We examine what leads states to accommodate enduring, international rivals in response to immediate threats. Drawing from network theory, we hypothesize that the direct and indirect ties the threatened state’s rivals form with each other and with other states in the global system play a critical role in shaping crisis. A threatened state should be more likely to accommodate rivals with economic connections to other actors. These connections generate influence, through leverage or information that can lead to crisis de-escalation. A threatened state is less likely to accommodate a rival that has military alliances with other rivals because credible allies are less likely to respond to such overtures. We use network analysis and data from the post–Cold War era to support the argument, shedding light on the importance of local and global connectivity in conflict management.
Akcinaroglu, Seden and Elizabeth Radziszewski. 2017. "Web of Links: Rival Connections and Strategic Accommodation in Response to Threats." Journal of Global Security Studies 2 (July): 237-252. https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/2/3/237/4082201