Data Collections


GTD | MAROB | PPT | GATE-Israel | BAAD | POL-Israel | PIPA 1 | PIPA 2 | FIRE | RANNSAD | LLIS | PREDICT | WARNINGS | BRIDGE | BLAME1 | BLAME2 | FRAMING | YOUTH | TOPs | TPDRC | SoVI


Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

Global Terrorism Database (GTD)The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2011). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes over 107,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and -- when identifiable -- the identity of the perpetrator.

Investigators: Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan

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Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB)

Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) is an open-source dataset covering political organizations representing the interests of ethnic groups whose political status and behavior is tracked by the Minorities at Risk project. MAROB gathers information on more than 163 variables for both violent and non-violent organizations, allowing for comparisons between the two. Currently, the dataset covers 112 organizations representing 22 ethnic groups in 12 countries of the Middle East and North Africa and operating between 1980 and 2004. Future MAROB data collection will extend to other regions, including Europe, South Asia and Latin America. An update of the Middle East and North Africa data through 2007 is also underway.

Investigators: Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Victor Asal, Amy Pate

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Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States(PPT-US)

Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism PPT-US includes detailed information on organizations known to have engaged in terrorist activity against targets on the U.S. homeland between 1970 and 2010. Data included for each organization includes information on its terrorist attacks, its history and base of operations, its ideology and goals, its engagement in political and criminal activities (other than terrorism), its alliances, its network and structure, and its financial resources. PPT-US includes information on the source used to code each variable in the data set, and also includes a confidence indicator for each variable (high v. medium v. low), which reflects the reliability of the source upon which coding was based. PPT-US will be updated on a regular basis, as new information on terrorist attacks in the United States becomes available.

Investigators: Erin Miller, Kathleen Smarick

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Government Actions in a Terror Environment - Israel (GATE-Israel)

Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism he purpose of the GATE-Israel project is to determine the effects of repressive and conciliatory actions on Palestinian terrorist activity in Israel. The time period covered by this study, 1987-2004, includes three distinct Israeli tactical regimes, the First Intifada, the Oslo Lull, and the Second Intifada, each of which took their own approach to preventing and responding to terrorism. Data concerning Palestinian terrorist attacks was drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), in which Palestinian terrorist attacks were defined in this research as cases involving a minimum of one Israeli target in either Israel or the Palestinian territories. Data relating to Israeli state actions was found in the GATE-Israel dataset, which coded Israeli governmental actions as being conciliatory or repressive from the Palestinian perspective. Only the government actions relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are included in these data. Data were also partitioned by whether the actions were discriminate or indiscriminate. The data presented here is monthly counts of Palestinian terrorist actions and Israeli governmental responses that are relevant to the Palestinian conflict.

Investigators: Laura Dugan, Erica Chenoweth

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Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Database 1 - Lethality Data, 1998-2005

Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Database 1 - Lethality Data, 1998-2005 The Big, Allied, and Dangerous (BAAD) Lethality Database was formed in order to help answer the question "Why are some terrorist organizations much more lethal than others?" BAAD Lethality seeks to create a comprehensive database of terrorist organizations, much like the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) does with terrorist incidents. The lethality database contains information on organizational level variables such as ideology, location, size, structure, and funding as well as network data on variables such as allies, rivals, targets, and state sponsors. The data were retrieved from MIPT's Terrorism Knowledge Base, Correlates of War (COW), Polity, and Polity2.

Investigators: Victor Asal, R. Karl Rethemeyer

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Police Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience

Police Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes of Jews and Arabs in Israel concerning the role of the police in counterterrorism. The study focuses on the public perception of the effect of the police’s involvement in counterterrorism on their ability to perform traditional police roles; how the police’s role in fighting terrorism affects the relationship between police and the community; and the willingness of Jews and Arabs in Israel to assist the police by reporting crimes and terrorism threats. These questions are asked against the backdrop of majority-minority relations, in which the ways both the majority Jewish population and the minority Arab population in Israel responds are examined. Data included in this study was gathered from a community survey. The computer software “Dvash” and the database “Bezek,” which includes all residents of Israel who have "land" phone lines were used to conduct the survey. The low response rate (58%) of the community survey limits the extent to which the results can be applied to the entire Israeli population. Variables affecting the data gathered include the respondent’s past experiences with the police, their religion or ethnicity, their trust in the capabilities of the police, and their views on the consequences of policing terrorism.

Investigators: David Weisburd , Tal Jonathan-Zamir

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Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda

Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda Since the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, there have been many studies of Islamic groups, such al Qaeda, which oppose the United States and use violence against civilians. However there has been relatively little research into how these groups are viewed by the larger Muslim society from which they arise. The attitudes of this larger society are important for a variety of reasons. At the broadest level, they tell us whether these groups are considered legitimate in terms of their goals as well as their methods. They also tell us how much support such groups are likely to get from the larger society, both directly and indirectly. To answer these and other questions, WorldPublicOpinion.org conducted an in-depth study of public opinion in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The research was primarily supported by the START Consortium at the University of Maryland.

Investigators: Steven Kull, Stephen Weber

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Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies

Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies To deal with the threat posed by groups that use terrorist methods against Americans, in particular al Qaeda, the US is faced by more than the problem of the groups themselves. These groups operate in a larger society that provides them with some degree of support-enough to allow them to persist. The purpose of this study is to understand more deeply the nature and extent of this support, and also to determine how it is evolving. To address these issues, WorldPublicOpinion.org conducted an in-depth survey of public opinion in Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia. This is the second wave of surveys and was conducted between July 28 and September 6, 2008. The research was primarily supported by the START Consortium at the University of Maryland.

Investigators: Steven Kull, Stephen Weber

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Public Warnings and Evacuations: California Station Fire

Public Warnings and Evacuations: California Station Fire On August 26, 2009, a massive wildfire was ignited in Los Angeles County. Deemed the Station Fire, given the proximity of the ignition site to the Angeles Crest Fire Station, this fire eventually affected more than 160,000 acres, resulted in the deaths of 2 firefighters and 22 injuries, destroyed 200 buildings (including 89 homes), took more than 6 weeks to contain, and was the tenth largest fire in California since 1933. In an effort to examine the relationship between public warnings and evacuation dynamics during this event and, particularly, how residents received and responded to evacuation orders, a survey was administered to residents of the Station Fire-affected region. The focus of the survey was to understand the impact of public warnings on the behaviors and actions of individuals in the midst of this disaster.

Investigators: Kathleen Smarick, Gary LaFree

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Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries Database (RANNSAD)

Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries The Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries Database (RANNSAD) is the first phase in a larger research effort entitled Anatomizing Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries. The purpose of RANNSAD is the development of profiles of all former non-state users and attempted users of radiological and nuclear weapons and the database seeks to answer the research question "Who are the most likely radiological or nuclear non-state threat actors?" The database provides Radiological and Nuclear Adversary Profiles as well as information perpetrated by a specific actor/organization. Analysis of the dataset has allowed researchers to perform quantitative analysis and generate models of event type, agent type, perpetrator type, ideology type, individual demographics, and perpetrator success level.

Investigators: Gary Ackerman, Charles Blair, Maranda Sorrells

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Survey on Information Sharing, Attitudes, and Practices of LLIS Users

Information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies has become a critical element of U.S. homeland security strategy. In order to explore this relationship, an online survey was administered to 83 registered users of Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)-a Department of Homeland Security information sharing system, and interviews were conducted with 10 LLIS.gov users located in different regions of the country. Using a communication perspective, this study finds that the concepts of information sharing and preparedness accommodate multiple-and at times conflicting-meanings and practices. As a result, the government’s effort to create a "trusted partnership" and a "culture of information sharing" among federal, state, and local agencies faces significant challenges.

Investigators: Hamilton Bean, Lisa Keranen

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Predictors of Activism and Radicalism: Past Activism, Past Radicalism and Grievance Against the Government

Predictors of Activism and RadicalismThe study aimed at testing the relationship between grievance, activism and radicalism. Researchers gathered 429 participants from across the United States and randomly divided them into two experimental conditions. One group was given questions about past and future intention to engage in activism-radicalism first, followed by questions about any grievance against the US government; the other group was given grievance questions came first, followed by questions about activism and radicalism. Questions from the study were designed in order to determine how past behavior may relate to future behavior in regards to activism and radicalism. The major variables that were included in this study were demographics, future/past activism, grievances with the United States government, and attitudes toward U.S. law enforcement.

Investigators: Clark McCauley

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An Experimental Study of the Effects of Government Terror Warnings on Political Attitudes

Terror WarningsHow do concerns about terrorism affect the way Americans view the 2008 presidential candidates? How would an event that increases the prominence of terrorism, like a threat or attack, affect the 2008 election? The purpose of this study is to examine the role that exposure to terror threats has on the American public’s view of presidential candidates and candidate preferences; specifically, the effect that terror threats have on political attitudes. Moreover, researchers were interested in if Americans' view of the war on terror remained the same or changed. The survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks (KN) over the Internet in May 2006, using a nationally representative sample of 1282 American adults. KN recruits panel members over the telephone via random digit dialing (RDD) and provides them with WebTV equipment in exchange for their participation in weekly surveys, which they complete online.

Investigators: Robb Willer

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Bridging Partisan Division over Anti-Terrorism Policies: The Role of Threat Perceptions

Anti-Terrorism PoliciesThis study examines how changes in perceptions of threat affect individuals policy views, as well as the political implications of this relationship. A survey experiment was administered to a representative sample of the U.S. population in which individuals perceived likelihood of a future terrorist attack on American soil was manipulated. The purpose of the survey is to address two hypotheses which state that a higher perceived threat from a terrorist attack will make individuals more supportive of public policies designed to combat terrorism and the effect of threat information on support of public policies designed to combat terrorism will be stronger among Democrats who believe an attack is likely. The respondents were picked for the study through Random Digit Dialing administered by Knowledge Networks and sent a questionnaire over the Internet.

Investigators: Neil Malhotra, Elizabeth Popp

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Sources of Blame Attribution: Citizen Attitudes Towards Public Officials after 9/11

Sources of BlameWhen government fails, whom do citizens blame? The purpose of this study is to explore citizen attitudes regarding blame of intelligence officials for making America vulnerable to the attacks on 9/11. The study used a short Internet-based survey experiment to test whether party cues affect people’s attitudes about the responsibility of three government officials in making America vulnerable to the 9/11 attacks: CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. The survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks (KN) over the Internet in February 2007, using a nationally representative sample of 1015 American adults. KN recruits panel members over the telephone via random digit dialing (RDD) and provides them with WebTV equipment in exchange for their participation in weekly surveys, which they complete online.

Investigators: Neil Malhotra, Alexander Kuo

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Assigning Blame: The Public's Response to Hurricane Katrina

Assigning BlameThe purpose of this study is to examine who citizens blame for property damage and loss of life in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and how citizens base their decision on who is to blame, whether they are based on biased or content-rich information. The survey uses political party affiliations and the job titles of public officials to see how the inclusion or absence of these details affects how citizens blame certain individuals. The survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks (KN) over the Internet in May 2006, using a nationally representative sample of 397 American adults. All Americans were sampled from the KN panel, not simply those directly affected by Hurricane Katrina, because the entire nation formed judgments about the competence of the government officials involved.

Investigators: Neil Malhotra, Alexander Kuo

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Ethnicity and Episodic Framing in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina

Framing in the Wake of Hurricane KatrinaThe Ethnicity and Episodic Framing in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina looks at the effects of photo images and race on attribution of responsibility for the consequences of Hurricane Katrina. Subjects drawn from a national representative sample, oversampling for African-Americans, were asked through web-based interviews who they thought was responsible for the disaster. The study looked at 3 major groups of variables; demographics, attribution of responsibility, and knowledge. The three groups eligible for attribution of responsibility were the Federal Government, local authorities in New Orleans, and New Orleans residents . Knowledge variables were gathered by asking respondents questions related to personal knowledge of Hurricane Katrina and the surrounding events. The study found that images affect attribution of blame, possibly acting an episodic framing mechanisms to reduce accountability.

Investigators: Eran N. Ben-Porath, Lee K. Shaker

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The Youth, Emotional Energy, and Political Violence: The Cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

This project intends to explore and explain the values and sociopolitical and cultural attitudes of young Egyptians and Saudis by looking at four general areas of values. The first area looks at the sources of epistemic authorities that the youths rely on. The second area looks at the extent to which the youth are aware of developmental ideas. The third area looks at the youths’ orientations toward various issues. Finally, the fourth area looks at the youths’ religiosity and attitudes toward religion. To analyze these four areas researchers conducted face-to-face interviews with 18 to 25 year old youths from Egypt (in the cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and El-Minya) and from Saudi Arabia (in the cities of Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam/Khobar). The research was supported by the United States Institute of Peace, the Mellon Foundation, and Eastern Michigan University.

Investigators: Mansoor Moaddel, Stuart A. Karabenick, Arland Thornton

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Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs)

Terrorism & Preparedness Data Resource Center (TPDRC) The Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) data collection provides background information on more than 850 organizations that have been known to engage in terrorist activity around the world during the last four decades. Included for each organization is information on bases of operations, organizational strength, ideology, and goals. These data were collected for the Terrorism Knowledge Base® (TKB®), managed by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) until March 2008. START has neither reviewed nor verified these data, but is presenting this information as a service to the homeland security community.

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Terrorism & Preparedness Data Resource Center (TPDRC)

Terrorism & Preparedness Data Resource Center (TPDRC)The Terrorism & Preparedness Data Resource Center (TPDRC) is housed at the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). TPDRC archives and distributes data from a variety of sources. It also organizes and streamlines access to extant research and administrative data from across the world that are relevant to the study of terrorism and the response to terrorism for descriptive and scientific analysis by academics and researchers.

TPDRC is jointly managed by researchers from the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence), Michigan State University's School of Criminal Justice, and the University of Michigan's National Archive of Criminal Justice Data.

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Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI)

Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI)The Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at the University of South Carolina has released a Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) for the United States. SoVI provides comparative data at the county level on social vulnerability to hazards and extreme events, based on the synthesis of 42 socioeconomic, demographic, and built environment variables. The county-level data have been geo-coded, facilitating comparison of vulnerability within and across states.


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