of publishing statements, declarations, video and audiotapes, and other material of a propagandistic nature, a well-organized order has emerged, manifesting an absence of competition or rivalry, but rather respect for each other and cooperation under the leadership of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). This order might also be a result of the fact that there is a growing awareness of the importance of this mission in the militant jihadi “war of the minds” and its recognized legitimacy as an integral part of militant jihad.

It seems that effective and easy use of the E-Jihad helps in creating a kind of “militant jihadi virtual state” that is open to a pluralistic views and positions within the joint militant jihadi mission of *tawhid*.

Internet Militant Jihadi Scholars

Against the above-mentioned background, there is also the evolving phenomenon of “Internet militant jihadi scholars” who appear by their real names or pseudonyms but gain a growing respect from their virtual audience. This is also a new phenomenon, which seems to exert more influence upon the “laymen” supporters of global militant jihad.

As mentioned above, the E-Jihad, or the widespread use of the Internet by militant jihadis and their sympathizers, seems to create a process of pluralism, which results in an increasing number of topics being debated, even those of a “sacred cow” nature, within a framework that is seeking maximal doctrinal unity. However, this pluralism has so far remained “within the family” and has not been causing splits or gaps in the ideological umbrella of the militant jihadi-Salafi current. This may well go on for as long as the fight looks promising and successful, driven by the characteristic sense of the apocalypse.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, global militant jihad must use open indoctrination in order to sustain and broaden its audience in general, especially for its younger generations. Open indoctrination

is incompatible with disinformation. Therefore, even though we should be selective and careful in our selection of which information on militant jihadi web sites we follow, once we have established the authenticity of a militant jihadi web site, we can be reasonably certain that the words we read “from their lips” are credible. Such an authenticity may be established by information provided by material from arrested webmasters or the content and details of debates over these sites. The militant jihadist instigators cannot allow themselves to mislead the “Solid Base”—*Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah*—the base of the future pioneering militant jihadi generations. Furthermore, we should understand the role in the militant jihad played by the present ideological umbrella. This role is not merely one of terrorism but, and perhaps more importantly so, as a crucial pillar in building the current solidarity among Arabs and Muslims, as well as in the nation-building process of the future Muslim Caliphate. In April 1988, Dr. Abdallah Azzam, the spiritual father of modern global militant jihad, wrote very clearly in the article in which he established the idea of Al-Qaeda (*Al-Qa'idah al-Sulbah*) (Azzam, 1988, p. 46-49):⁵

“The Islamic society cannot be established without an Islamic movement that undergoes the fire of tests. Its members need to mature in the fire of trials. This movement will represent the spark that ignites the potential of the nation. It will carry out a long Jihad in which the Islamic movement will provide the leadership, and the spiritual guidance. The long Jihad will bring people’s qualities to the fore and highlight their potentials. It will define their positions and have their leaders assume their roles, to direct the march and channel it...

Possession of arms by the group of believers before having undergone this long educating training and indoctrination—*Tarbiyyah*—is forbidden, because those carrying arms could turn into bandits that might threaten people’s security and do not let them live in peace.”

Militant jihadi terrorism in Muslim lands and against Muslims is one of the “Achilles heels” of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad and a good reason for criticism, sometimes by militant jihadi scholars. Since the bombings in London and Amman in 2005, and due to the murderous attacks against Shi’i civilians in Iraq, there is growing debate and criticism between two schools within Al-Qaeda or global militant jihad. These two schools are centered around, on one hand, older scholars such as Abu Basir al-Tartousi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, and on the other hand, the group of Saudi militant jihadi-Salafi scholars, who fully support what we may call the “Zarqawi doctrine” – the indiscriminate violence against everyone who does not support the militant jihadi-Salafi ideas. The “Zarqawi doctrine” is quite similar to the Algerian Takfir of the 1990s hence, the debate between Al-Omar and Al-Libi on the Algerian background is significant. It is also important since Iran and the Shi’a were “upgraded” to the status of “top enemies” by the successors of Zarqawi in Iraq who are backed by Arabian militant jihadi-Salafi scholars, such as the Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali and several “Internet scholars” such the present ideologue of Al-Qaeda, Abu Yahya al-Libi.

The question of what the position is of the old central leadership of “Mainstream Al-Qaeda,” especially Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the “Amir” of the Islamic State in Iraq, who is anonymous to the militant jihadi audience, seems so far to follow the “Zarqawi doctrine.” On 8 July 2007, in his last videotaped speech on the militant jihadi Internet, he even threatened the Iranian government—the “Persian dogs” as he called them—and gave

⁵ Azzam was much influenced in developing this issue by the two Egyptian Jihadi scholars Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb, who were the first to use this term.

Iran an ultimatum of two months to withdraw its support from the Iraqi Shi'is, and "to stop interfering directly and indirectly in the affairs of the Iraqi State of Islam." His call was aimed at "all Sunnis, and the Salafi-militant jihadist youths in particular in all parts of the world to get ready for this war and make the preparations for it. I ask you not to spare any effort once our instructions are given to you." Abu Omar was talking as a self-appointed "Amir" of an entire Islamic Caliphate in all parts of the Muslim world, not just the Islamic state in Iraq. This was the first time that such pretentiousness was manifested by a leader recognized by Al-Qaeda and raises another question as to the control of "mainstream Al-Qaeda" over the militant jihadi insurgency in Iraq or in other regions such as the Maghreb, Lebanon, or Somalia.

Al-Baghdadi has recently diverged from past speeches about the Iraqi Shi'as, trying to distinguish between the Shi'a leadership and the public. In the meantime, we are witnessing a growing use of indiscriminate suicide bombings and attacks against Muslims in other parts of the Muslim world in Algeria, Somalia, Pakistan, and most recently in Libya. Algeria has traditionally been a model for Arab movements, both nationalist and Islamist, and several of the leading militant jihadi-Salafi scholars (Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, Abu Qutadah al-Filastini, Abu Basir al-Tartousi) were deeply involved with its militant jihadi groups and their internal conflicts and debates. It seems that, out of all the militant jihadi insurgencies and terrorism, Algeria is still held as a model and supporters of Al-Qaeda proudly point to the renewed militant jihad there as a great achievement. On 8 August 2007, a member of a militant jihadi forum posted a statement issued by the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, in which the group claimed responsibility for attacking a patrol of the Algerian police in northeast Algeria. A 13-minute and 27-second video, which is part of the "Under the Shadow of the Swords" series, was provided and showed the attackers without masks as well as the terrain, the equipment used, and the equipment gained. One of the striking things about this video was the self-confidence shown by the Algerian group. The Algerian model is also important when viewed against the background of the recent failure of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad to find a model similar to Algeria and gain a foothold in Palestine. Hamas is not only a "thorn" in the face of Al-Qaeda's ambitions, but is also criticized a lot by al-Qaeda's scholars for many of its "sins." One of the harshest critics was Abu Yahya al-Libi himself, in a long videotape in April 2007.

In the past two years, Abu Yahya al-Libi has played a significant role in not only defending and promoting the positions of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad, but also as one of the "theologians" of global militant jihad responding to attacks by opposing Muslim clerics. The fact that he belongs to the first generation of Al-Qaeda members grants him more influence with the supporters of global militant jihad, especially through the Internet. In the two years since his escape from prison, he joined the ranks of the militant jihadi-Salafi scholars that advocate the "Total Jihad" – the focus on permanent violent jihad in every region of conflict between Muslims and "infidels." The extent of his formal Islamic education is not at all clear. Nevertheless, his readers on the Internet do not pay attention to his academic credentials, but only at the bottom line of his conclusions – the legitimacy for the "total Takfiri Militant Jihad," where the rules of engagement permit any action that promotes the militant jihadi target, or "catch as much as you can and do not miss any opportunity to fight."

However, it should be noted that for those who try to understand the mindset of the militant jihadi scholars through their indoctrination over the Internet, Abu Yahya al-Libi and his colleagues make it an easier task than the ambivalent and double-language writings of their scholar counterparts, especially the Saudis. The role of the "Internet scholars," either well-known

ones who appear by their real names, or those who hide in militant jihadi forums behind pseudonyms, is to back and legitimize the extreme positions, which their audience wants to hear. Such writings are an integral part of what has recently become a legitimate branch of militant jihad—the militant jihadi propaganda underpinning a sense of identity and belonging to a growing number of “students” in the Open University for Militant Jihad Studies. Zealot scholars like Al-Libi, model topics like Algeria, or numerous videotapes from Iraq or elsewhere are part of a system that hotwires the imagination of radicalized youth who can join militant jihad from home. They are no longer regarded as dodgers from jihad or *Mutaqa`idin*, the term first coined by Sayyid Qutb for those who do not join the military jihad. The “total jihad” of al-Libi, including that in Muslim countries and against Muslim “apostates,” enables them to channel their emotions of frustration, personal or social stress, hatred, and fears into a legitimate jihad, religiously approved by real or false scholars.

The long-term jihad, which the West—and indeed much of the world—is currently facing, uses the Internet to provide both militant jihadists and the rest of the world a wide spectrum of diversified information. Western intelligence and security analysts can learn a great deal about modern militant jihad by reading the lips of jihadi clerics, scholars, operatives, commanders, leaders, as well as the response of their growing audience. Improving their ability to do so, and above all in the original language, must be a priority.

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3.4. Violent Non-State Actors and the Use of Strategic Communication: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Frank Hairgrove, Douglas McLeod)

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Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is transnational movement intent on mobilizing Muslim populations toward the goal of reestablishing the Islamic Caliph as the political authority, first over Islamic countries, then worldwide (Baran, 2004a, 2004b; Tahrir, 2003). For the time being, this organization is non-violent, but it does not rule out the use of violence to achieve political goals in the future, particularly in the event that the reestablishment of the caliphate becomes a possibility (Schneider, 2006; Whine, 2006). The historical precedent for this potential switch is that of Muhammed who, while in Medina, was restrained and waited until Mecca, when he had sufficient strength, to attack his enemies. (Baran, 2004; Habeck, 2006). HT members have been known to have connections to terrorist organizations, though HT itself is not listed as a terrorist

organization because of its current non-violent stance (Malik, 2005; Yunanto, 2003). Habeck (2006) argues HT's non-violent stance is an Arabic "sleight of hand" regarding the definition of "jihad," because when a Caliph is established, or has the possibility of being established, they will switch into a violent posture to promote their radical agenda as allowed for in Islamic scriptures.

Based on our research, which has included personal observations and interviews with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) leaders, this paper will assess the strategic communication techniques used by this organization to accomplish its objective of mobilizing an Islamic population toward the goal of establishing the caliphate.

Background

The Indonesian branch of Hizbut Tahrir began in Bogor, West Java in 1982. Because the Hizbut Tahrir strategy was to overthrow the government and establish a pan-Islamic nation under the Caliph, it chose to remain "nameless" and clandestine until 1990 when it felt it had sufficient organizational strength to become an active mobilization organization. Recruits first came from the secular universities in Bogor and Bandung where they met in small groups (*halaqa*) to study books written by al-Banna, Qutb, and al-Nabhani. In Arabic, *halaqa* means "circle", but has a powerful connotation in the Muslim psyche as a study group (Hairgrove & McLeod, 2008). Wiktorowicz (2006) observed, "...various Salafi factions are all tied to the same educational network, which explains their commonly understood religious creed. The key...is the critical role of student-scholar relationships (i.e., *halaqa*)." Meeting locations varied from week to week, and those attending arrived and departed at staggered intervals to avoid detection. Membership grew steadily through the 1990s and early 2000s, as members proceeded through the recruitment and training process (Bruinessen, 2003; Collins, 2004; Salim, 2005). Today, Indonesia has one of HT's most active branches, currently numbering 13,000 core cadre and 37,000 associates for a total organizational size of 50,000.

Media Use Theories Employed by the Hizbut Tahrir Organization

Hizbut Tahrir is well known for incorporating innovations into the traditional Islamic milieu. They utilize websites, publications, four-color magazines, cell phones, international conferences, music, demonstrations, and television programs by embracing technologies for the purpose of Islamizing a population. Their ideological justification comes from 19th century Islamic thinkers such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh, who felt Muslims must incorporate modern ideas into fundamental practice for Muslims to survive the modern world (Habeck, 2006; Hourani, 1983). For this reason, Hizbut Tahrir, more than most any other radical Islamic groups, applies media technology in their approach to strategic communication and persuasion (Ahnaf, 2009; Habeck, 2006).

Some researchers have argued that the Internet is being used by terrorist organizations as a weapon for persuading discontented populations to join jihad, and as a central weapon in their arsenal of terror (Bunt, 2000, 2003; Conway, 2006; Paz & Prism, 2006; Weimann, 2004a, 2006). Though there is some evidence of the Internet being used in this manner, these exaggerated threats have hidden the power of the mundane, yet more typical, use of the Internet - that of providing for the exchange of information (Weimann, 2004a).

Hizbut Tahrir's Impact in Indonesia

Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia launched its first Internet site in March of 2004 after first publishing pamphlets in early 2000 and subsequently added translated books and then later a magazine (Salim, 2005). Currently, it produces a million weekly flyers called *al Islam*, which are sold for 200 rupiah each (or about \$.025) and distributed by local HT members at their mosques each Friday (Ismail Yusanto, Spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, personal interviews, August 2007). The files for the weekly flyers are sent via email to networks that produce them locally via low cost and low quality methods. HT-I also produces a monthly 72-page magazine with glossy full color cover called *al-wa'ie*, whose 40,000 copies are distributed through various venues and sell for 5,500 rupiah each – (\$.60).¹ HT-I's media strategy also includes a daily updated website called *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*. Hits on the website <http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id> averaged 1,089 hits per day in late 2006,¹ but after a change in the site layout in March 2007, hits and web page views have made it the fourth most popular Indonesian language Islamic website in Indonesia. The communications network is so well organized that Ismail Yusanto, spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir, noted he could implement a nationwide demonstration within two hours by using email and phone text messages (Ismail Yusanto, personal interview, August 2007).

Evaluating the organizational strength of HT-I is difficult as it remains a secretive organization. Sidney Jones, an expert on Indonesian radical groups with International Crisis Group Indonesia, estimates that Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia has about 13,000 committed cadre actively participating in weekly *halaqa* meetings and twice that amount in associate status (i.e., not active in *halaqa* studies) for a total of nearly 50,000 members (Sidney Jones with International Crisis Groups and Fajri [last name withheld] - a former ranking member of Hizbut Tahrir, personal interviews, August 2007). The Third International Caliphate Conference sponsored by HT-I and held in Jakarta on August 12, 2007 drew 90,000 participants, most of whom were Indonesians in their 20s.²

Measuring Internet Effectiveness

In any media marketing campaign, decision makers seek to position their message in combination with other messages in a "media mix" so as to capitalize on the synergistic power of messages that reinforce each other across different media (Arens & Bovee, 1994; Belch & Belch, 1995). In the media mix, each message and each medium has a specialized persuasive function and may even be targeted to different audiences in a manner that is coordinated to maximize campaign effectiveness (Perloff, 2003). The confluence of the media mix makes it difficult to isolate the influence of one particular medium without considering its specific role and influence as part of the synergistic persuasive campaign. Without this broader context, as well as the interpersonal and cultural situations in which the messages are received, one is bound to underestimate message influence (Rogers, 2002).

An appropriate approach to measure effectiveness would observe how users interact with the Internet and how this correlates with use of other communication behaviors, both mass media and interpersonal. Here, we take a multi-methods approach to observe Hizbut Tahrir's Internet

¹ Personally monitoring of website October to December 2006.

² Personally attending the International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta, August 2007 and counting the stadium seating. Media reports estimated between 90,000 and 100,000.

use by looking at quantitative data of website activity from various sources, combined with a qualitative analysis of topics posted and discussion on those topics. By correlating these different data, one can infer the intentions of Internet site designers and assess strategic effectiveness.

Influence of Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia's Internet Activities

HT-I's Internet site was fairly simple prior to March of 2007. The site posted articles by a range of authors, many were full text or abridged versions of articles found in the *al-Islam* newsletter or *al-wa'ie* magazine. Links along the left side of the web page allowed visitors to go to Hizbut Tahrir websites in other languages or to online versions the *al-Islam* newsletter and *al-aw'ie* magazine. We tracked website activity from September 2006 until December 2006, a time span that included the high Islamic holiday Ramadan. We observed weekdays as being heavier than weekends, with Mondays having the most traffic. We also observed that a significant increase in postings and activity surrounding an incident when the Pope made disparaging comments about Islam and again following the announcement of President Bush's visit to Indonesia.

After the website was updated in March of 2007, it was less glitzy, but easier to navigate. Like the old site, it offered links to the other nineteen Hizbut Tahrir sites in various languages, as well as archived "online" versions of *al-Islam* and *al-wa'ie*. The greatest advantage to the new site was the added interactivity allowing users to post comments. Comments from March 2007 through September 2007 were grouped under twelve themes based upon article headings. In total, there were 70 articles and 812 comment postings, with an average of 11.6 postings per article. The top four categories of postings were the *Caliphate conference* (held August 12, 2007), *hegemony* (by governments suppressing or oppressing Muslims), topics related to the *establishment of the Caliphate*, and issues related to *Israel*. The largest proportion of articles posted (24%) addressed the theme of *Dakwah* (outreach meeting announcements), followed by the Caliphate (with 14% of all articles posted).

To determine whether the postings were from a few enthusiasts or from diverse users, we investigated the diffusion of postings. For the month of September, there were 96 postings, of which 35 were from sources who contributed multiple postings. One person had 10 postings, one had 5 postings, two had 3 postings each, and seven had 2 postings each. If one excludes the one unique user with 10 postings, the data reflect a diverse group of users.

Were visitors who posted comments actually engaging in dialogue by adding to the intellectual content, or were they merely registering support? Two researchers fluent in Indonesian reviewed the comments to determine into which of two categories the comments fell: intellectual argument or only support. Results show that 47% of the comments were from people who were engaging in dialogue, with the rest merely posting words supportive of the article. Of those who engaged in dialogue, none were critical of HT-I's position, expressing pro-HT-I rhetoric instead. Most of the topics followed this pattern, half engaging in dialogue and half expressing support.

One interesting feature of the comment posting was the date and time of day of the posting. From this one could determine when visitors posted the comments according to the following categories: typical office hours (8am-5pm except lunch), lunch (11am-1pm), travel home (5pm-7pm) and night (7pm-5am). Postings followed this pattern: 70% of the postings were during office hours, 14% were done during lunch, 8% were made at home or on the way home possibly at an Internet kiosk, with 5% posting at night and 3% measuring early morning hours,

most likely from home. Clearly, 84% of HT-I posters did their postings during office hours (office and lunch), presumably using office computers.

Finally, we examined how the HT-I site was ranked by an independent Internet ranking organization, Alexa (<http://www.alexa.com>), recognized as the leading authority by the advertising industry in Indonesia (CDA Advertising group in Jakarta, personal interview, August 2007). By observing Alexa site rankings, as of October 2, 2007, HT-I was ranked fifth in Indonesia among Islamic religion websites, and ranked 2,006th among all websites in Indonesia. Of those logging on to HT-I, 84% were from Indonesia, 10% were from Palestine, and the rest were from a variety of places. Average views by each visitor were 3.8 pages, which is below the average of 4.7 among the top five sites. Eramuslim.com was ranked the top Islamic website and ranked 151st among all Indonesian websites. Of those logging into eramuslim.com, 87% were from Indonesia, 4.2% were from Malaysia, with the remainder being from various places. The average visitor viewed 4.4 pages. According to the Alexa data, web traffic has doubled or tripled since the measurement was taken in 2006. Based on a conservative estimate, the HT-I website experiences at least 2,000 hits per day and 3.8 web pages per visitor.

Discussion

Two of the most popular articles posted on HT-I's website were related to the *Caliph*, a theme that was preeminent with Taqiuddin al-Nabhani's founding of HT. Criticism of U.S. policies and Israel's oppression of Palestine are among the top four issues. All posters supported HT-I propositions, with over half extending the discussion by adding supporting material. It is safe to assume that the website functions to support HT-I ideology for its members. Unlike Weimann's (2006) description of terrorist groups' use of the Internet, which posits that the Internet is used mainly for communication, propaganda, marketing, and fund-raising, HT-I appears to use the Internet for reinforcement and solidify membership in HT-I ideology, rather than as a recruitment tool.

From the postings that appeared on the HT-I website, most visitors were not regular contributors (only a few people posted multiple responses). Rather, visitors posted supportive comments over the course of a month. Experts deduce that there are about 50,000 HT-I followers, both hard-core cadre or committed sympathizers. Other research among radical groups observes that content online is further disseminated to friends in *halaqa* groups who do not have Internet connections (Lim, 2005). With HT-I's website having daily hits of over 2,000 visitors, it is safe to assume that diffusion of HT-I's message occurs among core cadre, associates, and sympathizers. Ismail Yusanto's statement of being able to mobilize cadre nationally within a few hours testifies to the efficiency and density of electronic connections within HT-I.

But with the daily numbers being so low, is HT-I's reach considered relevant? Merlyna Lim reported that Indonesia's Laskar Jihad group's Internet site likewise had a small reach (Lim, 2005). At that time, Alexa ranked Laskar Jihad fifth among Islamic religion websites, and it also ranked above 2,000 among all Indonesia websites; however, its reach and effectiveness were demonstrated by mobilizing a jihad against the Christians on the Maluku islands, a multi-religious archipelago located on the eastern side of Indonesia. The sectarian conflict inflamed by jihad incursions left as many as 10,000 dead and 700,000 refugees. (ICG, 2000; Lim, 2005).

The combination of Internet use and *halaqa* participation makes for a potentially powerful ideological force. In research conducted in Indonesia in December of 2006 by the Program in International Policy Initiatives (PIPA) for the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, the only significant correlation with attitudes supporting suicide bombings was Internet use and discussing the material with associates. This is consistent with previous persuasion research that investigated small group influence on attitude changes (Brinol & Petty, 2005; Hairgrove & McLeod, 2008; McCauley & Segal, 1987).

Judging by the postings on HT-I's core issues—the *Caliph*, *Hegemony*, and *Israel*—the Internet serves alongside other media to reinforce ideology for what Rogers (2002) calls strong media effects, especially among radicals engaged in the HT struggle. According to the Alexa data on HT-I, the second largest visitor population was from Palestine, whereas Malaysia, much closer to Indonesia in language and culture, was the second largest population for all the other Muslim websites, which reinforces the nature of the transnational audience that the HT-I site has within the greater HT movement.

A final observation is that those who post do so from their offices. This leads to several additional insights. One is that many of the HT-I population hold white-collar jobs that provide computer access. This is logical since HT-I has recruited from colleges, and it appears these recruits have moved on and now hold influential jobs. This model is consistent with Carrie Wickham's observations of the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, where organizational leaders were groomed from college chapters (Wickham, 2002). This also reflects the fact that ownership of personal computers is limited, which raises questions about the use of work resources for non-work-related purposes, such as religious pursuits. Interviews with members of the "myquran" blog community revealed that nearly all participants acknowledged that they access religious websites from work. Many stated (unsolicited) that they made sure their work was done before going online for personal use.

Conclusion

This case study investigated how Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia uses the Internet to accomplish its mobilization goals. Data came from personal interviews, observation of their site during two periods in 2006 and 2007, and independent evaluations from Alexa. Results show that HT-I uses the Internet mainly for indoctrinating recruits into HT-I ideology. From extrapolation, it appears HT-I is effective at reaching its target audience both online and offline, with members downloading material for distribution among compatriots who are involved with *halaqa* study groups.

Since it appears that HT-I is using Internet not for recruitment, but for grounding cadre in basic ideological propositions of HT, HT-I is solidifying its leadership. Schneider (2006) argues this should not come as a surprise since this follows the three stage plan propagated by Hizbut Tahrir whereby in stage two it consolidates the cadre before implementing stage three of jihad in overthrowing governments. Habeck (2006) likewise argues that Hizbut Tahrir current posturing supports a jihadi intentionality that when they mobilize after the establishment of a Caliph in some location will come as a surprise to governments not associated with the newly formed Caliphate.

All media, including the Internet, are used intentionally in the *halaqa* to establish its grassroots leadership base. Success of this approach can be observed from the organizational growth in terms of numbers – currently 50,000 members, success of its visitors to its web sites, and success of its outreaches. The first Caliphate conference in May 2000 had 5000 participants, whereas the 2007 conference exceeded 90,000, reflective of substantial growth in a few short years (Ismail Yusanto, personal interview, 2007). HT-I shows healthy signs in both solidifying

its leadership and increasing its influence heading toward its final goal of establishing a Caliph who has the authority to pronounce a jihad fatwa.

Schneider (2006) and Habeck (2006) argue that HT will remain below the radar screen until they establish a Caliphate somewhere, be it Indonesia, or any of the mid-Asia “stans.” But when they do, it will most likely be fairly quiet. Yet the newly established Caliph will then be authorized to issue a jihadi fatwa, much like Osama bin Laden did in 2000, leading to the 9-11 attacks. HT’s rise as a potential player in the war on terror should not be underestimated, especially as al Qaeda’s influence wanes. Policy makers in countries where HT operates openly such as England and Holland should take this group’s potential and intentions seriously.

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3.5. Explaining Al-Qaida's Continued Appeal (Brynjar Lia)

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Introduction

Despite its seemingly extreme ideology and its even more extreme use of political violence, al-Qaida has been able to elicit sympathy and support from a surprisingly large number of people. Suspected al-Qaida members have been arrested in dozens of countries around the world, and opinion polls in both Western and Middle Eastern countries have showed that relatively large numbers of young Muslims express sympathy with al-Qaida. In other words, we have a situation where al-Qaida has killed civilians on a massive scale, including a large number of Muslims, but it still seems to enjoy relatively widespread support. How can we explain this apparent conundrum?

I argue in this paper that al-Qaida's continuing appeal is a result of three key factors.

- Firstly, al-Qaida *propagates a simple popular message*, which resonates strongly with deeply held grievances in the Muslim world. The organisation strives to follow the popular mood in many respects.
- Secondly, al-Qaida has created for itself *a powerful and captivating image*. It has become the world's most feared terrorist organisation, which exerts an immense attraction on young people. In some countries in Europe, it has become "cool" to be a jihadi.
- Thirdly, the strength of al-Qaida's appeal lies in *its global character*; unlike most terrorist groups of today, membership in al-Qaida is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can in principle become an al-Qaida member.

These three factors: *simple message*, *powerful image* and *global character* lie at the very core of al-Qaida's appeal today. By studying these factors in more detail, we may also find clues to identifying al-Qaida's inherent weaknesses. I will return to these weaknesses at the end of my talk.

Al-Qaida's Simple Populist Message

Al-Qaida's core message is so powerful and resonates strongly among young Muslims in most parts of the world because of the simplicity of its message and its linkages with real-world grievances. During the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, militant Islamist groups condemned the rulers in Muslim countries as apostates, hypocrites, and collaborators. They called for overturning Muslim regimes and preached the need for an Islamic state. Their theoreticians talked about abstract notions such as excommunication (in Arabic: *takfir*) and God's sovereignty on earth (in Arabic: *hakimiyya*), concepts which were formulated by Sayyid Qutb back in the 1960s. The problem for these militants, however, was that this message did not resonate with ordinary Muslims. Very few Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an Islamic state. Furthermore, there is a religious taboo against internal strife among Muslims, (in Arabic: *fitna*), and militant Islamists who justified the killing of other Muslims, often found themselves isolated and marginalised.

Al-Qaida has so far shrewdly avoided ideological missteps and failures of previous Muslim extremist groups. It has not propagated the revolutionary anti-regime Qutbist ideology of previous jihadi groups. Instead, al-Qaida has consistently rallied its followers around a simple populist pan-Islamic message, which is that "Islam is under attack," militarily, religiously, and economically. Al-Qaida has focused almost exclusively on the foreign or "Crusader" occupation of Muslim lands, foreign desecration of Islam's holiest places, and how foreigners plunder the Islamic world's natural resources, especially oil. (However, as we shall see, this "far enemy"-focus seems to be changing.)

This choice of focus on foreign occupation, religious desecration and economic imperialism is not coincidental. Al-Qaida strategist Abu Musab al-Suri has written extensively on why this choice of focus is so important for al-Qaida. He correctly observes that very few Muslim youth will sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an Islamic utopian state. Many more, however, are willing to die for *al-Aqsa*, and to sacrifice themselves for liberating Palestine or other countries under occupation such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Al-Suri's conclusion is that

Muslims are deeply touched by anything that smacks of foreign occupation. Hence, he urges al-Qaida to harness the power of pan-Islamic sentiments and the strength of popular Muslim solidarity in order to rally a mass following.

These identities are key to understanding the power of al-Qaida's propaganda. Al-Qaida's simple message of foreign occupation, desecration and exploitation resonates deeply among Muslims today. The reason for this is simple: there is some truth to it. The Western world, led by the United States, has a strong and visible presence in this part of the world militarily, economically and politically. There are U.S.-led military coalitions occupying Iraq and Afghanistan; the United States supports Israel militarily and economically and politically even if the latter continues to maintain an illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories. The ruling elites in many Muslim countries are not elected, corruption is widespread, and there is a widespread belief – right or wrong – that the United States keeps these regimes in power to secure its access to the region's oil reserves. The list of widely shared popular grievances against the United States' foreign policies in the Islamic world is very long. Hence, it is very easy for al-Qaida to find good arguments for its propaganda messages.

Al-Qaida's Image

Let me turn to al-Qaida's second key selling point, namely its *image*. Today, new information technologies are revolutionising our lives, at least in the way we communicate and socialise. Especially young people seem to live a considerable part of their lives in the virtual world of Facebook or in other cyber communities. Furthermore, the new information technologies allow more and more people to disseminate their message to a global audience. In other words, the mass media is changing rapidly. The major news agencies face competitors and the battle for capturing people's attention is tougher than ever. Hence, image and branding have become absolutely vital components in any marketing campaign that aims at promoting a product or an idea through mass media.

Terrorism and violence has always attracted the media's attention, but al-Qaida has succeeded more than any other terrorist group in modern history in captivating and thrilling the world by its acts of violence. From its very inception, al-Qaida has given top priority to carrying out spectacular and unprecedented attacks. Until al-Qaida gained a foothold in Iraq, its total number of attacks was actually very small. Its operations were, however, audacious, and almost mind-boggling in devastation. Al-Qaida is very innovative in the art of terrorism. Its bombing of the USS Cole warship in Yemen and the September 11th attacks on America were unprecedented acts of terrorism. The attacks on America made al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden a household name all over the world, and a powerful media image of al-Qaida was created. Overnight, al-Qaida succeeded in elevating itself to a "vanguard" among Muslim extremist groups, and managed to outbid groups with more limited regional objectives.

Al-Qaida's acts of violence provoked massive countermeasures by the United States and its allies. You will recall that the Bush Administration stated that 9/11 was not an act of terrorism; it was "an act of war". By using the word "war" about 9/11, the U.S. President de facto declared that al-Qaida was its main counterpart in the ensuing global confrontation, which became known as "the Global War on Terror". In other words, the whole world witnessed a new drama unfolding. And it was al-Qaida and the United States who starred in this drama, nobody else. Needless to say, this contributed immensely to al-Qaida's popularity skyrocketing and making its brand name the strongest on the market.

The ensuing U.S.-led military interventions on Afghanistan and Iraq further elevated al-Qaida's status to almost mythical proportions. Not only did these invasions serve as "evidence" that al-Qaida's rhetoric about the aggressive Western world was true, the invasions also demonstrated the power of al-Qaida to provoke the sole remaining super power to drain its military and human resources in endless and costly occupation. The invasion of Afghanistan also had the effect of weakening many of al-Qaida's potential competitors, who had regional agendas and had opposed an attack on the United States. These groups lost their sanctuaries in Afghanistan and their remnants gravitated towards al-Qaida.

Al-Qaida's Global Outreach

Let us now turn to al-Qaida's third selling point, namely its *global outreach*. Hardly any terrorist group of today is truly multinational with branches all over the world. Most violent extremist groups are diehard nationalist extremists who would never accept foreigners in their ranks. Al-Qaida is an exception. From its very inception, al-Qaida has been a multinational and multiethnic enterprise, even if Arabs, especially Saudis and Egyptians, have always dominated the upper echelons of the organisation. The fact that membership in al-Qaida is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality, is a key selling point for al-Qaida, because it strengthens the credibility of its pan-Islamic rhetoric. It greatly expands the recruitment base for the organisation. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can, in principle, become an al-Qaida member. Hence, al-Qaida has succeeded in recruiting Muslim followers from Mauretania to Indonesia. Furthermore, a substantial number of Western converts have played a role in al-Qaida, the American Adam Gadahn being the most famous example.

However, al-Qaida's global outreach goes beyond its appeal to Muslims of every shade and origin. The organisation has also worked consistently over the past two decades to establish cooperative networks with other groups of Muslims extremists in many parts of the world, from South-East Asia to Northern Africa. Some of these groups have merged with al-Qaida like the *Islamic Jihad Group* in Egypt. Others have renamed their organisations in order to become "al-Qaida's branches" such as the Algerian *Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat*, and yet others, maintain close collaborative relationships such as the Taleban movement in Afghanistan and the Pakistan. This vast array of cooperative relationships underscores how important such alliances are to al-Qaida. It is precisely this ability to find reliable local partners that is al-Qaida's strength and weakness. In the past, al-Qaida succeeded in finding local partners by offering training facilities, military expertise, and financial support. In recent years, the organisation also offers media services and increasingly also its brand name to local groups who are willing to work with al-Qaida. Al-Qaida's ability to sustain cooperative relationships with local partners and insert itself as a relevant actor in local and regional contexts is key to its survival.

A final aspect of al-Qaida's image building is its exploitation of the Internet. I believe that al-Qaida's appeal owes a great deal to its shrewd media strategies. The importance of "the jihadi web" for al-Qaida's widespread appeal cannot be overstated. The organisation has demonstrated an ability to exploit the potential of the Internet for a wide variety of purposes. Al-Qaida and its numerous online sympathisers are producing enormous amounts of material on the Internet. The scope of this material is far too extensive and variegated to be discussed in this short paper. Suffice it to state that al-Qaida's Internet resources include thousands of audiovisual products, tens of thousands of audio-files, and probably millions of written documents. They span a wide

range of genres, all designed to cater to the needs of jihadi sympathisers, recruits, operatives, and not the least, the recruiters.

Al-Qaida's Weaknesses

Let me conclude this paper by offering a few thoughts on al-Qaida's current and future weaknesses, especially in terms of its appeal. A major weakness of groups like al-Qaida is that it is always difficult to justify the killing of civilians. You will recall that there were mass demonstrations in Jordan and Morocco against al-Qaida following terrorist attacks by al-Qaida-related groups. A number of leading militant ideologues, from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in Egypt to Salman al-Awda in Saudi Arabia, have severely censured al-Qaida for its acts of violence. Such criticism does not go unheeded. Ayman al-Zawahiri felt compelled to respond to al-Sharif's criticism in a 200 page document that was posted on the Internet last year. Al-Zawahiri even described the document as the most painful text he had ever written.

Such schisms are not new to al-Qaida. In fact, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) study *Cracks in the Foundation* (Brown, 2007), based on declassified al-Qaida documents retrieved from Afghanistan reveals that there has been far more internal dissent in al-Qaida than has hitherto been acknowledged. These internal tensions started right after al-Qaida's foundation, and have been a recurrent feature of al-Qaida. Interestingly, over the past few years, we have seen signs of policy disagreements between al-Zawahiri and bin Ladin on al-Qaida's future course of action. The first such disagreement was evident in statements following the Lal-Masjid showdown in Pakistan during the summer of 2007 when bin Ladin called for a jihadi uprising in Pakistan while al-Zawahiri urged that all efforts be concentrated on supporting the Afghan Taliban. In general, bin Ladin appears to push for jihad against the "near enemy" far more aggressively than al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaida's second-in-command has also called upon his followers to explore ways of non-violent activism, in particular in Egypt, while bin Ladin dismisses demonstrations and protest campaigns as a diversion and a waste of time.

This brings us to another inherent weakness of al-Qaida: namely its unwillingness to prepare for a future transition to politics. Al-Qaida's appeal is totally dependent on the continuation of violence. Its brand-name is simultaneous car bomb attacks with suicide bombers, not state building and party politics. Bin Ladin has said that al-Qaida's victory is simply to inflict pain and economic losses on the enemy and undermine his political resolve. As a religiously linked ideological movement, al-Qaida clearly finds it difficult to articulate political strategies. While al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaida strategists have outlined rational strategies for liberating Islamic territory and building a state-like entity, other ideological voices in al-Qaida dismisses the term strategy as a Western invention. For them, the strategy of al-Qaida is simply to please God through its continued destruction of its named enemies.

At some point, al-Qaida's image will inevitably fade; all extremist ideologies have a limited life span, so does al-Qaida's extremist interpretation of Islam. Sometime in the future, al-Qaida will lose its attraction among the youth, and to pose as a jihadist will no longer be "cool." Already, al-Qaida is slowly but steadily becoming yesterday's enemy. Bin Ladin statements are no longer top news stories, and even fewer journalist pour over the contents of al-Zawahiri's most recent speeches. At the same time, the 'Obama factor' has greatly improved the image of the United States internationally and undermines the credibility of al-Qaida's hate propaganda.

It may be that the lack of political visions in al-Qaida will doom the organisation before it loses its captivating image. Already, we find that opinion polls in the Middle Eastern countries show that people only support al-Qaida because it is anti-American. Very few people would like to see Osama bin Laden as their ruler. Hence, it is not very likely that al-Qaida should be willing to negotiate seriously with the United States, nor is it likely that the U.S. would negotiate with al-Qaida, although the issue has now been raised in Britain. However, al-Qaida's biggest problem is that several of its key regional partners in Iraq and Afghanistan are contemplating the idea of negotiating a political solution with their enemies. This spells trouble for al-Qaida. If the Taleban movement agrees to a ceasefire and enters into serious negotiations with the Karzai government, al-Qaida will no longer be useful to the Taleban. On the contrary, the Taleban might consider al-Qaida a major liability, which it needs to get rid of. Or alternatively, the Taleban might begin to view individual al-Qaida fighters as bargaining chips, which can be handed over for a suitable price. Both outcomes are of course very bad for al-Qaida's future.

For now, however, this is still an unlikely scenario. Even if the sympathy for al-Qaida appears to be on the wane and its ideological message has come under attacks, the organisation will continue to enjoy a degree of support. The Gaza war earlier this year was clearly a vitamin injection to al-Qaida's propaganda campaign. More generally, as long as the United States and its Western allies continue to maintain a strong and high-profile military, political and economic presence in the Islamic world, al-Qaida is ensured a certain minimum level of support.

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3.6. Ideological Basis for Islamic Radicalism and Implications for Deradicalization (Sherifa Zuhur)

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Background

Approaches to counter violent Islamic extremism predate 9/11 and, since then, have traversed an all-encompassing critique of Islamic thought and practice. Recently, we have seen views that de-emphasize ideological, historical, and political reasons for violence. These approaches wield epidemiological and criminological concepts and treat networking and terrorism in universalist and mechanistic terms, as if Mexican and Columbian gangs, liberal left-wing global activists, and Islamic extremists are more similar than they are different (Manwaring, 2009; Wiest, 2007; Williams, 2009). At the same time, Islamism continues to be treated as a sectarian and cultural problem, rather than as a political response to Western policies in the Muslim world (Burgat, 2009). Determining whether organizations are hierarchical, chain, hub or star, or all-channel networks (Springer, Regens, & Edger, 2008) may identify vulnerabilities, but does not provide an antidote to the replication and spread of violent jihadist discourse. Orienting analyses to the network or movement level, rather than to the individual or global political level, has some advantages, but by no means produces predictable, universal, or reliable patterns. Such analyses may present useful conclusions about the state counter-response to terror tending to spread Islamic terrorism (Wiest, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004) or by theorizing about the existence of a war in Clausewitzian terms. However, these analyses are likely to miss subtle distinctions in the goals, ideology, and *modus operandi* of al-Qaida and other groups. Further, these analyses do not address the connection between a movement and its popular support or, in important cases, its status as an “insurgency.”

That connection depends on linkages forged at the individual and community level, which are in turn dependent on psychological, religious, political, and social factors. These linkages cannot be essentialized to a particular “cultural model,” nor do they exemplify a universally applicable process. Despite a good deal of attention to recruitment, or attraction via the Internet, interpersonal connections are extremely strong and compelling in the Muslim world (as in the Middle East). Communities, families, and friendship or business alliances, circles, and sets have a power beyond the reach of the government or the “strategic messaging” of external powers like the United States.

Governments hope to interrupt the ideological or tactical diffusion of movements, kill or imprison their leadership, prevent them from freely acting, and if possible, disempower these movements altogether. Those responding to these movements, especially the United States, have not always understood which aspects of movement counter-reactions are free of influences at other levels. They also may discount these issues and the significance of secondary effects on the communities in which these movements operate, as well as the differences between movements. Some current recommendations that use a movement/network focus suggest buy-out type strategies rather than ideological deradicalization, or selective inducements with some

ideological component, as when the Nasser regime co-opted Muslim Brotherhood and Special Apparatus leaders (Ashour, 2009). These recommendations may work in the short term, but the future is unclear because of the power of Muslim discourse both as a response to identity crisis (Burgat, 2008) and to Western political influence or military force.

A willingness to abandon the idea of “turf” may also be found in certain anthropological or sociological approaches that essentially revive 1960s and 1970s-era development theory approaches,¹ recasting them in the “failing state” format. That “failing state” format has been applied to many states in no danger of imminent collapse (Pakistan, Egypt, and even Saudi Arabia) as well as to more apt cases (Somalia). Some note that the model of the failed or failing state is too broad (Call, 2008) and unhelpful, as it is used to rationalize intervention, which provokes the counter-rationale for jihad. However states are measured, treatment of jihadist recruits as “accidental” phenomena and proposals for state-building as if it can be devoid of ideology are profoundly troubling. We see this in the new emphasis on state building and provision of services in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more generally in the developing world. As a general goal, providing better services is theoretically a public good (by definition addressing those who are excluded and when these do not create rivalries), but difficult to extend to all the poor, and insufficient in staving off recruitment to extremism. We should remember that all the previous decades of enlarging and legitimizing state governments, and even efforts to democratize, have not served as a counter to jihadism in the 1990s, or since 9/11.

A deep concern over the ideological strength of Islamic extremism is appropriate. There were excesses and mistakes in the first seven years of the War on Terror, when various voices demonized the beliefs of Muslims well beyond the violent radicals (thus leading to a ‘second-effect’ of creating more anti-Americanism, or more support for the radicals) or were too imprecise (Zuhur, 2008). Ultimately, where radical views may be shared by more than one organization (e.g. in Afghanistan), what is crucial is whether such organizations will relinquish violence or not.

The debate continues about how best to dampen enthusiasm for violent radicalism confronting the Near Enemy (local governments) and the Far Enemy (the U.S. and other Western nations) in the Islamic world and in immigrant communities. Both the pervasive indictment of Islamic ideas and the ‘new’ answer – refocusing away from ideology – will do little to deradicalize those committed to these movements. We must remember that large numbers of violent radicals are not necessary to wreak havoc; a relatively small number can do so.

Not all extremist groups are identical, nor do they emerge from the same intellectual or political sources, even though some common themes exist in the histories of older and newer groups (Paz, 2003). Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Front Islamique du Salvation fought repression at the hands of secular Western-style Muslim governments and Islamist student movements in Iran confronted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Early Islamist

¹ Comprehensive analysis of development theories may be found in Binder, L. (1998). *Islamic liberalism: A critique of development ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago; and as a ‘self-deceptive rational planning device,’ in Mitchell, T. (2002). *Rule of experts: Egypt, technopolitics, modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press; also see Anderson, L. (1990). Policy-making and theory building: American political science and the Islamic Middle East. in H. Sharabi (Ed.), *Theory, politics and the Arab world*. NY: Routledge.

militants like the Qassam Brigades in the 1930s or Tahrir al-Islam, established in 1953, also confronted different types of opponents, but not the West. Newer radical Islamist groups like Takfir wa al-Higrah, the Military Academy Group, the Jihad Islami, and the Gama`at Islamiyya in Egypt opposed Muslim leaders they believed to be misdirecting their societies; the latter two groups represented a very large movement that fought a low-level war with the Egyptian government in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Saudi Arabia, an ultra- or neo-Wahhabi movement emerged in 1979, and more definitively since the Gulf War, while in Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Yemen, and Syria other radical Islamist groups emerged as well. In the late 1990s and since 9/11, many other cells, groups, and clusters of groups have formed and engaged in destabilizing acts of violence, while also intensifying their own commitment to jihad and formalizing this commitment on the Internet.

Many discussions of the emergence of militant jihadi radicalism draw on different causal theories. Multiple factors were at work: underlying political circumstances, the appeal of ideology, and the often violent responses by states in the region, or, since 2001, outside the region. All of these factors have contributed to the growth and dissemination of violent radicalism. For instance, we can find explanations that focus on:

- a) resistance to Western political domination;
- b) resistance to Western ideological and cultural domination;
- c) reactions to the end of clerical influence in education and law in modern states (Feldman, 2008; Kelsay, 2007; Messick, 1992);
- d) the failures of modern, Western-style, non-Islamist, and even religious Islamic (as in Saudi Arabia) governments to create deep national loyalties (Okruhlik, 2005; Zuhur, 2005);
- e) the social shock of modernization, rural-urban migration, persistent poverty, and failure of national governments to meet popular needs;
- f) the failure of revolutionary, leftist, Arab-nationalist, and other political movements to achieve social and political change, and right grievances such as the dispossession of the Palestinians; and
- g) the failure of local governments to democratize or significantly increase political pluralism.

Some of the above-mentioned factors actually pushed citizens away from other loyalties (to their governments, for example) and simultaneously enhanced recruitment by Islamist radicals, because no other political or social entities were meeting their needs. At the same time, radicals attracted followers for other ideological reasons; for example, in arguments against the *`ulama* of the *sulta* [establishment clerics] (Zuhur, 2005) and for the *`ulama* of jihad. Meanwhile, the defining slogan of Islamist moderates who forswore violence, the Muslim Brotherhood, "*Islam huwwa al-hal!*" (Islam is the solution!) actually became a mainstream idea in many other contexts, countries, and communities. Now, following thirty to forty years of Islamic awakening, or re-Islamization, this slogan is not objectionable and claimed by non-violent conservatives and salafists as well.

The necessity of imminent and militant jihad was the unique priority of radicals emerging from experiences of state oppression, and resulted from their analysis of both Western positions

and their local government's positions. Radicals thoroughly believed they were impelled into activism or militancy, and they exerted ideological pressure on Muslim publics. Then, due to the failures of local governments and earlier nationalist movements and the efficacy of Islamist movements, in combination with their compelling messages, other Islamist movements were challenged. An example is the slow but steady base-building activities of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. The failure of the earlier nationalist, leftist, or non-Islamist radical movements also led to the sense that the radical Islamist path was timely and appropriate, and catastrophic conditions – like the wars in Lebanon and Afghanistan – provided reasons for its emergence and support. All of this background helps to explain variations in recruitment in different communities and from one geographic area or political setting to another. The ideology would not be as attractive (or alternatives so unappealing) without the compelling nature of these circumstances. Thus any discussion of ideology and its role in deradicalization efforts should proceed by first understanding that radicalization is a multi-directional process in which extremist ideology attracts adherents concomitant with other available “ideologies” or social and political memberships repelling or failing to attract adherence. Radicalization also is multi-directional in its interaction with local political, social, or movement situations or events. For example, radicalization can be intensified even when its governmental opponents mount an energetic campaign against it either by conceding that Islamic values are intrinsic to the society and trying to out-Islamize the radicals (e.g., as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or appearing to leave Islamic primacy to radicals (e.g., as in Afghanistan and Pakistan). This inherent complexity and multi-dimensionality is the reason deradicalization may not be effective if it calls for too broad a range of relinquished beliefs or if all it does is address “improper aspects of belief” or create a new orthodoxy.

With this context in mind, let us address the aspects of ideology contained in the New Jihad as expressed in several waves of thought since 1979, the late 1980s, early 1990s, or later, depending on which group we consider.

Fighting the West When It Bolsters the Near Enemy

The determination to fight Western attacks on Islam by fighting their representatives or alleged pawns in local governments, or to attack Westerners more directly was a “new” aspect of an extant Islamic extremism. It is not that Western intentions had not previously been challenged, but movements had focused their opposition on their primary enemy – local governments, the near enemy. Ultimately, it is the West's global hegemony and policies that are protested. Other Muslims are not the enemy, but local leaders who bend to Western intent represent “those so-called Muslims ... who don't have their own will,” according to Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a key al-Qa'ida field commander (Shahzad, 2009).

The radical groups claim that they are fighting infidelization, co-optation, and the moral bankruptcy that accompanies it. Other groups oppose the material, cultural, and ideological impact of the West, as well as specific political and military actions, but choose not to target Western actors for various reasons. This distinction still sets some groups apart from others, but it is important to realize that the West is not opposed for what it is, but for what it is doing in the Muslim world. Other ideas are shared more widely, and these will now be reviewed.

Hakmiyya

Extremists have (along with conservative Muslims) defended the true sovereignty of Allah (God) (*hakmiyya*) as compared to the nation-state and its civil laws. The main problem

here is the distinction between true Islamic practice and the lifestyle, laws, or license encouraged or permitted by the local government. Extremists call for a restoration of God's sovereignty, and thus their movement is one of purist reform. This principle was emphasized by Abu al-A`la Mawdudi in his arguments for Pakistan to become an Islamic state, and also appeared early on in the discourse of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The 1970s-era Islamic radicals determined that the only way to bring about the sovereignty of God was to first overthrow local governments (fighting the near enemy via jihad), which had secularized laws, education, and society, as well as compromised nations politically through dealings with the West. These radicals deemed their rulers apostates using the mechanism of *takfir* (calling or considering a Muslim to be a renegade or a non-believer). They use *takfir* because they are concerned with the restoration or purification of Islamic law (*shari`ah*) and establishment of the form as well as intent of an Islamic state.

Confronting this emphasis on *hakmiyya* is not easy, for it is a core value in Islam. The secularization and renewed call for assimilation of Muslims, as urged by Western governments, many scholars, agencies, and think tanks, will not work in today's Islamic world, which is impacted by Islamic revival and devoid of counter ideologies. The best strategy is to emphasize the history of temporal (as opposed to divine) power throughout Islamic history, as well as the need for moderation. Since temporal power essentially has been acknowledged since the Ummayyad caliphate, there is no reason to sacrifice prosperity and public order for the chaos of full-scale jihad today. Emphasizing moderation is key because, in this way, the imperfect status of society can be acknowledged, but its desired transformation can be gradual and non-violent.

Islamic Society

All actions taken by radical violent Islamic actors are intended to re-Islamize or Islamize society. A truly Islamic society will uphold the *hisba* (commanding the good and forbidding the evil) by following *shari`ah*. There is no dispute that the *hisba* is an Islamic principle; however, the question has to do with the responsibility of the state or non-state authority to enforce the *hisba* in requiring observance of *shari`ah*. According to Islamist reformers and salafists, Islamic society must also cleanse itself of practices that are not truly Islamic and, in the modern period, of unbridled materialism that has led Muslims to stress wealth and status rather than piety. It is important to note that many non-radical Muslim authorities also criticize the contemporary materialism, but call for individuals to take part in healing the social malaise by focusing on piety and actions that help the Muslim community. These authorities do not require a program that enforces extreme change in the socioeconomic order. The mainstream position is that differences in wealth may exist, but the wealthy should aid others.

The aim for a more authentically Islamic society is the deeper purpose of jihad; extremists battling to consolidate power in a neighborhood, village, or larger area insist on social and legal changes in the territory they rule, ensuring more pious behavior, rules, and laws, according to the group's interpretation. One can argue that enforced norms instituted in the Swat Valley by the Taliban or by Somali groups are *shari`ah*-based, just as the *mutawa'in* (volunteer "morals police") in Saudi Arabia also strive to impose their understanding of *shari`ah*. However, in the latter case, the government actually has intervened in *mutawa* behavior on occasion, and does so on the basis of Islamic principles that support moderation (Ansary, 2008). I do not agree with those who paint the extremists (along with the so-called 'Wahhabis') as totalitarianians (Khosrokhavar, 2008; MacDonald, 2006). These arguments confound the beliefs

of ordinary Muslims with the ideals and preoccupations of radicals (Zuhur, 2008). The counterargument from within the Islamic tradition is that, “compulsion to religion is forbidden.”

The longing for a truly Islamic society means that deradicalization of ideas that have been accepted by the local population as “Muslim,” or that are in fact a part of the historical legacy of Islamic thought, is an arduous process. Thus, state interventionism, movement-initiated deradicalization, or some other means of directly addressing the ideological issue to be reformed, is necessary.

Necessity for Jihad

Jihad’s purpose is described above. The most important development for contemporary Islamic extremism was its declaration insisting that jihad is inevitable and necessary, as is martyrdom, because of the heightening of global conflict – the West’s intolerance for Islam and its military and political attacks on Muslims. Even so, the New Mujahidin have focused rather exclusively on militarism, in a parallel to the leftist militarists who emulated Castro and Che Guevara by emphasizing focoism (“foco” meaning to battle; Zabel, 2006), almost for its own sake, or to trap external powers in countries like Afghanistan (Kashmiri in Shahnaz, 2009). This focus on militarism also is a way of distinguishing themselves from the *qa’iduna* (those Muslims who sit on the sidelines and refuse to fight (Zuhur, 2006), such as the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. The insistence on jihad, and discourse of a perennial and generational jihad, distinguishes actors willing to moderate violence, in return for pursuing political participation in the existing system, like Hizbullah or Hamas, from others who continue to emphasize jihad without qualifications or truces. These latter ‘al-Qa’idist’ radicals describe a jihad that is revolutionary, Trotskyist in its “eternal” quality. Ironically, much of their discourse is appealing because of the rhetoric of the actual ongoing revolution that was propagated by governments including the Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi ones, and left-wing parties from the middle of the 20th century.

Battles between activists and those willing to compromise are recurring themes in Muslim history, dating back to the early conflict when the `Alids and Khawarij fought the Ummayyads and a Khariji murdered `Ali ibn Abi Talib for daring to agree to mediation. Jihad movements have recurred over and over; a few well-known early modern ones were the Mahdiyya of the Sudan, the Senussiyya of North Africa, and the Ikhwan, followers of Muhammad abd al-Wahhab and warriors of the first Saudi “state” who battled the Egyptian-Ottoman forces, and their descendents who fought for Ibn Sa’ud in the early 20th century.

Newly Urgent Jihad. So what is ‘new’ about jihad? Abd al-Salam al-Faraj of the Gama`at Islamiyya explained the necessity for jihad in a crucially influential pamphlet in an argument not unlike Muhammad abd al-Wahhab’s. As an aside, current scholars debate whether the radical Egyptians influenced bin Laden or the Saudi thinkers, who have influenced groups from the Muslim Brotherhood in exile to Usama bin Laden. For instance, some blame “Qutbism” for terrorism and what Americans have called “Islamic fascism” (Eikmeier, 2007). This is a historical exaggeration (as is the entire description of ‘Islamofascism’), for Sayyid Qutb actually was an important force in Islamic thought, with a much broader impact than his posthumous identification with radical groups. He influenced both groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas who do not engage in *takfir*, as well as takfiri extremists (Kepel, 2006). Earlier in his life, he called for a *da`wah* (the mission of Islamizing society and energizing Muslims or returning them to their Islamic identity), and then a social and political “earthquake” (implying a radical

but not necessarily violent change of the social and governmental order), rather than violence or jihad as the means of changing Islamic society (Qutb, 1975; Qutb, 1974). It was Qutb's own martyrdom more than anything else that made his book *Ma`lim fi Tariq*, which alluded to the martyrs of early Islam, so influential (Zuhur, 2008). The book, interpreted in the historical context of the vilification of the Muslim Brotherhood by pro-government sources, led to the narrow focus on his conclusion that jihad and martyrdom were inevitable.

Radicals argue that jihad is a religious requirement forgotten by Muslims – *al-farida al-gha'iba*, or literally, the forgotten duty (Peters, 1996; Zuhur & Aboul-Enein, 2004). Indeed, early Muslim reformers like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan argued that the general struggle to be a “good” Muslim (the “great jihad”) could supplant jihad-as-warfighting. That argument was made in the wake of the 1857 Mutiny in India blamed on a Muhammadan conspiracy to spare Muslims from bloodshed. Khan proceeded with the logic that the lesser jihad (‘war-fighting’) was not necessarily appropriate in modern times when there is no authorized Muslim leader. Others had already expanded on the possibility that Muslims could support jihad financially, instead of actually traveling to fight. Activists, including some radicalized through state torture and imprisonment (as in Egypt), with inspired strategic messages and attainable local military goals (like Ibn Sa`ud), awakened the call to ‘war-fighting’ jihad.

The corrective “recanting” literature and ideas produced by the Egyptian radical group, Gama`at al-Islamiyya, attempts by Jihad leaders to dissuade their movement from fighting that helped effect a 1999 truce (al-Awwa, 2006; Ashour, 2009), and Saudi deradicalization campaigns (since 2004) argue that jihadists have been on the wrong path. The arguments highlight doctrinal differences between ‘classical jihad’ and its interpretation in the new *fiqh al-jihad* (jurisprudence of jihad) by contemporary extremists (Aboul-Enein & Zuhur, 2004; Kelsay, 2007). However, texts explaining jihad and *siyar* (Islam’s ‘law of nations’) not only demonstrate rules and limitations (Khadduri, 2002), but also that the boundaries of jihad (or just causes for war) were under dispute, even in medieval times. Both the militants and those seeking to defuse violence have textual references on their side. Jihad most definitely was authorized for Muslims in the Qur’an, although verses of peacemaking may likewise be found. Jihad’s appropriate participants, objects, and rules are carefully explained by scholars, and jihad has been an important factor in determining Islam’s response to attack as well as a cause for its expansion. Bin Laden and Zawahiri effectively countered Saudi governmental arguments about the exclusivity of Islamic knowledge (Zuhur, 2006) that would limit jihad and their claim that jihad can only be led by a proper Muslim leader. Al-Qa’ida challenged the Saudi leadership, accusing the Saudi rulers of compromising their stewardship of the Holy Places by allying with the West, and pointing to the official `ulama as being tamed servants of the state.

A very important distinction concerns the respective conditions under which jihad can be waged, either as an individual or as a collective duty. When it is an individual duty, then every Muslim –man, woman, and child—can participate in jihad, and discouragement of participants with debts or dependents is nullified. Because Muslims are interpreting today’s crisis as just such a situation, we have seen women’s participation in jihad and a general fever of volunteerism resulting in teenagers and persons with dependents that want to sacrifice themselves in jihad. Rather than stating that only collective jihad is doctrinally valid, as do some scholars (e.g., Kelsay, 2007) and governmental spokespersons, it would be better to engage in open discussions with those intent on jihad, with the goal of determining practical solutions to crises in various nations. These types of open debates about jihad are central to Saudi Arabia’s Tranquility

(Sakinah) Program, conducted over the Internet, and aimed at discouraging recruitment (Boucek, 2007; Zuhur, 2009).

Occupation of Muslim Lands and Onslaught on Muslim Practices

The occupation of historically Muslim dominated lands, the *dar al-Islam*, direct attacks on the lives and livelihoods of particular individuals and groups, and restrictions on religious rights provide the rationale for jihad as an individual duty. The War in Iraq and Afghanistan were an impetus for this reaction, as were the Soviets and their proxies in Afghanistan, and the Indians in Kashmir. Some claim that Muslim governments have been complicit in the increased popularity and pervasiveness of these views on occupation and neo-colonialism. Other sources of complaint have developed; for instance, the oil companies have maintained large blocks of Western expatriate employees (and other nationalities) in Saudi Arabia for many years. However, the idea that Westerners should not be present anywhere on the Arabian peninsula, land of the two holy sites, Mecca and Medina, was primarily preached in response to the first Gulf War when Westerners were stationed in Saudi Arabia (Fandy, 1991; Zuhur, 2005). By supporting a total American military withdrawal from the Kingdom, both the U.S. and the Saudi governments inadvertently strengthened the public impression that Western presence – either commercial or military – constitutes ‘occupation.’ This was essentially a U.S. decision that took several years to enact once alternative basing was in place in Qatar, which inadvertently served to strengthen the extremists’ position, and subsequently was extended to refer to the entire Arabian Peninsula and all *dar al-Islam* (lands governed by Muslims).

Some distinctions need to be made. Since the nineteenth century, Western colonialism and imperialism did indeed expose Muslims to direct and indirect forms of oppression, occupation, expropriation, and exploitation. Muslim extremists deny the Western supremacy of civilization that is asserted by Samuel Huntington or Bernard Lewis. They are not trying to conquer the world and they do not feel inferior to or wish to defeat Western civilization, but seek to prevent Muslims from falling prey completely to its “sicknesses,” particularly infection by the West’s social immorality in their own society.

In Iraq, we can admit there was a military seizure of power, and a military occupation. No one convinced Iraqi or Saudi extremists otherwise. Rather, they were either overwhelmed by coalition forces, or accepted an offer in which they relinquished their armed struggle in return for promised influence, cash (as with the al-Anbar Awakening groups), or representation. These groups did not acknowledge that war-fighting jihad is wrong. This is similar to the leadership of the Gama`at Islamiyya, which expressed in its books of recantation that jihad is not sinful, but nonetheless cannot be undertaken under particular conditions nor at the expense of the broader population (al-Awwa, 2006; Hafidh & Mohammed, 2002).

Likewise, the continued presence of Western military operations and troops in Afghanistan, and the air campaigns in Pakistan, provide a focus for militarist, or militant, jihad.

Martyrdom

According to the new militant jihad, the linkage of jihad to martyrdom is key. In the classical treatises on jihad, such as al-Shaybani (Khadduri, 2002), Muslims are exhorted never to set out deliberately to become martyrs, but rather to fight jihad as avidly as possible. However, in the movements of New Jihad, a reverence for martyrdom has been emphasized through recruiting videos, speech, poetry, songs, and Internet-posted histories of ‘martyrs,’ so that

fighting and martyrdom are equated at a new level. This comparison has helped to rationalize suicide operations, even though suicide is anathema and in fact forbidden, to Muslims.

Sayyid Qutb, often named as the inspiration for pursuing martyrdom, shifted from a focus on gradual Islamization to an acceptance of martyrdom, which – like his own – was experienced at the hands of the state, not by choice or by suicide bombing. He only came to see martyrdom as inevitable because of the Egyptian government’s brutality and determination to execute those like himself, whose voices and writings were influential (personal interview with al-Ghazali, 1988).

When recruits believe that they will be martyrs, a powerful psychological component is operating, for even in today’s non-extremist *salafi* thought, one is constantly reminded that this world (*dunya*) is not the abode of Muslims; their true life begins only at the grave. The doubts and fears of the recruit drop away when he is assured of martyrdom by the organization.

Takfir

Because many Muslims are, or perceive that they are, embroiled in a global conflict (though Western governments argue that attacks are aimed solely at radicals or that massive military campaigns as in Iraq were only temporary), the New Jihad has correctly identified local Muslim governments as being influenced, and subservient to, Western powers (Gerges, 2005). The radicals also believe these rulers to have acted against Islam in their national programs, through actions such as the peace treaties with Israel (for Egypt and Jordan), promotion of legal reforms not in accord with *shari`ah*, and failure to address poverty, corruption, and Western interference. *Takfir*, referred to above, is the action of calling a Muslim an infidel, or non-believer, and as such, he may be the object of jihad (i.e., he may be killed for offenses to Islam). Most of the actors in the New Jihad engaged in *takfir* against their local Muslim governments, thus legitimizing violence on authorities, police, judges, or other agents. The Sunni extremists in Iraq also *takfir*, or infidelize, the Shi`a Muslims – drawing on historical arguments against them that are influenced by contemporary fears of their dominance in the new Iraqi government. This is why the Shi`a were called apostates, or renegade (*rafidhi*)-apostates (because apostates are subject to death) and their specific religious characteristics were mocked and identified as un-Islamic.

Paradoxically, attacks in the West are not the primary aim of extremists. These attacks typically are engaged in as terrorism, in order to demonstrate capability, which ultimately cannot be sustained. However, the extremists primarily focus on their “near enemies,” and targeting and enraging the “far enemy” is a secondary aim.

Non-Muslims

The Qur’an defines Jews and Christians as “Peoples of the Book”, meaning that they have special rights, are fellow monotheists, and can reside in an Islamic state so long as they pay the *jizya*, a variant of a poll tax. However, extremist groups have emphasized certain historic claims that Jews and Christians seek to trick Muslims into not following their faith; that Jews and Christians themselves rejected their Message after believing (Quran 3: 105, 106); or that they will betray Muslims (as certain Jewish figures in Madina did to the Prophet Muhammad). These scriptural references are mainly concerned with events in the seventh century, which have unfortunately been complicated by the modern-day conflict with Israel and Zionist forces. These antagonisms are intensified by the easy media access to accusations made by Western

figures who vilify Islam utilizing arguments derived from their Christian beliefs or movements, and who claim that the West is a Judeo-Christian culture inimically opposed to (and by) Islam. In areas such as Israel-Palestine, the antagonisms by groups center around religious rights and access, and have been aggravated by the continuous limitations on Muslim religious rights as well as fears of the Judaicization of Arab Jerusalem.

One can argue that Muslim governments or schools must teach more tolerance toward Christians, Jews, or other Muslim sects. This is true, and indeed such a program was already underway in Saudi Arabia prior to 9/11 (Doumato & Starrett, 2007) and has been enhanced by King Abdullah's interfaith initiative. However, the prejudices stirred up by ignorant or intolerant figures are difficult to dispel when people have little or no contact with the other groups, and in the context of political conflicts like the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian crisis. During recent heightened anxieties over the al-Aqsa mosque, Israelis called for the leader of the Islamic Movement in Israel, Raed Saleh, to be put in prison and said Muslims were "ungrateful" that they were permitted to pray during Ramadan. Yet, they overlooked the fact that the archaeological investigation at the base of al-Aqsa that set off the disturbance is being supervised by Ateret Cohanim, the politically-motivated group currently accused of judaicizing Jerusalem. The political impact on religious issues might be unclear to the average American, but Muslims who witness first-hand nightly scenes of arrests and evictions during attacks, such as the attacks on Gaza in 2008-9, or those following the media, understandably believe that Israel oppresses Palestinians, and are doing so because they are Muslims, Arabs, and undesirable occupants. Similarly, with extensive coverage in the West highlighting Islamic terrorism and ridiculing many aspects of Muslim life and belief, strong fundamentalist Christian movements calling for evangelical activity in the Muslim world, and websites mocking aspects of Muslim thought and deriding moderates even more sharply than radicals, it is not unreasonable for Muslims to make assumptions that Western Christians hate and detest them on the basis of their religion. So, while it is true that Islamic extremists heighten religious tensions, there is a far more complicated ongoing interaction, in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews clash politically. They also fail to highlight the commonalities of their faiths, tending instead to stress their differences and see them as a basis for political decisions about confrontation.

Implications for Ideological Responses

Policy makers have focused on the incitement to violence provided by religious figures. Prison reeducation programs (in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan), like movement efforts to call off violence in Egypt as published by Dr. Fadl (Sayyid al-Sharif) (Hafidh & Mohammad, 2002) and others, strive to de-couple violent Islamic ideology from the beliefs of program participants by emphasizing moderation, and delegitimizing takfir and the brutal actions of jihadists, while challenging their claim to political leadership (Ansary, 2008; Boucek, 2007; Zuhur, 2009; Zuhur, in press). To interrupt the incitement, recruitment, and mobilization cycles, some community policing efforts (London, Indonesia) rely on their networks in mosque communities.

The most effective voices in this counter-radicalization process are former movement members who have recanted, or desisted from violence, as opposed to governmental *`ulama* (clerics). There are some pitfalls in focusing on religious figures and their messages, since they may not be with the same as the actual operational leaders who can move these activities elsewhere. A general danger is that too much importance will be granted to religious figures in the hopes that they will influence those attracted to extremist ideology, without also addressing

any of the root causes for radicalism. It is likely that religious figures, parties, and powers will retain dominance wherever they can (as in Iraq) if they are primary intermediaries. Perhaps this is a permanent fixture of the region, since non-religious, non-sectarian opposition parties are tiny and weak. Nevertheless, responding through this framework is important to interrupt the process by which terrorism moves from being a tool and a tactic, to a more routinized and volunteerist behavior.

Clerics or other speakers who possess religious legitimacy can play an important role in backing the state to urge truces, to end violence, or in deradicalizing movements, but their appeal and influence varies. Where the opposition to a local Muslim government is strong, the state needs to gain the assistance of clerics and/or former movement leaders to deradicalize (Taylor, 2007), and the opposite is true where the opposition has less popular support. Governments may be tempted instead to use force through the military or security services, resulting in unintended consequences—either an upswing in violence (Blom, Bucaille, & Martinez, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004) or a broader underground, exile, “transglobal,” or transnational phenomenon.

One can extend Taylor’s paradigm to a more general one about religious discourse, in that it continues to serve as an important source of legitimacy. This point – the importance of “Muslim-speak” – cannot be overstated (Burgat, 2009). However, a government-backed message cannot remain legitimate if it simply argues the opposite of the various aspects of ideological radicalism because, in many cases, these aspects overlap with mainstream principles and thus the “devil is in the details” of these arguments.

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3.7. A Computational Modeling Approach for Ideologies (Steve Seitz)

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I review five considerations regarding ideology and its place in the study of terrorism. First, I offer a concept of 'ideology' rooted in artificial intelligence and made practical through computational models. Second, a properly conceived 'ideology' (PCI) makes explicit connections to the conditions that foster violent non-state actors. Third, a PCI can explain many of the dynamics of violent non-state actors. Fourth, a PCI allows us to understand the real world consequences that flow from a war of translations (ideas) when participants are literally talking past one another. Fifth, a PCI may provide explicit program and policy guidance in the war on terrorism.

A Conception of Ideology

Most people would agree that ideas play some role in the shaping and changing of human cultures, but this seemingly innocuous generalization confronts serious difficulties when people attempt to show how different belief systems lead to different political choices and modes of political action. The problem lies not in the notion that ideas play some role in the making of human history, but rather in the conceptualizations and measurements of how this dynamic works.

The French intelligentsia known as the Ideologues developed a theory of political authority based on a new and 'objective' theory of knowledge, but they ran afoul of Napoleon's quest for autocratic power. Responding to their criticisms, Napoleon derided their work as visionary moonshine and idealistic trash. Since that time, the term 'ideology' has come to mean thought that is rooted in a socio-historical context. Thus ideology, rather than being truth, is a form of knowledge that is biased and incomplete. In this sense, ideologies are: (1) abstract pictures of man, society, and state as imagined by a given group in a concrete socio-historical position; (2) abstract pictures of how man, society and state ought to be, based on the perspective of a given group in its concrete socio-historical position; (3) vehicles used to explain human, social and political 'reality', however inadequate or inaccurate the explanation (Seitz, 1972).

I also compare ideologies to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm (1970). Kuhn defines a 'paradigm' as the entire set of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by the members of any given scientific community. (1) Ideologies reflect the 'consciousness' of certain groups in concrete socio-historical circumstances; paradigms reflect a large area of scientific experience at a given point in time. (2) Ideologies tell us something about man, society, and the state; paradigms tell scientists something about the entities that nature does and does not contain. (3) Both ideologies and paradigms provide standards and criteria of legitimacy. (4) Ideologies provide directions for political action; paradigms provide directions for research.

How do we put this conception of ideologies to practical use? Consider an 'ideology' as the equivalent of a computer program running in a robot. In this simple application of artificial intelligence, the 'ideology' or 'program' processes information inputs and makes inferences about the next action to take. Just as humans engage in selective perception, the programs can process some inputs but not all, and the programs construe information through its peculiar data structures. The robot's 'understanding' of the environment into which it projects action is thus seriously constrained by the lens (data structures) and brain (inference engine for a particular ideology). We now have the basis for a computational model of ideology and each 'program' may represent a computational instantiation of a different ideology.

Ideologies and Conditions that Foster Terrorism

The sociologist W.I. Thomas (Janowitz, 1969) famously observed: that which we perceive to be real has real consequences. Objective life situations are interpreted and filtered through ideologies (computer programs); hence, the assertion is that people with one type of ideology will not produce VNSAs (Violent Non-State Actors) while people with a different ideology in the same objective circumstances will produce VNSAs. Therefore we must understand the interaction between objective conditions and how they are 'interpreted' in order to understand why some are motivated to terrorism while others are not.

Consider severe deprivation. The medieval fusion of church and state taught that deprivation is a test imposed by God and that silent perseverance is the route to reward in the afterlife. A conspiratorial ideology, on the other hand, interprets deprivation as the result of exploitative forces that have denied me and mine my just due. The first produces no grievance, while the second identifies a target (the exploiter), what has been denied to me (the 'object' being exploited), and a potential course of action aimed at the target.

The proliferation of competing ideologies that may generate VNSAs is commonly found in the same arenas where pathological forms of nation- and state-building lead to weak or failed states. This co-occurrence may suggest that the two sets of problems share a common heritage. The commonalities might include (1) multiple objective conditions involving, (2) cumulative inequality of resources, (3) rapid changes in the division of labor occasioning, and (4) threats to older ways of thinking and acting. In these circumstances, we are likely to see fundamentalist (speaking to the present from a point in the past) and messianic (speaking to the present from a point in the future) ideologies. Both of these ideological forms have a higher probability of generating VNSAs.

Ideologies and the Dynamics of VNSAs

If we think of ideologies in terms of computer programs, then reconstructing a group's perception of reality may help forecast or 'predict' VNSA dynamics. Unlike simple

games, the computational construction of ideologies permits one group's perceptions of other groups in the environment to become part of the calculus of action. That is, the 'perceptions' of group B can be considered as if they were part of the objective situation of group A. In artificial intelligence terms, other groups are part of the field of action. Some constructions of reality (e.g., how group A views its field of action and how group B views its field) are close enough to share certain 'family' traits, while other constructions permit only fortuitous and transitory cooperation. The reverse also occurs; some constructions make groups A and B natural enemies. There can even be mixed fields of action, where groups A and B view each other incommensurately. Event streams can be thought of as inputs to these 'computer programs' and the 'carbon-based processors' transform the same stimuli into clearly related or seemingly unrelated reactions or outputs. Knowing the transformational heuristics within these carbon-based computer programs help us understand and predict what triggers or inhibits VNSA.

The ideologies of terrorist groups also bear some direct relation to forms of leadership. Leadership that is based on more than the transfer of goods or resources (e.g., cronyism or corruption) or a 'cult of the personal' typically involves some standard of legitimacy (Weber, 1997), and this standard is encapsulated in each ideology. In a fundamentalist ideology, for example, the person(s) claiming revealed truth inherit(s) the trust and legitimacy associated with the divine figure(s) from whom the revelation derives. Fundamentalist cults speak to the present from a point in the imagined past. Messianic or millennial cults speak to the present from some imagined point in the future. By way of contrast, a solely charismatic leader, using the Weberian definition of non-institutionalized authority, has a cult-of-the-personal that speaks to the present from a point in the present, and the related charismatic ideology is often transformative in the sense that it seeks to bring a perceived 'reality' into line with supporters' contemporary notions of fairness or equity. (An 'eye for an eye' is still fair play in some ideological constructions.)

Funding of terrorist groups sometimes follows the simple patterns of "a friend of my friend is my friend" (or "a friend of my enemy is my enemy", or "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"), but conceiving of ideologies as the throughputs between environment and field of action (the environment as transformed by my actions) suggests a more complex problem. Terrorist funding activities may be better approximated by hyper-games among ideologues and non-ideologues, where ideologues are playing games with other ideologues and/or non-ideologues who are also playing games, except that the games each are playing may not be the same as that played by another. (Seitz, 1994).

Ideologies and the War of Translations

Karl Mannheim (1960) drew a distinction between partial and total conceptions of ideology. In the former, ideologues from various camps shared sufficient common premises that they could reason together even if they disagreed on the weights attached to different matters. In the latter or total conception of ideology, the premises were so disparate that there was no common ground for reasoning; the various camps literally saw the world in such incommensurable ways that communication was meaningless. The ideological type most conducive to VNSAs is the total ideology. Actors perceive different worlds with different forces at work and different strategies for addressing their problems. These are paradigms in collision.

A battle of incommensurables cannot be a battle of ideas because there typically is no available way to translate from one to the other so as to encourage discourse. Each actor takes an action, misperceived by the other, and vice versa. In computational terms, different actors have fundamentally different portrayals of the field of action, use different data structures to filter information flows, and often even different inference engines. A universal translator may not be available, but good intelligence work requires the ability to map from the action taken by one ideologue to its perception by another, etc. The same holds for how one another perceive the inferencing (causal reasoning processes) performed by another, etc.

Computational simulations of ideologues (Seitz, 1993) make such translations reasonably straight-forward because each 'instantiation' of an ideology contains a simulated field of action, inference engine, and filtering lens. This is the modern-day equivalent of 'getting into the mind of one's opponent', except that the computational simulation allows testing, reformulation, and validation. Simulations of total ideologies in action create a composite 'virtual field of action', or how the overall field of action would look to a research observer standing apart from the total ideologues, each acting from within its myopic constructions of reality.

In his contribution to the Data Development in International Relations project entitled "Through Rose-Colored Glasses," (Seitz, 1993) used the structure of extended metaphors to see how leaders construct an event sequence and communicate it to their followers. Saddam Hussein used a 'trials and tribulations' metaphor to prepare his people for the onslaught in the first Gulf War. A typical 'trials and tribulations' narrative holds that a person or a people are continually confronted with problems and obstacles to test belief, dedication, and perseverance, and if the trials and tribulations are weathered without loss of faith, the person or people have demonstrated their worthiness and have thereby earned future divine favor or intervention. What the American press giddily dismissed as the mother of all battles speech was not an Armageddon speech, but rather a carefully crafted speech through which Hussein told his people that weathering this storm would earn them a FUTURE victory. These two metaphors, "Armageddon" and "Trials and Tribulations", can have significantly different implications for the political survival of a leader after the battle is over and can have significant implications for the policies and strategies adopted by enemy. What the Iraqi people heard and what the American people thought they heard were rather different things with quite different consequences.

Ideologies and Counter Radicalization, Disengagement and Deradicalization

The pragmatic test of any conception of ideology (or any theory, for that matter) is the degree to which that conceptualization and its associated tools allow us to do more and do so more effectively or efficiently than those without that conceptual approach. More simply, does the approach have policy relevance? The conception of ideology offered here has a conceptual and instrumental dimension. Conceptually, ideology-qua-computer program specifies the field of action, how incoming information is given 'meaning', and how the inferencing engine leads to new actions. Instrumentally, the approach allows us to simulate the 'virtual field of action' or the concatenation of multiple fields of action; to introduce standard canons of scientific testing, verification, and validation; to add layers of completeness to our understanding of terrorist funding; and to understand the perceptual constructions of ideologues and even to communicate with them in their own vernacular.

I have made a deliberate effort to put ideology at the core of all components discussed in this white paper. Understood in traditional ways, ideology and its components are other factors entered into a long and variable regression equation. Understood in terms of modern computational simulation technology and the sciences of the artificial, ideologies are the blueprints of political action. We gain considerable policy leverage as a consequence.

Social and political constructions of reality are, by their function, relatively impervious to simple information flows because one function of the ideology is to filter out and assign meaning to bits of information. Knowing how and why an ideologue is likely to act provides the foundation for counter action. But knowing what information is filtered out and what meaning is attached to information allowed into the ideologue sanctuary, or knowing how the ideologue constructs the field of action or how the ideologue makes inferences about the next course of action provide entry to vulnerabilities that are, by their nature, difficult to protect once identified.

In the early 20th century Harold Lasswell (1927) showed how propaganda could manipulate the suasive symbols used by friends, enemies, and even citizenries. In the early 21st century, we can give computational instantiations to the myriad of minds of many terrorist individuals, groups, and organizations. We can also instantiate the minds of uncommitted peoples to see what events, appeals, etc., might push them toward one side or another in the struggle for their hearts and minds. And, although the science is still in its infancy, the possibility of de-programming, de-bugging, or re-programming the data structures and inferencing engines of the ideologue opens new horizons in the war on terror.

Summary Overview

Ideologies are properly conceived as the functional equivalent of computer programs running in our human ‘wetware.’ The diffusion of, and appeal for, competing ideologies bear patterned relations with the structure of power and leadership, socio-economic context, and rate of socio-cultural change, among others. These ideologies qua computer programs essentially construct what the world is, what constitutes meaningful signal (information) in the surrounding cacophony of noise, why things are the way they are, and what should and can be done about it. One subset of these ideologies defines the various ‘minds’ and ‘behaviors’ of violent non-state actors.

Modern computational modeling permits the computational instantiation of ideologies-as-programs-for-action and makes them accessible to scientific tools of verification and validation. The newer technology also allows the researcher to treat the ‘ideologies’ of individuals and groups as part of an ‘objective environment,’ allowing the researcher to trace through the real consequences of perceptions or social constructions of reality of actors in that environment, including situations where competing belief systems are incommensurate. These new tools and technologies open new strategic and policy vistas for counter radicalization, disengagement, and de-radicalization.

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3.8. Role of Ideology and/or Religion as They Impact or Motivate Terrorism or Violence against Civilians (Joel Mort, Tom Lawson, Ignatius Gous)

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The commitment that people have to powerful ideas is only now beginning to be understood from the perspective of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. Much of the earlier work in the social sciences that attempted to explain the impact of such ideas on human behavior has been circular and redundant because scholars have attempted to explain social facts (such as violence against civilians) by social facts. In effect, such explanations simply state common sense notions in more complicated terms without getting beneath the surface.

The reason for the circularity approach lies in the persistent belief that the social sciences are autonomous and have little need for including psychological and biological facts in their purview. In fact, appealing to psychological and biological levels of explanation is frequently met with hostility.

This situation has now changed. A growing number of social scientists have acknowledged (Atran, 2002; Atran & Medin, 2008; Boyer, 2000) that in order to really account for problems such as terrorism or, more generally of violence against human beings, we need to find deeper explanations for such forms of human behavior than the seemingly obvious ones, such as appealing solely to the cultural context. This is especially true when such violent acts (e.g., suicide bombings) appear to be motivated by religious ideas.

Significantly, what we have begun to understand is not the causal role of religious ideas, or more generally, the causal role of ideologies of any kind on human behavior. Instead, we have begun to understand the deep psycho-biological roots of various human *susceptibilities* to various environmental cues or triggers that, *under the right conditions*, “awaken” these susceptibilities and propel human beings to engage in violent acts. For example, humans are particularly susceptible to identifying outgroup members by means of various perceptual cues such as skin color (Hirschfeld, 1996), facial features (Corenblum & Meissner, 2005), speaking accents (Kinzler et al., in press), as well as other culturally specific cues such as dress, diet, and

artifacts. What is not as well known is how these readily made identifications may be linked to aggressive behaviors against outgroup members. Various cognitive mechanisms are potentially complicit. Human precautionary threat detection systems (Boyer & Liénard, 2007; Szechtman & Woody, 2004) may, in some cases, be triggered by such identifications (Kinzler & Shutts, 2008) making us vigilant against potential predation or aggression threats and generate precautionary strategies such as adopting aggressive attitudes and even engaging in violent acts against the members of outgroups. Recent examples are Romanians in Belfast and Zimbabweans in South Africa. Furthermore, these mechanisms also are capable of pathological development. In the case of threat detection systems, physical (brain) trauma and/or emotional trauma may result in changes in precautionary cognitive processing (e.g., problem solving, attention) and the resulting behavioral outputs (e.g., impulsivity, irritability, aggressive behavior) – in many cases without any awareness on the part of the person affected (McAllister, 2008). Threat detection related disorders like post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have been found to occur frequently in conflict zones including South Africa (Seedat et al., 2003) and have been correlated with violent criminal behavior, both in terms of a consequence of exposure to trauma and as a precursor to such behavior (Erlinder, 1984). This is a darker picture of human nature, but also a more helpful one, because knowledge of such susceptibilities leads to new means for controlling them.

To talk of susceptibility is to talk of *a tendency to behave in a certain way in the presence of certain cues*. Whereas in the past behavioral psychologists tended to treat all cues as equally capable of precipitating or reinforcing certain forms of behavior, our picture of the human mind has now become much more interesting and complicated. Rather than being a “black box” capable of responding to any stimulus in a mechanical and completely predictable manner, because of the modularity of mind, we have come to understand that not all cues are equal. For example, in the course of psychological development the recognition of faces occurs at a different stage of cognitive development than the recognition of some of the complexities of human speech. Face recognition capacity develops by age two months whereas some of the more complex speech recognition capacities are not in place until age five years (Nelson 2001). Responses to visual cues, responses to olfactory cues, and responses to sonic cues involve different mechanisms. Furthermore, responses to *imminent* danger cues activate different mechanisms than response to *potential* danger cues (Boyer and Liénard 2007).

So what can we say about apparently religiously motivated violence? First of all, ‘religion’ causes nothing. It does not exist *as a causal entity* (Mort & Slone, 2006) despite the persistence of claims to the contrary in the social sciences in general (Whitehouse & Laidlaw, 2007). It is important to maintain a clear distinction between cause and corollary rationalization, specifically when making motivational claims. At one level it does seem that religious ideas are complicit in *motivating* various behaviors including violent behavior. Conventional wisdom suggests that religious conceptual schemes are very effective for doing so (as well as being optimally designed for transmission). However, while religious ideas are commonly appealed to when informants (and even perpetrators) explicitly rationalize their past or imminent actions, that these ideas can be viably claimed to be the actual *causes* of violent behavior is much more dubious, however popular. Claims that religious ideas are the motivating/causal force for violent acts amount to *cum hoc ergo propter hoc* (with this, therefore, because of this) arguments, i.e., proposing causality because one thing, ‘religion,’ accompanies another, ‘a violent act.’ Such mere correlations do not count as causal explanations but at best as empirical generalizations (Boyer, 2005). Rather, a more viable account is that violent behavior is the output of an

aggregate of evolutionarily ‘selected for’ cognitive systems responsible for psychological stances concerning coalitions, mate guarding, hazard management, social information management, etc. – all stances that lend high adaptive value and that suggest that there is an evolutionary advantage if humans are highly susceptible to the activation of the complicit cognitive systems.

This proposed account indicates that even if ‘religious’ conceptual schemes were to disappear as cultural artifacts, the relevant cognitive systems would still produce the violent behavior we study and alternative schemes would be used to rationalize them. In other words, *it is not the case that the conditions either necessary or optimal for triggering those cognitive systems, an aggregate of which result in a set of violent behavioral outputs, require or follow from a ‘religious’ aspect.* This claim is in direct opposition to the implied conventional wisdom that not only influences elected representatives and their constituents but also informs policy making, particularly when making judgments about adherents to religious systems and their tendencies toward terrorist activity (e.g., claims that some religious traditions are inherently more violent than others [e.g., Islam vs. Sikhism]).

Religious ideas, particularly theological and ideological, ARE in fact handy post hoc rationalizations for violent behavior. It is perhaps for this rationalization that the byproducts of various cognitive systems (e.g., religious representations) are well suited, rather than for promoting violence, increasing solidarity, group cohesion, etc. Yet there exists a false dichotomy between so-called ‘traditional’ or ‘primitive’ religions and ‘world’ religions. The category of ‘traditional religion’ usually includes religious systems with little or no written doctrine such as Zulu traditional religion (Lawson, 1984; Berglund, 1989) or the practices of the Pomio Kivung (Whitehouse, 1995). World religions include those with a long and complex theological lore such as Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism, each with many different strands or schools of thought. Often the categorical lines are drawn between East and West or small scale groups and large civilizations. However, this dichotomy is the result of mistaking theological religious ideas with folk religious ideas and behaviours, in other words, to use the language of Robert McCauley (2000), unnatural versus natural thoughts or acts. Both “natural” and “unnatural” reference the notions of noncultural features and intuitive cognitive processing (McCauley, 2000; Boyer 1994). Natural thoughts and acts do not rely on cultural scaffolding for processing or transmission whereas unnatural thoughts and acts are heavily dependent on counter-intuitive tools such as formal logic, reflective reasoning, literacy, etc. For example, Christian theological notions such as the omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience of God, while taken by many to be part of the bedrock of Christianity are, in fact, very difficult to process, philosophical propositions that most people, even theologians, abandon when faced with real time tasks. Typically, these concepts are abandoned for behavioral outputs that reside within the actual domains of ordinary human cognitive processing: characterizing God as engaging in acts temporally, being in one place at a time, etc. (Barrett & Keil, 1996). The explanatory significance of this tendency is twofold.

First, it provides insight into the transmission of ideas, both how the transmission process works and what sorts of ideas are generated, survive, and persist. If seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that theologians such as Paul Tillich (1957) often despaired of lay people (to whom his work was ostensibly directed) due to the fact that they persisted in clinging to so-called superstitious ideas specifically refuted by theological precepts. Theological ideas, like

scientific ideas, are (generally) outside of the proper domain of our ordinary cognitive systems while many superstitions are comfortably within those boundaries (McCauley, 2000).

Second, the tendency of human cognition to lean toward thoughts and acts that depend less on cultural scaffolding and more on intuitive cognitive processing should (further) bolster the claim that the explanatory framework that accounts for human behavior in general, and religiously motivated violence in particular, should not be based on the explicit, often theological, reports of perpetrators or observers but rather on the ‘natural’ domains of cognitive processing. Instead, focusing on the former is very common in both common sense thought, policy making and, somewhat surprisingly, scholarly thought. That it exists in the latter is likely the result of a social scientific preoccupation with the formalized doctrinal trappings of religious systems (i.e., theological literature, codified rules, etc) coupled with the erroneous assumption that such explicit beliefs directly cause specific behavior (e.g. violence).

Examples of apparently religiously motivated violence help to illustrate the prevalence of the often mistaken tendency to both identify religion as a causal factor for violent behavior and accept the explicit accounts for this behavior by actors and observers. Pipe bombs in London, Dublin, Derry, and Belfast, often rationalized by religious rhetoric dividing Catholic and Protestant. Car bombs in Iraq, the motivations for which have been suggested to be the gain of martyrdom rewards, fighting for the true faith, and cleansing the area of Western secularism. Suicide bombings in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank carried out in the name of Zionism, Islamic Jihad. Car bombs in the USA, specifically Oklahoma City, included actors that were members of Christian militia groups whose ideologies vary but consistently appeal to religious precepts. Mass suicides – Jonestown, Heaven’s Gate -- for explicitly religious reasons (e.g., the way to board a spaceship carrying Jesus). A murder in the UK, seemingly motivated by religion, involving a recent immigrant to the UK from Lesotho who killed his mother-in-law (or stepmother) because, when she waved a red cloth, he felt she was evil and possessed by the devil or spirit and so he killed her. New England, USA, where women accused of being “witches” were drowned or killed by hanging to cleanse the community of their evil or Lesotho where “witches” were barricaded in a rondavel and burnt alive.

These examples are of violence that does not stem exclusively from pathology (Wrangham, 1996) even though often “It is simpler to relegate these crimes to aberrant behavior than to imagine that we are living in a sacrificial climate.” (Perlmutter, 2007) Admittedly, the impetus for some violent acts seemingly motivated by religious ideas may be a particular pathology – depression, schizophrenia, PTSD etc. However, these instances are not representative of the majority of violent acts with a religious aspect, much like the religious experiences studied by William James are not representative of most religious thought and behavior. James focused on religious “experiences” such as trances, visions, or revelations. Even stipulating the veracity of such reports, such events account for a tiny fraction of human religious thought and action. They are certainly not representative of the well-publicized terrorist acts that are often reported (by both victims and perpetrators) as being caused by something religious.

More often, violence often merely *correlates* with reported or apparent beliefs, motivations, prescriptions, or rationalizations that have a ‘religious’ component. (e.g., “I will kill myself because I want to be a martyr for [fill in the blank].”) The religious ideology involved is then thought to be the cause of the violent behavior. A few types of evidence seem to

back up this stance: (1) Models, such as the Sageman/Atran Madrid bombing network model (Atran, 2009; Sageman, 2004) or recent work done by Donald Braxton (2009), give an after the fact description of events. They are impressive in their detail and accuracy, in terms of the people involved, connections between them, timeline, materiel suppliers and use. (2) Observations – indicators that religious systems are particularly good at providing markers for solidarity, confidence, and coalitions (ingredients necessary for violent behavior: Wrangham, 2007). (3) Informant reports – “I want to be a martyr”, “She was evil so I killed her”, “I am protecting the holy land from infidels”, etc.

Despite these, there is no real evidence to indicate that religious beliefs actually *cause* violent behavior. On the other hand, a lot of evidence indicates that explicit beliefs are often bypassed or undermined by low-level cognitive mechanisms. Informant reports are unreliable for determining true explanations, even when the informants vehemently insist on the reasons for engaging in specific behaviors (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and, anyway, it does not serve us well to rely on informants to do the science for us. Often they are either wrong about the causes of their own behavior, engage in explicitly contradictory behavior, or they do not know why they do what they do. For example, the Dorze cattle herder on an Orthodox fast day protecting his cattle from what he insists are devoutly Orthodox leopards who observe fast days (do not eat meat) (Sperber, 1975).

Because the assumption that religion causes violence is so prevalent, one might ask, “Why is it so natural to *think* religion causes violence?” Attributing the cause of violent behavior to ‘religion’ IS easy (i.e., appeals to our common sense), but sometimes the elephant in the room is not an elephant, much as we insist that it is. The blindness is not in our mistaking the elephant for something else – greed, need, grievance (Tremelin, 2007) – but rather our insistence that it is an elephant, no matter what.

Since religious ideas and practices are ‘present’ or ‘engaged in’ concurrent with (and sometimes are the explicitly reported impetus for) many kinds of situations including violent (as well as beneficent) acts, it nevertheless seems reasonable to hypothesize that there is some more fundamental explanation for the cause of such acts. Therefore, cultural artifacts (like Jihadist ideologies) may be red herrings, in terms of explanations of, or predictors for, violent behavior.

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3.9. Religious Ideology and Terrorism: Anthropological Considerations (Alan Sandstrom)

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Executive Summary

Ideology has often been implicated in violent, radical movements (Rapoport, 1984) and since 9/11, much attention has been devoted to the ideological underpinnings of violent Jihadist groups and others (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Habeck, 2006; Jurgensmeyer, 2004; Ranstorp, 2004; Schbley & McCauley, 2005; Stern, 2003). Scholars and other experts hardly agree on the role religious ideology plays in non-state violence. Is it cause or consequence, after-the-fact justification, or simply a rhetorical rallying call? In this paper, I will examine how anthropologists have defined religion and ideology, and consider its role in violent movements. In this brief essay, I will make the case that the concept of religious ideology is imprecise and because of this analytical imprecision, its usefulness as an aid to understanding people's shared thoughts and values is severely limited. Furthermore, I will assert that the concept should never be used to account for or to explain people's behavior. I will suggest that a better way to think about different religious traditions and the groups of people immersed in them is derived from a research strategy in anthropology called "cultural materialism" (Harris 1979). Cultural materialism avoids explanations based on ideology and concentrates instead on the pragmatic, day-to-day circumstances that condition people's actual behavior.

The phrase "religious ideology" is often used loosely in anthropology and in casual conversation to refer to the set of socially shared ideas associated with a given religion. Thus, people talk and write about the religious ideology of Islam or Christianity as if a distinctive set of ideas or beliefs characterizes the one religion in opposition to the other. Furthermore, these imputed characteristic ideas and beliefs are often used by analysts to account for certain forms of behavior engaged in by followers of a religious tradition. For example, people often say that Catholics have more children than Protestants because their religious ideology leads them to regard birth control as sinful and it is therefore avoided. Major world religions such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism have features that make them relatively easy to identify. They are religions whose beliefs, rituals genealogies, stories and poetry are documented on sacred writings and they hold meetings in designated churches, mosques,

synagogues or temples, follow a yearly schedule of rituals, and have identifying symbols such as the cross or crescent moon.

Anthropologists have had a difficult time precisely defining religion in such a way that it applies to all of the nearly 6,000 cultures in the world. Religions vary enormously and it has proven to be a great challenge to find common elements that distinguish the religious realm from other areas of life. Anthropological expert on religion, Anthony F. C. Wallace, defines it as "a set of rituals, rationalized by myth, which mobilizes supernatural powers for the purpose of achieving or preventing transformations of state in man and nature" (1966:107). In an effort to distinguish religion from other aspects of culture, he listed the minimal categories of religious behavior. In any given culture, these behaviors are "combined into a pattern that is conventionally assigned the title 'religion'" (Wallace 1966:52). Wallace's 13 categories (1966:53-67) include:

- (1) Prayer: addressing the supernatural
- (2) Music: dancing, singing, and playing instruments
- (3) Physiological exercise: the physical manipulation of psychological state (use of drugs, sensory deprivation, mortification of the flesh, deprivation of food, water, or air)
- (4) Exhortation: addressing another human being
- (5) Reciting the code: mythology, morality, and other aspects of the belief system
- (6) Simulation: imitating things
- (7) Mana: touching things
- (8) Taboo: not touching things
- (9) Feasts: eating and drinking
- (10) Sacrifice: immolation, offerings, and fees
- (11) Congregation: processions, meetings, and convocations
- (12) Inspiration (revelation, conversion, possession, and mystical ecstasy)
- (13) Symbolism: manufacture and use of symbolic objects

These elements are commonly found in the widest sample of religions throughout the world but there is no limit on how these individual behaviors may be expressed. In all cases, a careful distinction must be made between the official doctrines of a religion and the actual behaviors and beliefs of people. Not only do the behaviors vary widely, but religious ideology also varies enormously within a given religious system. Many investigators, including some anthropologists, assume a regularity of belief and practice among members of a culture that is simply not the case. For example, for the Nahua people, among whom I have conducted ethnographic research since 1970, there exists a wide range of beliefs and ritual practices connected to their religion (Sandstrom, 1991). Some people are true believers who are literalists while others range from skeptics to outright atheists. Like people anywhere, the Nahua love to discuss religious matters but no two people are in complete accord. There are generally agreed-upon principles, for example, that the earth is a sacred being that the sun provides the energy

animating the universe, and that corn is the basis of human life. However, these are rather generalized beliefs that overlap with a Western scientific understanding of how nature works. If people in small, remote villages exhibit such a wide range of beliefs, those in cultures following a world religion are even more diverse. There is no reason to believe that people in other cultures are more uniform in their religious ideology than are the people in any Euro-American society. Even in evangelical and fundamentalist Christian religions, great diversity of opinion and commitment should be assumed unless proven otherwise. The same is true for Islam, which is practiced under several major schools of thought with many variations within each.

Not only are religious ideologies diverse and their meanings varied, but religious as well as political ideologies are loaded with fail-safe, flexible definitions, appeals to authority, ad hominem arguments, tautologies, metaphysical leaps of faith, ranges of emotional responses, unproven - and unprovable - assumptions, and self-fulfilling prophecies. The amorphous nature of these two ideological realms means that they can blend into one another such that a strictly political position can be linked to religious fervor and vice versa. This is clearly the case with the use of religion by Islamic radicals and violent extremists (Sageman, 2008). Religious ideologies can be utilized to serve a number of social functions that have nothing to do with religion itself. For example, religion may be claimed as the basis for class or ethnic identity, justification for racial oppression or, equally, civil rights movements, engagement with or escape from the world, saving or taking of human life, and the rationale for imperialist or anti-imperialist movements. In sum, religious ideology or, for that matter, any ideological system can be used to serve any conceivable end.

People often attribute their own behavior or that of others to ideological motives. However, in general, people everywhere live their lives as a totality and do not distinguish among their activities and beliefs as being economic, political, or religious. Activities and ideologies interpenetrate and it can be difficult to draw lines between them. Most people have a clear idea of their religion and feel that it underlies everything they do. They insist that religious values cannot be singled out from other aspects of their lives. For example, many Protestants define meaningful work as kind of sacred enterprise that is linked to salvation.

Based on longstanding traditions in Western philosophy, ideas and ideologies are understood by people to have a saliency that transcends mere material conditions. However, a tautology underlies this type of explanation. Religious ideology is understood by what people say and do, and simultaneously, their behavior is explained as being the result of ideology. Based on my study of several world and traditional religions (Sandstrom, 1991), it is my contention that ideology is often so amorphous, flexible, unstable, and frankly incoherent that it has little explanatory power in and of itself. What does explain behavior is reference to the daily and pragmatic material conditions that people face in their lives. In this view, terrorism in the Middle East is not caused by the radical ideology of a sect of Islam but rather by the material conditions that people experience. These conditions can include economic deprivation, military conquest, political repression, environmental degradation, market dynamics, blocked social mobility, or any number of on-the-ground, empirically verifiable, and measurable factors (Gurr & Moore, 1997; O'Neill, 2005; Thomas, Kiser, & Casebeer, 2005). Outside analysts as well as the people who engage in terrorist acts may use religious ideology as an explanation or justification for their own behavior or to condemn a behavior in others. As stated above, religious ideology can be and are used to justify almost any range of behaviors. Islamic peace activists justify their actions using the same religious sources as the terrorists. What has caused

the ideology to be used in one particular manner rather than in some other way? Analysts should look to material conditions to find the answer to this key question.

The perspective that ideology does not account for people's behavior (including collective violent behavior) but that their material conditions often do, derives from a research strategy developed by anthropologist Marvin Harris (1979) called cultural materialism. Cultural materialists search for causative explanation of human behavior in the material conditions and context of people's lives. One important theoretical contribution from cultural materialism is the critical distinction between so-called "emic" and "etic" perspectives. The terms derive from the terms "phonemic" and "phonetic" employed by linguists to distinguish sounds recognized by speakers of a language from those recorded by scientifically trained outside observers of the language. The emic perspective takes the point of view of people in the culture engaging in the behavior to be explained. The etic perspective on the behavior takes the point of view of observers who abide by the internationally agreed-upon canons of scientific research. The etic perspective is verified by how well the explanation conforms to operational empirical scientific standards and is capable of generating additional hypotheses. Emic and etic perspectives are often identical. However, when they differ significantly, it is a sign of the degree to which people in the culture are mystified by the behavior in question. Terrorists who use religious ideology to justify their actions and the analysts who agree with them are employing an emic explanation. It is the responsibility of the social scientist to determine if there are etic conditions that better explain the causes of the behavior. Empirical research that is scientifically verifiable is accumulating, which uncovers these underlying conditions such as discrimination, political repression, relative deprivation, occupation, and political instability (Asal & Blum, 2005; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, 2009; Ivanova & Sandler, 2006; Kuznar, 2007; Kuznar, et al., 2009; LaFree, Dugan, & Franke, 2005).

In conclusion, anthropologists have learned a great deal about the world's religions but there is no common agreement about how best to understand or explain them. The perspective brought by cultural materialism assigns causal priority to the material conditions in which people behave and live their lives. In this perspective, religious ideology derives from the material context and should not be used to explain any specific kinds of behavior from terrorism to patriotism. Idea systems associated with religions are flexible and capable of being used to justify any number of behavioral responses. Thus, analysts should identify material causes that lead one interpretation of religious ideology to predominate over others at a specific time and place. Religious ideology should be implicated in explanatory theories only after all materialist factors have been eliminated as causal factors.

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4. Existing and Proposed Deradicalization Programs

4.1. Radicalisation and Deradicalisation: Dutch Experiences (Albert Jongman)

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Abstract: Since 9/11, the Netherlands has experienced a number of traumatic terrorist incidents that have shocked and polarised society. The incidents triggered a wave of investigations and studies by journalists, academics, government, NGOs, and think tanks, which have resulted in an extensive body of knowledge on radicalisation leading to terrorism. In 2003, the Dutch government reformed its counterterrorism structure, which resulted in the appointment of a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism tasked with the coordination of Dutch CT-policy. The Hofstad-group was a group emerging from the Moroccan community in the Netherlands and engaged in terrorist activities. Members were arrested and convicted to long prison sentences. While the current terrorist threat is still significant (one level below critical), the threat has gradually shifted from home-grown groups to the danger of groups that may come from abroad. Salafist jihadi groups are likely to use the provocative video “Fitna” produced by Minister of Parliament (MP) Geert Wilders to justify attacks directed against Dutch interests. Partly as a result of an extensive awareness campaign, the popular concern about terrorism has diminished and the feeling of security among the general public has improved. In general, Dutch society remains peaceful, with a far lower level of political violence than other European countries. Over the last three years there have been no terrorist incidents with a Salafist jihadi background, and in 2008, only four suspects were arrested.

Keywords: Terrorism, radicalisation, deradicalisation, immigration, counterterrorism policy, internet, networks, threat assessment

Introduction

Two assassinations of public figures said to be critical of Islam, one of a politician in 2002 and the other of a journalist and film director in 2004, led to a situation that has been described by commentators as a “pressure cooker.” Since then, the pressure has gone down, but it is still significant. Over the last few years, Dutch authorities have been specifically focused on the reduction of tensions in society and on improving relationships between groups with different ethnic backgrounds. This focus is consistent with the government’s view that counterterrorism policy is much broader than just law enforcement. This approach is based on lessons learned from a short terror campaign involving the Moluccan community in the late 1970s. At that time, the Dutch authorities also chose to use psychological and socio-economic approaches to reduce

tensions and improve the situation of the Moluccan community in order to reduce their motivation for violence.

A third assassination in 2005 received far less international media coverage. The victim was an activist who ran an investigative unit doing research on the behaviour of the Dutch police and intelligence services. The case was solved when the perpetrator was traced in Spain and arrested. It turned out that he had a personal grudge against the victim due to the fact that he was expelled from an activist group in the 1980s after being suspected of being a police informer. Personal problems also contributed to his motivation for revenge.

In October 2007, Bilal Bajaka, a young Dutch Muslim of Moroccan descent, entered a police station in Amsterdam, pulled a knife, and stabbed two police officers. In self-defence, one of the officers shot the man, who died on the spot. It turned out that Bajaka was a suicidal schizophrenic who had just left a psychiatric clinic where he had been treated for mental problems. The incident triggered riots among young Muslims in immigrant neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and fuelled tensions between Muslims and non-Muslim communities in the Netherlands.

The most lethal incident in the Netherlands since 9/11 occurred during the Queen's Birthday celebration (April 30, 2009), when a desperate man crashed his car through a watching crowd in an attempt to hit an open bus with the complete royal family. A total of eight people died, including the perpetrator. Sixteen others were injured. Several investigations are still ongoing. So far there are no indications that the perpetrator had a political motive. The incident will have far reaching consequences for security measures during future large scale public events involving royalty or other important public figures.

The last three incidents illustrate how events unrelated to radicalisation or terrorism, but rather resulting from personal problems, can trigger intense public debate, fuel tensions between different communities, and lead to other types of violence.

Public Awareness Campaign

The increased tensions following the assassinations and a series of terrorist threats forced the government to initiate a public awareness campaign. It took quite some time before the decision was made, as the government wasn't sure such a campaign would be effective. After opinion polls and discussions in focus groups, the government finally agreed to organize a campaign under specific conditions. It did not want to have a one-off information campaign without any follow-up; thus, it decided on a three year campaign with a certain dynamic that should be evaluated. The results were to be used as a basis for refining the information strategy. The government also decided to focus and tailor the campaign for specific groups (e.g., youths) with message(s) translated for specific audiences and communicated via different channels. The campaign costs were 4.8 million euro over a period of three years. A special website was established: <http://www.nederlandtegenterrorisme.nl>. The first stage of the campaign focused on newspaper advertisements, radio commercials, and house-to-house pamphlets. In the second stage, the campaign was deepened by focussing on specific partner groups and a special focus on youths. In the third and last stage, new television and radio commercials will be focused on the results and the development of the campaign. In this stage, new strategic choices also will be debated.

Partly due to this campaign, the fear of terrorism has diminished from a peak in 2005 when the Dutch population had the highest ratings in Europe. Further, the feeling of security among the general public in the Netherlands has improved. Nonetheless, thirteen percent of the population still fears a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. In 2008, 35 percent of the population felt secure everywhere in the Netherlands. This figure was a five percent improvement from 2007. While overall fear levels have diminished, the Dutch still rank second highest in Europe, after the Spanish, in terms of feelings of fear regarding terrorism (Bakker, 2009). However, in general, people currently are more concerned about economic developments than about terrorism.

People also started to think in a more nuanced way about the origin of terrorism and the consequences of radicalisation in the Netherlands. The majority of the survey respondents think that terrorists are not born as terrorists and radicalisation is not a unique characteristic of Islamist groups. The number of people concerned about radicalisation has decreased from 21 to 8 percent of the population, with estimates of radicalization in the Netherlands lower than in previous years. There is a general feeling that the terrorist threat is fuelled from abroad.

Guidelines for Counterterrorism

The launching of the public awareness campaign coincided with a symposium attended by local administrative authorities in 2006. Speakers from the city of London were invited to inform the Dutch authorities about the handling of the metro and bus bombings in July 2005. The threat in the Netherlands has convinced the government that counterterrorism policy warrants a broader approach than the traditional law enforcement approach. In an attempt to improve the integration of immigrants and provide a future perspective for an alienated and frustrated 2nd & 3rd generation, existing policies have to be adapted. New ways of cooperation have to be developed, involving both cooperation and coordination between new organizations on different administrative levels.

Traditionally, disaster management in the Netherlands is handled bottom-up. The scale of the disaster determines whether it should be handled on a higher (provincial) or even a national level. This approach does not work very well for terrorism. Depending on the type of terrorist attack (e.g., cross-border incidents), there should be immediate coordination at the national level. Also, the triggering of agencies to take action depending on an evolving scenario can be better managed using a top down approach. Effective public relations strategies should be ready for execution when a situation occurs.

The Dutch government decided to focus its policies on the prevention of further radicalisation of Muslim youths and the abolishment of so-called 'hot spots' of radicalization, including the development of new ways to communicate between Muslims and non-Muslims and the involvement of people on different administrative levels. This approach has been working; in its latest threat assessment, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism concluded that four hot previously identified hot spots are no longer considered as such.

The majority of the Dutch Muslims live in the four major big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague). These cities are currently involved in implementing various initiatives not only to improve the relationships between the various population groups, but also to deal with the social and economic problems related to specific groups. Some cities have been better than others in countering segregation. This has impacted the outcome of recent municipal elections.

The Dutch government identified 40 big city districts that were problematic. These districts were classified as “backward” from a socio-economic point of view, based on a variety of criteria. This backward socio-economic situation creates a breeding ground that may contribute to future radicalisation. The assumption is that, by improving the living conditions in these city districts, radicalisation can be prevented. The local authorities decide on their own what kind of projects they will support, depending on local circumstances and budgets that face severe challenges in some cases.

Shift in Voting during 2006 Municipal Elections

A growing dissatisfaction of the general public with the national government has built up over the years and has affected the outcome of recent elections. The outcome of the March 2006 municipal elections was viewed as a score card for the national government. The non-indigenous population did vote and showed a high voter turnout. This event was promising, as some radical Muslim clerics have argued that faithful Muslims should not participate in democratic elections. This activity is seen as a threat because of fears it may result in a parallel society.

The outcome of the 2006 municipal elections was interpreted as a rejection of the national government. There were big losses for the parties of the governing coalition. The non-indigenous population voted overwhelmingly (80%) for the left-wing Labour Party (Party van de Arbeid). Many non-indigenous voters cast their votes for non-indigenous candidates. In 39 cities, left-wing parties won an absolute majority. Despite these majorities, the PvdA formed coalitions with the Christian Democrats in many city councils. Commentators pointed to the danger of an ethnic division along party lines.

New parties for the non-indigenous population have been established that will participate in the next parliamentary elections. Some of them hope to gain a significant number of seats in parliament. One party, the Party for Non-indigenous Dutch (PAN), includes in its party programme the following goals: the abolishment of the obligatory integration course, the establishment of a Ministry for Cultural Development, the introduction of school uniforms, a general pardon for asylum seekers who already have lived at least five years in the Netherlands, and the integration of Turkey into the EU.

Many right-wing parties that fared well during the previous election were essentially punished in the election for their polarising policies during the prior years. Many voters were tired of this polarisation and were looking for a more democratic future focused on consensus. They expected that improved social conditions would be attained by voting for the left-wing parties.

Since the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, many observers and commentators have spoken about a so-called gap between the government and the people. During the election, campaign politicians developed new ways to reach out to the people in an attempt to improve their political involvement. The gap still exists and the Party of Freedom (PVV) of PM Geert Wilders and the Proud on the Netherlands (TON)-movement of Rita Verdonk have tried to exploit the undercurrent of popular frustration about national politics. Geert Wilders, in particular, has been able to organize a new party focused on appealing to the right-wing of the political spectrum that has not fallen apart due to internal struggles and personal egos. Opinion polls indicate support for his party is increasing, and the party is seen as a threat to the governing coalition. The established political parties have difficulty in handling Mr. Wilders’s provocative way of making politics.

The shift in voting was most clear for the ten major big cities in the Netherlands, and had consequences for coalition formation. There are substantial differences in the political climates in these big cities. This climate was very dependent on the polemics between the cultural approach of the integration problem and the social economic approach. Each city has its own accents in this debate.

Quarterly Threat Assessment

One of the outcomes of improved cooperation in the field of counterterrorism is the production of a national quarterly threat assessment. The assessments are based on the integration of contributions from the various intelligence agencies and the police based on relevant information concerning terrorism and radicalisation. On the basis of these contributions, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism formulates a comprehensive national assessment. An unclassified version is presented to the parliament.

Some of the highlights from the latest assessment follow. The international jihadi threat is still one of the main components of the terrorist threat against the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad. Due to its military involvement in Afghanistan and alleged insults to Islam, the Netherlands and its interests are considered priority targets. The main theaters of the global jihad are the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, Northern Africa, Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia. In these regions, organisations are active that support the global jihad. They are seen as a threat to Western, including Dutch interests. As the American surge in Afghanistan is building, a new peak of violence is expected in Afghanistan during the summer. This may result in increased levels of anxiety and retaliatory attacks against coalition partners, including the Netherlands. The probability of a jihadi attack against Dutch interests is the highest outside of the country, particularly in regions where international jihadi organisations have built up terrorist infrastructures and may exploit local circumstances. On several occasions, the Netherlands has been explicitly mentioned in threat videos and audio messages by jihadi organisations.

The local Dutch jihadi networks have kept quiet for some time and activities are largely focused on situations abroad. During the last reporting period, no travel movements of Dutch jihadis to training camps abroad have been observed. Two Dutch jihadis remain in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. It is assumed that the presence of Dutch jihadis in foreign training camps or theatres of the global jihad may result in strategic or tactical coordination of attacks in the Netherlands. This also may be true for nationals of other Schengen-countries.

The presence of Salafis in the Netherlands is increasingly a topic of scientific research, including efforts to try to clarify how Salafi Muslims experience and practice their religion. Preliminary results indicate that it is important to differentiate Salafi Muslims from Muslims in general. In addition, results indicate that, apart from the group of intolerant “purists,” there are many believers who are willing to adapt their religion to the daily life in a Western society (Samenvatting Dreigingsbeeld, 2009).

Sentencing of the Hofstad Group

The Hofstad group was seen as a local Islamist terrorist organization composed of nine persons, including Mohammed Bouyeri, Jason Theodore James Walters, Ismail Akhnikh, Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe, Nouredine el Fathni, Youssouf Ettoumi, Ahmed Hamdi, Zine Labine Aouraghe, and Mohammed el Morabit. The name ‘Hofstad’ was a codename used by the Dutch domestic intelligence service (AIVD) as it started monitoring the group. Hofstad is the

popular name for the city of The Hague, where some of the members had been active. The group was influenced by the takfiri ideology. Key member Mohammed Bouyeri was responsible for the murder of the Dutch writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Bouyeri was convicted in July 2005 for planning and carrying out the attack. Thirteen other suspects were taken into custody on various charges in connection with the murder. Nine of the total fourteen suspects were convicted for membership in a terrorist organisation and are currently serving various sentences, from one year to life imprisonment (EU Commission, 2007).

As a result of the introduction of new anti-terrorism legislation, the trial ended for the first time in a conviction. Although the general prosecutor was satisfied with the outcome, seven cases will be appealed. The prosecutor is seeking further clarification on a number of issues, including both a clarification of the concept of a terrorist organisation and a clarification of the distinction between the separate support activities and the terrorist purpose of the possession of weapons.

The changes in penal law were the following:

- Participation in an organization with a terrorist goal will become punishable.
- The concept of participation was made more explicit and now includes financial and other forms of material support.
- Preparation of severe crimes will become punishable, including the financing of terrorism.
- Recruitment for the jihad will become punishable.
- Conspiracy will become punishable as a terrorist crime.
- The preaching of hate and incitement to violence will become punishable.¹

The judges indicated which evidence was convincing and legal. They also clarified that the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression are restricted at the moment that a violent act begins. The judges decided on a differentiated approach. Not everyone in the group received the same punishment. The judges decided that the Hofstad group was a criminal organisation with a terrorist purpose.

Jason Walters was sentenced for attempted murder, but not for murder with a terrorist purpose. According to the judges, he didn't throw hand grenades to instil fear. Some commentators have criticised this ruling. Nouredine el Fahtni was deemed to be in possession of a weapon, but the judge was not convinced that it had a terrorist purpose. Some commentators have questioned how this can be reconciled with the ruling that he was a member of a criminal organisation with a terrorist purpose.

Some observers did not agree with Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe's sentence for possessing radical documentation. In fact, these were Koran and Hadith texts. The sentence could be interpreted as an infringement on the right to freedom of expression. Members of parliament will investigate how the current law can be adapted in order to prevent situations in which possession of ordinary religious texts could end in convictions.

¹ For a discussion of Dutch counter terrorism legislation see: EU Commission. (2008, 19 December). The ethical justness of European counter-terrorism measures. Deliverable 12b, Work package 6 of the *Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society*. Retrieved from www.transnationalterrorism.eu

In a recent assessment of Dutch anti-terrorism legislation, researchers pointed at several ethical bottlenecks in the Dutch approach. Dutch counter-terrorism policy exhibits a proactive approach to combat terrorism from its inception, in addition to its perpetration. Judicial, legislative, law enforcement, and intelligence reforms have been introduced in order to better tackle the threat of terrorism. Measures are no longer reactive by nature, as they used to be in the past. Pre-emption and anticipation of terrorism is in evidence when analysing the newly introduced counterterrorist legislation. According to the researchers, pre-emption and anticipation are an ethical bottleneck because they limit civil liberties, whether through legislation or through police action. The pro-active character of Dutch measures allows for an a priori limitation of civil liberties, and the manner in which these liberties can be taken away is not clear. Another trend is the lack of fair trials for those individuals who are detained on terrorism charges. Individuals have little recourse to defend themselves.

The case of the Hofstad group received a lot of international attention. As an autonomously operating network of Muslim immigrants, the Hofstad group was an example of a relatively new development, which other countries were afraid could also occur on their territory. An analysis of this Dutch example was believed to be essential to improving counterterrorism policies in other countries.

A number of persons with close ties to the convicted members of the Hofstad group network have not been convicted or were never arrested. Some of them are still under surveillance by Dutch authorities. As the most recent national threat assessment indicates, they have kept quiet and focus on activities outside the Netherlands.

Obligatory Integration Course

Currently, restrictive migration and asylum policies introduced by the government are being implemented. The policies created new obstacles for migrants to enter the country. The new policies try to provide the migrants with a better idea of what it means to become part of Dutch society. Following the policies of several other countries, the government introduced an obligatory naturalisation ceremony. The government declared the 24th of August as 'naturalisation day'. The developments in the Netherlands are closely watched by other European countries. Some of them have already indicated that they want to introduce similar programs. One positive spin-off is the creation of new jobs in Morocco and Turkey. In these countries, new enterprises have emerged that help people prepare for the obligatory examination in order to increase their chances of passing the test.

Asylum Figures and Population Projections for the Netherlands

Asylum requests gradually increased since the mid-1970s. In the second half of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, the figures increased exponentially and reached a peak in 1994, with a total of more than 50,000 requests. Since 2000, the number of requests decreased to about 10,000, partially due to a more restrictive policy. New requests are highly dependent on wars elsewhere in the world and on differences in national asylum legislation. Asylum seekers know about loopholes and find out about countries with the least restrictive policies.

According to the latest population projections, the percentage of the non-indigenous population will rise in the coming years from 19 percent (3.1 million) to 30 percent (5 million) in 2050. The overall population will only slightly increase (with 800,000) to a peak of 17 million in 2050. Thereafter the population of the Netherlands is expected to decrease. The demographic

changes will cause a number of social and economic problems. The proportion of the elderly will significantly increase in the coming years, from 14 percent to a peak of 25 percent in 2040. Predictions indicate shortages on the labour market that will result in a demand for a more focused immigration policy. In the past decade, the number of Dutch with a double nationality has more than doubled, from 400,000 to 900,000. The previous government wanted to abolish the possibility of having two nationalities. The State Council, however, suggested that this is a bad idea, and has asked for support for the idea that citizens can have more than one identity.

Illegal Entry and Permission of Migratory Labour

The estimates of the number of illegals in the Netherlands vary from 46,000 to 225,000; however, if the East and South Europeans are not included, the estimate is 125,000. Most illegal immigrants in the Netherlands came from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. More restrictive entry policies usually result in increased number of illegals. Economists state that the presence of more people always results in more economic activity. They consider finding replacement workers as a temporary problem. In their view, more legal migration will result in less illegal jobs. Some experts say that closing the borders in Europe disturbs the self-regulating mechanism of emigration, allowing for high levels of exploitation, as well as increasing numbers of people imprisoned.

Some say the Netherlands has the worst situation imaginable: closed borders and increasing pressure by a globalising economy. In 2006, the government decided to open the borders to admit workers from Eastern Europe. This decision was part of a larger trend; one million East Europeans already have been allowed into the European Union. The Netherlands handed out 30,000 work permits. Opening the borders is expected to increase that number to 70,000. This decision can have important consequences for specific economic sectors (e.g., transport). The current economic crisis is reducing employment opportunities and has forced many East Europeans back to their home countries.

Concentration of the Non-indigenous Population in the Major Cities

The non-Western, non-indigenous population in the Netherlands comprises little more than ten percent of the total population. The migrants are mainly concentrated in the four major big cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague. Although there are variations among the cities, a disturbing trend is that the level of segregation is increasing. This trend is a major issue that city administrations are trying to counter, with some efforts more successful than others. Rotterdam succeeded in reducing the level of segregation, while segregation levels for Turks and Moroccans in both Amsterdam and Utrecht increased. People from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles tend to be less segregated than are Turkish and Moroccan people.

Another disturbing trend has been coined the 'white flight' from the big cities. The indigenous population is moving away and being replaced by non-indigenous people. High percentages of the indigenous population live on or below the poverty standard (Moroccans: 46 percent Antillians: 43 percent, Turkish: 38 percent, Surinam: 36 percent). The big cities focus attention on the youths of the non-Western, non-indigenous population groups to try to reduce social problems. City councils try to improve the indicators for social problems, including school dropout rates, rates of youths without beginner's qualifications, poverty rates, rates of dependence on social security, segregation rates, and crime rates.

Muslims in the Netherlands

Compared to other countries in Europe, the Netherlands has the highest concentration of Muslims (5 percent) after France (8-9 percent). By taking a closer look at the map of the Netherlands, we see that the strongest concentrations of the 857,000 Muslims are in the Western and Southern part of the country, especially in the big cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, and Rotterdam. The largest groups originate from Turkey (328,000) and Morocco (296,000). Other major groups come from Iraq (42,000), Afghanistan (36,000), Surinam (32,000), Iran (28,000) and Somalia (25,000). Surinam was a former colony of the Netherlands. Many people from Surinam decided to come to the Netherlands after their country became independent. The other four countries are theaters of the global jihad and have experienced prolonged periods of armed conflict, causing population displacement and refugees. According to the Dutch Minister of Integration, between 20,000 and 30,000 Muslims in the Netherlands are potentially attracted to Salafi ideologies, and 2,500 more might be susceptible to violent radicalisation. The latter figure represents only a mere 0.3 percent of the total Muslim population in the Netherlands (Veldhuis & Bakker, 2009).

Tinka Veldhuis and Edwin Bakker describe the potentially violent tensions and conflicts in which Muslims are involved (both within and between social groups), and the underlying mechanisms that are responsible for causing inter-group conflicts. They focus on three different categories of events: a) Muslims ‘attacking’ non-Muslims; b) non-Muslims ‘attacking’ Muslims; and c) confrontations between or within Muslim communities. The authors describe the activities of a number of radical Muslim organisations that have a presence in the Netherlands, including the al-Jama’ a al-Islamiya (AJAI), Arab European League (AEL), Group Islamique Armé (GIA), Hamas/al-Aqsa Foundation, Hizb-al-Tahrir, Hofstad group, the Islami Büyükdöğü Akincilar Cephesi (IBDA-C), Milli Görüs, Piranha group/Samir Azzouz, and the Teblig movement (Islami Cemiyet ve Cemaatlar Birliđi).

The fact that the release of the anti-Islam movie ‘Fitna’ did not lead to angry responses by Muslim communities may indicate two things, according to these authors. Either the idea of intolerance and polarisation has been exaggerated, or Dutch society gradually has rediscovered its traditions and the importance of adhering to common rules and values, including showing a minimum level of respect and understanding.

Africans in the Netherlands

There is a large population of Africans in the Netherlands. Some came as migrants, others as refugees or asylum seekers. Their integration in the Dutch labor market is not very good. Unemployment is high and many work below their educational skill level. Indeed, the Netherlands has a number of well-known universities and schools that attract students from Africa. The distribution of distinct African communities throughout the Netherlands varies from one group to the next. The Angolese, Congolese, and Sudanese are more widely distributed throughout the country, whereas the Ethiopians/Eritreans and Nigerians mainly are concentrated in the four big cities. Due to better economic opportunities, large numbers of the Somalis moved to the UK during the past few years. In general, non-asylum groups (Ghanese, Nigerians) are much better integrated than are the asylum groups (Sudanese, Somali). The speed of the integration process very much depends on the motivation for migration. War and refugee trauma may hinder employment possibilities. Most African immigrants in the Netherlands have a stronger sense of community than is common in the indigenous population. For example, the

Somali community shows a higher level of organisation, which is possibly related to their clan structure. Nonetheless, many Africans in the Netherlands tend to feel quite lonely. Male Somali, Congolese, and Angolese youths in the 10-25 age category exhibit higher crime rates than do other groups. This finding may be related to the lack of norms in their home country due to the perennial existence of armed conflict.

Moluccan and Other Communities

The real question after viewing the data on immigration and asylum is what these data mean in terms of a terrorist threat. The Netherlands had its first experiences in the 1970s with a problematic immigrant community that resulted in episodes of terrorism.² At that time, the perpetrators were second generation South Moluccans. Their parents were given the choice in the 1950s to come to the Netherlands after refusing to become part of the new independent Indonesian republic. They lived for a long time in poor housing conditions and were not very well integrated into Dutch society. The anger about their situation resulted in several terrorist attacks, including the occupation and hostaging of a school and the hijacking of a train. This was the first time the Dutch government had to decide about the deployment of military force in order to end the hostaging of passengers in a train, and this event had a traumatic impact on society. These experiences with terrorism within Dutch borders resulted in an extensive government program to improve the situation of the Moluccan community. This move turned out to be an effective approach, as no more serious violence occurred. However, a latent wish still exists for an independent Moluccan republic. The annual Moluccan demonstration in The Hague sometimes ends in limited clashes with the police no new terrorist attacks by Moluccans have been recorded since the late 1970s. The lessons learned from this period are currently applied in dealing with the second and third generation of Moroccans. Government policies are implemented based on the assumption that social-economic and psychological approaches will reduce the motivation to engage in violence.

Moroccan Community

The Moroccan community currently is considered to be the most problematic. Many Moroccans came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s when there was a big labor shortage. They came as migrant workers and many believed that it would be a temporary affair and that they would return to their home country. However, many in fact decided to stay in the Netherlands and brought their families over. It is the second and third generation that is responsible for many of the current crime and violence problems.

Many Moroccan youths reject both their parents and Dutch society, which, in their view, do not offer them a future. Thus, they have developed a kind of ‘counter culture.’ In trying to develop a new kind of identity, some of them came into contact with radical jihadist ideology, which provides them with readymade answers for their problems. Contact with this ideology is facilitated by the Internet and other means of modern communication technology. Through webpages and chatrooms, they develop their own ideology that justifies violence and motivates them to engage in terrorist acts. The process of becoming radicalized to the point of engaging in collective violence can commence with self-recruitment; however, more and more research indicates that group dynamics and the role of so-called “spiritual guides” play decisive roles in

² For a history of terrorism in the Netherlands, see: Siem Eikelenboom. Niet bang om te sterven. Dertig jaar terrorisme in Nederland. Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam Uitgevers, 2007, 293p.

this outcome. Several radical networks with a multi-ethnic character have emerged in which Moroccans play a dominant role. Further radicalisation could cause one or more of these networks to engage in violent activities.

Veldhuis and Bakker described the radicalisation process as follows:

radicalisation is a gradual process that has no strictly specified beginning or end. It is a twofold process including a shift in thinking towards fundamentalism and a heightened readiness to act on behalf of a cause. Secondly, its gradual nature indicates that in most cases, the direct causes or triggers of radicalisation are unclear and can even be unknown to the radicalising person. Rather, radicalisation is the product of a combination of causal factors that interact and that is unique for every individual. People are drawn to radical movements or ideologies for different reasons, of which some are more conscious than others. Whereas some are primarily inspired by ideological or political motivations, others might simply be attracted by action and adventure or seek group membership to obtain a positive identity. Even more so, radicalisation can occur beyond the consciousness of the relevant person, who might not be aware that he or she is in a process of radicalisation (Veldhuis, Bakker, 2009, p.84).

The European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation also emphasized in its final report the diverse paths of radicalisation:

What follows from the understanding that terrorist groups may consist of different types of individuals who undergo diverse paths of radicalisation is not that it is futile to develop strategies of prevention to target all these diverse types but rather that it is necessary to develop several specific measures which may fit each separate type of dimension and to be prepared to adapt to changes. Some of these types are affected by social and economic interventions, others by psycho-social factors and by ideological and political issues. Thus, preventive strategies have to be tailored to the specific drivers behind each main type of activist and the specifics of the various groups.³

Expanded Definition of Terrorism

Due to European pressure, the official Dutch definition of terrorism has been expanded in recent years. Traditionally, a distinction was made between terrorism and what was called politically motivated activism. Since the Netherlands for a long time had no home-grown terrorist movements, the authorities did not want to see activists who used a certain degree of violence immediately labelled as terrorists. The majority of Dutch activists stuck to the unspoken rule that no violence against persons would be used during their activities. There are, however, a number of cases where their activities could have ended in fatalities. The assumption in the 1970s and 1980s was that calling activists "terrorists" would drive them underground. Due to international pressure, it no longer is possible to maintain the distinction. For a long time, animal activism in the Netherlands was not called terrorism, as it is in some other European countries where activists are willing to cross the threshold of personal violence. As the activities of Dutch animal activists have become more violent, political pressure has been building to treat them as terrorists. The Dutch domestic intelligence agency was forced to spend more energy on the issue and to increase its investigative efforts.

³ Radicalisation processes leading to acts of terrorism. A concise report prepared by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 15 May, 2008, p.13. The report contains 13 recommendations for further research on radicalisation leading to terrorism.

Recent Terrorist Incidents Involving the Dutch

Those who consult the MIPT terrorism knowledge database will find very few terrorist incidents in the Netherlands. Dutch people have a higher chance of getting involved in terrorism when they are abroad. The Dutch like to travel and are very active abroad in all kind of activities, including NGO work. As Salafist jihadi terror organisations no longer consider relief organisations as neutral actors in the situation of armed conflict, relief workers have increasingly become targets of terrorism. In a rising number of occasions, Dutch citizens were targeted. Arjan Arkel worked for the NGO Doctors without Borders in Chechnya. He was kidnapped and held hostage for over a year. In the end, a ransom was paid after which he was released. A Dutch speedskating coach who had contacts in Moscow finally succeeded in speeding up the negotiations. Another Dutchman joined an international tourist group that traveled through the desert in northern Africa. The group was kidnapped and held hostage by the Algerian Salafist Group for Predication and Call (GSPC). Due to successful mediation by the son of Moammar Gaddafi, the German government paid a ransom, after which the group was released. Currently the successor of the GSPC, the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is holding another group of European tourists hostage. They have threatened to kill a British citizen if the British government does not release from prison the radical cleric Abu Qatada al-Falastini. Over the years, jihadi organisations have discovered that the kidnapping of foreigners can be a profitable tactic and may help to finance their operations. Several jihadi organisations have introduced this tactic, causing a rise in kidnappings of foreigners.

The first big shock after 9/11 for Dutch society was the assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn, just a few days before parliamentary elections in 2003. It was likely that he would have become the leader of the party that won by a large margin. He was killed by a left-wing environmentalist. If it would have been a Muslim migrant, it could have caused a severe violent backlash against the Muslim community. The assassination was a big shock because many believed that this kind of violence was not possible in the Netherlands. For many people, Fortuyn was the personification of a new strong leader who would introduce new groundbreaking changes. Many people still believe that his death prevented important political change. Although his party won a significant victory in the elections, it fell apart quickly due to internal disputes.

Assassination of Theo van Gogh

Pim Fortuyn was one of the persons who put many important issues on the political agenda, resulting in heated debates about dealing with the social and economic problems related to the presence of the non-Western, non-indigenous population groups. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee who studied political science in the Netherlands, became a member of parliament. She became the spokeswoman for the emancipation of Muslim women. In order to put this topic on the political agenda, she decided to make a short movie. Film director, Theo van Gogh, was asked to produce the short ten minute movie. They decided on a movie with a certain shock value. When it was broadcast, it led to angry reactions by Muslims. The anger over the film, in part, triggered the assassination of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutchman of Moroccan origin who was thought to be well-integrated. Ayaan Hirsi Ali became an international celebrity and her movie and books have garnered many prizes. She has become a scapegoat for many radical Muslims who want to take revenge on her. Since the death of Theo van Gogh, she has been under 24/7 protection and can no longer move around in the country without bodyguards. She had plans to produce a second edition of the movie. As a result of the

commotion related to the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark, she postponed her plans and has focused on writing books that have been translated in many languages and sold very well.

Since the murder of Theo van Gogh, there has been a lot of debate on whether the killing was an indication of a new trend. The question was posed as to whether radical Muslims would focus their attention on public figures that do play a role in public debates about immigration/asylum and integration issues. The tactic fits strategy papers of Islamist organisations that assume that by targeted killings of public figures, societies can be destabilised. This destabilisation would be the first phase of a struggle that has three stages. These strategy papers also suggest how targeted killings can be executed most effectively. It is not known if Mohammed Bouyeri read these suggestions, but the way he executed the murder of van Gogh was done in a very calm and controlled way. He left a last will stuck with a knife on the dead body and walked away in the direction of a park. He had expected to be killed by the police. He was shot in the leg and survived. From prison, he succeeded in writing a paper that was smuggled to friends who then placed it on the Internet. The text may inspire others to execute new attacks.

New Phase of the Global Jihad in Europe

According to the French historian and Islam expert, Gilles Kepel, three phases of the global jihad can be distinguished (Kepel, 2005). Whether jihadists focus on the ‘near’ enemy or the ‘far’ enemy is a continuing debate within the various jihadist organisations, including al-Qa’ida. Some of them focus on the ‘near’ enemy, while others focus on the ‘far’ enemy. According to observers, jihadists tend to shift from the ‘near’ enemy to the ‘far’ enemy if they come under severe pressure in their own home country. As this pressure varies from country to country, it is logical that we’ll see great variation among various jihadist organisations.

But after Madrid and London, the assassination of Van Gogh, and the various plots that have been prevented, it has become clear that Europe has become a theater for the jihad. The Norwegian researcher, Peter Nesser, studied jihadi plots and attacks in Europe. He categorised them in three periods and found that the plots and attacks have spread to an expanding circle of countries in Europe (Nesser, 2008).

1994-1996: Europe functioned as an arena for local jihad, when GIA activists took their local, Algeria-based, struggle to France, in an attempt to deter the former colonial power from further involvement in the conflict between local Islamists and the secularist military regime.

1998-2003/2004: Europe functioned as an arena for global jihad, when several terror networks linked to and trained by AQ planned and prepared mass casualty attacks against the interests and citizens of the U.S., Israel, and to a minor extent, France.

2003/2004-2007: Europe became a target for global jihad, when AQ inspired Islamist militants planned, prepared, and executed attacks against European countries that contributed to the U.S.-led global war on terror (GWOT). Many of these militants were recruited and radicalised within Europe’s jihadi underworld, and they appear to have been motivated principally by European participation in the invasion of Iraq.

Processes of Radicalisation in the Netherlands

The Dutch government and the Dutch intelligence agencies have been very active in analysing the current threat from jihadist organisations in order to understand the process of radicalisation and in developing countermeasures. A number of key reports and policy memoranda were written with recommendations that currently are being implemented.⁴ One of the outcomes of these analyses was that countermeasures will only have effect when they are differentiated and multidisciplinary. This approach has been successful to a certain degree. Administrative countermeasures taken against a number of radical mosques have reduced radicalisation. Radical Muslims became more aware of the measures and have taken their own precautions. Recent reports indicate that mosques controlled by Salafis are very active in da'wa (literally, "invitation" or "summons" to learn more about Islam) activities and try to influence other more moderate mosques and organisations. Another trend is that Moroccan groups have tried to persuade Turkish groups to fulfill their Muslim duties. This would be in line with the development we have seen in London, with attacks being executed by cells with varying ethnic backgrounds.

The traumatic attacks and the tense situation in the Netherlands have resulted in a wave of academic research on radicalisation, terrorism, and counterterrorism. Muller, Rosenthal, and de Wijk have been responsible for the most interesting collection of nearly 1,000 pages of research results (Muller, Rosenthal, & de Wijk, 2008, p.996).

Many Dutch researchers participated in a project financed by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework programme. The FP6-project Transnational Terrorism Security and the Rule of Law had its final conference in February 2009 in Brussels. During the two-day event, experts took part in seven plenary and discussion sessions, providing relevant insights in the current state of affairs. Topics included media and terrorism, radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, and security and ethics of counter-terrorism measures, among others. A comprehensive final publication of the research findings will be released later in 2009. The project has its own website with all deliverables and background papers, including one on causal factors of radicalisation, containing two case studies on Mohammed Bouyeri and Samir Azzouz. The website also contains a concise report of the final conference.

In one of the workshops, interesting insights were presented on the research of successful and failed terrorist plots in Europe. A quarter of the studied plots in some way involved al-Qa'ida. Furthermore, it was revealed that, while home-grown terrorism indeed is rising, the phenomenon is certainly complemented by 'fly-in' terrorists.⁵

⁴ AIVD. From Dawa to Jihad' (2004); Ministry of Integration: 'Resilience & Integration Policy'(2006); Ministry of Justice: 'Radicalism & Radicalisation'(2006); NCTb: 'Radicalisation in Broader Perspective (2007); AIVD: 'The Rise of Islamic Neo-radicalism in the Netherlands' (2007); NCTB: - 'Salafism in the Netherlands' (2008).

⁵ For details about the project and its results see: www.transnationalterrorism.eu; Separately the European Commission established an expert group on violent radicalisation. This group published the report: 'Radicalisation processes leading to acts of terrorism' in May 2008.

Dutch Debate about Counterterrorism

In the fall of 2003, a memorandum of the Minister of Justice sketched the new counterterrorism approach of the Dutch government. He defined three counterterrorism goals:

- 1) Prevention of terrorist attacks;
- 2) Preparation of consequence management for attacks with large scale consequences;
- 3) Increase attention to the causes of terrorism

For each of these three goals, specific projects have been developed. A national coordinator for counterterrorism was appointed and tasked to structure the activities of the twenty different agencies involved in counterterrorism activities, divided over five different ministries.

There has been a debate behind the scenes whether this coordinator and his new organisation should be developed into a separate homeland security department. No further developments in this direction have occurred since the last elections.

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

One of the main new features of Dutch counterterrorism policy is the development of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb). This development has forced the twenty involved agencies to cooperate in a national framework and has resulted in a national policy. Authority structures and responsibilities are now more clearly defined. Different generic attack scenarios have been developed in order to see at which moment certain measures have to be taken in the preventive sphere, in the crisis management sphere once an attack is ongoing, or in the investigative sphere once an attack has occurred. The scenarios are regularly updated as new assessments become available.

In May 2009, the government published a National Risk Assessment, which includes 33 disaster scenarios. The scenarios are divided in thematic sections, including climate change and polarisation and radicalisation.

A number of specific projects have been formulated that are currently being implemented. The Dutch approach to terrorism is much broader than to traditional law enforcement. In order to reduce the terrorist threat, developments in the major big cities have to be closely watched. Further segregation has to be prevented, and more efforts should be made to integrate the non-indigenous population groups. More attractive alternatives should be provided to youths so that they no longer have to choose between crime and making a jihad. The government is fully aware that this progress is only possible when Muslim organisations are actively involved in tackling the existing problems.

Priorities in Counterterrorism

Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been active in defining specific projects in order to focus their limited manpower capabilities on what they consider to be the most dangerous issues. A major innovation was the introduction of the so-called CT-infobox. This means that several agencies sit physically together in one building with their own information systems that are not connected. By sitting together, they can consult each other on suspect individuals in order to prepare comprehensive CVs of terrorist suspects. These files can be used

to make decisions regarding whether legal or administrative action can be taken against a specific person. The method was developed bottom-up and has been gradually expanded. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU's) have been developed with the aim of bringing in more government agencies. Also, specific research tools have been developed to analyse the information in the participating agencies' databases.

The NCTb identified the internet as a hotspot of radicalisation. Research on the Hofstad group found that it acted as a virtual organisation and that it followed a multi-media strategy. The group provided foreign productions, including translations and subtitles, developed its own productions, developed its own web pages, distributed material via public websites, and made use of encryption. Most interestingly, research on the group revealed that internet-based material from the group contained clues about future terrorist attacks. This finding underlines the importance of internet surveillance. After the arrest of Mohammed Bouyeri, his computer was confiscated. The documentation on his hard disk was submitted for analysis to an Islam expert from Utrecht University. Ruud Peters was able to identify important triggers and events that played a role in Bouyeri's radicalisation process.⁶

Another important investigation was conducted by Albert Benschop of the University of Amsterdam. As an internet researcher, he monitored developments on radical Muslim websites, and was able to analyse the development stages of jihadi webpages in the Netherlands. He identified three important shifts. In 2002, he saw a change in the terrorist threat from an exogenous to an endogenous threat. In 2003, he saw for the first time an explicit focus on the Netherlands as a target for attacks. In the third quarter of 2005, he identified the first independent Dutch jihadi web site. These developments resulted in three overlapping periods. The first period was dominated by foreign-oriented web pages in the Netherlands. In the second period, Dutch jihadi sites with a foreign orientation emerged. Finally, Dutch jihadi sites emerged with a focus on the Netherlands (Benschop, 2005, p. 140).

Over the last few years, the NCTb has coordinated an informal task group monitoring radical discourse on the internet and formulating policies to counter this form of communication. During its work, the task force has identified five categories of sources for radical discourse. For each category, different counter-approaches are necessary. The five categories are: a) interactive mainstream sites (e.g., Hyves, YouTube); b) opinion sites (e.g., Telegraaf, Elsevier, GeenStijl, Fok.nl, Marokko.nl); c) hot spots of radicalisation (e.g., thabaat.net, Stormfront, Holland Hardcore); d) radical/jihadi material sites (e.g., freewebs, geocities, tripod); and e) closed sections of radical websites (e.g., password protected virtual networks for insiders).

The NCTb has been involved in a number of activities related to radicalisation via the internet. In its quarterly threat assessments, the NCTb reports on ongoing developments based on internet monitoring. The Dutch government has introduced a reporting station on Cyber Crime Reporting Center (MCC). The NCTb will raise awareness of the MCC and inform the public regarding what kind of activities can be reported. When violations of the law are reported, a Notice and Take Down (NTD) procedure can be initiated. During the last year, the Dutch police have been involved in a large international project to counter child pornography. An extensive study was written by the WODC on filtering of child pornography on the internet, which

⁶ Peters testified during the trial of Bouyeri. His analysis has been included in: Coolsaet, R. Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge in Europe. London: Ashgate, 2008, 195p.

contains important lessons for countering radical expressions on the internet. The government has formulated a specific memorandum on the maintenance of law and order on the internet, which contains a number of specific countermeasures. The government has developed a legal framework for the NTD procedure. The Dutch police have been involved in the so-called Check the Web project. This project has created an ICT-portal with EUROPOL, and has participated in a research project on the as-Sahab media production branch of al-Qa'ida. The government took steps to ratify Article 7 of the Treaty of the Council of Europe (penalisation of documentation that may contribute to the preparation of a terrorist crime) and to integrate the EU framework decision on counterterrorism (penalisation of the training for committing a terrorist crime) in national legislation. Finally, the Dutch government participates in the UN working group on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

The experiences of the internet working group of the NCTb have resulted in important lessons. The working group will focus its activities on the following three issues. First, it will work on a joint assessment and identification of the hotspots of radicalisation on the internet. Second, it will develop more coordinated negotiations with providers in order to promote self-regulation and the facilitation of information on signals of radicalisation. Finally, it will initiate research into means other than criminal law to influence radical expressions on the Internet.

Conclusions

1. The threat situation in Europe is worsening and possibly shifting to new areas. During 2008, only one Islamist attack was recorded in Europe, in the United Kingdom. During the same year, a total of 187 radical Muslims were arrested the majority in France, Spain, and Belgium. Many of them were involved in terrorist fundraising and logistical support activities. Sketchy information about Islamist terror cells that have been disrupted over the last years indicates that attack planning for new devastating attacks, including suicide attacks, continues.

2. By looking at social-economic and demographic trends, it becomes clear that a number of factors are advantageous to the Muslim population in Europe. In terms of numbers, their position will get stronger. If governments want to reduce radicalisation, they will have to expend more effort on social-economic issues and on integration. Counterterrorism is much broader than just law enforcement, as the Dutch experience has shown. The body of knowledge that has been produced on radicalisation during recent years has resulted in a more nuanced and realistic Dutch public opinion about the situation. The level of fear has been reduced, and the general feeling of security has improved. The situation is still fragile and unexpected events could easily trigger a backlash. New provocations by rightwing politicians could be exploited by radical organisations and could be used by terror organisations to justify new attacks. The response to 'Fitna' has shown an increasing level of resilience in the Dutch Muslim community.

3. The challenge for many European governments, including the Dutch government, is to reconcile a more restrictive immigration policy with a more effective integration policy for the non-indigenous population groups, especially those that are Muslim. The Dutch authorities have made gradual progress in this field, although there are still many problems to be solved. A small cadre of hardcore Moroccan youths is still causing headaches for the authorities.

4. For decades, the different cultural, ethnic, and religious groups in the Netherlands lived together peacefully and did not experience serious violent conflict. Compared with other European countries, the Netherlands has experienced hardly any violence between social groups and has had only limited experiences with violent inter-group conflict. The traumatic incidents of

the past years led to tensions and conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and eroded the idea of the Netherlands as a peaceful and tolerant country. The restrained response to 'Fitna' may, however, indicate a gradual rediscovery of its traditions and the importance of adhering to common rules and values, as well as showing a minimal level of mutual respect and understanding. As Geert Wilders has announced the production of a second edition of Fitna, it remains to be seen if this trend can be maintained.

5. During the past few years, the terrorist threat gradually has shifted from domestic home-grown groups to ad hoc coalitions of external networked groups that adhere to the ideology of the global jihad and are inspired by messages of the core al-Qa'ida leadership. Afghanistan currently has become the main theater of the global jihad, where a decisive struggle is to be expected. As the coming period probably will show an increase in the level of violence, this may trigger retaliatory attacks against European coalition partners, including the Netherlands. According to Dutch assessments, an implicit hierarchy in targets is in use by AQ depending on the number of military personnel involved in Afghanistan. For that reason, it is likely that other countries, like the United Kingdom and Germany, will be hit first. The upcoming elections in Germany are another reason that this country probably will be hit first because AQ considers it to be the weakest link in the chain. The terror network is no longer completely dependent on European volunteers to execute attacks in Europe. There are indications that it is willing to use 'ready made' terrorists from among the Taliban in order to execute attacks in Europe.

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4.2. The Role of Community Services in Radicalization and Deradicalization: The Potential Power of Aid to Marginalized Communities (Shawn Flanigan)

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It is well known that some violent organizations actively engage in education, health, and social service provision. While some of the most visible providers of services are organizations like Hamas in the Palestinian Territories (Levitt 2004 and 2006) and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Fawaz, 2000; Flanigan, 2008; Hamzeh, 2004; Harik, 1996; Harik, 2004; Ranstorp, 1998; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002; and Usher, 1997), other organizations like Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are known to exert control over local nonprofit service providers in an effort to harness their resources and expertise (Flanigan, 2008). While there are several ways to conceptualize relationships between violent organizations and service provision, one important dynamic is the use of social service provision by terrorist organizations as a tool to gain the acceptance of their community (Flanigan, 2006). Education, health, and social service provision is an influential tool because of the power dynamics that are inherent to service provision. As Emerson notes in his theory of reciprocal power-dependence relations, "the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A" (Emerson, 1962). Therefore, the amount of power a health or social service provider has over the service recipient is a direct function of the service recipient's ability to obtain aid elsewhere. In many cases, the service recipient's ability to obtain aid elsewhere is quite low, particularly in the developing world, where many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the sole organization operating within their service area. Because of the prevalence of sole service provision, the poor are often in a position where they must choose between seeking services from a particular provider and going without services entirely. This is hardly a real choice when the services one speaks of include food aid, urgent medical care, clothing, shelter, and other goods and services essential to meeting basic human needs. Therefore, poor community members in the developing world suffer a serious power disadvantage in comparison to a violent organization that is the sole provider of a needed service (Flanigan, 2009). This power can have a radicalizing effect as it is used to subtly silence community members who might otherwise oppose an organization's violent activities, to generate widespread favorable opinion of the organization within the community, and to recruit community members to actively participate in the organization's violent activities (Flanigan, 2006).

However, the power dynamics inherent to service provision also offer other actors opportunities to intervene in the process of radicalization and use community services as a tool to deradicalize community members and generate support for nonviolent entities. This can be done by proactively providing aid to generate community support before violent organizations gain a foothold in this domain, "competing" with violent organizations to be a more effective service provider, supporting legitimate government entities to provide public goods effectively, and supporting service provision by alternative organizations such as local apolitical NGOs.

Community Services as a Radicalizing Force

Community members do not necessarily accept or support the violent activities of terrorist organizations, even in situations where violent groups purport to be fighting for the community's social and political wellbeing. The degree to which communities accept the violent activities of political insurgents and terrorist organizations varies. The level of acceptance spans a continuum, ranging from a complete lack of acceptance and active resistance to terrorist organizations to the active participation of the community in violent movements (see Figure 1). Terrorist organizations can use community service provision as a tool to move community members in a rightward direction from a lack of acceptance to passive acceptance, genuine acceptance and favorable opinion, and active participation in the violent activities of the organization (Flanigan, 2006).




Figure 1. Continuum of Community Acceptance of Violent Activities by Terrorists and Political Insurgents (Flanigan 2006)

Community service provision can help organizations gain various levels of acceptance in the community. In some cases, service provision may result in passive acceptance of violent activities by community members who might otherwise oppose such tactics. This is particularly true when community members are low-income or otherwise marginalized, and when the services provided meet essential human needs. In this context, community service provision can serve as a means of silencing dissent and subtly coercing community members to accept the violent activities of an organization. Although clientele may not be “coerced” in the most literal sense of the word, economic and social conditions oblige them to accept services from whomever provides them. Because many nonprofit agencies have a monopoly within their service area (Lipsky & Smith, 1989-90) and NGOs heavily supplement public functions in many developing countries (van Tuijl, 1999), community service provision becomes a powerful tool for gaining acceptance in the developing world. Many service recipients will be reluctant to express discontent with the organizations upon which they often depend for their very survival. If they have no other service options, community members desperate to meet their basic needs will not be overly concerned with whether or not their service provider is secular, religious, or engaged in political violence. The scale and immediacy of the needs of the local population mean that even those opposed to violent activities will be silenced and subtly coerced by the organizations’ ability to provide assistance (Flanigan, 2006).

Of course, in other contexts, there may be widespread goodwill toward violent organizations and genuine acceptance by community members. The violent activities of some terrorist organizations are merely one aspect of their broader social and political agenda. In light of these political and social activities, including community service provision, it is not unusual

for communities to view these organizations favorably in spite of—or even because of— their violent activities. Hezbollah in Lebanon is an excellent example: although the United States government regards Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, in Lebanon, the group is widely respected for its network of charities and social services. Hezbollah’s investment in these resources has built a constituency that is beholden to its Islamic sociopolitical agenda, and popularity among the disadvantaged has allowed it to enter the mainstream political sphere. Similarly, in Palestine, “the peaceful face of Hamas has been more visible to residents,” (Juergensmeyer, 2003) many of whom benefit from Hamas-supported health clinics, schools, and food aid programs, and indeed voted Hamas into political power. Community services are such a powerful tool for generating goodwill and political support that Sri Lanka’s LTTE has been known to rebrand NGO services as coming from the LTTE itself in order to benefit from the subsequent positive perception in the community (Flanigan, 2008).

Finally, some scholars argue that terrorist organizations sponsor community services solely for the purpose of socializing and recruiting new militants who later will become active participants in their violent activities. Levitt suggests that Hamas uses an array of schools, orphanages and summer camps as a means of socializing religious and secular children to aspire to die as martyrs (Levitt, 2004). The community services of terrorist organizations can encourage the active participation of the community by socializing community members to be sympathetic to their cause, supplying a pool of potential new recruits, and providing a safety net to militants and their families. Sometimes the additional benefits offered to militants’ families, such as widows pensions, special housing, and other community services, can serve as a motivation for participation in violent activities. This has been evident in Lebanon, Palestine, and Sri Lanka (Flanigan, 2006, 2008; Levitt 2004, 2006).

Using Community Services to Deradicalize and Gain Community Support

The absence of state service provision and a reliance solely on services provided by non-state actors is a key factor that makes charitable service provision such a powerful tool for gaining acceptance in the developing world. There are distinctive power dynamics at play in social service settings, especially when the community members served are poor and disenfranchised (Handler, 1973, 1979). Relationships between social service providers and service recipients are governed by the amount of power each can bring to the exchange, and the amount of power a social service provider has over the service recipients is a direct function of the client’s ability to obtain aid elsewhere (Hasenfeld, 1987). This pattern suggests that outside actors not only can gain a foothold in communities by offering services that generate community support, but can attempt to undermine violent service providers’ support by providing community members with alternative services of broader scope and higher quality.

Proactively Providing Aid

Perhaps the most proactive deradicalization strategy suggested by the literature on power in service provision is providing aid in communities where violent groups have not yet developed a foothold. While more research is necessary to make a conclusive statement to this effect, statistical evidence shows that organizations are more likely to become engaged in service provision when they operate openly (i.e., are not clandestine) and have a military arm, which suggests the organization has the logistical and financial resources for larger-scale operations such as community services (Asal & Flanigan, forthcoming). Targeting aid to areas where such organizations operate may be an effective strategy to preemptively subvert the power of terrorist

service provision in radicalization. By reducing overall poverty, needs will become less acute and service providers' leverage will be further reduced. While humanitarian aid supporting community service provision promised to be useful, aid supporting political inclusion can also prevent radicalization. Social and political exclusion have been shown to motivate both charitable activity and political violence. Minority groups form separate systems of social support when they are excluded from mainstream social systems and, in extreme cases, desire separate states when they are excluded from mainstream politics. By ensuring that minority groups have access to services and a valid means of political expression, the impetus to resort to separate and at times violent tactics will be reduced (Flanigan, 2006). Proactively providing aid has the additional benefit of generating community support for the state providing community services, creating loyalty that will be more difficult for terrorist organizations to discourage.

Supporting State Service Provision

Another important strategy for undermining radicalization suggested by research is supporting legitimate state actors in effective community service provision. Judith Palmer Harik, an expert on Hezbollah formerly at the American University of Beirut, has stated (Prusher, 2000): "There's a continuing initiative by Hezbollah to provide more services. . . . People all over would love to have the state provide them because they don't want to be beholden politically, but the state doesn't do it." The large scale of Hezbollah's aid efforts, and the notable absence of others offering assistance, has earned the group great favor in the south of Lebanon. Hezbollah's construction charity Jihad Al Bina'a rebuilt 5,000 homes in more than 80 villages in the aftermath of Israel's bombardment of southern Lebanon, often providing aid well before the arrival of United Nations assistance. Such responsiveness heightens Hezbollah's image vis-à-vis the Lebanese government, and increases its popularity with the local population (Ranstorp, 1998).

Supporting Service Provision by "Mainstream" Nonprofit Organizations

A third strategy for undermining radicalization suggested by the literature on power in social service contexts is using aid to ensure that other "mainstream" apolitical nonprofit organizations are able to provide quality services. Theory shows that sole service provision and an acute need for service increases the influence that nonprofit service organizations have over poor service recipients. If service recipients have the ability to choose between service providers, they will not be beholden to the single, perhaps terrorist-supported, charity that offers them education, food, and health care.

"Competing" with Violent Organizations in Service Provision

Theory suggests that providing competitive services is critical to the success of these strategies in undermining the radicalizing power of terrorist-provided community services. Offering multiple service choices to community members is not sufficient. As can be seen in countries like Lebanon, Hezbollah's services are broader in scope and more sophisticated than those offered by the state, making Hezbollah a much better choice as a service provider. For these strategies to be successful, aid must be used to support the services of state and NGOs to such an extent that, from a purely utilitarian perspective, these organizations' services are clearly superior to those offered by violent organizations. Ensuring that services are more broadly accessible than violent organizations' services by providing services in a variety of geographic areas and to all ethno-religious groups should also make these strategies more viable.

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4.3. Counter-radicalization Programs: Tackling Terrorism and Hate Crime in London: A Brixton Case Study (Robert Lambert)

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When academics and think-tanks address terrorism and organised crime from a top-down perspective, it is generally to locate both phenomena in the broader context of international politics. On the more rare occasions when academics and think-tanks address terrorism and organised crime from a bottom-up perspective, it is almost always to interrogate the psychology and dynamics of groups of participating individuals. This chapter adopts a bottom-up vantage point as well but is drawn instead from research that interrogates the experience of eye-witnesses to terrorist recruitment and street crime at close quarters in a specific community in London. As such, it seeks to introduce preliminary evidence concerning the authenticity and value of the eye-witnesses' community experience, most especially their knowledge of a handful of young men who have become involved in terrorism and street crime. Crucially, this community perspective reveals interplay and inter-dependence between street crime and terrorism that is otherwise overlooked.

For insider observers on the sometimes violent streets of Brixton in South London, it is axiomatic that petty drug dealers operate in the lowest and most vulnerable places within an intricate global network of organised crime. Their commercial relationship with the commodity they trade in is often compromised by their own dependency on it. According to a former Brixton drug dealer with five convictions for drug related crimes it was 'stupid street kids' like him 'who took the risks and got prison while the men in suits who kept clean and made lots of money' (interview, 3 December 2007). As such, the lives of petty drug dealers are far removed from the lives of the global strategists who manipulate their day-to-day livelihoods. Similarly, there is a growing appreciation on the Brixton street that many foot soldiers in the global network of al-Qaida inspired terrorism lead lives equally far removed from those of the global strategists who provide the propaganda and rationale for their actions. On the Brixton street, it has also become clear that petty drug dealers and other servants of organised crime have sometimes become involved in al-Qaida inspired terrorism as foot soldiers. While, from one standpoint, that might be seen as swapping one low status high risk occupation for another, it would appear that the individuals concerned see it differently – believing that al-Qaida inspired terrorism affords them high status and religious rewards. That, at least, is key evidence that emerges from the research on which this chapter is based. It is not, however, intended to suggest a strong link between the two types of criminal activity merely to emphasise three key points: that petty criminals and terrorist foot soldiers share similarly distant relationships with the strategists that determine their high-risk criminal activities; that circumstances exist in which the street skills of petty criminals are likely to be valued and deployed in terrorist scenarios (Kenney, 2007); and that petty criminals may be attracted to terrorism in the belief that it affords status and dignity that their lives have otherwise lacked.

The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to introduce a small police and community partnership project in Brixton in which the police partners have sought to make use of their community experience with street crime and terrorism in ways that offer tangible support to those individuals who have or who may become involved as foot soldiers for global terrorism or petty drug dealers for global organised crime. The focus is on a partnership project that operates as a form of counter-terrorism and counter-street crime - a community intervention that does not have imprisonment or punishment as its goal. While such a community based approach is familiar with respect to gun crime and other kinds of street crime, it is still novel in the context of counter-terrorism (Briggs et al, 2006). However, while the chapter gives clear indications about the value of the community partner's experience in a counter-terrorism context, it is principally concerned with establishing the authenticity and value of their experience as a tool to provide a richer understanding of terrorism and street crime from a particular community perspective. Given that terrorism and drug dealing take place in different communities for different reasons, it would, of course, be wrong to transpose experience outside the context of a specific community. Equally, it follows, top-down and bottom-up outsider perspectives of terrorism and organized crime are likely to be deficient when they interpret relationships and motivations without the benefit of coherent community contexts provided by insiders.

In January 2002, a partnership project was launched between the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London and the managers of the Ibn Taymiyya Masjid (also known as the Brixton Mosque) in Gresham Road, Brixton. For ease of reference, the project is described as 'the partnership' and the mosque managers as the 'Brixton Salafis'.¹ A key aim of the partnership at the outset was to better understand how a handful of former worshippers at the mosque, most notably the shoe-bomber Abdul Raheem (otherwise known as Richard Reid), had become involved in al-Qaida terrorism. Both sides of the partnership (MCU and Brixton Mosque management) brought considerable experience of terrorism and street crime to the table and it is that experience that enriched their discussions and now informs this chapter.² During the course of their early discussions, it became clear that street crime and terrorism were often inter-related issues. For instance, in Richard Reid's case, his prior involvement on the bottom rung of organized crime activity pre-figured his defining role as an expendable foot soldier for al-Qaida (Lambert, 2009).

Bombing Brixton

Even before 1981, residents of Brixton had a very clear understanding of what terrorism was - bombs and bomb threats. Brixton tube station opened in 1971 and by 1981, the majority of Brixton residents used it regularly for journeys to work in central London or for social trips to the West End and across London. Like all London commuters, they had become familiar with the use of bombs in London as a terrorist tactic by the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Even during long periods in the PIRA campaign when PIRA bombs did not explode in London, Brixton

¹ 'Salafi' is a 'name derived from salaf, 'pious ancestors,' given to a reform movement that emphasizes the restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Qur'an and Sunnah, rejection of the authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah' (Esposito, 2003).

² This chapter draws on the author's experience as a Metropolitan Police officer in London from 1977 to 2007, with a particular emphasis on his role as head of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) from 2002 to 2007. In turn, the author draws on participant observation and interviews carried out in the Brixton Muslim community from 2006 onwards in his subsequent role as a researcher.

commuters were constantly reminded of the extant terrorist threat by regular anti-terrorist campaigns that warned them to be vigilant. More specifically, litter bins were removed from stations so that PIRA terrorists could not plant bombs in them; adverts on the tube highlighted suspicious behaviour and unclaimed luggage as potential signs of terrorist activity; heads of the MPS Anti-Terrorist Branch became household faces as a result of regular television appearances at the scenes of London bomb attacks.

Then at 5.30pm on 17 April 1999, without warning, a bomb concealed in a rucksack exploded in the street just fifty yards from Brixton tube station. Thirty-nine people were injured by flying shrapnel, shards of glass and nails embedded in their bodies.³ Among the victims was a 23-month-old boy who had two centimeters of a nail in his brain, which surgeons at Great Ormond Street Hospital carefully removed during a one-and-a-half-hour operation. For the remainder of April, Brixton residents were joined by all Londoners in a state of heightened alert as the ‘nail-bomber’ carried out further bomb attacks in Brick Lane and Soho, killing three and injuring sixty-five in the latter attack. On 1 May 1999, Anti Terrorist Branch officers arrested David Copeland, a right wing racist, for the attacks. Copeland said he planted the bomb in Brixton because he hated blacks and wanted to be the spark that started a race war in Britain. One black Brixton resident who narrowly missed injury in the attack recalled his emotions when first reading Copeland’s testimony at his trial:

I was disgusted but not completely surprised. Copeland was not untypical in his racism. We had grown up with that kind of National Front thinking in London. He was just unusual because he took his hatred to an extreme. All the things Copeland says about killing blacks and white supremacy were things we knew were just below the surface (interview, 6 December 2007).

Copeland made it clear that he had chosen to plant his first bomb in Brixton because he viewed it as the heart of the black community in Britain. On that basis, his motivation was not unlike the PIRA who targeted the West End and the City of London because it was the symbolic heartland of the British Establishment. Brixton was also a venue that had come to symbolise what many locals regarded as a black rebellion against a racist establishment: the Brixton riots in 1981. The same interviewee as above (interview, 6 December 2007), who had grown up in South London about three miles from Brixton, said:

“After the riots, Brixton became the hub of our community. It gave us a sense of pride. We would talk about ourselves as ‘the brothers’. Later on when the Stephen Lawrence case happened it was like we were all under attack from these racists who surrounded us in places like Eltham, Croydon and Morden in the outer suburbs.”

For four weeks, the Metropolitan Police Anti Terrorist Branch (SO13), backed by Special Branch (SO12), led an intensive investigation to identify and apprehend the nail-bomber. Key aspects of the investigation – CCTV evidence, scene examinations, forensic examinations, witness appeals – were conducted in the same manner as in cases where the suspects were PIRA bombers. The overwhelming majority of detectives involved in the investigation had experience

³ On the day of writing, another isolated and poorly educated white Englishman, Nicky Reilly, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his failed attempt to explode a nail-bomb in a busy shopping area in Exeter in May 2008. Unlike Copeland, who was inspired by white supremacist racist propaganda, Reilly was inspired by al-Qaida propaganda.

in investigative and intelligence work against PIRA and dissident Irish republican terrorist groups. For the two detectives who subsequently launched the MCU, the experience of the Copeland case, combined with experience of PIRA terrorism and experience of a myriad of other international terrorism cases, provided a basis for assessing al-Qaida's influence in London.

Becoming Muslim

In the early 1990s, three close friends, one of them Abdul Haqq Baker, were contemplating giving up lifestyles typical of secular young black Londoners and becoming practicing Muslims. Twelve years later, when they first met the MCU in 2002, they had become established leaders in the Brixton Mosque and had already faced tough questioning from the Anti Terrorist Branch and the media about their connections to the al-Qaida shoe-bomber, Richard Reid. They would face similar questions about their connections to Zacarias Moussaoui, subsequently convicted of terrorism offences connected to 9/11. Guilt by association is a powerful tool in the hands of the media and especially so for the Brixton Salafis who had known both would-be terrorists extremely well. In essence, what they said to a skeptical media was accurate - they had been fighting the influence that had seduced Reid and Moussaoui to become terrorists - along with others in their community - for nearly the entire decade. Significantly, it follows, had the three close friends never embarked on parallel journeys of religious conversion in 1991, the impact and influence of powerfully charismatic al-Qaida propagandists based in London would likely have been even more pronounced.

Moreover, it is reasonably certain that, had they not converted and become the peaceful Salafi leaders that they were in their neighbourhood and mosque, that the al-Qaida propagandist Abdullah el Faisal – not Abdul Haqq Baker – would have become the voice of Brixton Mosque, thereby forging a North-South London al-Qaida alliance with another extremist, Abu Hamza, who was in control of the Finsbury Park Mosque during the latter half of the same period. As it was, the extent to which a small, new Salafi community effectively challenged the authority of violent extremists and disrupted al-Qaida's UK goals was overshadowed by the terrorists' success in a handful of cases. The fact that this insider Salafi account⁴ was, and remains, obscured by outside commentators anxious to describe Salafism as the slippery slope that leads to al-Qaida terrorism provokes rich research interest in the Brixton Salafis' compelling testimony. Rather, on the evidence presented in this chapter, the replacement in 1991 of *Public Enemy* cassettes with tapes of Qu'ranic recitation – for use while driving around London - symbolises a change of lifestyle and allegiance that proved wholly beneficial to the safety and well being of fellow Londoners. Three street-wise partygoers became street-wise Salafis and put their street skills at the service of their new community, at the very time it was being subverted by violent extremists.

When asked to recall the compelling moments in their initial conversion process before this trend became established, the three Brixton Salafis suggest they responded positively to overtures from a handful of black Londoners who had already embraced Islam as a way of enhancing their self-esteem. For one of the three key Brixton Salafis, a personal introduction to Islam by a respected friend proved decisive. That said, it is notable that most of the fifty plus

⁴ Abdul Haqq Baker, chairman of Brixton Mosque since 1994, and leading London Salafi, is currently completing his own PhD thesis, 'Countering Terrorism in the UK: A Convert Community Perspective' so as to further reduce this deficit in community grounded research in relation to al-Qaida influence in the UK.

black London Muslim converts met or interviewed during the course of participant observation, my PhD - London Muslims and Muslim Londoners: Countering al-Qaida Influence (forthcoming, 2009) - highlighted that hearing and reading what are believed to be the actual words of Allah as written in the Qur'an had a powerful impact. The appeal of this direct and simple connection to their creator appears crucial to the conversion process. In this respect, the Brixton Salafis have something in common with early modern London Protestant forebears like the radical Anabaptist William Gouge who rejected religious hierarchy in favour of direct engagement with sacred texts (Hill, 1991). Later, the Salafi converts would want to hear and understand the scripture of their new religion in their original Arabic – but initially it was a life changing experience to be connected so clearly to their creator, even in a language that was translated from the original. Those with traditional religious upbringings recalled that Christianity could not compete with that clarity.

Their ongoing interest in black American politics and the influence of two iconic figures, Mohammed Ali and Malcolm X, who had both embraced Islam was also influential. As in Mohammad Ali's case, it was not orthodox Islam, but the Nation of Islam, that had achieved a small but significant presence in Brixton, as elsewhere in black London. Malcolm X, on the other hand, is known to have moved from the Nation of Islam to an acceptance of orthodox Islam. One of the founding Brixton Salafis (interview, 11 December 2006) commented on the significance of Malcolm X in his own conversion to Islam:

“I read Malcolm X's autobiography in 1991 and it made a huge impression. What attracted Malcolm X to Islam was absolutely crucial for me as well. It was equality and justice for blacks. When Malcolm X went on hajj to Mecca it was the first time he really experienced a fraternity of people where black, white, yellow, brown did not matter. He had left the racial segregation of America behind and he found true equality in Islam. We were still facing discrimination in London and we were attracted to Islam for some of the same reasons as Malcolm X. We were also curious about the Nation of Islam but we soon came to see that it was a deviant, false religion with no proper foundation.”

Nor was becoming Muslim entirely inconsistent with an established trend in the local black community towards fundamentalist and evangelical Christian practice. Again, interviews and participant observation suggest that both local evangelical approaches to Christianity and Salafi approaches to Islam appealed especially to sections of the black youth community who had become involved in and wanted to escape from the pervasive influence of street gang - 'gangster' - culture where violent crime and the risks of death, injury and imprisonment were high. Islam, in general, and the Salafi rendition of it, in particular, offered salvation, redemption and the opportunity to 'wipe the slate clean' in much the same way as evangelical Christianity. Islam, however, had the advantage of being linked to an iconic black role model, Malcolm X. If Martin Luther King is remembered as a stereotypical Christian who turned the other cheek when faced with injustice, Malcolm X represents determined black activism that asserts itself against racism. That, at least, interviewees suggest, helps explain why becoming Muslim has particular appeal for local black youth. Thanks to the pervasive influence of black American and Jamaican street culture, the Atlantic gap had grown smaller. Jamaican influence also accounts for the strong presence in Brixton of Rastafarianism. Here again, an iconic black figure, Bob Marley, blended strict religious adherence with political activism and street credibility. According to one local interviewee, the only drawback to becoming 'Rasta' for Brixton youth wanting to escape

violent crime was that it did not remove them from the same street influences and tended to leave them at the mercy of Jamaican drug dealers (interview, 2 March 2007).

By 1995, the Brixton Salafis had become the driving force at the Brixton mosque, by then a bulwark against the growing influence of al-Qaida propagandists and supporters in the area and also a centre of pro-active community interventions against gang violence and street crime. After two years spent evaluating the many competing strands of Islamic adherence prevalent locally, they decided to follow Salafi practice under the guidance of Salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Such familiarity with the leading Salafi scholars of the day gave them useful tools with which to refute al-Qaida heavyweights like Abu Qatada who traded on their alleged links to key Salafi scholars. Despite a paucity of genuine English language scholarship on Salafism, the Brixton Salafis were quick to commend Quintan Wicktorowicz and Thomas Hegghammer, from the USA and Norway respectively, as two scholars' whose work on leading Saudi and Jordan based Salafi scholars they regard as being accurate and impartial (Wicktorowicz, 2006).

Brixton is an important case study because Abdullah el Faisal regarded himself as being well qualified to attract black convert Muslims (like himself) to the al-Qaida flag. As we have already noted, he encountered effective opposition from the Brixton Salafis. However, it was not difficult for him to operate in the vicinity, away from the direct notice of the Brixton mosque. This is precisely what he did during the second half of the 1990s and right up to his arrest in 2003, attracting black convert Muslims to wider Muslim youth audiences, many of whom had family backgrounds in Islam, albeit of a significantly different character. Typically, he would licence al-Qaida attacks that his audiences might see on the television and lesser street-level criminality that they might be engaged in. In the latter case, it would be commonplace to allow that young street robbers converting to Islam might continue their criminal activity so long as they only robbed non-Muslims, the kuffar. When the opportunity arose, the Brixton Salafis were extremely effective at countermanding this kind of advice to new converts with a background in street crime because they could relate to them on their own terms and putting el Faisal's erroneous analysis into its proper context. Again, in direct street level negotiations between local black Salafi leaders (aged in their twenties and thirties during the 1990s) and local black street criminals new to Islam (typically aged between fifteen and twenty), street credibility was crucial and readily understood. Physical presence and street credibility underscored religious authority.

The Brixton Salafis were not always bound to win this kind of argument. The well-documented cases of Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui give ample testimony to the ability of al-Qaida propagandists to 'radicalise' and recruit young members of the Brixton Muslim community during the late 1990s and early 2000s before 9/11. In an interview, one Brixton Salafi recalls how much effort he put into what might best be described as informal one-to-one counselling with Richard Reid in an attempt to help him move away from the influence of el Faisal and company – the "Takfiris" as they became known on the streets. Significantly, that unsuccessful 'counter-radicalisation' interview took place before Reid embarked on the international travels that culminated in his abortive attempt to explode a 'shoe-bomb' on a transatlantic flight in the name of al-Qaida. Equally significantly, it took place before the Brixton Salafis had established a partnership relationship with the MCU. Prior to cementing that relationship with the MCU in January 2003, the Brixton Salafis had largely negative experiences of dealing with the Metropolitan Police. Indeed, in the aftermath of Reid's arrest in December 2001, they were approached by both the police and media with a great deal of suspicion. This

was premised on the notion that they were likely to be part of a radicalising process that had caused or allowed Reid's progression to a would-be suicide bomber.

Richard Reid

When Abdul Haqq Baker and his close colleagues first heard the news that Abdul Raheem, otherwise known as Richard Reid, had been arrested for attempting to blow up a transatlantic flight en route to the U.S. at the end of 2001, they realised that the media would likely descend on the Brixton Mosque. Although Reid had disappeared from their radar over two years earlier, it seemed inevitable to them that his prior association with the Brixton Salafi community would be sufficiently well known to ensure they were implicated in the case. It was agreed that Abdul Haqq Baker would act as spokesman for the mosque. Within hours, the media arrived and Abdul Haqq Baker was kept busy dealing with their demands for information. He gave numerous interviews, conducting himself with dignity and provided very clear information that was accurate and truthful, generally while standing in the street outside the mosque in Gresham Road. We found it useful to review the press cuttings during interviews to prompt recollections of the events to which we were referring:

“It was a cold day - as you can see from the pictures, I was wearing a thick jumper and gloves! I knew I would have my work cut out defending the masjid against some stereotyping but on the whole I was pleased with the way it went. I also knew my comments would be seized upon by Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada, Abdullah el Faisal and company to say I was collaborating with the enemy (interview, 3 December 2006).”

Richard Reid would later be sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States after admitting that he tried to blow up a commercial flight using a bomb hidden in his shoe. At the time, it was thought that he acted alone, but it subsequently emerged that another British Muslim, Saajid Badat from Gloucester, had been earmarked by a ‘handler’, Mizar Trabelsi (a former footballer serving a ten year prison sentence in Belgium for plotting to bomb a NATO airbase) to take part in the same or a similar attack (Dodd, 2006). In 2005, Saajid Badat pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act with Richard Reid, having been found to be in possession of an identical ‘shoe-bomb’. While the evidence in the Badat case showed that al-Qaida operatives had skillfully recruited two British Muslims to carry out a ‘suicide bomb’ attack prior to 9/11, the initial media reports that confronted Abdul Haqq Baker on the doorstep of his mosque were more pre-occupied with stories about a ‘crazy loner’ with a wild-eyed appearance. According to Baker (interview, 3 December 2006):

“It was difficult to get across to the media a clear picture about Reid. They had this notion about him being a crazy fanatic. This was not helpful. He was not the brightest intellectually speaking and he was easily led but he still had good skills. What I would call street skills. He was a good graffiti artist for instance. So he was like a lot of young people in our community. He was part of a youth culture where street crime was normal behaviour. These are useful skills for people like Abdullah el Faisal to exploit. I'm not saying el Faisal recruited Reid directly but we lost influence over Reid because of what el Faisal and the others were calling.”

The son of an English mother and Jamaican father, the so-called ‘shoe bomber’ was born in 1973 in Bromley, South London. Reid attended Thomas Tallis secondary school in Blackheath, south-east London from 1984 to 1989. His father, Robin, told BBC News he had been in prison for most of Richard's childhood. "I was not there to give him the love and

affection he should have got," he said (BBC, 2001). This is how the key part of his story has been widely reported:

“[Reid] fell into a life of petty crime and in the mid-1990s was jailed for a string of muggings, for which he served sentences in a number of prisons, including Feltham young offenders' institution in west London. It was while at Feltham that Reid is said to have converted to Islam. After his release, he followed the path taken by many other Muslim prisoners, to Brixton Mosque, in south London. The place of worship has a reputation for attracting converts and helping ex-offenders re-adjust to life in the outside world. Initially he fitted in well. Taking the name Abdel Rahim, he became known for his willingness to get involved in the workings of the mosque and to learn Arabic (BBC 2001).”

“In fairness,” Abdul Haqq Baker points out, “the BBC reporting tended to be the most reliable and least sensationalist.” He confirmed that the following extract from a BBC report was accurate:

“‘At some point Reid began to get involved with extremist elements,’ says the chairman of Brixton Mosque, Abdul Haqq Baker. Reid was ‘tempted away’ by ‘individuals who set up a few years ago away from the mosque,’ Mr Baker says. ‘Their teachings were a lot more militant.’ He says extremists worked on ‘weak characters’ and believes Reid was ‘very, very impressionable.’ Reid attended external classes and started to question the peaceful philosophy of his teachers (BBC, 2001).”

However, on examining the next extract from the same interview, Abdul Haqq Baker identifies “the beginning of what has become a familiar problem,” the reduction of complex issues into sound bites.

“[Reid’s] appearance also changed, says Mr Baker. He went from wearing western clothes to the traditional Islamic robe - a loose, long-sleeved, ankle-length garment - with a khaki combat jacket on top (BBC, 2001).”

Abdul Haqq Baker explained his concerns in interview (3 December 2006):

“Now these two comments were separate. I was not saying that wearing traditional Islamic dress was in any way problematic, or an indication of Reid’s extremism. On the contrary, it is more likely to be of concern when an individual switches from Islamic dress to western appearance – like in Zacarias Moussaoui’s case [see below]. But what I was drawing attention to was Reid wearing a khaki combat jacket as an indication of the time when he started to get more militant. The bigger problem is that the media started to describe Reid’s adoption of Salafi practice as part of his move towards extremism. This became the norm and was very damaging.”

The next part of the BBC report makes a link to the case of Zacarias Moussaoui and Abdul Haqq Baker confirmed its accuracy:

“There is speculation that at some point during his drift to a more extreme philosophy, he may have met Zacarias Moussaoui, who has been charged in the U.S. with conspiracy over the 11 September attacks. Mr Moussaoui, a Frenchman of Moroccan origin, also attended the Brixton Mosque during the 1990s but was expelled for his extreme views and his attempts to impose them on the younger, more easily influenced members.

Towards the end of 1998, Reid ceased worshipping at the mosque and is thought to have moved to Pakistan (BBC, 2001).”

This same media bias/interpretation problem was identified by Abdul Haqq Baker as running through the rest of the report. “Travelling to the countries that Reid travelled too is not necessarily the problem. Many British Muslims were travelling extensively at the same time without problem, what is different is Reid.” This was the comment he made with respect to the next extract to clarify how Reid’s activities were different:

“He reportedly sent several letters written in Arabic to friends in London. His mother, Lesley Hughes, who is separated from Reid's father, also believed he was in Pakistan. But mother and son eventually lost contact and in summer 2001 Ms Hughes telephoned Brixton Mosque seeking news. About the same time, Reid is believed to have embarked on an extensive travel programme, which saw him visit seven countries including some of the world's so-called ‘terror capitals.’ [Reid] is thought to have spent time in Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and possibly Afghanistan. Commentators have suggested he may have used some of these excursions to test the security arrangements on various airlines, before boarding American Airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami on 22 December 2001 (BBC, 2001).”

In important respects, extracts from the following interview with Peter Herbert, a black UK lawyer, are more insightful. He visited Richard Reid in prison in the U.S. at the request of Reid’s mother. He reports that Reid was perfectly sane, reflective, and self-possessed:

“I am not crazy as they suggest, but I knew exactly what I was doing," [Reid] said. "Of course I would have been sad to have those people die, but I knew that my cause was just and righteous. It was the will of Allah that I did not succeed." His motivation for turning to violence, he said, was the foreign policy of the U.S. government, which, he said, had resulted in the murder of thousands of Muslims and oppressed people around the world from Vietnam to southern Africa to Afghanistan and Palestine (Dodd, 2006).

Another Brixton Salafi commented that Herbert has captured an important aspect of the case here. “Reid,” he said, “was genuinely concerned about U.S. foreign policy. We all were. Just because he had not much formal education did not mean he was stupid. What he misses out though is that Brixton mosque always taught that British Muslims had no Islamic right to carry out attacks of this kind.” So, for this interviewee who once spent all night trying to talk Reid away from the teachings of Abdullah el Faisal “and company,” there was a feeling of frustration that the report was missing the most important issues:

“It was 1998 when I tried to talk Reid away from the extremists. We were up all night talking. In the end he agreed with me but in those days we had no way of following cases up. Our work was just spontaneous. I guess Reid must have gone back to el Faisal’s erroneous teaching. Ideally, I would have followed up the meeting and kept on his case. But, at the time I had no time to do that kind of work. Nor did the brothers. We did the best we could to combat the false calls, and we worked long hours doing that (interview, 3.9.07).

The interviewee is representative of wider Brixton Salafi opinion when he argues that the Peter Herbert interview suggests that anger over foreign policy leads inexorably to terrorism. “This is what al-Qaida wants to suggest, so it has to be countered” (interview, 3.9.07). The

interviewee was especially critical of the following extract of Peter Herbert's interview with Richard Reid that appears to accept the belief that Muslims are not inhibited from carrying out such actions:

One issue that baffles those trying to counter al-Qaida is why young men will kill themselves for such a cause. Reid compared himself to the suicide bombers of Hamas. They did not have rockets or tanks or F16 jets to fight with, he said, and had to fight with the tools at their disposal. "What do you expect people to do?" he added (Dodd, 2006).

The Brixton Salafi interviewee accepts Reid's observation about his political motivation is critically important when assessing how best to tackle the problem:

"We don't disagree that this injustice exists. We do not try and apologise for U.S. or UK government action, but we explain how Islam tells you how to act responsibly. That Osama bin Laden and Richard Reid are falsifying their religion. Coming from us Salafis, that is a powerful message" (interview, 3.9.07).

There was a lot of discussion amongst those who knew him about why Reid's attempt to ignite his bomb on the aeroplane failed. The fact that he appeared to have been so indiscrete about his attempt to ignite the bomb suggested to many of his former associates that he may have been wanting to get caught. This is more than just idle speculation and has more resonance now that it has emerged that his would-be accomplice Badat had recently pulled out. The main point, according to one interviewee, since Reid had an abundance of street-crime craft and would have known to prepare or prime his bomb in a way that didn't draw any attention – for instance in a toilet – had he been intent on escaping capture (personal interview, 3 September 2007). In the next extract the interviewee reckons Reid is being honest:

[Reid] was fatalistic about his future. "I have to accept that what has happened is set," he said, a reference to the fact that sitting in a U.S. jail, having failed in his suicide mission, meant he would almost certainly never be released. But he missed his family, especially his mother, and felt remorse about what she now faced because of his notoriety. "I do feel sorry for my mum having to see me here. I had not wanted to see her, to protect her from all this, but [I] will see her if she travels to see me (Dodd, 2006)."

Later in Herbert's interview when he re-traces Reid's conversion, the interviewee comments that the issue of racism is important but notes that it was a common experience for scores of Brixton Salafis, so it is hardly a defining feature of radicalisation as Herbert suggests:

"Reid had converted to Islam after his spell in Feltham. He said that in prison Islam had helped him to understand better the world around him. He also said that racism played a large part in the life he had experienced as a young person. For those wanting to understand radicalisation, this is important. Reid's journey to violent jihad was not just fuelled by radical Islamist propaganda - he talked about the case of Stephen Lawrence and how that exposed discrimination in society (Dodd, 2006)."

The initial press portrait of Reid as a crazy man was finally laid to rest when his would-be accomplice Saajid Badat was brought to trial. The sophistication of the conspiracy became clearer, as Peter Clarke explained:

"Three years of intensive and painstaking international investigation brought us to the point where Saajid Badat had no option but to plead guilty to this horrendous offence. We

must ask how a young British man was transformed from an intelligent, articulate person who was well respected, into a person who has pleaded guilty to one of the most serious crimes that you can think of (BBC, 2005).”

It seems entirely reasonable to pose the same question with respect to Reid, who may not have been ‘respectable’ or ‘articulate’ but who was almost certainly more streetwise and capable as a terrorist than Badat. Certainly, Reid’s former associates think he would not have been as negligent as Badat in leaving a bomb at his home address for a long period of time – only to be found by police. Despite the speculation surrounding the circumstances of Reid’s failed attempt, there have probably been sufficient examples of faulty bomb mechanisms in this field since December 2001 to suggest simple malfunction – a lack of expert preparation – in this case too.

Zacarius Moussaoui

Zacarius Moussaoui, convicted in the U.S. for al-Qaida terrorism in connection with 9/11, was also well known to the Brixton Salafis. Abdul Haqq Baker gave evidence on his behalf, principally to avoid his being sentenced to death – and thereby avoid the possibility of an erroneous claim that he was a martyr. Subsequently, he gave an interview to the BBC, which accords with the account he gave to the MCU:

“Moussaouis’ lawyers have called witnesses from Britain to try to show how he was radicalised in this country. He spent 7 years living here before he went to America. Abdul Haqq Baker was the main defence witness from Britain. He told the court that when he first met Moussaoui, he was an affable man whose behaviour changed when he started attending sermons by extremist preachers (BBC, 2006).”

BBC reporter Nasreen Sulaman (NS) interviews him (AHB):

NS Zacarius Moussaoui arrived in London in 1993 and enrolled at the South Bank University where he began to study for an MA in Business Studies. Moussaoui was born in Morocco but grew up in France where he was not known as a practicing Muslim. His interest in Islam began when he arrived in Britain he started to attend Brixton Mosque in South London. Moussaoui not only prayed at the mosque but was also to sleep there as he had yet to find any accommodation. It was here the chairman of the mosque Abdul Haqq Baker first met Moussaoui.

AHB He was friendly he seemed like a very serious individual but had a sense of humour, quite jovial.

NS How soon after he started Brixton Mosque did he start to change?

AHB I’d say it had to be about a year to eighteen months and that’s when we were taking a quite firm stance against the extremists’ propagation in the area and they moved off to other centres and opened or started renting other premises. I noticed that he started attending those premises and it was then we started seeing conflict about our ideology and practice and their ideology and practice.

Although the interview continues, it is important to highlight three points at this stage. The first point is that Abdul Haqq Baker's account is completely at odds with the account provided by Moussaoui's brother, Abd Saamad Moussaoui, in which the influence of the Brixton Salafis is seen as the route to al-Qaida (Moussaoui ref). This is hardly surprising because Abd Samaad Moussaoui had no firsthand experience of the London Muslim scene. It would be perfectly understandable that, from a distance, he would notice the changes to his brother's lifestyle brought about by becoming a practicing Muslim at the Brixton Mosque and then blame that change on his subsequent adoption of takfiri or al-Qaida ideology. It is an entirely valid perspective, especially for a brother, but it has negative ramifications when it is applied more widely. To conflate the influence of the individuals who recruited Zacarius Moussaoui into terrorism with the individuals who were best placed to prevent that happening is necessarily problematic. The second point is that Abdul Haqq Baker gave this interview in 2006 and, despite the fact that he had been telling the media since December 2001 that Abdullah el Faisal, Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and company had never had control of Brixton Mosque or been imams there, sections of the media continued to repeat the opposite (see below). The third point is that the MCU explored these same issues with the Brixton Salafis three years earlier and had been able to verify them. To return to the interview:

NS The increasing animosity between Moussaoui and the Mosque leaders was because they were against any form of violent jihad, which they regarded as an erroneous ideology. They had recently expelled their imam Sheikh Al Faisal who used his sermons at the mosque to advocate hatred and promote holy war. The radical preacher then went on to spread his brand of Islam in a nearby leisure centre and at Brixton Town Hall. Moussaoui would regularly attend these talks and Abdul Haqq Baker describes what they heard.

AHB The type of jihad whereby you could commit suicide bombings and I'll give you a clear example. He was asked a particular question -- what should someone do if he has entered Islam and has AIDS? He said the best thing this individual can do for Islam is go to Palestine and blow himself up and kill as many Jews as possible. This was the type of Jihad that Faisal was propagating.

NS Al Faisal is currently in jail after becoming the first Muslim cleric to be convicted for inciting racial hatred and soliciting for the murder of Jews, Americans and Hindus. Moussaoui continued to attend the Brixton Mosque in the mid 1990's. Whilst there he would encourage other Muslims to come with him and hear what Al Faisal had to say. This brought him into further conflict with those around him and, according to Abdul Haqq Baker, he became increasingly arrogant and disruptive.

AHB There was one occasion when he entered the mosque in military wear and a rucksack on his back. He and a colleague of his, Yusuf, they went straight into the canteen. I remember looking at the dress and going in there and engage in dialogue as to why he was dressing like that? What was the purpose of this? Where he was coming from? He started shouting raising his voice saying he didn't want anything to do with me, don't talk to me about anything, go away from me leave me alone. Basically abuse. That showed the stage he had got to. Very proud of the way he had dressed and wanting to display that in the mosque as an act of defiance.

- NS Abdul Haqq Baker is one of the few people to get close to Moussaoui and their friendship which lasted several years has given him an insight as to why the man who became known as the twentieth hijacker in the 9/11 conspiracy might have aspired to become a suicide bomber.
- AHB He wanted a sense of belonging and there was a sense of frustration at the atrocities being committed in the Muslim world. Now when you go to an extremist and listen to their rhetoric, which galvanises you to do something. He wanted to do something. He was actively seeking arenas for jihad. We had conversations about that asking me where is the next jihad, do you know where the next jihad is? I was saying no I don't and he got very frustrated as he believed I was withholding some information from him. So he was actively seeking what he could deem a battlefield.
- NS What do you think was the tipping point for Zacarius Moussaoui becoming involved in 9/11 and the wider conspiracy?
- AHB One of the reasons I believe was that one of his friends Yusuf Xavier had died in Chechnya and that he was seeking similar fate. And this was the opportunity that he could see as such a fate.
- NS It has emerged in the court case that Zacarius Moussaoui had offered to help the prosecution in the case against him. Abdul Haqq Baker believes that he has deliberately been trying to sabotage his lawyer's efforts to stop him getting the death penalty.
- AHB It is my personal belief the reason he is doing this is because he wants that martyr status. If he receives the death sentence he believes that in the eyes of the Muslim community he will be seen as a martyr. If that is discredited in anyway by questioning his sanity then he will just be locked up in prison for a very long time and that will not give him any credibility at all.

According to MCU officers, Abdul Haqq Baker is right to emphasise the importance of Abdullah el Faisal's ability to 'galvanise' his supporters. Leadership is a crucial issue. When it came to giving new Muslims a sense of identity and belonging, both Abdullah el Faisal and Abdul Haqq Baker had outstanding leadership skills. The ability to imbue recently converted Muslims with recent involvement with drugs and related crime with a new sense of purpose and civic responsibility is well known locally. Indeed, it is worth noting that Abdullah el Faisal subsequently attracted significant followings in Willesden and Edmonton where, again, some black convert Muslims were often successfully encouraged to move away from lifestyles revolving around drug and alcohol abuse. One respectable Muslim leader in North London was full of praise for Abdullah el Faisal because of his skills in this area and found it difficult to accept the picture painted of Abdullah el Faisal at the Old Bailey (Lambert, 2009). According to MCU officers, such a blind spot towards extremists like Abdullah el Faisal was not uncommon in the wider Muslim community prior to 7/7 because of the extremists' ability to attract new converts to Islam and to influence them away from drugs, alcohol and 'nightclub' lifestyles. For the MCU, the Brixton Salafis had a unique role to play in countering not only moves from damaging lifestyles but also protecting them from al-Qaida influence because they had a leadership that could match and outperform the extremists in relation to the same target audience (Lambert, 2009).

Trust Building

Although the MCU was formed in January 2002, it was not until the end of the year that the unit was finally able to embark in earnest on a trust building project with the Brixton Salafi leadership. The reason for the delay was that the Anti Terrorist Branch had to undertake and complete an investigation into the Richard Reid and Zacarius Moussaoui cases and that involved interviews with Abdul Haqq Baker and colleagues at the Brixton Mosque. According to Abdul Haqq Baker, that experience did nothing to increase his confidence in the police. Therefore, he left the MCU still needing to overcome his long held suspicion of this organization. The MCU posed at the time: which sections, if any, of London's diverse and burgeoning Muslim communities have any expertise in tackling al-Qaida influence amongst those sections of communities that are susceptible to it? Clearly, the Brixton Salafis had a wealth of evidence to demonstrate their experience and expertise in this field. What would also become clear to the MCU during the course of this working partnership was that the same skills that achieved results against terrorism were equally effective when the Brixton Salafis were tackling street crime. Brixton Salafi reluctance to engage with members of a police service, who had previously only displayed suspicion towards them, was gradually overcome by recourse to patient trust building and a willingness to engage as partners and an agreement – not to recruit them as ‘informants’, but as partners in protecting and building their community to resist both crime and violent extremism.

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4.4. Peacemaking Efforts by Religious Actors (Qamar Al-Huda)

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It was common for Western social scientists and experts in the field of international affairs to assert confidently that religion would play a less prominent role in society at large and that eventually religion would play little role in national identity, politics, law, and international relations. This perspective was connected to a larger “secularization thesis,” which advocated that a secular liberal democracy would replace traditional ways of thinking, especially the place of religion (Stark, 1999). With the rise of modernization and post-modernity, the relationship of religion to society has changed in many ways; however, it remains a strong ideological source for identity and values, including those relating to nationalism, conflict, and peacemaking. Throughout the world, it is clear that religion has new resonance in contemporary times, and has been actively involved in promoting inter-communal violence in places like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, India, Northern Ireland, and Uganda. However, religion does *not* in fact play only a harmful role in motivating conflict and violence and in driving communities apart. Religion’s power to persuade, its resonance within communities, the influence of religious leaders to speak as political and spiritual voices, and religious values can all be used constructively to counteract radicalization and extremism and bring about resolution and reconciliation. Scott Appleby (2003) has described the “the ambivalence of the sacred” – the manner in which religion can create spiritual commitments to violence and to social activism and peace.

Peace building, in general, attempts to establish sustainable peace by addressing root causes of conflict through dialogue, institution building, political and economic transformation, reconciliation, and empowering those who work on the ground. Peace building refers to all actors that work toward concrete structural transformations for peace and prevent the relapse of conflict, while the term peacemaking refers to the actual intervention in a violent conflict to attempt to negotiate a peace agreement (Little & Appleby, 2004, p. 21; Lederach, 1997; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999, 2005). Originally used by official diplomatic efforts in negotiating international conflicts, peacemaking is also applicable to anyone trying to mediate a peace between disputants-within families or communities. Both peace building and peacemaking operate within the framework of conflict transformation, i.e., the movement from conflict with nonviolent means of resolving disputes, and consists of overlapping processes of conflict management and conflict resolution (Little & Appleby, 2004, p. 5). Peacemaking is an all-inclusive process that entails reducing tension, resolving conflict, managing conflict, mediating conflict, negotiating or advocating on behalf of a party involved in a conflict, and/or finding common ground for disputing parties. With such practical areas for contribution, peace building includes diplomats, educators, clergy, lawyers, human rights specialists, media, and other civil society actors (Johnston & Samson, 1994; Moyser, 1991).

Religious peacemaking is often distinguished from other non-religious actors, who often may or may not agree with the faith-based approaches and methodologies for peace building.

Religious actors¹ are often the first to observe disturbing behavior and opinions on the ground prior to a conflict (Sampson & Ledrach, 2000; Helmich & Petersen, 2000; Smock, 2006). Religious actors, in particular, are very sensitive to religious intolerance, ethnic hatred, tribalism, and communalism because this may disrupt their communities - especially if there is a history of tensions and conflict in the area. In times of crisis, religious leaders simultaneously serve in the capacity of mediators, observers, protectors, advocates, educators, and conflict resolution specialists (Steele, 2008, p. 5-41).

If religious peacemaking aims to structurally transform conflict peacefully and cultivate a culture of peace in war-torn societies, then experts dealing with conflict must take the work of religious actors seriously. For example, religious leaders in Zamboanga City, Philippines, were outspoken about the religious tensions that were growing between Muslims and Christians due to the Islamic extremist Abu Sayyaf. They conducted several inter-religious dialogues to forge a strategic plan to counteract the violence of fundamentalism in their region (Bacani, 2005). In Cambodia, the renowned Buddhist monk, Maha Ghosananda, led thousands of Buddhist monks, nuns and laity on a daring month-long march from the northwest to the capital Phnom Penh. Known as the "Pilgrimage of Truth March," Ghosananda traversed through dangerous areas filled with land mines and active conflict. By the end of the march, over 10,000 people had participated, thereby contributing to the formation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and in advocating for national elections (Maat, 1995). In Jordan, the Royal Hashemite Kingdom assembled over 150 leading Muslim jurists from the main eight law schools to discuss indiscriminate violence in the Middle East. Muslim scholars agreed to work together against the rise of extremism and the irresponsible and illegal act of calling other Muslims who disagree on certain positions apostates (*takfir*). The assembly compiled "The Amman Message" which stated, "Islam honors every human being, without distinction of color, race or religion."² These examples reflect numerous ways in which world religious actors participate in peace building and conflict preventative measures in various stages of conflict. From mass electoral participation to improving inter-faith relations, from negotiating peace settlements in conflict zones to aiding refugee or internally displaced person camps, religious actors are active on the ground and their work usually goes unnoticed compared to the efforts of global non-governmental organizations (see Kraybill, 2007; Lubbe, 1994; Williams & Williams, 1989; Niyonzima & Fendall, 2001; Jeffrey, 1998).

It is important to note that religious leaders, in times of crisis and in peace, offer their communities more than religious guidance: they possess a rich tradition of spiritual enrichment, of serving others, and being inter-connected during difficult times. The absence of any peace building work without the cooperation of religious actors may in fact lose legitimacy with the very people they are trying to help. Andrea Bartoli, a leading scholar in the field of religious peacemaking believes that religious mediators are often more successful than recognized in mediation. In analyzing Saint Egidio's peacemaking efforts in Mozambique, Bartoli (2004, p. 147-169) emphasizes four key reasons as to why they were able to negotiate a peace settlement in the civil war of Mozambique: (1) Religious actors exhibited an intimate knowledge of the culture and language of the peoples in conflict; (2) Leaders used firsthand information as the

¹ Examples of religious actors are priests, rabbis, imams, gurus, Buddhist monks, as well as international religious organizations like Pax Christi, Lutheran World Federation, The Mennonites, World Council of Churches, and Muslim World Congress etc...

² For online information see www.riifs.org/nashra/Ammanmessage_e.htm

conflict evolved and changed on the ground; (3) Leaders had access to a wide variety political expertise, locally and internationally; and, (4) They developed a long-term vision of peace for their particular society (see also Bartoli, 1999; Bartoli, Giradet, & Carmel, 1995). Bartoli (2004, p. 158) believes that “conflicts need to be seen and read properly, especially those that have major cultural, ethnic, and religious components.” Bartoli suggests that conflicts are not insignificant acts of random violence committed by invisible forces, but rather these are human events invented by human beings themselves. By emphasizing the human element of the conflict, Bartoli believes that human beings connected to the conflict need to be the very agents who interpret the core issues involved. In order to better understand the root causes of any conflict, religious actors need to be included from the beginning and not neglected in the process. The efforts of the Saint Egidio community in conflict zones, such as Mozambique, Algeria, Nepal, and the Philippines, demonstrate that religious organizations can seriously contribute in mediation and conflict resolution. They were able to devise a practical long-term strategy that was not exclusively meant for any religious community but whose mission was to be supportive to anyone anywhere in need. In this case, religious actors engaged rebel groups by listening to the concerns of the marginalized group without land, resources, education, health care or other basic necessities. This example reflects a complex and coherent approach to religious peacemaking and the organization’s capacity to delegitimize violent behavior while emphasizing non-violent peace building.

The spiritual convictions of the religious communities inspire them to work holistically for social justice activities and directly involve them in conflict prevention, mediation, and conflict transformation work. Religious leaders and religious organizations involved in peacemaking are operating from their respective faith traditions to support personal, communal, relational transformations.³ Some common methodologies used in peacemaking are: forgiveness, recognition of pain, love for others, healing, trauma recovery, public confessions, joint prayers, use of narratives to create empathy, advocacy programs for victims, forums to explain misunderstandings, addressing the image of the “other” in the traditions, and the use of arts to express mutual respect. Interestingly enough, the bonds that are formed in these interfaith peacemaking activities reveal an amazing level of openness to dialogue that allow the involved parties to take risks to rebuild their lives. Religious peacemaking efforts are reconstructing broken relationships, damaged communities, reconciling conflicting parties, negotiating peace agreements, and recreating a common vision of peace.

Islamic peacemaking, conducted by Muslim religious leaders with authority in the community, consist of several fundamental Islamic principles of nonviolence and peace, the pursuit of justice, doing no harm to the other, the universality and dignity of humanity, the sacredness of human life, equality, the quest for peace (on the individual, interpersonal, communal, regional, and international levels), peacemaking via reason, knowledge, and understanding, creativity, forgiveness, proper deeds and actions, responsibility, patience, collaborative actions and solidarity, inclusivity, diversity, pluralism, and tolerance. These Islamic

³ For etymological, scriptural, and theological definitions of religious peacemaking see MacQuarrie, J. (1973). *The concept of peace*. London: SCM Press Ltd.; Zehr, H. (1995). *Changing lenses*. Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press.; Ellul, J. (1970). *Violence: Reflections from a Christian perspective*. London: SCM Press Ltd.; Appleby, S. (2003). Catholic peace building. *America*, 189 (6) . Retrieved from www.americamagazine.com.; and Bock, J. (2001). *Sharpening conflict management: Religious leadership and the double-edged sword*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

principles of nonviolence and peace building are integral to the faith tradition of Muslims and are crucial to Muslim peace building initiatives developed by major figures like Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Satha-Anand, Grand Mufti Ali Goma, Mufti Muneeb al-Rahman, etc... (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Sachedina, 2007; Said, Funk, & Kadayifici, 2001; Paige, 1993).

Understanding some basic Islamic principles of peace building and leveraging these resources with Muslim religious leaders will be integral to counteracting radicalism and preventing or reducing the recruitment by radicals. Some examples of processes are: the use of a religious judge (*qadi*) to rely on Islamic law (*shari'ah*), the process of reconciliation (*sulh*), presenting evidence of the dispute (*bayyinah*), customary practices of dispute resolution (*'urf*), the use of third party members to reconcile the dispute (*mukhtar*), the use of an intermediary to represent the party (*wasta*), a truce or a period of mediation (*hudna*), providing a sum of money to the victim for compensation of losses (*atwah*), and even public offerings of forgiveness and apologies. Conflicting parties find representatives, not necessarily lawyers, who can best present their positions as clearly as possible. These processes allow space for conflict parties to have their interests represented and seek a proper restoration of peace or harmony in their community.

Based upon basic teachings of Islamic peacemaking, Sunni and Shi'ite religious scholars and authorities (*'ulama*) have agreed that the function of any society is to maintain healthy relationships; i.e., human-to-human and human-to-divine relationships. However, when conflicts erupt and destroys human relationships, then it is mandated that the restoration of relationships are essential in retributive justice. The accountability of those in authority – political, social, religious, economic, and intellectual – supersedes those who do not have the power to institute justice. The process of consultation allows for dialogue, debate, and an exchange of views on a variety of subjects, but it is especially critical for authoritative bodies to ensure that they understand the opinions of others. Theologians, jurists, philosophers, and other scholars have historically promoted Islamic teachings of ethics to prevent, mediate, and resolve conflicts; ultimately, any level of disharmony is understood to disrupt a peaceful being. There are Qur'anic verses, sayings by the Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*), and narratives of important companions of the Prophet who accentuate the proper ethical treatment of the elderly, orphans, prisoners, mentally challenged, neighbors, strangers, and members of different religious traditions and tribes, and animals. It is common for theologians to stress the need for personal transformation and to strive toward elevating spiritual awareness through fasting, prayer, charity, meditation, rituals, Qur'anic recitation, service, love of others, adoption of orphans, and displaying compassion and forgiveness to oneself and to others who have done harm. This inner emphasis as the primary focus to cultivate peace is connected to the outer dimensions of peacemaking. The traditional theological thought is that once the heart and mind is gradually transformed toward peace (moving away from greed, egocentric desires, suffering, materialism, harming others...) then only can humans act peacefully in the world.

Analysts need to examine the complex and intricate interconnections of psychological, religious, political, historical, and social self-understanding of victimhood or heroic savior within Muslim communities. Violent actors who are critical players in the region and international scene do not value their systems of governance, the rule of law, the judiciary, educational institutions, media, and political elites as sources of justice. Rather, their interpretation of the world is that it is structurally unjust and that the oppressive system is designed to maintain a

status quo of elites and non-elites.⁴ By engaging radicals on a certain level, one has already moved beyond the theoretical level of should we talk, ignore their existence, or just maintain the status quo. In reality, with either of the last two options, we are left with the possibility of escalating radicalization process and actually improving the ability of violent actors to operate on the ground.

There are four major benefits achieved by active engagement, including dialogue, with radicals. First, by engaging in a dialogue we recognize the importance of violent actors to express their needs, demands, means of communication, modes of operation and structure -- all of which encourages self-disclosure.⁵ Second, engaging the radicals with sensible approaches and conditions demonstrates the commitment to be involved, becoming a visible actor that can influence, manipulate, and manage their thinking and acting. To do nothing or to be passive observers would create a vacuum or weakness that radicals will most likely use to their advantage and propagate damaging information against our interests. Third, by engaging them we recognize the importance of deflating their potential damage to the region and our allies.⁶ Engaging is built on realistic politics and on-the-ground realities.

Fourth, within an Islamic peace-building and conflict transformation approach, most Muslim scholars believe, in principal, that extremists have the right to express their reservations, fears, uncertainties, and grievances with the state (El Fadl, 2001; Kamali, 1994). Radical actors are permitted to express their grievances within legal, social, and moral boundaries; however, public or private space must be respected according to the law. Historically, even if radicals were vilified and guilty of the most horrendous crimes, they still had the legal right of due process to represent and defend their views and/or actions. The state was interested in a just resolution and a transparent process. Other Muslim scholars have counter-argued that terrorism falls into another category where the rights of the radicals are nullified. The primary view is that the state must do all it can within its jurisdiction to protect civilians and the institutions of the state. These scholars argue that the state must vigorously eliminate or marginalize radical activities in order to protect public safety (Zayd, 2004; An-Naim, 1990, Arjomand, 2002). In light of this debate, there is a general consensus among Muslim scholars who support peace-building and conflict resolution on the need to use traditional Islamic processes of mediation, negotiation, transparency, public acknowledgement of wrong, reconciliation, resolution, and visible justice.

With the abovementioned debates for engagement with radicals, Muslim scholars have expressed a wide range of possibilities and processes without a consensus on what the term engagement means, what the process entails, how to go about enacting an engagement, and which actors should serve as a mediators with the radicals. The answers rest in the details, i.e., scholars rely on the specific cases of the context, assess its merits, apply several models of just-engagement rules, and then move forward. As a result, there is no single model to follow with diverse radical movements such as al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Taliban – some are

⁴ The recognizes the rigorous debate involved in engaging with terrorists as this recognizes them, their cause, and it could set the stage of other actors using the same method to reach their goals.

⁵ The art of engaging creates a dialogue where one strives for a more nuanced understanding of how actors reveal their interests and think about themselves and others.

⁶ These are the basic arguments for engagement with violent actors or any other actors hostile to any of our interests.

transnational anti-state puritanical ideologies while others are a social-political-economic party that aims to be a part of the formal political process.

The voices of nonviolent Muslim leaders are rarely heard because they are squelched by radical rhetoric and authoritarian systems that crush voices of dissent. It is crucial for Islamic peace builders to take seriously the work of Satha-Anand, Said Nursi, Sakina Yakoobi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Shaykh Ali Goma, Hakim Mohammed Said, Dr. Hossein Nasr, Farish Noor, Nicolish Majid, Kabir Helminski, Din Syamsuddin, Ghazi bin Muhammad, Dr. Abdal Hakim Murad Winter, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shaykh Mustafa Ceric, Shaykh Al-Habib Ali al-Jifri, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Yousef Sanei, and many others (see Smock & Huda, 2009). If there is any crucial reason to pay attention to these names it is to recognize that there are active every-day leaders involved in peace building activities, who are committed to relieving suffering and promoting the values of tolerance and diversity.

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4.5. Why the Salafis are not a Terror Problem (UK Imam)

Author: Anonymous¹

In the “war on terror”, the *Salafi da’wah* (*Salafi* -- one who takes his example from these early righteous generations, *da’wah* – an invitation) and tradition has been seen as an ideology, which is the main cause, thrust, and impetus for terrorism and political violence, including promoting such radical views. A large body of research claims that the *Salafi* way is, indeed, an extremist radical belief system which eventually manifests itself in political violence and terrorism (for example, see Sageman, 2004, p. 1). A number of papers have been written on this topic such as those by Mitchell D. Sibling and Arvin Bhatt (2007), Jocelyn Cesari (2008), Marc Sageman (2004), Vincenzo Olivetti (2001), Anne Sofie Roald (2004), and Juan Jose Escobar Stemann (2006). Even though they aim to understand the process by which Muslim youth become attracted to more extreme understandings and interpretations of Islam, they tend to fall short of doing the subject justice and demonstrate a great lack of understanding, denoting normative practices within Islam as being, in some way, subversive.

One of the more glaring problems with such analyses is that the *Salafi* methodology is stated to be the main catalyst for terrorism, and then examples are sought that seek to validate the connection between terrorism and what they consider to be ‘Salafi.’ This is erroneous as the two analysts, Silber and Bhatt (2007), make reference to samples which are not ‘Salafi’ in the slightest but rather more accurately characterized as *takfeeri* (a Muslim who accuses others of apostasy), *militant jihadi*, *ikhwāni* (i.e., followers of the Muslim Brotherhood) and even at times *Tablighi* (a Muslim missionary and revival movement). Yet all of the examples are placed under the poorly defined rubric of ‘Salafism.’

This paper will critically assess some of the claims about Salafism found within the literature and explore the reality of the *Salafi* way in regards to issues related to terrorism, political violence, and extremism. We will actually quote from the leading and well-known *Salafi* scholars themselves, who the *Salafis* consider their reference points, in order to assess the assertion that adopting *Salafi* Islam leads to political violence and terrorism. It will be evident that the *Salafi da’wah* and methodology is one of the main barriers to the spread of terrorism among Muslim believers in the world today (see, for example, the excellent study International Crisis Group, 2004). Indeed, the stricter and more serious the *Salafi*, the less likely that person will be likely to radicalize or engage in terrorism:

Ironically, this means that the most “radical” of the salafis are the most immune to jihadist teachings, and the more “moderate” Muslims are those more open to other militant streams of thought, and who may provide slightly more fertile recruiting grounds for the militant jihadis (International Crisis Group, 2004, p. ii).

¹ The authors of this paper are Salafi imams living in the United Kingdom (UK) actively working to prevent and counter militant jihadi extremist thought and terrorism. They wish to remain anonymous for reasons of security concerns.

Salafis are less likely to engage in terrorism for the following reasons:

- ✓ Strict *Salafis* are primarily religious and not at all entrenched in political activity, political involvement, and rhetoric - let alone terrorism. Politics is not their first “port of call,” rather their first priority is to educate and cultivate the sense of *tawheed* (the realization and affirmation of Oneness Muslims upon and adhering to the *Sunnah* (path, way) of the Prophet Muhammad (*sallallāhu ’alayhi wassallam*) along with purifying the beliefs of Muslims.
- ✓ *Salafis* frown upon forming political parties and groups based on partisan loyalties.
- ✓ *Salafis* do not condone holding clandestine meetings in order to put into place a strategic political plan as Allāh knows that which is concealed.
- ✓ *Salafis* do not pledge allegiance to authorities other than Allāh and His Messenger including heads of organisations, groups, and political parties.
- ✓ *Salafis* deem it to be un-Islamic to stage a revolt or rebellion against the leader of a Muslim country regardless of how unjust and oppressive that leader is and especially if the Muslims do not have the ability to remove a particular leader from power.
- ✓ *Salafis* take into account the benefits and harm likely to occur from any action which is done in the name of advancing the religion and do not endorse harming other Muslims nor creating chaos.
- ✓ *Salafis* do not agree with the targeting of innocent people in warfare based on the evidences from the Qur’ān and Sunnah.
- ✓ Those who claimed to be *Salafi* and then adopted the methodology of *Ikhwān ul-Muslimeen* (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood) eventually stopped referring to themselves as being ‘Salafi’ and rejected its well known principles. Unfortunately, these individuals then left the *Salafi* way and some began to support erroneous ideas of jihad which the *Salafi* scholars did not endorse whatsoever.

The confusion arises between mainstream Salafis and the militant *jihadi-takfīrī* because, in their violent extremist narratives, they have adopted established Islamic lexicology and terminology in an attempt to promote themselves as acting in accordance to the most authentic and correct interpretation of the religion. In essence, in order to gain legitimacy, these violent extremists use narratives ascribing to Salafism. This is why we find references to the ‘Salaf’ (the righteous predecessors) and ‘Salafi’ (one who takes his example from these early righteous generations) replete within the discourse of Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Mus’ab as-Sooree, al-Fizāzee and many others. This has been noticed by Salafi scholars themselves; for instance, Shaykh ’AbdulMālik ar-Ramadani al-Jazā’iri, a contemporary Algerian *Salafi* scholar, stated about the Algerian *takfeeree* group known as the ‘*Salafi Group for Da’wah and Combat*’:

How can, all of this -- making permissible the blood of the police and killing them, be clean (i.e. permitted)? Then they live on stolen monies which have been ransacked from people by force and they destroy the souls of the Muslim soldiers...As a result, we should not, however, absolve ourselves from ‘Salafiyah’ as it is the truth, yet we absolve ourselves, for Allāh, from the

‘Salafist Group for Dawah and Combat’ and from all those who grasp weapons today in our country against the system or the people. I say this so that the creation know that the ascription of those revolutionary groups (i.e. the GSPC) to Salafiyyah is a distortion of Salafiyyah, just as how ascribing deviant Muslims to Islam is also a distortion of Islam, blocking the true path of Allāh and causing people to flee from the victorious ones (Firqat un-Nājiyah). However, Salafiyyah is Salafiyyah, just as Islām is Islām, even though it is distorted by the deviants (Shaykh ‘AbdulMālik bin Ahmad bin al-Mubārak Ramadānī al-Jazā’iree, 2005).

This theme has been highlighted by Wiktorowicz (2006) who emphasized that in “many cases, scholars claiming the Salafī mantel formulate antipodal juristic positions, leading one to question whether they can even be considered part of the same religious tradition.” It is, perhaps, pertinent to cite Shaykh ‘Alī Hasan al-Halabī al-Atharī’s (2008) definition of Salafism (Salafiyyah) in order to capture a comprehensive but concise view about the mainstream Salafi movement and its adherents.

An excerpt from an unpublished translation mentions of three types of people who utilise the “Salafī” term without due rights:

First: Whoever ascribes to Salafiyyah methodologies which oppose what the ‘Ulama (Muslim scholars) and seniors of the Salafi da’wah traverse, not to mention oppose their proofs and evidences such as some of the violent armed groups in Algeria and the likes. I wish to state that the reason for those (violent armed) people falsely ascribing themselves to Salafiyyah is only due to the fact that they want to distinguish themselves from other older partisan groups present, such as *Ikhwān ul-Muslimeem* [Muslim Brotherhood], *Hizb ut-Tahreer* and others. The evidence of this is: many of them changed their ascriptions and their “skins” as soon as they had the opportunity to! Another point to mention is that: Salafiyyah is not a *hizb* (partisan political group) that has a legislative structure which is difficult to penetrate, rather it is an academic and proselytising methodology which all are able to be a part of, not to mention be covered in its dust and hide behind its door. Therefore, the real affair of one who covers himself, with the gowns of Salafiyyah, is only exposed by the level of his agreement with the manhaj of the Salaf us-Sālih in: the *Usūl* of understanding and *istidlāl* (deriving rulings); and respect for the people of knowledge who have carried the manhaj throughout every time and place. Respect of the ‘Ulama is *taqdeer* (holding them in high estimation) and not *taqdees* (veneration) of them. As for what is inside a person, who ascribes himself to Salafiyyah, then we defer his case to the Lord of the Worlds as He knows better about us and him (‘Alī bin Hasan bin ‘Alī bin ‘Abdul-Hamīd al-Halabī al-Atharī, 2008, p. 13).

This definition of Salafism, from an insider perspective, is in stark contrast to outside perspectives on the Salafī movement. When examining much of the existing material on Salafism, especially that which blames the Salafis for terrorism, there is clearly a paucity of primary evidence from the scholars of Salafism themselves (Baker, dissertation).

Moreover, much of the academic writing constantly mention the word ‘Salafi’ and claims that certain terrorists subscribe to the *Salafi* way, yet many researchers have neglected any reference whatsoever to recognized *Salafi* scholars. These well-known *Salafi* scholars who

Salafis take their guidance from include Imām 'Abdul'Azeez Bin Bāz, Imām Muhammad Nāsiruddīn al-Albānī, Imām Muhammad bin Sālih al-'Uthaymeen, Imām Muqbil bin Hādee al-Wadī'ī and other contemporaries such as Shaykh 'Abdul'Azeez Āli-Shaykh,² Shaykh 'AbdulMuhsin al-'Abbād al-Badr,³ Shaykh Rabī' bin Hādī al-Madkhalī,⁴ Shaykh Sālih al-Fawzān, Shaykh AbdulMuhsin al-'Ubaykān,⁵ Shaykh AbdulMālik ar-Ramadānī,⁶ Shaykh AbdusSalām as-Sihaymī,⁷ Shaykh Khālīd al-Anbarī,⁸ Shaykh Ali Hasan al-Halabī al-Atharī,⁹ Shaykh Mashhoor Hasan Āl Salmān, Shaykh Saleem al-Hilālī, Shaykh Sālih Āli-Shaykh,¹⁰ Shaykh 'Abdul'Azeez bin Rayyis ar-Rayyis,¹¹ Shaykh AbdusSalām Burjis, and many others. All

² The current Mufti of KSA.

³ One of the senior contemporary *hadeeth* scholars of Madeenah, he authored a book entitled *Bi Ayyi'Aql wa Deen yakunu at-Tafkeer wa 't-Tadmeer, Jihad?* [According to Which Intellect and Religion is Bombing and Wreaking Havoc Considered Jihād!?] – translated into English by Abu Eesa Yasir Gilani (London: Dārul-Itisām Publishing, 2004).

⁴ Another senior contemporary scholar of *hadeeth*, he is the main *Salafi* scholar to refute the ideas and writings of Sayyid Qutb.

⁵ A scholar from Riyadh, he has authored many books refuting the contemporary *Khawārij* and *takfeerees*, such as the book, which has been translated into English: *The Khawārij and their Recurring Ideologies* (Texas: Tarbiyyah Bookstore Publishing, 2005). He has also been outspoken regarding the Iraq situation and opposing those *takfeerees* who call themselves “Mujāhideen”. See: <http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=53890&d=3&m=11&y=2004>.

Also see the article wherein he unequivocally advises the Muslims to co-operate with the police if they are aware of terrorists in the community: http://www.al-athariyyah.com/media/pdf/terrorism/qanda_london_bombings_1.pdf.

⁶ Author of the 460-page refutation of the statements, beliefs, and ideologies of Abu Qatada and others. He also wrote a book regarding the Algerian crisis entitled *Madarik un-Nadhr fi's-Siyasah: Bayna't-Tatbiqat ash-Shar'iyyah wa'l-Infia'lat al-Hamasiyyah* [Perceptions of Viewing Politics: Between the Divinely Legislated Application and Enthusiastic Disturbances] (KSA: Dar Sabeel il-Mumineen, 1418 AH/1997 CE, 2nd Edn).

⁷ Associate Professor at the Department of Jurisprudence, *Madeenah Islamic University*, KSA. He is the author of *The Ideology of Terrorism and Violence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Origins, causes for its spread and the solution* (Cairo: Dar ul-Menhaj, 2006). A partial translation of this book can be accessed at www.salafimanhaj.com.

⁸ An assistant professor in Saudi Arabia, he was one of the first scholars to warn in the late 1990s about the tribulation of *takfeer* in his book *Hukm bi-Ghayri Ma Anzala Allāh: Usool ut-Takfeer* [Ruling by other than what Allāh has revealed: Principles of Takfeer]. He has also recently written a book emphasising the Islamic evidences against suicide bombing, *'Iqra' Maseerak Qabl an-Tufajjir* [Read about your end, before you blow yourself up!].

⁹ From Jordan he was one of the first to also warn throughout the 1990s about the tribulation of *takfeer* and is one of the main bulwarks against the *takfirī* propagation in the world today. Among the many classical works that he has edited, he has also visited many countries conducting lectures, seminars, and teaching. He has visited the U.S. (New York in particular), the UK (Brixton and Luton), Canada, Indonesia, and is well-known in the Middle East.

¹⁰ The current Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, he gives many lectures within KSA. Of his relevant lectures to this topic is *A Warning Against Extremism*, which has been translated into English here: <http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/warning.pdf>. Other beneficial lectures by Shaykh Sālih Āli-Shaykh, which have been translated into English include *The Fitnah of the Khawārij*, trans. Abu Az-Zubayr S. Harrison found here: http://www.authentictranslations.com/trans-pub/sas_fitnah-khawārij.pdf

¹¹ One of the scholars of Riyadh who has also been thorough in refuting the extremist *takfeerees*, he is known for his detailed refutation of their ideas and probably the best that he has written on this topic is

of these *Salafi* scholars are regarded as the heads of the *Salafi* methodology and tradition and are all well known for their stances against terrorism, extremism, and political agitation. We will include some of their statements later. Yet many academics have not referred to these *Salafi* scholars whatsoever and merely equated the *Salafi* tradition with terrorism and violence – this is inappropriate.

Writers should therefore be more careful in their labeling, as it is rather simplistic to merely say that something is “Salafi” when, in fact, such an organisation does not even refer to itself as being “Salafi.” So, for example, Silber and Bhatt (2007) refer to “Salafi NGOs” when, in fact, such “NGOs” belong to the Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen [Muslim Brotherhood]. Kumar Ramakrishna (2005) states in his paper *Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in South-East Asia*:

A brief exposition of terminology is called for. Islamic fundamentalism (or Salafi Islam) is not all monolithic. Salafi Muslims, who take the injunction to emulate the Companions of the Prophet very seriously, may express this piety simply in terms of personal adherence to implementing shariah-derived standards of worship, ritual, dress, and overall behavioural standards. The majority of Salafi Muslims, in fact, may be considered as “neo-fundamentalists” who possess “neither a systematic ideology... (nor) global political agenda” (Metcalf).¹²

It is important for us to look at the efforts of the bona-fide Islamic scholars of the Salafi tradition in opposing extremist ideologies responsible for the misconceptions about Islām today. Back in the mid-1990s, when many people had not even heard of the likes of Bin Lādin, the Salafi scholars were the most vocal in their condemnations!¹³ The former *Muftee* of Saudi Arabia, Imām ‘Abdul’Azeez ibn ‘Abdullāh ibn Bāz (*raheemahullāh*), one of the main Salafi scholars, stated in the late 1990s in regards to Usāmah Bin Lādin, Muhammad al-Mas’ari and Sa’d al-Faqeeh (2000):

These publications from al-Faqeeh, al-Mas’ari or other callers to evil, *bātil* (falsehood) and division must be totally destroyed, and no lenience should be shown to them. It is incumbent to advise and guide them to the truth and warn them from this *bātil*. It is not permissible for anyone to co-operate with them in this evil, they must be advised and referred back to (true) guidance. And leave this *bātil*. And my advice to al-Mas’ari, al-Faqeeh, Ibn Lādin and all who traverse their way is that they leave off this dangerous path, to fear Allāh and be warned of His Wrath and Anger, to return back to (true) guidance, to repent to Allāh from they have done before.

his book *al-Burhan al-Muneer fi Dahd Shubuhāt Ahl it-Takfeer wa ’t-Tafjeer* [The Clear Proofs for Refuting the Doubts of the People of Takfeer and Bombing] – it has been translated into English here: http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_TakfeerAndBombing.pdf

¹² The reference to ‘Metcalf’ is Barbara Metcalf and her research entitled “*Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs*” (2001). This essay was for the *Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM)* Annual Lecture, Leiden University 23 November 2001.

¹³ This is important to highlight as there is no doubt that the increased Western interest, attacks, accusations, investigations, reports, etc., into Islām of late has been due to the horrific 9/11 attack, which Bin Lādin has been accused of sanctioning and authorising, along with other attacks that have taken place in Europe or against Europeans abroad.

Imām Bin Bāz (1996) made an identical statement in the Arabic newspaper *al-Muslimoon* and in a report in *ash-Sharq al-Awsat*, on 9 Jumadā al-Ulā 1417 AH corresponding to 21 September 1996 CE. It can be heard in audio,¹⁴ where Imām Bin Bāz further emphasises that no co-operation should be made with the likes of Usāmah Bin Lādin due to risks related to safety and security. This was way before any ‘investigative report’ or ‘think tank into global tolerance’ even cared about the likes of Bin Ladin. Imām Bin Bāz (undated) also stated:

From that which is known to anyone who has the slightest bit of common sense, is that hijacking airplanes and kidnapping children and the like are extremely great crimes the world over. Their evil effects are far and wide, as is the great harm and inconvenience caused to the innocent; the total effect of which none can comprehend except Allāh. Likewise, from that which is known is that these crimes are not specific to any particular country over and above another country, nor any specific group over and above another group; rather, it encompasses the whole world. There is no doubt about the effect of these crimes; so it is obligatory upon the governments and those responsible from amongst the scholars and others to afford these issues great concern, and to exert themselves as much as possible in ending this evil.

Imām Bin Bāz (undated) also stated that with regard to the terror attack in Riyadh in 1416 AH/1995 CE that:

There is no doubt that this incident is great evil, which is based upon causing major corruption, major evil and serious transgression. And there is no doubt that this incident can only be done by one who does not believe in Allāh or in the Last Day, with correct and sound faith, performing such a criminal and filthy act which has brought about great harms and corruption. Only those with filthy souls filled with hatred, envy, evil and corruption, and devoid of (sound and correct) faith, would do the likes of such actions. We ask Allāh for well-being and safety and to help the people in authority in all that will affect those people because their crime is severe and their corruption is huge. There is no power or movement except with Allāh! How can a believer or a Muslim perform such a serious crime which is based upon such huge transgression, corruption and destroying lives and injuring others without due right?

He further stated (2000):

I exhort all who know anything about these (terrorists) to convey that information to the relevant people. It is upon all who know about their condition and about them should convey that about them, because this is from the avenue of co-operation in order to prevent sin and transgression and in order to secure the safety of the people from evil, sin and transgression; and to establish justice from the transgressions of those oppressors... There is no doubt that this is from the greatest of crimes and corruptions on the earth and those who commit such actions are more deserving to be killed and restrained due to the heinous crime that they have committed. We ask Allāh that He makes them fail and that He

¹⁴ <http://www.al-mobile.org/File/1163762664.ram>

shackles them and their likes and that He saves us from their evil and the evil of those like them and that He totally destroys their plots, indeed He is Lofty and Majestic, Generous and Kind.

Therefore, there is a clear delineation between such politically violent oriented groups and Salafism. As for movements such as the Ikhwān ul-Muslimeen, their declared political emphasis should not be considered “Salafi-politicos”, as Wiktorowicz (2006) had initially coined. In acknowledgement of this fact, McCants, Brachman, and Felter (2006) recommended a strategy for reducing the popularity of Jihadis amongst Salafis:

Label the entire Jihadi Movement “Qutbism” in recognition that the Jihadis cite Sayyid Qutb more than any modern author. Muslim opponents of the Jihadis (including mainstream Wahhabis) use this term to describe them, a designation Jihadis hate since it implies that they follow a human and are members of a deviant sect. Adherents of the movement consider “Qutbi” to be a negative label and would much rather be called Jihadi or Salafi.

To generally categorise Salafis as belonging to the same broad entity as the violent *Jihadi-takfiris*, the overly political-inspired *Ikhwān ul-Muslimeen*, and other similar movements obfuscates the clear parameters between movements that have been polemical in their opposition to violent extremism and those seeking to justify it.

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4.6. Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism Ideologies and Activities (Anne Speckhard)

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The last two decades have witnessed an explosive and dramatic leap in the growth of violent terror groups working in behalf of the global militant “jihad.”² The tactics employed include kidnappings, beheading, assassinations, bombings in civilian areas, and the use of suicide missions labeled by the perpetrators as “martyrdom missions.” Whereas in the past, terror groups were less “religious” in their espoused ideology, more nationalistic in their membership, and local in their goals, we have seen in the past two decades that the ideology of Al Qaeda and related militant jihadist groups is religious, and that the groups are also global in reach and not limited to addressing local grievances (although they often make use of these issues to draw in and motivate new recruits).

As we increasingly begin to understand the processes of, and threats from, violent radicalization, governments in Western, as well as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian societies, we have begun to understand that it is necessary to mount an equal and as comprehensive a fight against violent radicalization. This fight should include four main areas:

1. preventing radicalization, particularly among vulnerable populations;
2. immunizing society against violent ideologies;
3. identifying and disengaging (by arrest, amnesty programs, or simple intimidation); and
4. attempting deradicalization of those who are on the brink of, or already have, committed violent acts in behalf of the militant groups.

Deradicalization and Disengagement from Terrorism

To truly win against terrorism it is necessary to delegitimize it as a tactic. We must always keep in mind that terrorist groups exist because they have some political goal, some desire for power that drives them to violent action. Some groups exist as a result of serious grievances, real and perceived, and should, wherever possible, be channelled into laying down

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² The author makes use of the term “militant jihad” as a reference to terrorists groups (who are often also militants) who claim that they are carrying out a “jihad” and acting in the name of Islam by attacking both civilian and military targets. These groups heavily rely upon and promote “martyrdom” (suicide) operations, claiming the rewards referred to in Islamic scriptures will be accorded to the person(s) who carries out such an act. When referring to militant jihad, the author is fully aware of and respectful of the religious and completely non-terrorist related references to the greater jihad in the Koran, which refers to the constant and ever vigilant need for an inner struggle to master oneself and attain a moral lifestyle and assures her readers that in writing about those who believe in a call to militant jihadi terrorism, she has tried to find the best term that describes both their ideology and actions and by doing so means no disrespect to the Islamic faith nor to the majority of Muslims that follow Islam peacefully.

arms and achieving their goals through the legitimate political process. Individuals who engage in terrorism do so because somehow their individual vulnerabilities and desires have meshed with those of a group and they become engaged in the terrorism trajectory.

Deradicalization is a complex process and involves addressing the psychological state and makeup of the individuals involved in terrorism and those who are moving along the terrorist trajectory. Disengagement from terrorism is also an option but unlike deradicalization, it is behavioural only. Disengagement involves either the abandonment of violence or abandonment of a group that is advocating or actively involved in violence but entails no real and enduring change of mind and heart (Ashour, 2008; Horgan, 2008; Speckhard, 2007a).

Disengagement sometimes occurs through intimidation. For those who are afraid of law enforcement, the thrill of being involved in a terror cell can fade in the face of potential incarceration. These individuals may disengage from the group simply as a result of intimidation while continuing to hold extremist views and continuing to be vulnerable to easy reactivation for a terrorist attack - by virtue of continued contact with, but minimal activity within, a terrorist cell. For some, disengagement occurs with arrest and imprisonment, although the actors may still be highly extremist in their mindset and even “infect” others while in prison by recruiting for the group and perhaps even directing terrorist activities from prison as they wait out their sentence. This was the case for many Palestinian terrorists who were arrested and held for years in Israeli prisons. Some smuggled in phones and directed militant activities from inside the prisons while others recruited new members. Ahmed Sadat the leader of the PFLP commented to me in 2004, “The prison became our best university for finding and teaching recruits. The Israelis did us a favour in that regard” (Speckhard, 2004).

There are ways to disengage individuals and groups from terrorism and even to de-radicalize/change their belief that terrorism is a legitimate activity. These include:

1. delegitimizing the ideologies themselves;
2. understanding and tailoring strategies to address the various conduits used for persuading and motivating recruits (in the case of the militant jihad these conduits are through face to face recruitment, media glorification, or terrorism and the Internet);
3. disengaging recruits from active roles through intimidation, imprisonment, amnesty programs;
4. providing activities that attract them away from violence and into nonviolent solutions;
5. de-radicalizing/rehabilitating those who have been imprisoned through prison programs; and
6. prevention of radicalization on a societal-wide level with special emphasis on vulnerable prison inmates, gangs, military members, and youth.

Disengagement from terrorism is certainly a worthy goal. However, without an ideological shift, de-radicalization does not occur and those who have disengaged from terrorism appear to just as easily re-engage. Those that reengage can be the most lethal of all actors, volunteering for suicide missions in order to avoid what some have termed “another kind of death” meaning enduring imprisonment, torture, or living with extreme posttraumatic stress responses (Speckhard, 2004). Disengagement is simple to assess, whereas the profound and long-term attitudinal, belief, and behavioural changes involved in deradicalization are both far more difficult to achieve and to assess.

The remainder of this paper will focus on all of the above. Two types of disengagement/deradicalization programs will be described. The first deal with community based models, while the second set of approaches deal with prison-based programs. Since much has been written in this volume on the role of the media and internet in recruiting (Paz, 2009, etc.) the section on community based models will only focus on recruiting in the military and on the street.

Countering Recruitment/Radicalization in the Military

One of the calls to the militant jihad includes the seeking out and recruiting of key individuals who are in the military or soon will be, to convert them to extremism and to use their training and insider position to fight against their own countries and to fight against others as well. Following the identification of Zarkawi as the leader of AQ in Iraq, the Jordanian government understood that it needed to institute prevention programs within its military to find and work with those military recruits who may be influenced by, and act upon, militant jihadi ideologies. They developed a program for special forces recruits with psychological and ideological components to help detect those with doubts about being in the military, and to prevent their recruitment into militant jihadi groups through awareness and understanding the validity (or lack thereof) of the associated persuasive religious arguments. It is run by a military psychologist and cleric who lecture new recruits and invites them to consider family members, friends, and colleagues who deem their military commitments as “Takfir,” or apostate. The psychologist and cleric engage the military recruits to teach them their military service to the state is, indeed, legitimate under Islam and that militant jihadi violence is illegitimate.

Western Muslims as well are vulnerable to both recruitment and retaliation. Those who consider or actually join the military in countries involved in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan may find themselves attacked by other Muslims for taking part in military missions in Islamic countries. Several Muslim military members in the UK told the author in June 2008 that they do not admit, even to their own families, that they are in the military in order to avoid harassment and prevent harm to themselves and their families (Speckhard, 2008b). European militaries need to take these concerns seriously by appointing Muslim imams as chaplains to support and protect their charges from becoming radicalized or suffering from harassment.

The Street – Community Based Models of Intervention

While surveillance and infiltration of terrorist groups is necessary, it is possible to use parallel efforts for positive intervention when authorities identify young people that are becoming involved in militant jihadi activities. Youth workers (psychologists, social workers, imams, and education specialists) can be sent to talk with those at risk and help them with the problems that make turning to such groups and ideologies attractive in the first place. Youth workers can be mentored and trained to work in youth centers and in the streets, engaging with extremists, and those vulnerable to extremism to turn them back from belief in, and engaging in, militant jihad. These efforts may make it possible to thwart or reverse radicalisation of young Muslims, who have not yet been arrested, but are known to hold extremist views or support violent activities and have the potential to become personally engaged in or critically supportive of political violence/terrorism.

Community based counter-radicalization programs are active in both the Netherlands and the UK. The Dutch police understand that community policing is crucial and have instituted a program that mobilizes social services (i.e., housing, schooling, welfare benefits etc.) as a means

of prevention for those identified by the police as dangerously close to committing themselves to violence in behalf of the militant jihad.

The UK built a program modeled after the Dutch and also developed community based programs for dialogue and outreach to prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies as well as to directly address extremists themselves. In the UK initiative, when a potential extremist is identified by policing initiatives, they are either marked for security surveillance, or if they have not gone too far down the terrorist trajectory, moved through a process in which they are warned that while they have not yet broken any laws, they appear to need monitoring and assistance. Social services are then mobilized to deal with any social needs such as housing, educational services, social work, etc.

Just as deconstructing Internet militant jihadi materials is potentially a powerful method for countering its power to radicalize, deconstruction of the militant jihadi ideology is also a useful prevention activity in schools and mosques to protect vulnerable and young populations who are likely viewers of such materials by helping them to see the emotional manipulation and to provide a better path to take in response to the call to militant jihad. Similar to anti-AIDs campaigns for young people, such materials could be used in schools to inoculate youth against the call to militant jihad (Speckhard, 2007a).

It is important for countries to identify their “hotspots” and communities vulnerable to militant jihadi ideologies and consider programs that go well beyond simple criminal surveillance. The few Somali immigrant youth that went on “jihad” in Somalia after living in the U.S. are an example of a population that some experts, including this author, had expressed concerns about for years before they ever activated (Kobrin, 2008; Paz, 2008).

Prison Rehabilitation Programs

Prison authorities in many countries are struggling with how to best address militant jihadi prisoners and those vulnerable to their aggressive recruitment tactics. Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia, Jordan, the United States, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, Netherlands, the UK, and many other countries have all begun to address the need for prison rehabilitation and prevention programs to address and remediate the spread of militant jihadi activities within prisons. The author designed and pilot tested one of these rehabilitation programs in Iraq.

The spectrum of extremism in prisons ranges from those who entered prison as dedicated militant jihadists, having been imprisoned for some terrorist related act, to those who merely supported such groups for opportunist reasons. Those who have “blood on their hands” or who are already seriously indoctrinated and committed violence on behalf of the militant jihad can be called “hard core” extremists. The “hard core” also includes those who actively propagate the ideology and have been intimately involved in terror operations: as strategists, recruiters, and actual operatives.

Next to these “hardcore” prisoners are those who have fallen under their influence. These usually include Muslims who reverted to Islam while in prison and new convert to Islam who were imprisoned for other reasons (i.e., non-terrorism related criminal acts). If left under the influence of militant jihadi leaders inside prison, they have a strong chance of becoming indoctrinated by militant jihadists and leaving prison as “hard core” militant jihadis. Richard Reid, the infamous shoe bomber, is a good example of this group.

Somewhere between the “hard core” and those under their influence are the opportunists - a group imprisoned for security related crimes who may have served militant jihadi groups but who were not motivated by the militant jihadi ideology. They are the ones that will lay an IED, run guns, or carry out other criminal activities for money but they are not particularly interested in the “cause.” This latter group is criminal in nature and motivated by money, involved with drugs, gunrunning, gang, and criminal activities. Their motivations for assisting terrorists are mercenary rather than ideological, although once in prison they, too, are vulnerable to becoming more ideologically committed to militant jihadi ideas. Lastly, in some countries, individuals are imprisoned for having militant jihadi materials in their possession. These prisoners have not actually been involved in terrorist acts and are often not seriously dedicated to militant jihadi ideologies.

One of the greatest challenges the author found when designing the detainee rehabilitation program in Iraq was sorting the prisoners and assessing the factors that served as catalysts for starting and staying on the terrorist trajectory, the level of commitment, and the motivations at each stage. This understanding is necessary to successfully derail the person from engaging in terrorism. The rehabilitation needs vary: those who are ideologically indoctrinated need to have their worldview addressed, whereas those for whom trauma was a primary catalyst for engaging in terrorism are in need of posttraumatic stress therapy. Those with purely mercenary motives are unlikely to disengage from terrorism and might be drawn further into the militant jihad by a program that addresses only ideology. These individuals may need skills training and psychological help to reorient to a different, nonviolent means of earning an income.

The major aspects of nine programs for countering militant jihadi extremist ideologies and their followers inside prisons are briefly described. These programs are specifically designed as rehabilitation or “treatment” programs for extremist prisoners and also function to prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies inside the prison population. In the latter case, they may target prisoners who have converted or “reverted” to Islam and endorse militant jihadi ideologies. They were developed primarily with local issues in mind to combat the militant jihadist threat inside their own countries.

Saudi Arabia

The Saudi program is the most well known and longest standing. It was developed in response to increasing Saudi concern over “jihadists” who received military training and were ideologically indoctrinated in Afghanistan and returned to the kingdom disgruntled and advocating for it to be overthrown. In response to this societal challenge, a group of well-known clerics began a prison-based deradicalization program. These clerics visited the prisoners individually to engage militant jihadis in discussions about their beliefs.

Saudi clerics, some of the most respected Islamic scholars in the world, engage in respectful discussion with extremist prisoners and carefully challenge them in instances where the militants’ views did not coincide with authentic teachings of Islam. The Saudi clerics are often able to win these debates and move them to a more moderate stance of no longer endorsing terrorism. The credibility of the clerics involved is paramount in their success and may not translate to other locations. In fact, when clerics from the Saudi program were invited to speak with Saudi prisoners in Guantanamo and Iraq they found that, when they were up against the “hard core” Al Qaeda (AQ) prisoner, their program was less effective and often had no effect at all. The prisoners in Guantanamo and Iraq took the ideological stance that the clerics had been

co-opted by the Saudi royal family who they view as apostates (or “Takfeer”). However, the Saudi clerics were able to reach a few less “hard core” prisoners at Guantanamo and, as a result, gained important intelligence from them that led to further arrests of terrorist operatives.

The Saudis have the resources to offer substantial incentives to their prisoners for positive participation in the “reform” process. These include arranging marriages for single disadvantaged prisoners (no small thing in Saudi where failing to find a wife can be a serious frustration), offering new cars and jobs upon release – all things to help ex-prisoners settle down and start a family - and also making financial provisions for the wives and families of the married extremists prisoners. This enables the Saudi clerics to be able to offer material incentives as genuine expressions of their concern. Likewise, the Saudi system is able to keep close tabs on prisoners who are released, monitoring their communication and movements to ensure they do not resume their extremist memberships and activities. This is a disincentive for the groups as well, as they can be discovered and arrested for try to recruit a released militant inside Saudi.

An important point to note about the Saudi program is that it began solely with the involvement of clerics but, as time went on, the clerics understood that a purely ideological (in this case Islamic) approach was not sufficient. As a result, they invited psychiatric and psychological professionals to help assess the prisoners throughout the treatment program and have, in the last years, added many psychological aspects to their program including art therapy (Bennett, 2008). The Saudi program also has a prevention component and aftercare with a halfway house (that includes art therapy, play station, and religious lectures that aid in the transition from prison including for those released from Guantanamo (Boucek, 2008)). The head of the family members and graduates of the program also must sign a pledge renouncing terrorism, with the head of the family stating he will be responsible for the prisoner once released into their care (Mohammad, 2009).

At present, prisoners complete the program in eight to twelve weeks (Mohammad, 2009). The prison-based program started in 2004 and has graduated more than three thousand prisoners. The current claim made by the Saudi prison program is for 80 to 90 percent effectiveness with recidivism of only thirty-five of these as of 2008 (Boucek, 2008). One must keep in mind however that this figure is based on a prison population that aims mainly at moderate extremists – that is those who were arrested for having connections to extremist militant groups or having militant jihadi materials in their possession and makes little to no inroads with “hard core” operatives. Indeed the thirty-five reported by Boucek were all for security related offences but another nine prisoners graduating from the program were rearrested for returning to the militant jihad (Mohammad, 2009). In one infamous case, Said Ali al-Shihri (otherwise known as Abu Sayyaf al-Shihri) was released from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and passed through the Saudi rehabilitation program before resurfacing in Yemen as the deputy leader of Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch, where he is suspected of involvement in the deadly bombing of the United States Embassy in Sana, Yemen in September 2008 (Worth, 2009).

Singapore

The Singaporeans have a rehabilitation program similar to the Saudis, having modeled it after theirs. It was begun in 2002 in response to thwarted suicide bombing attacks on four key positions inside Singapore including the U.S. embassy involving 15 Jamaya Islamiya Singaporeans in their mid-to-late twenties. The existence of homegrown militant jihadis on

home soil came as a great shock to the Singaporean government. Singaporean system also involves incentives such as providing financial provisions for the wives and families of the prisoners, offering the wives jobs while the prisoner was still in prison, and providing, when necessary, employment for prisoners upon release. The prisoners are also strongly encouraged to continue meeting with the prison clerics weekly for the year after their release to ensure that they do not revert back to any militant jihadi ideas (Gunaratna & Ali, 2006). It also provides prisoners with a library and academic courses (Mohammad, 2009). The Singaporean program also claims huge success, with thirty-two of fifty-five prisoners released (Mohammad, 2009); however, their program works only with thwarted terrorists not those who had engaged in violence. Also, Singapore is a society in which it is easy to monitor prisoners (including their communications and movements) after their release.

Malaysia

The Malaysians claim their prison program is based on the Singapore system. The Malay prison system is a long-term, 2-3 year treatment program. "Treatment" in the Malay system is based upon group lectures, individual counseling sessions with one or multiple clerics, and perhaps most importantly, physical "discipline" (beatings) of prisoners who do not comply with the state sponsored Islamic teachings against militant jihad. The Malaysian prisoners generally comply with treatment, if only to simply avoid being beaten for any overt resistance to it. It is unclear if the program has truly been successful.

Indonesia

Indonesia's program, started in 2002, involves the participation of former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members who work to convince suspected terrorists that Islam does not support terrorism in return for incentives such as reduced sentences or assistance for their families. The most famous of these is a former high ranking militant, Nasir Abas, allegedly involved in the Bali bombing and a former mujahedeen in Afghanistan who "deradicalized" on his own as a result of his disgust with the wholesale attacks and killing of civilians that he never endorsed (Mohammad, 2009). Abas et al uses three arguments to convince militant jihadis to give up their allegiance to the movement: that militant jihad and attacking civilians is not Islamic; that not all westerners are bad, and that militant jihad has given a bad face to Islam, doing it a disservice. He admits many militants dismiss him but that he can make an impact in some cases (Economist, 2007).

The Indonesian program is based on two key tenets: that only radicals can deradicalize militant jihadi prisoners because they have credibility and that the state must reestablish trust and legitimacy (through incentives, etc.) to foster the cooperation of former militants/terrorists. For that reason, the program gives considerable support, medical care, and education to prisoners' family members and to the prisoners themselves. Abas and his group of former militant jihadis argue against the need for an Islamic state, stating that the government is not apostate (Schulze, 2008). According to Sidney Jones, an Indonesia-based analyst for the International Crisis Group only of a few of the "hard core" have been reached, the rest are not responsive to this program (Bennett, 2008).

Egypt

In 1997, leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) started a massive de-radicalization program in which they declared a unilateral ceasefire and from which sprang twenty-five

volumes containing Islamic arguments of why the use of violence against the state, society, and others was illegitimate and not based in Islam. The Egyptian prison authorities allowed the leaders to organize large study groups inside prison where they could gather their followers to tell them that what they had been taught about the militant jihad was no longer considered legitimate or Islamic. Following in the EIG footsteps, the imprisoned leaders of the al- Jihad organization also started a massive movement in 2007 renouncing violence (Ashour). This shook Al Qaeda to its core. The recanting and subsequent writings of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in particular created a furor within the global militant jihadi movement. This was because he was known previously for having authored what some refer to as the “bible” of jihad, and many of those involved in the formation of Al Qaeda previously had strong ties with the al-Jihad group. Indeed Zawahiri, the main current ideologue of Al Qaeda was so concerned that he wrote an entire volume to answer al-Sharif’s recantation of the militant jihad, questioning the piece, and asking if perhaps its author was hooked up to the torture machine to have written it.

The Egyptians are well known for their frequent use of torture to elicit information from and to “turn” militant jihadi prisoners. One man, imprisoned for teaching the Salafi version of Islam told the author, “I was arrested and held for five years. They would take us in up on the roof and douse us with freezing cold water and leave us there in the cold, along with many other ways of torturing us” (Speckhard, 2007b). The Islamist movement in Egypt, many whose members spent considerable time in prison and were tortured, spawned two distinct paths. Those who were released from prison or evaded arrest fled Egypt and some of them became the basis of the modern day AQ movement.

For both of the Egyptian groups recanting from terrorism, there were two important reasons for giving up political violence: torture and imprisonment (strong state repression) and the realization, gained from extensive study in prison, that violent militant jihadi ideas were not only counterproductive (i.e., often resulting in torture and death) but also were not justified by Islam. When interviewed, leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group recall feeling horrified as their followers moved from attacking political leaders, regarded as legitimate targets, to indiscriminate attacks against civilians, which they believed to be inconsistent with the teachings of Islam.

According to Egyptian authorities, this prison program has reached hundreds successfully. Their success is likely due to the scholarship of the leaders and the fact that they are respected leaders and insiders to the movement as well as charismatic. The success of the Egyptian model unfortunately highlights the potential power resulting from the coupling of imprisonment, torture, and heavy state repression with self-education and charismatic leaders dispersing their new found wisdom to their followers. It is unlikely that any Western state would want to emulate all aspects of this program, especially the repression, even with the high success rates. As an Egyptian ex-prisoner who was tortured in prison told this author, “I did not believe in terrorism and never preached it and I still do not, it is not Islamic.” Asked if he continues to preach nonviolent Salafi views after his release he answered, “No, I am too afraid to preach anything, I never want to return to prison” (Speckhard, 2007). We can hope most tortured prisoners are like him, but we know from actual research that is not the case – some become even more hardened and dedicate themselves to suicide missions rather than to risk recapture (Speckhard, 2005 #24).

Yemen

Yemen boasts great success from a prison system very similar to the Saudis in that it engages militant jihadi prisoners in respectful dialogue with imminent clerics who, like the Saudis, have the authority, education, and experience to debate Islamic issues. Yemen has reported success with even the “hard core” who are claimed to have reverted to a moderate stance of Islam (Taarnby, 2005). However, intelligence data reveals that, in fact, many of these “hard core” militants simply left Yemen upon release and surfaced in Iraq and other jihadi hotspots. It appears that the Yemeni government turned a blind eye to this, pleased to have the militants out of the country and engaged elsewhere.

United Kingdom

The UK began its program to combat militant jihadi ideologies inside prisons in 2005-2006. The UK program focuses on new Islamic converts who have endorsed militant jihadi ideologies. These prisoners meet individually with prison imams who ask them about their beliefs and present them with Salafi-based critical analysis methods to judge the authenticity of Islamic teachings and consistency with the Quran and the verified teachings (Hadiths) of the companion of the Prophets. Likewise, militant jihadi teachings are carefully challenged by presenting the context in which the Quranic verses and Hadiths used by terror groups are appropriately applied and highlighting where they have been misapplied. The goal is to empower the convert to think for himself and drop his mistaken commitment to militant jihadi beliefs. The UK program imams admit they are able to identify psychosocial factors and vulnerabilities that create a “hook” for the militant jihadi teachings but that they, themselves, do not address these factors other than to identify them, discuss them briefly with the prisoners and refer them for state sponsored social work assistance. The UK program is completely non-coercive and voluntary and operates for the most part as individual religious counseling/mentoring but also includes sermons and group discussions where appropriate.

United States

In fall of 2006, the United States Department of Defense, under the initiative of General Garner, committed to investigate existing prison deradicalization programs and to model one for use with the 20,000 + security detainees in Iraq. The U.S. program was designed by the author, with the help of UK imams involved in the Scotland Yard project, and pilot tested in summer 2007. The four to six week intensive program was the first of its kind to incorporate a comprehensive religious and psychological approach from the start -- combining religious challenge by Muslim imams with psychological counseling to inmates to help address the many psychological traumas and vulnerabilities that led them to involvement with terrorism and insurgency. The goal of the program is to challenge and move the detainees to make a profound shift from embracing violence to adopting a nonviolent stance. Changes are assessed relative to pre-treatment assessments by both psychologists and imams. Due to the huge numbers of detainees involved, most sessions occur in groups of no more than ten detainees and individual sessions only occur on an “as needed” basis. Treatment is a full day: half religious, half-psychological. The program is voluntary, but detainees are motivated by the potential of accelerated release from detention and amnesty. The program also has an economic and educational component designed by the military to improve detainees’ literacy (in Arabic) and to train them in useful skills for employment upon release. While the desire was to include family and tribal members in the treatment, the distances involved, particularly for those detainees

housed in Camp Bucca, precluded doing so. The challenges of designing and carrying out a large-scale rehabilitation program inside an active conflict zone are many. All those released will be going back into an environment where the original catalysts for activating into terrorism and political violence may still be present.

Of the 20,000 + detainees held by the U.S. at that time it was estimated between five to fifteen percent were “hard core” (i.e., dedicated to militant jihadi ideologies) and the rest were engaged in sectarian violence (including Shia militants) and economic opportunists. Likewise, 800 juveniles were among the detainees. Thus, the program was tailored for three populations: hard core, moderates and juveniles.

The eight hundred juvenile detainees, ages 13-18, were a huge concern as they were separated from their family and school for a considerable period of time during a critical period in their development. The program for juveniles included psychological and religious counseling along with continuing their education. Classes and sports offered included math, science, social sciences, language, and soccer. The juveniles were given group-counseling treatment by clerics. Psychological counseling was provided to address traumas, psychosocial needs and vulnerabilities, sense of identity, and future purpose and plans for exiting prison. The juveniles responded well to the program.

The program for the “hard core” prisoners was similar to the juveniles including both Islamic lessons and psychological treatment of their traumas. They were taken in groups through a series of lessons organized around themes relating to militant jihad and Islamic teachings that were designed to engage them in discussions, challenge militant jihadi ideologies, and turn them to relinquishing sectarian and militant jihadi violence. Some of the imams that worked with them were respected Salafi scholars with years of Islamic study and also prior involvement in the militant jihad, thus they had an insider position to work from. The psychological track addressed the multitude of traumas that may have given rise to their willingness to commit to violence, as well as the traumas that occurred during arrest and incarceration, grief and loss issues, their desires for revenge, their sense of identity, meaningfulness, life mission, and future purpose. The psychology track worked to create positive identity and future alignments, to reorient them to nonviolent problem solving and to empower the militant jihadis to consider alternative nonviolent pathways to changing their society and to address injustices.

The “moderate” prisoners were provided with a shorter program that addressed Islamic values and provided psychological counseling to create a sense of identity and self-empowerment that precluded commitment to violence. This group was given only a limited Islamic challenge because they were not ideologically committed to the militant jihad and there was no point to needlessly expose them to this ideology.

The program was designed to operate on the highest levels of human rights standards with no violence or coercion involved and full disclosure of the programs’ goals and contents, voluntary participation, informed consent, and the ability to opt out at any time. Likewise, careful precautions were taken to warn detainees who were receiving counseling that given prison surveillance, admitting to crimes they had not already admitted to in previous interrogation sessions might be problematic for them, that it was better to work on these issues without directly admitting to criminal involvement.

Initial results were very promising, with 6,000 detainees released nine months after program commencement, although most were low security risks rather than “hard core.” Of the original group released, only 12 inmates were rearrested – much lower than the usual recidivism rate from previous years of close to 200. Major General Douglas Stone, commander of detention facilities in Iraq, reported that improved security in the areas of the country many inmates were returning to also helped in keeping the recidivism rate lower (Bennett, 2008). Overall, the program appeared to work for releasing low security risk detainees and inside the prison also showed some success for reaching “hard core.”

Turkey

Turkey also has a prison program. One of its distinctive features is the use of family members to effect changes in the prisoners. Mothers, in particular, are brought into sessions to “talk sense” to their sons. Since the mother-son bond is so strong in Turkish culture, a mother’s strong emotional pleas to her son to give up commitment to the militant jihadi ideology can be quite persuasive, especially if she shows the suffering his imprisonment has caused her and their family.

Features of Prison Rehabilitation Programs and Recommendations for Success

Prison de-radicalization programs are a great challenge and the ingredients of a successful prison rehabilitation program are many and varied. There are features common to all programs – building rapport and challenging the ideology, but there are also distinctive features that can be used to increase the success of a program. The table on the next page gives a list of the potential ingredients of a successful prison rehabilitation program.

A prison program must first be voluntary and involve informed consent as well as give profound respect to human rights. While some may argue the “ticking bomb” reason for torture or advocate “soft torture,” serious Al Qaeda participants are usually prepared for both. There is evidence that many Al Qaeda operatives are trained to endure interrogation and even torture and to organize themselves into functioning recruitment cells inside prison walls. Physical abuse, isolation, and coercion may work to elicit confessions but they may also harden prisoners and drive them to suicide or “martyrdom” roles if they return to terrorism upon release. Likewise, photos and video footage from Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib give clear evidence that any mistreatment of prisoners can easily become a lightning rod for further global radicalization.

Detainees in Iraq who told the author about being mistreated (hit, held in stress positions, not allowed to clean themselves according to Islamic rules or pray, locked in small spaces, photographed naked among mixed gender groups, mocked while naked, etc.) made clear that such mistreatment can push some, but not all prisoners, into further radicalization and can do the same for their relatives and others who learn of it. The same was true in our Chechen sample – a group of suicide bombers volunteered for their missions after either being tortured or having a family member tortured in prison. Conversely, three former Al Qaeda operatives who spoke with the author in Iraq shared that the decency, respect, and extension of human care by their interrogators in prison turned them away from the movement (Speckhard, 2006).

Features of Deradicalization/Disengagement Prison Programs Dealing with Militant Jihadist Prisoners/Detainees

Rapport between prisoner and cleric, psychologist, or a team

- Charismatic leaders, former insiders, recanters, people with street credibility, Salafi scholars, and older maternal and paternal figures are most useful

Religious Treatment

- Challenged on Islamic legitimacy of militant jihad
- Taught critical thinking and means of testing Islamic thought

Psychological Treatment

- Addresses the original/current motivations and vulnerabilities that led to joining and engaging in terrorism;
- Reorients prisoner to nonviolent identity and solutions for achieving goals.

Family & Tribal Involvement

- Family members and tribal leaders involved in the treatment and after release
- Marriages arranged for prisoners upon release

Economic Incentives

- Family members supported during incarceration
- Jobs provided upon release
- Cars provided

Skills Training

- Language skills and literacy taught
- Training in job skills
- Basic education provided – particularly for juveniles

Sports Program

Incentives for Participation

- Accelerated or early release for successful participation
- Amnesty upon release for successful graduates

Weekly or daily sessions

Isolation from Other Prisoners for Safety Reasons

After Release Mentoring Program

- To ensure the changes occurring inside prison continue after release;

Human Rights Aspects

- Voluntary with Informed Consent
- Surveillance admitted to the participant to prevent further incrimination
- Nonviolent, noncoercive, no stress positions, solitary isolation, etc.

Systematic Assessment - Pre, during and post-testing for efficacy

A successful program must find a way to successfully sort through and identify prisoners or detainees according to their level of radicalization. This requires an assessment tool that should be used pre, post, and during treatment. The program must be tailored to address the process and level of engagement in the movement, original and current motivators, and find ways to activate potential motivations for disengagement or deradicalization. For the program to work, militant prisoners must be approached contextually, addressing issues that are important to them (i.e., anger over occupation, violation of sacred values, trauma, desire for revenge, search for meaning, need for belonging or a father figure, marginalization, discrimination, etc.). Motivational incentives that address their needs and motivations for becoming involved work best.

A common element of all of the programs is that they rely upon a relationship built with the prisoner, often by a cleric or imam brought in specifically for this purpose, but at times also involving a psychologist or an entire team of mentors. These individuals first build rapport in group or individual sessions which takes place anywhere from daily to weekly. Many programs at present are religious only and use imams solely to challenge the militant jihadi worldview. This is a serious limitation as the road to radicalization involves many group dynamics and individual vulnerabilities that are best addressed using psychological methods in conjunction with imam involvement. Many psychological tools (cognitive therapy, guided imagery, etc.) can be used to help militant jihadi prisoners envision restoring themselves to a nonviolent stance, rebuilding to engage with their social environment positively.

A program is also only as good as the quality of the people that carry it out. Charismatic persons, those with maternal or paternal streaks, and a sense of personal authority and maturity are also likely to have better success as prisoners are often drawn to such persons. Respect for age and strong family ties are often a cultural feature of those who join the militant jihad, thus experience and age can be serious asset. In the case of religious challenge, it is important to realize that hard-core militant jihadis who know their Koran well will likely demand a very highly trained imam to speak with them and are unlikely to respect anyone other than a Salafi scholar. Likewise, when sectarian violence is a huge issue as it has been with Al Qaeda in Iraq it may be difficult to use Shia staff for Sunni prisoners because they may be rejected or threatened.

A few programs make use of family members and tribal leaders in the treatment and release process, requiring the tribe or family to keep watch over the released prisoner and prevent him from further involvement. In Iraq, it was very clear that the prisoners were very worried about loved ones at home, particularly female relatives that were perhaps living without male protection while the inmate was imprisoned. Making use of this concern through family involvement and monitored phone calls and making use of the strong desire to return home puts a strong motivation to good use.

The roles that a militant jihadi will hopefully move into once disengaged/deradicalized are also important to consider. Amnesty, jobs programs, and continued mentoring upon release are all important considerations. Economic incentives, such as the Saudis provide, including jobs and even a car help make the transition from prison. Likewise, literacy and skills training in computers or a trade all provide increased likelihood of being gainfully employed upon release. A few programs include after release mentoring programs and frequent check-ins to ensure the changes occurring inside prison continue after release. All of these measures are likely to secure long-term compliance.

Lastly, a good program may not do well if the prison authorities are not behind the program. Guards that are disrespectful or abusive can easily undo positive movement in treatment sessions. Likewise, isolating prisoners taking part in the program, surveillance, getting medical care, and training for those who need extra care, getting the proper space to carry out the program, prison access and protection for staff, etc., all require close alliance with the prison authorities as does assessing who should be taking part in the program.

Sabotage of prisoner reform is also a serious factor to consider. In Iraq, those who were suspected of turning against the other Takfiri prisoners were subjected to sharia courts and had their arms broken or worse. It is wise to isolate those taking part in a program from those who are not in order to avoid such punishments and to keep them from being harassed and reindoctrinated while going through the program.

Assessing success in any prison program is extremely difficult. Prisoners are highly motivated to lie especially if they believe that they can gain amnesty and early release. Probably the best measure of a reformed jihadi is observation over time to see if there has been a real change of behavior, mind, and heart. This may be easier to detect in group sessions and with clandestine surveillance than in individual sessions where the prisoner may learn to manipulate his mentor.

Likewise, a successful program cannot be condemned by some level of recidivism.

Thousands of prisoners in Iraq were released after going through the Detainee Rehabilitation Program; however, release alone does not signify success and release does not mean that they did not return to terrorism – only that they were not detected. Previously incarcerated terrorists are likely to be very careful to avoid arrest again. Detainees released from the Saudi and Yemen programs have been found to have returned to the militant jihad, just as detainees released without treatment from Guantanamo and other programs returned to their former roles.

Challenges

The challenges to counter-radicalization programs whether they be prison or community based are multiple. First of all women are rarely addressed in either venue and women are increasingly playing a role in militant jihad: as motivators of men (even offering themselves as marital/sexual prizes to those who commit to self “martyrdom”), trainers of children, interpreters and teachers of militant jihad, and as “martyrs” and operatives themselves. In Iraq, arresting and detaining even clearly guilty women as prisoners was a highly radicalizing event and one that made it difficult for the women to return to society as it was assumed they had been sexually molested while in prison.

Another challenge with counter-radicalization programs is that the ideology and recruitment strategies that governments are confronting are highly fluid and difficult to address with static programs. The programs must constantly keep up with the changeable nature of the threat they are addressing. The militant jihadi discourse and their tactics change by the month. For instance, when the Egyptian al-Sharif disavowed jihad a great debate broke out among militant jihadis into which even Zawahiri stepped to weigh in. These are things that practitioners must be aware of in order to take full advantage of them.

There is much concern as well among Western countries for making use of the Salafi clerics who are probably most able to engage seriously indoctrinated militant jihadis in

meaningful discourse since the Salafi stream so closely runs alongside the Takfiri ideologies that allow the killing of Muslims, civilians, women, and children. While Western governments often fear Salafists, we may find that fear handicaps us from using our best allies in fighting militant jihadi ideologies. Another concern is that no matter what the deradicalization program, if it is true to Islamic scriptures, there are calls to jihad when Islam, Islamic lands, and Islamic peoples are under attack, so it is hard to put all of these ideas to rest when dealing with truly occupied Muslim lands. In these cases, the best Islamic arguments for giving up violence is that it is against Islamic scriptures to fight a losing battle with an overwhelming enemy when great losses will be sustained; in these cases Muslims are instructed to make peace until their strength is regained (or the issue becomes moot if the occupation is ended).

There are also serious concerns about the spread of militant jihadi ideologies inside prisons. Often prisoners ingeniously find the means to pass tapes, lectures, phones, and other means of communicating their virulent ideologies within and outside of prison walls. Prison officials can respond by moving prisoners although unless they are all successfully identified, this strategy may leave untraced ideologues in place and as a result exposes two new prisoner groups to experienced ideologues. Or, they can isolate militant jihadi prisoners in cells and prisons dedicated only to them, but this may lead to human rights outcry by society at large as it did in the Netherlands. Without active measures to counter in prison recruitment, it is likely that some prisoners will emerge more dangerous than they went in.

Certainly, there is a strong need for prevention, inoculation and deradicalization programs to attract and work with militant jihadis on the street, over the Internet, in prisons, in militaries, and wherever else they may be active in order to try to turn them back from terrorism and political violence. Let us have the courage to try and the hope that we succeed in these efforts to protect our citizens from militant jihadi terrorism.

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4.7. Example Cases and Programs: Battlefield of the Mind: Terrorist Rehabilitation (Rohan Gunaratna)

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Introduction

The global campaign against terrorism has been dominated by an overwhelmingly kinetic response. The lethal and kinetic operations have temporarily disrupted terrorist operational infrastructures but not their ideological and intellectual infrastructures driving extremism and terrorism. The modus operandi of catching, killing and disrupting terrorist organisations is having a boomerang effect.

The result has been an increased intention on the part of the terrorists to fight back, protracting the fight. In some countries, soft power has been cast by the wayside as hard powers are wielded. The combination – smart power – is used by only very few nations. While the use of operational measures should not be disregarded, an equal amount of attention should not be given to the strategic battle of ideas.

Ideological infrastructures form the foundations of the terrorist movement. Flourishing in permissive environments, radical extremist ideology remains the lifeblood of contemporary terrorism. Operational terrorists and terrorist ideologues can only be de-legitimized by ideological and theological refutation. To safeguard the next generation of youth from terrorism and extremism, detainee² rehabilitation and community engagement is a strategic tool. Counter ideology presents a positive and plausible mechanism to create an environment that is hostile to terrorists and unfriendly to extremists.

The Context

Prison de-radicalization programs ideally consist of both detainee and inmate rehabilitation and community re-engagement. These de-radicalization initiatives can counter the contemporary wave of extremism. Detainee and inmate rehabilitation is the reverse of terrorist indoctrination and is an essential element in the fight against terrorism. Historically, Egypt pioneered the very idea of religious rehabilitation: Al Azhar and other counselors as well as the historical leadership of al Gama al Islamiyah al Masri (Islamic Group of Egypt) began to influence detainees and inmates to abandon violence and build peace. After September 11, 2001, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia developed national

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² A detainee is defined herein as a prisoner who has not been sentenced who is either awaiting sentencing or imprisoned under prevention laws

rehabilitation programs. Since then, the process of detainee and inmate rehabilitation has been gaining popularity worldwide.³

The Battlefield of the Mind

There are over 100,000 terrorist and extremist detainees (i.e., uncharged versus convicted prisoners) and inmates from Europe to the Middle East and Asia (ICRC, 2009). Although not all security detainees and inmates can be rehabilitated, every prison and every detention centre from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America should adopt the practice of rehabilitation. No one is born an extremist or terrorist. Therefore, programs to rehabilitate terrorists and prevent terrorism are the intelligent approach to this phenomenon. Nonetheless, worldwide terrorist rehabilitation is the exception, not the norm. During the Bush presidency, the U.S. had a golden opportunity to start a rehabilitation program in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Instead of portraying images of chained men in orange jump suits, Gitmo should have been divided into two sections where detainees that cooperated received counseling, learned livelihood skills, played with their children, and met with their families. As it is, the detainees were more radicalized when released than when they were brought in. In the absence of a rehabilitation program, it is very seldom that detainees give up their ways. Because the battlefield of the mind was not addressed, nearly 100 former detainees have returned to fight (Morgan, 2009).⁴ President Obama has signed a decree on January 22, 2009 requiring the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention centre (Priest, 2009, p. A01). However, most countries receiving the Gitmo detainees have no rehabilitation programs. More than ever before, there is an urgent need for countries to develop rehabilitation programs.

The contemporary wave of terrorism presents a series of new challenges. Many countries have developed the skill and will to fight terrorism. However, most countries have not adequately developed the ideological and intellectual understanding, knowledge, and structures to counter the terrorist conceptual infrastructures. For success, we must hunt operational terrorists but also correct the misconstrued ideology and reality of their world. As opposed to the previous generation of threat groups, al Qaeda understood the importance and placed a premium on using new media technologies to spread its message. Eight years after al Qaeda attacked America's most iconic landmarks on September 11, 2001, we are still best at using lethal, kinetic, hard power. By investing more in operational counter terrorism – catch, kill, and disrupt – we cannot win the fight in the long run since we have not prevented it from reoccurring in the first place. To reverse the current global trend, strategic capabilities should be developed that focus on ways to prevent terrorism through community engagement and reintegration of former terrorists and offenders into the community through rehabilitation.

³ Singapore hosted the first International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR) from February 26-26, 2009. The 3-day international conference included 200 delegates and participants from 20 countries with existing and aspiring rehabilitation programs. The world's leading practitioners and scholars on detainee and inmate rehabilitation presented. Security and intelligence specialists, psychologists, religious counselors, social workers, and other practitioners active in the process of rehabilitating extremists and terrorists participated. To learn from global best practice, the national programs shared their experience and future plans.

⁴ Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell said the latest figures, current through December 24, showed an 11 percent recidivism rate, up from 7 percent in a March 2008 report that counted 37 former detainees as suspected or confirmed active militants.

Terrorism presents the tier-one national security threat to all countries in the western world. No country is immune from the threat of extremism or its vicious by-product, terrorism. Even if we have built the most capable military, law enforcement, and national security agencies, we cannot guarantee total safety from terrorism. A truly transnational and a globalized threat, terrorism and extremism permeates territorial borders. If any single country or region is producing terrorists and extremists, we will all be at risk. We need to recognize that no country is too big to secure itself without the cooperation of others. Similarly, no country is too small that it is unable to contribute to global security. Currently, cooperation and collaboration is largely on the operational arena and not at the ideological frontier. To make rehabilitation a part of the solution at a global level a more concerted effort is needed. The world needs the expertise and dedication of leaders and visionaries, more than ever before, to make this transition from local to regional, and national to international.

Challenges

The key to establishing a global rehabilitation regime is to build a sufficient number of national rehabilitation programs. There are multiple challenges to building national programs. Building a partnership between government, the Muslim community, and academia is at the heart of a successful rehabilitation program. By assessing the lessons learned from the terrorist rehabilitation program in Singapore, certain principles have been identified as central to the success of terrorist rehabilitation.

First, the government should seek to understand the terrorist mind. Furthermore, the government should understand that Islam is not the driver but that Islam has been misinterpreted and misrepresented to legitimize violence. As such, the role of the ulema (i.e., Muslim scholars trained in Islamic studies and Islamic law) is at the core of dismantling the concept of hate and violence harbored by operational terrorists and extremist supporters. Governments must be willing to bring learned and knowledgeable Islamic scholars and clerics to the frontline. There should be recognition that a theologian is important as a counter terrorism practitioner. That is why the staff of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research⁵ is 50

⁵ The **International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)** is a specialist centre within S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The Centre seeks to integrate academic theory with practical knowledge, essential for complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically motivated groups. Its research staff comprises functional and regional analysts from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Oceania, Africa, Europe, North America and the Middle East. The research staff is drawn from academia and government agencies and also includes Muslim religious scholars. The Centre seeks to maintain its unique cultural and linguistic diversity. More than fifty percent of ICPVTR staff is Muslim.

Our Core Objectives

- To conduct sustained research and analysis of terrorist, guerilla, militia, and extremist political groups and their support bases. To this end, the Centre collects and analyses literature seeking to politicize, radicalize and mobilize the public into supporting extremism and participating in violence.
- To identify the strengths and weaknesses of international, state, and societal responses in managing the threat of political violence.
- To provide high quality instruction and training for officials and future leaders engaged in combating terrorism and other forms of political violence.

percent Muslim and 25 percent Islamic scholars and clerics. Without Islamic scholars and clerics, we can fight operational terrorism but not its precursor and generator, ideological extremism. However, most governments treat terrorism as a mere law enforcement issue and extremism as a non-issue. Church and state are separate in the West. As such, there is reluctance in North America, Europe, and Australasia to bring in Islamic scholars and clerics to the forefront in matters of state. Governments often find it difficult job to identify the rightful scholars suitable to staff and lead the ideological fight. The Islamic scholars should lead the fight with the help of the government. Without being negatively predisposed towards religious leaders, the government must understand reality and start to work with them.

Second, through training and education, Islamic scholars and clerics should develop a full understanding of the ideology and psychology of detainees and inmates. The scholars and clerics know about Islam and Islamic law (sharia), but they do not know what the terrorists' level of understanding of religion is. Even if the government identified scholars and clerics with the right attitude, they must be trained. The training should cover two principal areas: first, terrorist ideologies, the linkages between ideology and operations, and second, psychological counseling skills, especially the ability to listen patiently to the inmate or detainee. The Islamic scholars and clerics must relearn the Islamic concepts, especially common misinterpretations and misrepresentations. They should examine the writings and speeches of ideologues of hatred and violence, especially the ways Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi and his followers perceive Islam and Osama bin Laden's followers understand jihad as holy war. The Islamic scholar and cleric engaged in rehabilitation is part psychologist. In the human system, there is a link between belief and feelings. Although the terrorists' feelings of hatred, anger, and the resentment of the West have nothing to do with Islam, the ideology will support these feelings. Psychologists know how to deal with the feelings. While the heart produces the feelings, the mind controls it. It is natural to get angry, but a sound mind prevents a person from killing. About 80 percent of the staff of Singapore's Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) has completed a seven-month diploma course in psychological counseling.

Third, a government should be able to differentiate between terrorist leaders, members or operatives, and supporters and sympathizers. Different levels of extremism require different levels of response. As there are circles of extremism, there are multiple target audiences. Counter terrorism practitioners, Islamic scholars, and academic specialists should work together to develop a program with a syllabus that can tailor to every category: from extremists that advocate and support to the terrorists that kill. As not all detained are identical in their understanding, it is necessary to divide them into leaders, operatives, and supporters. Government, together with clerics, must work on a structured program and a tailored syllabus: otherwise, the message we want to send to the detainee will not reach them and will be wasted. For instance, many foot soldiers do not know ideology. But if told, "To die as a shaheed is the best thing," they will. Because the ideology is evolving, constant research and analysis is needed to both produce and update rehabilitation manuals.

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- To advise government and inform societies affected by political violence on how best to manage the current and evolving threat.

Classifying Terrorists

After a terrorist is detained, he is assessed. The detainee is categorized into high, medium and low risk⁶ as each of these categories requires a different approach.

High risk: There are very few people in this category. They are mostly spiritual and operational leaders. They are usually the “hard core” individuals. They believe in the ideology and they do not want to move from it, even after many counseling sessions. Often, they have had contact with, and received direct inspiration from, the top terrorist leadership. For example, even though Mullah Omar never completed his religious education and Osama bin Laden had no formal religious education, many terrorists have received instruction and guidance from them. They regarded a poorly educated Afghan or a Saudi as more important than a scholar or cleric from their own country. They believe their version of Islam is correct. It is necessary to use most prominent ulema (Islamic scholar) to talk to them and allow to them to reflect and repent. When released, they are the most susceptible to return to violence.

Medium risk: The individuals in this category are the operatives and the experts that form the bulk of the terrorist group membership. They are active ideologically and operationally, full of hatred and ready to commit violence. They tend to look for justification and interpretation that suits their current mindset. They usually have served a long time in the organization. They know the ideology and accept it. In general, they can be rehabilitated. In a few cases, it is debatable if there has been a genuine transformation or merely an apparent change due to a strategic calculation. There have been cases where detainees tried to mislead the religious counselor by agreeing with him solely with the intention of gaining an early release (JI Case Study, 2009).

Low risk: This category includes both active and passive supporters. They are mostly foot soldiers, inactive members, and not involved in crimes. They do not know or understand the ideology very well. They often joined thinking that their peers (relatives, colleagues, and friends) were fighting for Islam. They completely believe that whatever they do is justified by religion. Some provided money without realizing that their contributions were used for purchasing arms or conducting violence.

After the assessment process, the right cleric⁷ or psychologist is assigned to counsel the detainee. The detainee is continuously assessed. It is essential to identify the detainee’s problem. Is it their character or the fact that they believe in a dangerous ideology? Is he still sympathetic to jihadist ideology? What is his actual problem? The process of rehabilitation is long and multifaceted. Unlike in many countries, Singapore will not release a detainee unless the government is fully convinced they do not pose a security threat. If a detainee or inmate is prematurely released, he is likely to participate in terrorist and extremist activity, a mistake that could discredit the vital tool of rehabilitation and the program itself.

⁶Categorisation developed by International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), <http://www.pvtr.org/>.

⁷ “Right cleric” refers to a mainstream cleric while “right psychologist” is one who is formally trained to work with detainees.

Conclusion

Terrorist rehabilitation comes with several premises and notions. First, there must be zero tolerance towards any promotion of hate and violence using religion as justification. We cannot inform the detainees that they cannot kill at home but in Iraq, it is a jihad. We should instill and adopt the principle of zero tolerance, a parallel from the world of drugs. The world failed to take action to control illicit drugs use.⁸ As a result, party drugs have become a worldwide phenomenon. Party drugs can be as harmful as other forms of drugs.

Terrorist rehabilitation should not treat the symptom; it should be a cure for the (terrorism) disease. It should address those who are sick – those radicalized and those who are constantly exposed to the sickness out there. Those susceptible will fall immediately. Those who are regularly bombarded with propaganda will eventually fall too.

As such, any rehabilitation program should be complemented by public education and public awareness. Otherwise, those who are supposed to be immune will fall prey to radicalization. In a few countries, they have developed programs where a community participation component in prison de-radicalization is absent. There should be synergy where government works with the community. Larger goal of rehabilitation is to prevent contamination of the rest of the community by former terrorists or by terrorists not exposed to rehabilitation.

Without a vision and a strategic direction, no program that requires a long-term investment will succeed. For a rehabilitation program to be successful, a long-term commitment is a must. Rehabilitation comes with the notion that a country must gain a greater understanding from others and put more resources. A successful rehabilitation program requires both the government and community to work together. Without a dedicated, well trained, and a motivated staff, such a program cannot succeed.

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⁸ Examples of recreational drugs misused are Cocaine, Crystal Meth, Ecstasy, Marijuana, et cetera

4.8. Counter-Radicalization and Extremism Disengagement in Saudi Arabia (Chris Boucek)¹

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Almost eight years into what previously was known as the ‘war on terror,’ there is an increasing recognition of the value of rehabilitation and disengagement programs for violent extremists. Since 2003, the government of Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a sophisticated effort to rehabilitate Islamist militants and extremist sympathizers. Such programs are now increasing in popularity and can be found in a number of countries including Singapore, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Jordan, and Iraq.

The Saudi government’s ability to engage in ‘soft’ counter-terrorism and security designed to combat the ideology that supports violent Islamist extremism is a result of hard security, intelligence, and law enforcement successes. The elimination of immediate terrorist violence provided the government with the space in which to launch a series of ‘soft’ counter-terrorism efforts including prevention programs, rehabilitation programs, and reintegration strategies. A primary component of these efforts has been the development of a program to rehabilitate violent militants and their sympathizers through an innovative detainee disengagement program. Known as the ‘Counseling Program’, it is made up of religious discussion and debate, extensive social support, and implicit family obligation. This program was initially developed in secret and is now one of the primary examples of an extremist rehabilitation program.

The Saudi model is not universally applicable. In many ways, it is very much a unique Saudi solution to a unique Saudi problem. The Counseling Program incorporates many traditional Saudi methods of conflict resolution and conflict management, including cooptation, persuasion, and coercion. This brief overview will highlight several factors central to its success, including the focus on extended social networks, the importance of treating families and not just individuals, and the use of time-honored methods of social control including notions of family honor and extended social hierarchies.

Understanding the Saudi approach to extremist and militant disengagement is important for a number of reasons. To date the Saudi Counseling program is the most expansive and successful in seeking to disengage radical violent Islamist extremists. It is currently the longest continually running program and the best funded. More people have participated in the Saudi program—and been released—than any other program -- approximately 1,500 of about 3,000 detainees have been released. In many ways, it has become a de facto model for other countries

¹ Based in part on Boucek, C. (2009). The counseling program: Extremist rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia. In T. Bjørge & J. Horgan, (Eds.) *Leaving terrorism behind: Disengagement from political violence*. Routledge; and Boucek, C. (2008, September). Saudi Arabia’s ‘soft’ counterterrorism strategy: Prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare. *Carnegie Paper*, 97.

seeking to implement similar programs. As a result, understanding the Saudi experience can be very instructive.

The centerpiece of the Saudi strategy is dubbed the ‘Counseling Program,’ which is intended to help individuals that have espoused *takfiri*² beliefs ‘repent and abandon terrorist ideologies.’ The program seeks to counter-radicalize extremists and extremist sympathizers by engaging them in intensive religious debates and psychological counseling, supplemented with extensive social support. It is important to stress that the only people who have been released through the Counseling Program are terrorist sympathizers and support personnel, and at the most, individuals caught with jihadi propaganda or who have provided logistical assistance. The Counseling Program aims to short-circuit the radicalization process, both with program participants and in their social networks. While the program has been criticized for dealing with relatively low-level offenders, this should not be discounted as it can prevent sympathizers and supporters from developing into violent operatives. As senior al-Qaeda leadership elements in the kingdom have been killed or captured by Saudi law enforcement and security personnel, they have not been replaced -- in part because of these efforts to derail potential successors.

Thus far, the Saudi program has dealt with the easiest cases—those furthest from participating in violence within the kingdom. This is an important point to bear in mind when considering the relative success of the Saudi program. They are not individuals that have been active in terrorist violence in the kingdom; thus far people ‘with blood on their hands’ are barred from release through the Counseling Program. Some of these suspects have gone through rehabilitation but were not released as a result. The Saudi government has announced plans to try approximately 990 people charged with participating in a series of terrorists attacks in Saudi Arabia since 2003 (Boucek, 2008).³

Saudi officials are very careful to stress that not everyone who participates in the program will be released. Release is contingent upon successfully completing the program and satisfactorily demonstrating to the Advisory Committee’s⁴ doctors and psychologists that the rehabilitation is genuine. Moreover, not everyone who completes the program will be released. According to Saudi authorities, in the event that a detainee has appeared before a judge and if there is still time left on a sentence, that time must first be served before a prisoner can be released. Furthermore, if the Interior Ministry has information that despite having finished the program (or a sentence for that matter) that an individual plans to commit further acts of violence, then a prisoner will not be released.

Format

The Counseling Program is based upon a presumption of benevolence, and not vengeance or retribution. It presumes that the suspects were lied to and misled by extremists into straying away from true Islam, and the state wants to help security detainees return to the correct path—in this case, to the official state version of Islam. The vast majority of detainees that have

² The accusation of another Muslim of being an apostate.

³ In July 2009, 330 defendants were found guilty of security offenses in the first round of terrorist trials in Saudi Arabia.

⁴ The Counseling Program is run by the Advisory Committee, an organization within the Ministry of Interior comprised of shaikhs and religious scholars, academics, statisticians, social scientists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers.

participated in the program, according to research conducted Saudi officials, have been found to not have had a 'successful' religious education during their childhood. To be sure, all education in Saudi Arabia is rooted in religion. Saudi officials argue that these individuals did not understand what they were taught or turned elsewhere to seek answers from questionable sources.

Many of the detainees have been found by the Committee to have an incomplete understanding of Islam, and it is this fact, which according to Saudi officials, accounts for the successes of the religious rehabilitation program. According to the Committee's research, most detainees did not complete much education (see al-Khalifah, 2008; Boucek, 2008, p.60-65; al-Hakeem, 2009). The majority have been radicalized through extremist books, tapes, videos, and more recently the internet. The Counseling Program, therefore, seeks to 'correct' this misunderstanding by reintroducing and reinforcing the official state version of Islam. The official view is that because these individuals did not correctly learn the tenets of their faith originally, they were susceptible to extremist propaganda. As a result, the program seeks to remove incorrect understandings of Islam and replace them with correct understandings.

Moreover, the state is able to marshal its considerable religious authority to confer legitimacy to this process. The fact that a number of former militant figures have joined the Advisory Committee adds further legitimacy in the view of some prisoners. The presence of such figures carries credibility with a number of participants in the program as it was their *da'wa* that originally led many on the path toward extremism.

Another critical component of the Saudi Counseling Program is the attention given to a prisoner's social needs. Each participant is evaluated to determine how incarceration will affect the detainee's family. Specific strategies are then devised to offset the hardship of a loved one's detention. For instance, once a breadwinner is incarcerated, the Committee provides the family with an alternate salary. Other needs, including children's schooling and family healthcare are also provided. This is intended to prevent or offset the radicalization of family members. It has been acknowledged by officials that when the government detains someone, that memory lingers, and this social support is intended to short-circuit that hardship. The government further recognizes that if they fail to do this, then it is likely that extremist elements will move in to provide this support.

Social support continues upon release. Detainees who have successfully completed the rehabilitation process and have satisfactorily renounced their previous beliefs are given assistance in locating jobs and other benefits, including additional government stipends, cars, and housing. Assistance in getting jobs have included placement in government jobs and within the private sector. Placement in government jobs is noteworthy, as previously many detainees would not work with what they considered to be an illegitimate government. The Interior Ministry also helps those individuals that previously had government jobs before they entered the program to regain their previous positions. More recently, efforts have been started with local chambers of commerce and other certification organizations to organize training courses for program participants. This, and a government program providing start-up funds, were intended to empower released detainees to be qualified and equipped to start their own businesses.

Upon release, former detainees are required to check in with authorities, and are encouraged to continue meeting with the scholars they had spoken with while in prison. Some continue to attend their study circles at mosque after being released. Furthermore, rehabilitated

prisoners are encouraged to settle down, marry, and have children, in part because it is understood that it is much more difficult for young men to get into trouble once they become obligated with family responsibilities. Central to its success, the Counseling Program seeks to replace a detainee's social network with one that is more conducive to preventing a reoffense. The government has facilitated this by paying for weddings, donating dowries, and covering other essential pre-marriage costs such as furnishing apartments. Senior officials from the Interior Ministry and the Advisory Committee frequently attend the weddings of former detainees.

The successes of the program are compounded by the Advisory Committee's application of these social support programs within a prisoner's larger family network. The Ministry of Interior augments this support by delivering the message that a prisoner's larger family network is also responsible for his behavior upon his release.⁵ Working through families can be an effective strategy in Saudi Arabia. This makes use of several important Saudi cultural mores, including social responsibility, notions of honor, and the recognition of traditional family and extended family hierarchies. For instance, when detainees are released for family events such as weddings or funerals, three family members must come forward to guarantee his return. Should the detainee not return, then those three family members would have to take his place.⁶ As of this writing, no prisoner has ever used this opportunity to escape. The use of Saudi social networks, familial obligations, and extended responsibilities reinforces program objectives once a detainee has left the committee's formal oversight.

Process

When members of the Advisory Committee initially sit with a prisoner, one of the first things that they stress is that they are not employees of the Ministry of Interior or associated with the security forces. Rather, they explain that they are independent and righteous scholars. Before the government adopted this technique, it was not uncommon for families to ask clerics and scholars to visit their family members in jail and talk with them about their behavior.

As word of the program began to spread, there was initially a backlash from extremists who would denounce the Committee. The rehabilitation program was declared a sham, and the militant community accused anyone that had gone through the program of being a government spy (Mohammed bin Nayef, interview, 2007). Detainees themselves, at first, thought that the program was merely another form of interrogation. However, numerous officials have confirmed in interviews that the counseling process begins only after the interrogation and investigative phases have ended.

In their first meeting, a Committee Member will simply listen to a detainee. They ask them about what they did, why they did it, and the circumstances that brought them to be in

⁵ Interestingly, this also applies to non-family members. There have been occasions when furloughed Guantanamo returnees have been followed by the family members of those still remaining at Guantanamo Bay. This was done to make sure that the returnees did not do anything that would jeopardize the repatriation program for those loved ones still yet to be repatriated. Such collective responsibility is a common factor in Saudi rehabilitation and after-care programs.

⁶ So far it has only been male relatives that have signed for a detainee's release. There is no restriction against female relatives signing for a prisoner's release, and according to author's interviews the Advisory Committee would like to see female family members get involved in this way.

prison. Throughout the process, the scholars seek to draw out detainees in discussions about their beliefs and then attempt to persuade them that their religious justification for their actions is wrong and based upon a corrupted understanding of Islam. This is done in part by presenting evidence drawn from religious sources that contradict a detainee's beliefs or presumptions. First, the Committee demonstrates how what the prisoners were tricked into believing was false, and then they set to teach them the proper state-approved interpretation of Islam.

Initial sessions, especially those held in prison, are conducted one-on-one.⁷ These can be both formal and informal discussions, as much of the counseling process depends on the two individuals involved. Later on, especially once a detainee has moved to the external residential facility known as the Care Rehabilitation Center, sessions do not just take the form of religious lectures. Discussions and dialogues are encouraged. While some counseling sessions take place in classrooms, others occur in very informal settings, oftentimes involving very subtle negotiations and dialogue about everyday affairs. All the while, the Committee staff is evaluating program participants.

The Advisory Committee runs two programs. The first are short sessions, which typically run about two hours. While some prisoners recant their beliefs after a single session, typically a prisoner would go through several of these. These are usually individuals who are looking for a way out or people who unwittingly got involved with extremists. The other program has been dubbed 'Long Study Sessions'. These are six-week courses for up to 20 students led by two clerics and social scientist. Ten subjects are covered over the six weeks, including instruction in such topics as takfir, loyalty and allegiance, terrorism, the legal rules for jihad, and psychological courses on self-esteem. Instruction is also given on the concepts of 'faith, leadership, and community,' as well as guidance on how to 'avoid misleading, delusional books.' The important role of scholars in Islamic jurisprudence is stressed, and detainees are also taught about sedition and the sanctity of blood in Islam. At the end of the course, an exam is given; those that pass the exam move to the next stage of the process, those that do not pass, repeat the course.

Success Rate

As of November 2007, roughly 3,000 prisoners have participated in the Counseling Program in custody, and about 1,500 have renounced their former beliefs and been released. According to program workers, some detainees have refused to participate in the program. Saudi authorities have acknowledged that some detainees have sought to actively undermine the program. These prisoners are individuals who know that they will not be able to get out and feel that they can do the most good for the cause by attempting to frustrate the authorities' attempts to turn detainees. In many respects, their desire to work against the Counseling Program from inside prison demonstrates, to an extent, the successes of the Advisory Committee.

Thus far, the program has produced results, with Saudi authorities claiming an 80-90 percent success rate. The 20 percent failure rate described by Saudi officials includes those detainees that refused to participate in the program as well as those detainees who failed the rehabilitation program. The 80 percent figure includes those detainees that the program staff believe have successfully completed the program, including those released through the Counseling Program, as well as those that remain in custody. There are individuals—allegedly

⁷ According to Committee members, some meetings did initially occur with several shaikhs present.

including those that have participated in violence within the kingdom, and who therefore are not eligible for release—who have gone through the Counseling Program. According to program staff, participation in the program is possible for all security detainees;⁸ however, those that have been engaged in violence cannot be released through the program. Admittedly, it is difficult to measure the relative success of the Counseling Program, especially only several years into program. However, according to Saudi authorities, as of 1 November 2007, only 35 individuals have been re-arrested for security offenses since their release through the Counseling Program, equating to a recidivist rate of between one and two percent (see Boucek, 2009, p. 7-10).⁹ Officials admit, however, that there could be more individuals that have been released through the program that have yet to be caught reoffending. When, and if, Saudi authorities decide to put other more “difficult” cases through the program, including detainees closer to violence, the re-arrest and recidivism figures are sure to increase. This is, in large part, because current research demonstrates that the closer someone is to participation in violence, the more difficult it is for him or her to disengage from violence.

Conclusion

In only several years, Saudi Arabia’s Counseling Program has generated some very intriguing results. The problem posed by extremism is not one that can be addressed by hard security measures alone, and the Counseling Program demonstrates the benefits that can come through critical engagement in the ‘war of ideas.’ This understudied program, and other similar programs like it, clearly warrant greater attention in the West as the successes being generated hold applicable lessons for other nations struggling with extremism. While responses to the program have varied from genuine interest to deep skepticism, it is clear that the kingdom’s efforts warrant further study in order to better understand how its techniques can be applied in other cases and other situations.

The Saudi program highlights the importance of several factors that will be essential in any disengagement program for Islamist militants, including the essential nature of the close involvement of an individual’s family and extended social network. Such programs raise the question of whether they are actually changing beliefs or rather engaging in behavior modification. The short answer is both. The Saudi program seeks to determine what led an individual to extremism—religion, criminality, etc.—and then to address those needs. By understanding how someone got into this mode of behavior, officials seek to design strategies to move them out of it. In some cases, through religious discussion, individuals will renounce their former beliefs. In other cases, officials will attempt to explain how violence is not permitted. On other occasions, behavior modification and family pressure is used—both conciliation and coercion—to demonstrate that the benefits associated with not reoffending far outweigh the penalties for reoffending. This and other programs are based on a premise that being radical is not a bad thing— that violence based on those beliefs is, and that is what the program seeks to

⁸ This refers to Sunni militant extremists, and not any other detainees such as Shi’a detainees, constitutional monarchists, bloggers, criminals, or other detainees.

⁹ This excludes Guantanamo returnees. Of the 117 Saudi nationals that have been repatriated as of July 2009, 24 are either wanted or in custody for security violations. Fourteen have been rearrested, and ten remain wanted for fleeing Saudi Arabia to rejoin al-Qaeda in Yemen. Three more Saudi nationals were repatriated in June 2009.

address. It is also founded on an understanding that violent behavior is not a permanent state, and that there are ways to move someone out of violence.

To be sure, approaches such as the Saudi rehabilitation program are bound to increase in popularity and practice. Critical to their success will be thorough monitoring and support programs and very detailed risk assessment tools to help measure the likelihood of re-engaging in terrorism. At the present time, we do not yet have such tools. There will always be an inherent risk in releasing someone from custody, and the objective of any rehabilitation program will be to minimize that risk to society.

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Appendix A: Acronyms

Organizations:

AEL	Arab European League
AFRL	Air Force Research Laboratory
AIVD	Netherlands' General Intelligence and Security Service (<i>Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst</i>)
AJAI	al-Jama'a al-Islamiya
AQ	al Qaeda
AQC	al-Qaeda Central
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTC	Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
DoD	Department of Defense
DTI	Directed Technologies, Inc.
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Freedom
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOUO	For Official Use Only
GIA	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria
GIA	Group Islamique Armé
GIMF	Global Islamic Media Front
GON	Government of Nigeria
GSPC	Salafist Group for Predication and Call
HT -I	Hizbut Tahrir - Indonesia
HT	Hizbut Tahrir
HUM	Harakat Ul-Mujahidin
IBDA-C	Islami Büyükdogu Akincilar Cephesi
IJY	Islamic Jihad in Yemen
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
INSS	Institute for National Security Studies
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LT	Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MCU	Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces - Iraq

MPS	Metropolitan Police Service in London
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NSA	National Security Agency
NSI	National Security Innovations
NYPD	New York Police Department
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIRA	Provisional Irish Liberation Army
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Worker's Party
PVV	Party of Freedom
RRG	Singapore Religious Rehabilitation Group
SDSU	San Diego State University
SNCC	Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TNSM	Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
TON	Proud on the Netherlands Movement
TTP	Taliban Movement of Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNTAK	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAWC	United States Army War College
USN	United States Navy
WODC	Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice
WTO	World Trade Organization

Other Acronyms

ADHD	Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
CAD	Community, autonomy, divinity
CPDTE	Crime prevention through environmental design
CT	Counterterrorism
DCIA	Director, Central Intelligence Agency
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GWOT	Global War On Terror
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IKMASS	Ideology, Knowledge, Management, Audience, Social distance, Symbolic Value
ISI	Islamic State in Iraq

MAR	Minorities at Risk Project
MAROB	Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset
MIPT	National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCTb	National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NSA	Non-State Actor
NTD	Notice and Take Down
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PCI	Properly conceived 'ideology'
PGIS	Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services
POLRAD	Gallup survey on political radicals
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RDD	Radiological Dispersion Device
SMA	Strategic Multilayer Assessment
SMO	Social Movement Organization
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SNF	Spent Nuclear Fuel
VNSA	Violent Non-State Actor
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMV	Weapons of Mass Victimization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II