In his Master of Professional Studies (MPS) degree in Security and Terrorism Studies capstone, Anthony Busani explores how states increasingly compete through proxies and gray-zone forces to project power while avoiding direct confrontation. Through case studies of Iran, Russia, and China, he shows both the advantages—deniability and reduced political risk—and the downsides, including limited control and reputational costs, arguing proxy warfare is becoming a defining feature of modern geopolitical rivalry.
Capstone Summary
This report argues that modern geopolitical competition is increasingly shaped by states using non-state actors and proxy forces to wage hybrid warfare in ways that avoid the political and military risks of direct confrontation. Rather than engaging adversaries conventionally, states can project power indirectly while maintaining plausible deniability, reducing domestic backlash, and imposing economic or military costs on rivals.
Case studies of Iran, Russia, and China demonstrate how proxy networks function as tools of statecraft. Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” including groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis, allows Tehran to pressure adversaries such as the United States and Israel without direct escalation. Russia’s use of the Wagner Group has enabled force projection abroad while minimizing reported military casualties and expanding influence in resource-rich regions. China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia uses ostensibly civilian fishing vessels to assert territorial claims and conduct gray-zone operations.
While proxy employment offers strategic flexibility and cost efficiency, it also creates tradeoffs. These include reduced control over proxy actions, reputational damage, declining deniability, and long-term sustainability risks—as seen in leadership losses among Iranian proxies and internal instability within Wagner.
Taken together, these cases illustrate that proxy warfare is not simply an opportunistic tactic but an enduring feature of great-power competition that reshapes how influence is exercised below the threshold of open conflict. States are increasingly willing to accept reputational and diplomatic costs in exchange for the asymmetric advantages proxies provide, suggesting that future conflicts will be defined less by direct military engagements and more by deniable, indirect contests for power carried out through legally ambiguous actors operating in contested political and physical spaces.