This project examines the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism efforts. Looking at a data base of all the terrorist attacks by various Palestinian organizations in the period 2000-2006 and all the Israeli (offensive and conciliatory) initiatives, we employ Cox Hazard modeling to examine the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism measures. We find that Israeli CT policies have different effects on different Palestinian organizations, that massive CT measures (whether offensive or defensive) have greater impact than restricted measures, and that conciliatory political initiatives have short term temporary effects on terrorist activity.
Massive measures (construction of the defensive fence, occupation of Palestinian town by Israeli military) have a strong effect on suppressing terrorist activity, whereas short term measures (short encroachments, targeted assassinations) have, if anything, limited term effect. The impact of Israeli CT differs according to the different terrorist organization in some measure probably because of the competition between the organizations. Conciliatory political measures (summit conferences, meetings, negotiations) have a short term effect on the cessation of terrorism; the negotiations are suspended during the meeting and a period after, but are then resumed (reflecting a failure of the meeting or the summit to produce significant progress).