Incident Summary:
06/17/1999: Hilario Gustavo, a resident of Caiceli, Darulete, was kidnapped and then stabbed to death in Manufatia, East Timor, Indonesia. Police suspected that the attack was perpetrated by a pro-independence group because Gustavo was a member of Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron), a pro-Indonesia militia group.
Overview
GTD ID:
199906170004
When:
1999-06-17
Country:
Indonesia
Region:
Southeast Asia
Province/administrative
region/u.s. state:
Liquica
City:
Manufatia
What
Attack Information
| Type of Attack () |
Armed Assault |
| Type of Attack () |
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) |
| Successful Attack? () |
Yes |
Target Information ()
| Target Type: Private Citizens & Property |
|---|
| Name of Entity |
Civilian |
| Specific Description |
Hilario Gustavo |
| Nationality of Target |
Indonesia |
Additional Information
| Hostages |
Yes |
| Number of Hostages |
1 |
| US Hostages |
0 |
| Days of Kidnapping |
2 |
| Outcome |
Hostage(s) killed (not during rescue attempt) |
| Ransom |
No |
| Property Damage |
No |
How
Weapon Information
| Type |
Sub-type |
| Melee |
Knife or Other Sharp Object |
Additional Information
| Suicide Attack? | No |
| Part of Multiple Incident? | No |
| Criterion 1 () |
Yes |
| Criterion 2 () |
Yes |
| Criterion 3 () |
Yes |
| Doubt Terrorism Proper () |
Yes |
| Alternate Designation () |
Insurgency/Guerilla Action |
| Additional Information |
While Gustavo's body was found two days after his abduction, it was unclear exactly when he was killed. |
Who
Perpetrator Group Information
| Group Name |
Claimed Responsibility |
| Separatists (suspected) |
No |
Perpetrator Statistics
| Number of Perpetrators |
Unknown |
| Number of Captured Perpetrators |
0 |
Casualty Information
| Total Number of Casualties |
1 Fatalities / 0 Injured |
| Total Number of Fatalities |
1 |
| Number of U.S. Fatalities |
0 |
| Number of Perpetrator Fatalities |
0 |
| Total Number of Injured |
0 |
| Number of U.S. Injured |
0 |
| Number of Perpetrators Injured |
0 |
Sources
Sources
| "East Timor Militia Member Kidnapped, Found Dead 19 June," Surabaya Jawa Pos (Internet Version), June 21, 1999. |
Criteria
Criteria 1
The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.
Criterion 2
There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.
Criterion 3
The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants.
Doubt Terrorism Proper
The existence of a "Yes" for "Doubt Terrorism Proper?" records reservation, in the eyes of GTD analysts, that the incident in question is truly terrorism. Such uncertainty, however, was not deemed to be sufficient to disqualify the incident from inclusion into the GTD. Furthermore, such a determination of doubt is subsequently coded by GTD analysts as conforming to one of four possible alternative designations: 1) Insurgency/Guerilla Action; 2) Internecine Conflict Action; 3) Mass Murder; or 4) Purely Criminal Act.
Alternate Designation
The determination of "yes" for "Doubt Terrorism Proper" by GTD analysts is coded as conforming to one of four possible alternative designations: 1) Insurgency/Guerilla Action; 2) Internecine Conflict Action; 3) Mass Murder; or 4) Purely Criminal Act.
Successful Attack
Success of a terrorist strike is defined according to the tangible effects of the attack. For example, in a typical successful bombing, the bomb detonates and destroys property and/or kills individuals, whereas an unsuccessful bombing is one in which the bomb is discovered and defused or detonates early and kills the perpetrators. Success is not judged in terms of the larger goals of the perpetrators. For example, a bomb that exploded in a building would be counted as a success even if it did not, for example, succeed in bringing the building down or inducing government repression.
Type of Attack
This field captures the general method of attack and often reflects the broad class of tactics used. It consists of the following nine categories:
- Assassination
- Armed Assault
- Unarmed Assault
- Bombing/Explosion
- Hijacking
- Hostage taking (Barricade Incident)
- Hostage taking (Kidnapping)
- Facility / Infrastructure Attack
- Unknown
Target Information
This field captures the general type of target. It consists of the following 22 categories:
- Abortion Related
- Airports & Airlines
- Business
- Government (General)
- Government (Diplomatic)
- Educational Institution
- Food or Water Supply
- Journalists & Media
- Maritime (includes Ports and Maritime facilities)
- Military
- NGO
- Other
- Police
- Private Citizens & Property
- Religious Figures/Institutions
- Telecommunication
- Terrorists
- Tourists
- Transportation (other than aviation)
- Unknown
- Utilities
- Violent Political Parties
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