A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Al-Qa'ida Narrative

 

Al-Qa’ida

Last Update

March 2015

Aliases

al-Qa’eda; Qa’idat al-Jihad (The Base for Jihad); formerly Qa’idat Ansar Allah (The Base of the Supporters of God); the Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; the Usama Bin Laden Network; the Usama Bin Laden Organization; the Osama Bin Laden Network; the Osama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; the Jihad Group; Qa’idat al-Jihad; Qaidat a-Jihad.[1]

History

Al-Qa’ida (AQ) was founded in 1988 by Osama Bin Laden,[2] to eradicate Western influence from the Muslim world, overthrow governments of Muslim countries who do not abide by its interpretation of sharia law, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate.[3] Bin Laden moved AQ’s base of operations to Sudan in 1991, with the cooperation of the National Islamic Front.[4] The group continued to operate there until 1996, when international pressure persuaded the Sudanese government to expel Bin Laden.[5] AQ then relocated to Afghanistan, operating training camps in safe havens provided by the Afghani Taliban.[6] In 1998, AQ released a fatwa, demanding that all Muslims should make it a mission to murder Americans. Later that year, AQ carried out simultaneous suicide bombings on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.[7] In October 2000, AQ militants launched a suicide attack against the USS Cole docked at a port in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39.[8] On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked four commercial airplanes flying out of Boston and Washington, DC. Three were then flown into the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, while a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania.[9] The attacks claimed nearly 3,000 lives.[10]

On October 7, 2001, the United States, with the support of Great Britain, began Operation Enduring Freedom, a military offensive meant to strike back at AQ and end Taliban control of Afghanistan.[11] This caused most AQ members to flee to Pakistan. The organization transformed from a military hierarchy to a looser cellular structure, focused on strengthening the international jihadist network[12] by providing funding, arms, logistical support and ideological support to affiliated groups that boast stronger numbers and control territory in several countries.[13]

Osama bin Laden was killed in a U.S. Navy Seal raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011.[14] The following month, Ayman al-Zawahiri was appointed to lead AQ.[15] Zawahiri has attempted to solidify AQ's position at the ideological center of the global jihadist movement,[16] but the organization has been challenged by the growth of Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which al-Zawahiri expelled from the AQ network in 2014 due to their brutality and internal disputes.[17] AQ affiliates operate in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Algeria.[18]

Home Base

  • 1988-1991: Afghanistan[19]
  • 1991-1996: Sudan[20],[21]
  • 1996-2001: Afghanistan[22]
  • 2002-present: Pakistan[23]

Founding Year

1988

Ideology

Religious-Islamist-Salafist[24]

Specific Goals

  • To expel Western influence from the Muslim world.[25]
  • To destroy the United States, Israel, and their allies.[26]
  • To establish a global caliphate.[27]

Political Activity

None.

Financing

  • Charities/Donations: By 2004, AQ was financed primarily by donations from like-minded supporters and Islamic charities[28]
  • Drug Trafficking: As early as 1998, AQ was funding itself through the production and smuggling of drugs, especially opium.[29] There is evidence that this continued through 2010,[30] although the overall contribution to the organization may be minimal.[31]
  • Robbery, Extortion: Al-Qa’ida has also engaged in extortion and the theft and selling of miscellaneous goods.[32]
  • Other
    • In its early years, AQ relied on the vast personal fortune of Osama bin Laden.[33]
    • AQ has occasionally employed less "traditional" forms of funding (e.g., illegal sale of falcons for recreational hawking).[34]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • 1988-2001: AQ began as a hierarchical organization with a defined paramilitary leadership structure. Bin Laden was advised by a shura council of high-ranking members.[35]
  • 2002-present: AQ developed a cellular, franchise structure in response to counterterrorism efforts. Affiliate groups pledge allegiance to AQ leadership, although they tend to act primarily as independent agents.[36]
  • 1988-2011: Founder Osama bin Laden killed by U.S. Navy Seals[37]
  • 2011-present: Ayman al-Zawahiri[38]

Strength

  • 1998: several hundred to several thousand[39]
  • 2000: several hundred to several thousand[40]
  • 2002: 1,000[41]
  • 2004: 1,000[42]
  • 2012: 500-1,000[43]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Taliban
    • AQ has had a working relationship with the Taliban since at least 1996,[44] conducting attacks on each other’s enemies as acts of alliance.
    • On September 9, 2001, AQ assassinated Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud in a suicide bombing. Massoud’s death was considered a major gift to the Taliban as he was a main rival of the group.[45]
    • Between 2007 and 2010, the Taliban took care to distance itself from AQ, without straining the relationship to the point of contention.[46]
  • Currently, AQ has two distinct sets of allies: those that have formally pledged allegiance to AQ, and those that collaborate with AQ without such statements of allegiance. Groups formally aligned with AQ are typically required to pledge bayat, an Islamic oath of loyalty.[47] While these groups are formally under the command of AQ, they operate with a considerable degree of autonomy and are considered “franchises” rather than “cells.” The groups (and the year they joined the AQ network) include:
    • al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (2006)[48]
    • al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (2009)[49]
    • al-Shabaab (2012)[50]
    • al-Nusrah Front (2013)[51]
  • There are also groups once formally affiliated with AQ, but which left (or were expelled from) the network:
  • Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (2007-2009)[52]
  • Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), previously known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI)[53] (2004-2014)[54]
  • Collaborating groups not formally in the AQ network are far more extensive. In accordance with Resolution 1267, the United Nations’ al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee maintains a list of all known groups associated with AQ. These groups (and the year they were listed by the United Nations) include:[55]
  • Abdullah Azzam Brigades (2014)
  • Abu Sayyaf Group (2001)
  • Ansar al-Islam (2003)
  • Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) (2014)
  • Armed Islamic Group (2001)
  • Causcasus Emirate (2011)
  • Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (2002)
  • Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI) (2010)
  • Islamic Jihad Group (2005)
  • Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (2001)
  • Jaish-e-Mohammad (2001)
  • Jemmah Islamiya (2001)
  • Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (2005)
  • Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (2003)
  • Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (2003)
  • Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (2011)
  • Tunisian Combatant Group (2002)
  • Ummah Tammer E-Nau (2001)
  • In addition of the groups on the list above, the following have been known to collaborate with Al-Qa’ida.
    • Haqqani Network[56]
    • Boko Haram[57]
    • Hizb-i-Islami[58]
    • Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)[59]
    • Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia[60]
    • Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya (IG)[61]
    • Jama'Atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)[62]
    • Lashkar-e-Islam[63]
    • Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)[64]
    • Jundallah (suspected)[65]
    • Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) (suspected)[66]
    • Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (suspected)[67]
    • Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (Ibda-C) (suspected)[68]
    • Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) (suspected)[69]
    • Hizbul Mujahideen (suspected)[70]
    • Indian Mujahideen (suspected)[71]
  • AQ received support from the government of Iran from 1992 (when Iran agreed to provide explosives training to AQ operatives)[72] until at least 2001.[73] 

Rivals and Enemies

  • Israel (enemy)
    • An explicit AQ goal is "the destruction of Israel and its allies."[74]
  • United States (target)
    • An explicit AQ goals is "the destruction of the United States and its allies."[75]
  • The Northern Alliance (Group violence)
    • From 1996 to 2001, AQ was in armed conflict with the Northern Alliance, which had been supported by the United States.[76]
  • Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) (rival)[77],[78]
    • AQ expelled ISIS from the AQ network in February 2014 for refusing AQ mediation of a dispute between ISIS and the al-Nusrah Front, as well as indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including religious pilgrims and hospitals.[79]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • International Law Enforcement:
    • According to US intelligence, bin Laden’s role before 1996 was to finance other extremist groups.[80] In 1996, the CIA developed a dedicated unit to collect intelligence on bin Laden and his organization,[81] with the CIA and FBI working independently to monitor AQ through 1998.[82]
    • Counterterrorism efforts against AQ from 1998 to 2001 included covert intelligence gathering, diplomatic efforts, and international arrests.[83]
    • In 1999, the UN Security Council also passed Resolution 1267, placing sanctions on the Taliban and calling upon UN member states to restrict travel and freeze the assets of any individuals or organizations on the AQ Sanctions List.[84]
  • International Military:
    • After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US.. government considered itself at war with AQ.[85] Military actions in Afghanistan against AQ and the Taliban began in October 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom).[86]
    • In 2011, a team of US Navy Seals raided the compound of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, killing him in the process.[87]
    • The United States has used drones for both surveillance and attacks,[88] including the targeting AQ leader Anwar Al-Awlaki, a dual Yemeni-American citizen in September 2011.[89]

United States Government Designations

  • Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) 1999.[90]

Other Governments’ Designations

  • Australia (October 2002) Listed Terrorist Organization[91]
  • Canada (July 2002) Listed Terrorist Entity[92]
  • United Kingdom (March 2001) Proscribed Terrorist Organization[93]
  • India (no date) Banned Terrorist Organization[94]
  • Russia (July 2006) Listed Terrorist Organization[95]
  • Kazakhstan (no date) Banned Terrorist Organization[96]
  • United Nations (1999) Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Resolution 1267[97]
 

[1] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[2] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[3] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[4] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[5] Farrall, Leah. 2011. “How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength.” Foreign Affairs 90 (2): 128–38. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67467/leah-farrall/how-al-qaeda-works.

[6] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[7] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[8] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[9] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[10] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[11] Katzman, Kenneth. 2015. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy. CRS Report for Congress RL30588. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf.

[12] Brown, Vahid. 2007. Cracks in the Foundation Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. http://ctc.usma.edu.

[13] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[14] Brown, Adrian. 2012. “Osama Bin Laden’s Death: How It Happened.” BBC News. September 10. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13257330.

[15] Sheridan, Mary Beth. 2011. “Zawahiri Named New Al-Qaeda Leader.” The Washington Post, June 16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/al-zawahiri-named-new-al-qaeda-leader/2011/06/16/AGNk87WH_story.html.

[16] Jones, Seth G. 2014. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa-Ida and Other Salafi Jihadists. Product Page. RAND National Defense Research Institute. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html.

[17] Jones, Seth G. 2014. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa-Ida and Other Salafi Jihadists. Product Page. RAND National Defense Research Institute. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html.

[18] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[19] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[20] Farrall, Leah. 2011. “How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength.” Foreign Affairs 90 (2): 128–38. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67467/leah-farrall/how-al-qaeda-works.

[21] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[22] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[23]Nelson, Rick, and Thomas M Sanderson. 2011. A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011. Washington, DC: CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program and CSIS Transnational Threats Project. https://csis.org/publication/threat-transformed.

[24] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[25] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[26] Hobbs, Joseph J. 2005. “The Geographical Dimensions of Al-Qa’ida Rhetoric.” The Geographical Review 95 (3): 301–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034241.

[27] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[28] Gandel, Stephen. 2011. “Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt Al-Qaeda?” Time, May 2. http://business.time.com/2011/05/02/will-Osamas-death-bankrupt-al-qaeda/.

[29] Burke, Jason. 1998. “Bin Laden’s Opium War: The US Rained Missiles on the World’s Top Terrorist. Now He’s Using Drugs to Fund His Campaigns.” The Observer, November 29. via LexisNexis.

[30] Bronstein, Hugh. 2010. “Colombia Rebels, Al Qaeda in Unholy Drug Alliance.” News service. Reuters. January 4. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/04/us-drugs-colombia-qaeda-interview-idUKTRE6034L920100104; Vardi, Nathan. 2009. “Al-Qaeda’s New Business Model: Cocaine And Human Trafficking.” Forbes. December 18. http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/18/al-qaeda-cocaine-business-beltway-al-qaeda.html.

[31] Gandel, Stephen. 2011. “Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt Al-Qaeda?” Time, May 2. http://business.time.com/2011/05/02/will-Osamas-death-bankrupt-al-qaeda/.

[32] Gandel, Stephen. 2011. “Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt Al-Qaeda?” Time, May 2. http://business.time.com/2011/05/02/will-Osamas-death-bankrupt-al-qaeda/.

[33] Gandel, Stephen. 2011. “Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt Al-Qaeda?” Time, May 2. http://business.time.com/2011/05/02/will-Osamas-death-bankrupt-al-qaeda/.

[34] Shipman, Tim, and Gordon Thomas. 2004. “Bin Laden Tape May Hold Coded Order For Next Attack.” Sunday Express, April 18, sec. News. via LexisNexis.

[35] Brown, Vahid. 2007. Cracks in the Foundation Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. http://ctc.usma.edu.

[36] Farrall, Leah. 2011. “How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength.” Foreign Affairs 90 (2): 128–38. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67467/leah-farrall/how-al-qaeda-works.

[37] Brown, Adrian. 2012. “Osama Bin Laden’s Death: How It Happened.” BBC News. September 10. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13257330.

[38] Sheridan, Mary Beth. 2011. “Zawahiri Named New Al-Qaeda Leader.” The Washington Post, June 16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/al-zawahiri-named-new-al-qaeda-leader/2011/06/16/AGNk87WH_story.html.

[39] US Department of State. 1999. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998. US Department of State. http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1998pogt.pdf.

[40] US Department of State. 2001. Country Reports on Terrorism 2000. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2000/.

[41] “Selected Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 102 (2002): 224-231, doi: 10.1093/milbal/102.1.224

[42] “Selected Non-State Armed Groups,” Military Balance 104 (2004): 362-377, doi: 10.1080/725292356

[43] The Military Balance. 2012. “Chapter Eleven: Non-State Groups and Affiliates.” In The Military Balance 2012, 112 (1):477–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2012.663221.

[44] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.The 9/11 Commission Report.

[45] Joscelyn, Thomas. 2014. “Taliban Commander Exchanged for Bergdahl Coordinated with Al Qaeda to Attack Northern Alliance the Day before 9/11.” The Long War Journal. June 13. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/taliban_commander_ex.php.Joscelyn, Thomas. "Taliban Commander Exchanged for Bergdahl Coordinated with Al Qaeda to Attack Northern Alliance the Day before 9/11." Long War Journal. June 13, 2014. Accessed October 9, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/taliban_commander_ex.php.

[46] Strick van Linschoten, Alex, and Felix Kuehn. 2011. Separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan: The Core of Success in Afghanistan. New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation. http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf.

[47] Kirdar, MJ. 2011. Al Qaeda in Iraq. Washington, DC: CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program and CSIS Transnational Threats Project. https://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf.

[48] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[49] Rollins, John. 2011. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for US Policy. R41070. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.

[50] CNN. 2012. “Al-Shabaab Joining Al Qaeda, Monitor Group Says.” Online News. CNN News. February 10. http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/index.html.

[51] BBC. 2013. “Syria Crisis: Al-Nusra Pledges Allegiance to Al-Qaeda.” BBC News. April 10. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22095099; Jones, Seth G. 2014. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa-Ida and Other Salafi Jihadists. Product Page. RAND National Defense Research Institute. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html.

[52] Blair, David. 2009. “Extremist Group Announces Split from Al-Qaeda.” The Telegraph, July 9. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/5788302/Extremist-group-announces-split-from-al-Qaeda.html.

[53] National Counterterrorism Center. 2014. “Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI).” Terrorist Groups. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqi.html.

[54] Sly, Liz. 2014. “Al-Qaeda Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq.” The Washington Post, February 3. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.

[55] UN Security Council. 2015. “The List Established and Maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with Respect to Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Other Entities Associated with Al-Qaida.” February 19. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/AQList.htm.

[56] Fantz, Ashley. 2012. “The Haqqani Network, a Family and a Terror Group.” CNN News. September 7. http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/07/world/who-is-haqqani/index.html.

[57] Jones, Seth G. Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa'ida since 9/11. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2012; Abonyi, Ike. "UN House Bombing - SSS Confirms Al Qaeda Link, Declares Suspect Wanted." This Day. August 31, 2011.

[58] Nick Hordern, "Amnesty for an Afghan warrior," Australian Financial Review, July 22, 2005; Arthur Kent, "Canada must share blame for Bhutto assassination," The Calgary Herald, January 1, 2008; "British soldier, 10 Taliban killed in violence," The Bismarck Tribune, August 28, 2006.

[59] Yoshinari Kurose, "N. Korea sold arms to Moro extremists," The Daily Yomiuri, January 4, 2005; James Hookway, "Philippine Group may be Another Terror Threat for us," Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2002; Caroline Glick, "Stop navel gazing," The Jerusalem Post, May 14, 2004.

[60] Hugh Bronstein, "Colombia rebels, al Qaeda in 'unholy' drug alliance," Reuters News, January 4, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/04/us-drugs-colombia-qaeda-interview-idUKTRE6034L920100104

[61] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.The 9/11 Commission Report

[62] "Bangladesh judge, law officers receive death threats." BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political, December 3, 2009; Riaz, Ali. "Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh." Routledge, 2010; "'How fake currency is pushed into India'." Daily the Pak Banker, February 9, 2011.

[63] Starkey, Jerome, Julius Cavendish, Bamako and Cindy Wockner. "Al-Qaeda groups turn to African as global jihad dies." The Times (London) April 27, 2012.

[64] Declan Walsh, "International: 42 Pakistani soldiers killed in revenge attack on camp: Second suspect arrested after suicide bombing: Explosion follows army raid on radical madrasa," The Guardian, November 9, 2006.

[65] "Pakistan security agencies say Al-Qa'idah, Taleban militants present in Karachi" BBC Worldwide Monitoring. November 6, 2013; Hardy, Roger. "Profile: Iran's Jundullah militants." BBC News. June 20, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8314431.stm; Pennington, Matthew. "Pakistan announces arrest of five from al-Qa'ida; Govt. offers no details on names or roles." The Herald-Sun (Durham, NC). August 13, 2004.

[66] Nelson, Dean. "Street children are unseen victims of Mumbai terror." The Sunday Times. July 16, 2006; Rahul Bedi, "India accuses Pakistan over bombings." The Irish Times, August 27, 2003; Dunn, Mark. "Pakistan rift widens." The Courier Mail, November 29, 2008.

[67] Titeca, K., Vlassenroot, K. (2012) "Rebels without borders in the Rwenzori borderland? A biography of the Allied Democratic Forces" Journal of Eastern African Studies. 6(1): 154-176; “Uganda foiled al-Qa'ida plot to kill Queen with bombs,” The West Australian. January 14, 2008; Turyakira, Fred. "Business Community Warned of Terror Threat in Mbarara." New Vision. June 28, 2012; "Terror in Kampala," The Independent, July 18, 2010. http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/cover-story/cover-story/82-cover-story/3198-terror-in-kampala-

[68] Craig Smith, "Turkey Expects to Identify Synagogue Bombers Soon," The New York Times, November 18, 2003; "Al-Qaida cell raid as Pope toured," Sunday Mail, December 10, 2006; David O’Byrne "'Al-Qaeda links' to Istanbul attack," BBC News, July 9, 2008

[69] "Al-Qaeda affiliate blamed," News 24, October 7, 2003.

[70] "Osama Dead: Hizbul Mujahideen Owns Osama bin Laden Mansion in Abbottabad," The Economic Times (New Delhi), May 5, 2011; Bala Chanuhan, "Indian intelligence officials suspect Pakistan-based groups of Mumbai attacks," BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 28, 2008.

[71] "Enter, Osama in 13/7 plot." The Telegraph. February 7, 2012; "Security stepped up at US embassy, consulates." The Times of India. May 3, 2011.

[72] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.The 9/11 Commission Report

[73] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[74] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[75] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[76] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.Ibid.

[77] National Counterterrorism Center. 2014. “Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI).” Terrorist Groups. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqi.html.

[78] Sly, Liz. 2014. “Al-Qaeda Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq.” The Washington Post, February 3. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.

[79] US Department of State. 2014. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, DC: US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[80] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[81] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[82] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[83] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[84]UN Security Council. 1999. “Resolution 1267 (1999).” United Nations. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1267(1999).

[85] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2011. National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Washington, DC. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.

[86] MOFA, Japan. 2002. Diplomatic Bluebook 2002. Tokyo, JPN: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/index.html.

[87] CNN. 2014. “Operation Enduring Freedom Fast Facts.” Online News. CNN News. December 31. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/index.html.

[88] 9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). Washington, DC. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/.

[89] Al Jazeera English. 2014. “US Court Dismisses Yemen Drone Strike Lawsuit.” Online Newspaper. April 5. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/04/us-court-dismisses-yemen-drone-strike-lawsuit-2014450048238609.html.

[90] US Department of State. 2009. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Other Release. Bureau of Counterterrorism. May 8. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

[91] Attorney-General, Australia. 2013. “Listed Terrorist Organisations.” Australian National Security. September 13. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx.  

[92] Public Safety Canada. 2014. “Currently Listed Entities.” Listed Terrorist Entities. March 4. http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx.

[93] UK Home Office. 2013. Proscribed Terror Groups or Organisations. London: UK Home Office. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2.

[94] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India. 2014. “Banned Organisations.” January 27. http://mha.nic.in/BO.  

[95] BBC. 2006. “Russia Names ‘Terrorist’ Groups.” Online Newspaper. BBC News. July 28. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5223458.stm.

[96] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kazakhstan. 2015. “Fight against Terrorism and Extremism in Kazakhstan.” Republic of Kazakhstan. Accessed March 23. http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/en/foreign-policy/current-issues-of-kazakhstan-s-foreign-policy/counteraction-to-new-challenges/fight-against-terrorism-and-extremism-in-kazakhstan.

[97] UN Security Council. 2007. “General Information on the Work of the Committee.” Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities. January 31. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/information.shtml.