## Building Resilience to Violent Extremism

# Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul

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### **PURPOSE**

**CHARACTERIZE** how social experiences impact involvement in violent extremism for diaspora youth and young adults.

**UNDERSTAND** how resilience could prevent violent extremism in communities under threat.

**SUPPORT** the development of prevention strategies that incorporate security and psychosocial dimensions and are based on theory, evidence, and community collaboration.

METHODS This study involved ethnographic data collection in the Somali-American community in Minneapolis St. Paul including youth (n=19), parents (n=18), and providers (n=20). This study utilized a grounded theory approach to qualitative data analysis using Atlas/ti software after establishing coder reliability. Findings were affirmed through team consensus and reviewed by community members.

#### SPECIFIC AIMS

**INTERVIEW** Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul so as to characterize the potentially modifiable multilevel risk and protective factors that may impact young adult males' vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment.

**ENGAGE** parents, community advocates, providers, and policymakers so as to inform the development of socially and culturally appropriate strategies for preventing violent extremism.






Figure 1

### FINDINGS: RISK

**NO ONE RISK FACTOR** explained teenage boys' and young men's involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at multiple levels.

**RISK FACTORS COMBINED** to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism (Table 1). The key opportunities were:

- 1) youths' unaccountable times and unobserved spaces;
- 2) perceived social legitimacy for violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment; 3) the presence of recruiters and associates.

THE INVERTED PYRAMID in Figure 1 indicates that:

1) involvement in violent extremism depended on all three opportunities; 2) decreasing proportions of teenage boys/young men are exposed to the mid and lower opportunities.

RISK FACTORS are social and psychosocial factors that may be associated with violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment.

PROTECTIVE RESOURCES are social and psychosocial factors that can stop, delay, or diminish negative outcomes, including violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment.

# RISKS FACTORS AND PROTECTIVE RESOURCES

- 1. Transnational
- Multilevel (global, state, & societal/ community/family/youth)
- 3. Multitemporal (persistent or transient)






Figure 2

## FINDINGS: RESILIENCE

**PREVENTION STRATEGIES** involving government, community, family and youth are needed to strengthen opportunity-reducing capacities (Table 2). Priorities are to: 1) diminish unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) diminish the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; 3) diminish the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates.

**BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE** to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building (Figure 2). Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection.



# RISK FACTORS COMBINED TO CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM

LEVELS	RISK FACTORS	OPPORTUNITIES
Global, State & Societal	<ul><li>Secondary migration</li><li>Being an underserved U.S. refugee community</li></ul>	
Community	<ul><li>Lack of support for youth</li><li>Unsafe neighborhoods</li><li>Social exclusion</li><li>Unmonitored spaces in community forums</li></ul>	
Family and Youth	Family separation or loss  Weak parental support  Absolute trust in everyone who attends mosqu  Mistrust of law enforcement  Overemphasis on government power  LACK OF AWARENESS OF VIOLENT  RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT  Lack of accurate info on violent radicalization at Little parental involvement in education  Lack of opportunities  Lack of warning signs	& Onobserved Spaces
Global, State & Societal	<ul> <li>Viewing Somalia as a failed state</li> <li>Violent extremism on the Internet</li> <li>PERCEPTION OF A NEW THREAT TO SOMALIA</li> <li>Objections to U.S. government foreign policy</li> </ul>	Д
Community	COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR AL SHABAAB Hearing bad news about Somalia Social exclusion Being a divided community Remittance sending Having a nomadic heritage Interaction with migration brokers	Perceived Social Legitimacy Of Violent Extremism
Family and Youth	<ul> <li>Little family talk about war</li> <li>Identity issues among members of Generation of Being passionate about Somalia</li> <li>Being uninformed about Islam</li> <li>Being uninformed about Somalia</li> <li>Social identity challenges</li> <li>Indirect and direct traumas</li> </ul>	1.5
Global, State & Societal	Terrorist organization's recruitment     Violent extremism on the Internet	Dragones Of
Community	Sources of radical ideology	Presence Of Recruiters Or Associates

CAPS = Transient risk

SECTOR	AIMS	PROTECTIVE RESOURCES
Family and Youth	Diminish Youth's Unaccountable Times and Unobserved Spaces	<ul> <li>Awareness of risks and safeguards</li> <li>Parental monitoring and supervision</li> <li>Family confidants</li> <li>Family social support</li> <li>Family involvement in education</li> <li>Access to services and helpers</li> <li>Parental and youth help-seeking</li> <li>Parental involvement in mosques &amp; religious education</li> </ul>
	Diminish the Perceived Social Legitimacy of Violent Extremism	<ul> <li>Focus on youth's future in the U.S.</li> <li>Parental support for youth socialization</li> <li>Rejecting tribalism and war</li> <li>Parental talk with youth regarding threats</li> <li>Youth civic engagement</li> <li>Youth political dialogue</li> </ul>
	Diminish Recruiters and Associates Presenting Opportunities	Parents informing law enforcement     Parental messaging in community re youth protection
Community	Diminish Youth's Unaccountable Times and Unobserved Spaces	Trusted accurate information sources Increased activities in supervised community spaces Mentoring of youth Increased civilian liaisons to law enforcement Interactions with community police Social entrepreneurship Interfaith dialogue Social support networks
	Diminish the Perceived Social Legitimacy of Violent Extremism	<ul> <li>Islamic education &amp; Imam network</li> <li>Community support for youth socialization</li> <li>Understanding of Islam as a peaceful religion</li> <li>Youth civic engagement</li> <li>Youth political dialogue</li> <li>Youth opportunities for peace activism</li> <li>Messaging to challenge legitimacy of violent extremism</li> </ul>
	Diminish the Potential for Contacts with Recruiters and Associates	<ul> <li>Cooperation with law enforcement</li> <li>Monitoring by community members</li> <li>Messaging to warn off recruiters</li> <li>Bloggers and websites against violent extremism</li> <li>Critical voices in the community</li> </ul>
Government (in part through supporting community-based NGOs)	Diminish Youth's Unaccountable Times and Unobserved Spaces	<ul> <li>Trusted accurate information sources</li> <li>Community policing</li> <li>Support for parenting and parent education</li> <li>Support for after-school programs and mentoring</li> <li>Support for youth and family social services</li> </ul>
	Diminish the Perceived Social Legitimacy of Violent Extremism	<ul> <li>Empowering critical voices</li> <li>Support for youth community services</li> <li>Support for youth leadership training</li> <li>Support for parenting and parent education</li> </ul>
	Diminish Recruiters and Associates Presenting Opportunities	<ul> <li>Community policing</li> <li>Training for community leaders and providers</li> <li>Support for community messaging</li> <li>Support for bloggers and websites</li> </ul>

## Further Considerations

## RISK AND PROTECTION

**ACKNOWLEDGE** community members' concerns that violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment will not disappear from U.S. Somali-American communities anytime soon, though over time it will change in form and intensity.

**SHIFT** from analyses overly focused on individual-level factors to multi-level analyses that include structural, social, political, economic, community, and family-level risk factors and protective resources.

**UNDERSTAND** why some communities are more at risk than others in terms of presenting more opportunities for transformative contact with recruiters and violent extremists in the everyday lives of diaspora youth.

### RESILIENCE APPROACH

**REALIZE** that community resilience is not a single factor and cannot simply be dialed up.

**ENSURE** that resilience-focused programs and policies are well supported by theory, empirical evidence, and community collaboration.

**APPRECIATE** the risks and limitations of government, communities, and families when focusing on resilience.

**INCLUDE** family resilience as an important component of community resilience and acknowledge the family as a key locus of both risk factors and protective resources.

## **PREVENTION**

**ACCEPT** that there is no magic bullet of prevention.

**CONCEPTUALIZE** that primary prevention in an immigrant and refugee community is more than only better cooperation with law enforcement.

**TARGET** prevention efforts towards the most vulnerable people and places.

**UTILIZE** a capacity building approach to enhance government, community, and family capacities to reduce opportunities for involvement in violent extremism.



#### PARTNERSHIPS

**WORK** towards countering violent extremism through collaborative partnerships between government and community groups, organizations and leaders.

**REALIZE** that building prevention through partnership is a long-term process.

**UTILIZE** a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism with key contributions from law enforcement, immigration, public health, social services, education and media.

**ADOPT** balanced, fair and transparent approaches to partnerships not limited by the biases of particular gatekeepers.

### FURTHER RESEARCH

**IDENTIFY** reliable short-term proximal indicators of violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment as well as community and family protective resources.

**CONDUCT** feasibility assessments of prospective interventions to demonstrate whether they are acceptable, appropriate, and practically achievable.

**PERFORM** efficacy studies of potentially effective interventions to demonstrate whether they lead to statistically significant differences in key outcomes.

**ADAPT** effective interventions that have worked under one set of circumstances, and investigate applying them to new or larger circumstances with community collaboration.

For additional information on this research contact

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