A Department of Homeland Security Emeritus Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland

Taliban Narrative

 

Taliban

Last Update

July 2015

Aliases

None.

History

The Taliban (“students” in Pashto) formed in 1994, amidst the Afghan civil war which broke out following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989.[1] Its members were mainly Pashtun Afghans educated in madrasas (Islamic religious schools) throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan with a Deobandi interpretation of Sunni Islam.[2]  Taliban ideology purports a strict adherence to sharia law with strict punishments, including amputations and public executions for those who refuse to comply.[3] The group first gained international notoriety after taking control of Kandahar in 1994.[4] Two years later, they gained control of Kabul; assassinated the former president, Mohammad Najibullah; and effectively took control of the country.[5]  The Taliban established a new government, declaring it the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and brought widespread order through the implementation of sharia law.[6]

While the international community supported the newfound peace, the Taliban was criticized for its extreme interpretation of sharia law.[7] In 1996, when Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, the Taliban gave him and his followers sanctuary under the condition that his group did not perpetrate attacks against the United States.[8] Bin Laden later broke this agreement when al-Qa’ida orchestrated the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.[9] These acts of violence led the United Nations to enact sanctions against the Taliban in 1999, demanding the surrender of Osama bin Laden, which the Taliban refused.[10] In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the United States led an international invasion in Afghanistan to apprehend bin Laden and drive out the Taliban.[11] Some Taliban members rejoined society while the majority of the leadership, including top leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, fled across the border to Pakistan.[12]

The remnants of the Taliban formed the Quetta Shura, a governing council subordinate to Mohammed Omar, to oversee and plan future operations.[13] The Pakistani government made an attempt to negotiate with tribal leaders in 2004 to eradicate the Taliban, offering monetary compensation if they would give up the Taliban hiding in their territories, but the negotiations proved futile.[14] The notable increase in Taliban activity, especially suicide attacks, in 2005 elevated violence to levels not seen since the initial invasion in 2001.[15] Since then, the group has remained active throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan, carrying out operations against Afghan and coalition forces through armed attacks and bombings.

Home Base

Afghanistan

Founding Year

1994

Ideology

Religious-Islamic-Sunni-Deobandi[16]

Specific Goals

  • Eradicate the foreign military presence in Afghanistan.[17]
  • Return to reestablish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under a strict Deobandi interpretation of sharia law.[18]

Political Activity

  • In July 2013, the Taliban opened an office in Doha, Qatar, to facilitate negotiations for a political resolution to the war in Afghanistan with the United States.[19] 
  • They closed the office a month later after the government of Afghanistan protested the use of the Taliban flag and the title “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” seeing both of these moves as an attempt to present themselves as a government-in-exile.[20] 

Financing

  • Smuggling/Trafficking: The majority of their funding comes from trafficking opium, a drug found in abundance throughout Afghanistan.[21]
  • Extortion: The Taliban also collect taxes from the areas they control.[22]
  • Funded by other violent group:  Al-Qa’ida has provided them with some measure of financing, as well as personnel, technology, and training.[23]
  • State Sponsorship: Between 2006 and 2012, the Iranian government sporadically provided training and weapons for Taliban members.[24]

Leadership and Structure over Time

  • The Taliban is based on a hierarchical system but the local commanders enjoy a substantial amount of autonomy in their operations. [25]  
  • The Quetta Shura, a group of officials overseeing different aspects of operations, is positioned below Mullah Mohammad Omar, the supreme leader. [26]
  • 1994-2013: Mullah Mohammad Omar. [27]
  • 2013-Present: Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, originally Taliban second-in-command, leader of the Quetta Shura,[28] named as Omar’s successor.[29]

Strength

  • 2003: 7,000[30]
  • 2005: 7,000-12,500[31]
  • 2006: 6,000-17,000[32]
  • 2009: 25,000[33]
  • 2010: 25,000-36,000[34]
  • 2011: 25,000-36,000[35]
  • 2012: 30,000[36]

Allies and Suspected Allies

  • Haqqani Network (ally)
    • Jalaluddin Haqqani joined with the Taliban in 1995 during the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan.[37] He would later break away and form the Haqqani Network, a group still closely affiliated with al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.[38]
  • Al-Qaida (ally)
    • The Taliban has maintained a relationship with al-Qa’ida since providing sanctuary for Osama bin Laden and his insurgents in 1996.[39]
  • Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (ally)
    • From 1998 to 2002, IMU was strongly tied to the Taliban for logistical and fiscal support.[40] IMU has continued its strong ties with northern Afghanistan Taliban shadow governments and leaders in the Quetta Shura.[41]
  • Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (ally)[42]
  • Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (ally)  
    • TNSM mobilized fighters for the Taliban after it took power in Afghanistan,[43] and again after the 2002 U.S. invasion.[44] TNSM was still allied with the Taliban in late 2007, when it effectively controlled the entire Swat.[45]
  • Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ally):
    • Abdul Haq (ETIM leader 2003-2010) was killed in a 2010 drone strike while traveling in a Taliban vehicle.[46] The UN Security Council has said that ETIM has "maintained close ties with the Taliban."[47]
  •  Lashkar-I-Jhangvi (ally)
    • The Taliban has provided sanctuary and training camps to LeJ in Afghanistan.[48]
  • Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (suspected ally)
    • TTP and the Afghan Taliban share an enmity towards coalition forces in Afghanistan, although there have been reported disagreements over TTP tactics, and how they have impacted the Taliban in Afghanistan.[49]
  • Harakatul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) (ally)
    • The Taliban’s alliance with HuJI goes back to 1980s when the fighters that subsequently founded both groups fought together against the Soviet Union. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, HuJI has supported the Taliban’s insurgency against the U.S. led coalition forces.[50]
  • Jaish-e-Mohammad (Jem) (ally)
    • The Taliban assisted with the original formation of Jem in 2000 and the groups have been considered allies ever since.[51]
  • Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
    • LeT supports the military efforts of the Taliban, and the two groups collaborate on a range of activities including recruiting, training, logistics and financing.[52]
  • Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) (suspected ally)
    • The Islamic Jihad Group is listed on the United Nations Al-Qa’ida Sanction’s list as an affiliate of the Taliban.[53] IJG fought against coalition forces in Afghanistan; however the full extent of their collaboration with the Taliban is not clear.[54]
  • Jundallah (suspected ally)
    • The Iranian government has claimed that Jundallah and the Taliban are linked; however these claims have not been substantiated further.[55]

Rivals and Enemies

  • Afghanistan Government (enemy, target): The Taliban routinely targets the government of Afghanistan.[56]
  • ISAF (enemy, target): The Taliban also targets coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.[57]
  • Northern Alliance (UIFSA) (enemy, target): The Northern Alliance fought against the Taliban for control of Afghanistan after they gained power in 1996.[58]

Counterterrorism Efforts

  • Domestic Military:
    • Afghan forces have used military tactics to stamp out the Taliban insurgency.[59]
  • International Military:
    • Coalition forces have used military tactics to stamp out the Taliban insurgency.[60]
    • Progress in eliminating Taliban strongholds in northwestern Pakistan has been hindered by the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani government to deal with the issue.
      • Some critics accuse the Pakistani government of supporting the Taliban in order to counter Indian power in Afghanistan, allegations which are denied by the Pakistani government.[61]
  • International Political:
    • The recent negotiations for the exchange of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in return for five top Taliban leaders is evidence of a more political approach to dealing with the Taliban.[62]

United States Government Designations

  • Specially Designated Global Terrorist, July 3, 2002.[63]

Other Governments’ Designations

  • Canada (May 2013): Listed Terrorist Entity
  • Russia (February 12003): International Terrorist Organization.[64]
 

[1] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551; Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136; BBC, “Who Are the Taliban?,” Online News, BBC News, (November 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11451718.

[2] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136; Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551; NCTC, “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015” (National Counterterrorism Center, August 15, 2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[3] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136.

[4] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551; Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136.

[5] “Afghanistan Unveiled,” Timeline, Independent Lens, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/afghanistanunveiled/timeline.html;John Daves, “Afghanistan: The Other War - Who Are the Taliban?,” TV synopsis, PBS Frontline, (April 10, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/who.html; Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[6] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551; John Daves, “Afghanistan: The Other War - Who Are the Taliban?,” TV synopsis, PBS Frontline, (April 10, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/who.html.

[7] NCTC, “Counterterrorism Calendar 2015” (National Counterterrorism Center, August 15, 2014), http://www.nctc.gov/site/pdfs/ct_calendar_2015.pdf.

[8] Al Jazeera, “Timeline: Taliban in Afghanistan,” Online News, AlJazeera, (July 4, 2009), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html;Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136; Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[9] John Daves, “Afghanistan: The Other War - Who Are the Taliban?,” TV synopsis, PBS Frontline, (April 10, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/who.html.

[10] John Daves, “Afghanistan: The Other War - Who Are the Taliban?,” TV synopsis, PBS Frontline, (April 10, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/who.html.

[11] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551; BBC, “Who Are the Taliban?,” Online News, BBC News, (November 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11451718.

[12] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136; “Taliban: Political and Religious Faction, Afghanistan,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Taliban;Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[13] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[14] “Return of the Taliban,” TV synopsis, Frontline, (October 3, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/etc/synopsis.html.

[15] Al Jazeera, “Timeline: Taliban in Afghanistan,” Online News, AlJazeera, (July 4, 2009), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html;“Afghanistan Unveiled,” Timeline, Independent Lens, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/afghanistanunveiled/timeline.html.

[16] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[17] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[18] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[19] Associated Press, “Taliban Close Qatar Office in Protest at Flag Removal,” July 9, 2013, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10169161/Taliban-close-Qatar-office-in-protest-at-flag-removal.html.

[20] Associated Press, “Taliban Close Qatar Office in Protest at Flag Removal,” July 9, 2013, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10169161/Taliban-close-Qatar-office-in-protest-at-flag-removal.html.

[21] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[22] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[23] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136.

[24] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf.

[25] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136; Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[26] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136; Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[27] Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Taliban Officially Announce Death of Mullah Omar,” The Guardian, July 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/30/taliban-officially-announces-death-of-mullah-omar.

[28] Matthew Rosenberg, “Around an Invisible Leader, Taliban Power Shifts,” The New York Times, December 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/world/around-an-invisible-leader-taliban-power-shifts.html; Abubakar Siddique, “The Quetta Shura: Understanding the Afghan Taliban’s Leadership,” TerrorismMonitor, February 21, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42006&cHash=7af7678306a23ff6734f35e261b15b90.

[29] Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Taliban Officially Announce Death of Mullah Omar,” The Guardian, July 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/30/taliban-officially-announces-death-of-mullah-omar.

[30] Shehzad H Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency, and the American Endgame in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2011), http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

[31] Al Jazeera, “US: Taliban Has Grown Fourfold,” AlJazeera, October 9, 2009, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html; Shehzad H Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency, and the American Endgame in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2011), http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

[32] Shehzad H Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency, and the American Endgame in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2011), http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

[33] Al Jazeera, “US: Taliban Has Grown Fourfold,” AlJazeera, October 9, 2009, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html.

[34] Shehzad H Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency, and the American Endgame in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2011), http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

[35] Shehzad H Qazi, “The Neo-Taliban, Counterinsurgency, and the American Endgame in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2011), http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/586_ISPU%20Report_Neo%20Taliban_Qazi_WEB.pdf.

[36] IISS, “Chapter Eleven: Non-State Groups and Affiliates,” in The Military Balance 2012, vol. 112 (1) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 477–84, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2012.663221.

[37] “Haqqani Network: Pashtun Militant Organization,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Haqqani-network.

[38] Frontline, “Jalaluddin Haqqani,” TV synopsis, PBS, (October 3, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/haqqani.html.

[39] CFR, “Profile: Osama Bin Laden,” Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, (September 1, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-osama-bin-laden/p9951.

[40] Sanderson, Thomas M, Daniel Kimmage, and David A Gordon. 2010. From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf.

[41] Fitz, Duncan, Thomas M Sanderson, and Sung In Marshall. 2014. Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf.

[42] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs, June 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485136.

[43] Stephen Tankel, Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan (Peaceworks, 2013), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW89-Domestic%20Barriers%20to%20Dismantling%20the%20Militant%20Infrastructure%20in%20Pakistan.pdf.

[44] Navid Iqbal Khan, “Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I-Shariat-I-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of ‘State Inversion,’” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 31, no. 1 (2010): 130–58, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/6.%20Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-%20Muhammadi,%20Navid%20iqbal.pdf.

[45] Alok Bansal, “Talibanisation of Pakistan,” Scholar Warrior 2, no. 2 (2011): 66–73, http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/397326186_AlokBansal.pdf.

[46] Zenn, Jacob. 2014. “Turkistan Islamic Party Increases Its Media Profile.” Biweekly Briefing on Current Affairs. The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. February 5. http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12909-turkistan-islamic-party-increases-its-media-profile.html.

[47] UN Security Council. 2007. “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QDe.088 Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement.” Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities. January 31. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQDe088E.shtml.

[48] Farooqi, Asif. 2013. “Profile: Lashkar-E-Jhangvi.” Online News. BBC News. January 11. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20982987.

[49] Jayshree Bajoria and Jonathan Masters, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/Pakistan’sNewGenerationOfTerrorists.pdf.

[50]  Mariam Mufti, “Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Literature Review,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/120628_Mufti_ReligionMilitancy_Web.pdf

[51] Australian National Security, Terrorist Organizations, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Updated March 3, 2015. http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Jaish-e-Mohammed.aspx; Jane Perlex, "Militants are entrenched, Pakistan says; Statement by minister highlights shortcomings of government in fight." The International Herald Tribune, June 4, 2010.

[52] Ashley Tellis,"Policy Outlook: The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf

[53] United Nations, Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing, QDe.119 Islamic Jihad Group, Updated February 3, 2015. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQDe119E.shtml

[54] Duncan Fitz and Thomas Sanderson, “Central Asian Militancy: A primary Source Examination,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf

[55] "Sunnis claim attack on mosque; Double suicide bombing that killed 26 is revenge for leader's hanging, Iranian separatists say," Toronto Star, July 17, 2010; "Iran Says US, Pak Behind Terror Attack," Kashmir Observer, October 20, 2009.

[56]  US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[57]  US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.

[58] Fiona Symon, “Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance,” BBC News, September 19, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1552994.stm; Jason Burke, "Taliban army seals fate of siege city," The Independent (London), August 10, 1998; Richard Galpin, "Foes of the Taliban hit back at Kabul," The Guardian (London), July 30, 1999.

[59] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[60] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[61] Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

[62] BBC, “US Defence Chief Chuck Hagel Defends Bowe Bergdahl Swap,” Online News, BBC News, (June 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-27800092.

[63] US Department of the Treasury, “Recent OFAC Actions,” Press Releases, Resource Center, (July 3, 2002), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20020703.aspx.

[64] “Single Federal List of Organizations Recognized as Terrorist by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation,” National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC), accessed April 22, 2014, http://nac.gov.ru/document/832/edinyi-federalnyi-spisok-organizatsii-priznannykh-terroristicheskimi-verkhovnym-sudom-r.html.